Hypnosis and higher order thoughts

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Hypnosis and higher order thoughts Zoltán
Dienes University of Sussex Josef
Perner University of Salzburg
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1. Higher order thought theory and conscious
   awareness
2. Types of control
3. Cold control theory of hypnosis

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Higher order thought theory of Rosenthal a
mental state is conscious if we are conscious of
being in that mental state we are conscious of
being in a mental state when we have a thought
that we are in that mental state in sum, a
mental state is a conscious mental state in
virtue of the person having a higher order
thought that they are in that mental state.  
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A second order thought (e.g. I see that the cat
is black) makes one aware of the first order
thought (the cat is black) and hence makes the
first order thought a conscious thought. The
second order thought itself is not a conscious
thought until one becomes conscious of it by a
third order thought (e.g. I know that I am
seeing that the cat is black). It is the third
order thought that makes one consciously aware
(introspectively aware) that it is me seeing.
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Similarly for intentions First order mental
state Lift the arm! This is unconscious unless
you are aware of having that intention by a
second order thought I intend to lift my
arm This second order thought is itself
unconscious, unless you are aware of it I think
I am intending to lift my arm This third order
thought renders one introspectively aware of
intending to lift ones arm.
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Norman Shallice (1986) Supervisory Attentional
System (SAS) (attention demanding, conscious
control)
contention scheduling selects according to level
of activation, which is determined by trigger
conditions of the schema and lateral
inhibition/excitation between schemata.
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SAS can bias activation values and is needed
for 1) planning or decision making 2)
Troubleshooting 3) learning new actions 4)
technically difficult actions 5) overcoming
strong pre-existing response
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Imperative representations action schema
When A is active, A is to be immediately
performed When C is active, C is to be
taken as true
Intention in the SAS e.g. If C, then do
A Active representation of C but C is not
necessarily to be taken as true Active
representation of A but A is not necessarily to
be immediately performed
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The higher control system (SAS) (a) can trigger
the lower system (b) and monitor its successful
performance Either or both of the above can lead
to the representation "I am intending this
action". Sense of agency and intention comes
from the higher order thought I am intending
this action and also the third order thought I
know that I am intending to perform this action
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Hierarchy of voluntary action -
Non-intentional the lower system produces an
action not set by the higher system. -Intentional
higher system sets up the lower system when
appropriate conditions are met, the schema
executes the appropriate action.  -
absent-minded intentional action lower system
runs unmonitored, producing actions appropriate
to plan. - fully executive-controlled
intentional action Higher system triggers and
continuously monitors execution of action schema,
over-riding when necessary.
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fully executive-controlled intentional
action -without HOT unconscious performance of
executive function tasks??   -fully voluntary
action, i.e. performed with HOT ("I intend to
perform this action") (and typically with 3rd
order thought, making you aware of your intention
"I know I am intending to perform this action").
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Cold control theory of hypnosis Successful
response to hypnotic suggestions can be achieved
by forming an intention (imperative
representation in the SAS) to perform the action
or cognitive activity required, without forming
the higher order thoughts about intending that
action that would normally accompany the
reflective performance of the action.
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Can hypnotic suggestions involve executive
function tasks? a) Suggestion to forget the
number "four" "1,2,3,5,6,.." - must be content
control, but person claims ignorance of doing
anything strange gt no second order thought. b)
Spanos, Radtke, and Dubreuil (1982) highs
suggested to forget certain words in any type of
task given to them produced those words at a
below baseline level in a word association test.
Executive control because existing associations
must be suppressed. c) Amazingly Raz et al
(2002, 2003) Highs can eliminate the Stroop
effect when it is suggested the words are
meaningless (can occur in or out of hypnosis)
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In general, virtually any arbitrary behaviour can
be hypnotically suggested despite the fact that
such behaviour might be novel to the person, and
many hypnotic suggestions require the person
ignore some salient aspect of the situation (e.g.
amnesia or analgesia suggestion) gt many
hypnotic responses are under executive control.
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Often intentions, at least those maintained over
several minutes, trigger HOTs of
intending. Consider Wegners white bear
task Do not think of the concept of a white
bear for 2 minutes!
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White bear task Form intention Do not produce
representations of white bears! If intentions
tend to trigger HOTs, one has I am intending
not to produce representations of white
bears! Making the concept of white bears part of
a conscious mental state. To not think about the
concept of white bears consciously, one needs to
be able to avoid second order thoughts.
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Maybe highs are good at avoiding accurate HOTs
about intentions? Bowers and Woody (1996)
(after hypnosis) highs could NOT think of their
favourite car for 2 minutes more effectively than
lows
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How is the normal triggering of HOTs prevented?
  According to HOT theory, HOTS are just
thoughts and so their occurrence will be
sensitive to the same influences as other
thoughts (Rosenthal, 2001). That is, consistent
with the socio-cognitive approach, a HOT about
intention might not occur because of Beliefs
and expectations the expectation that the act
will occur involuntarily prevents HOTS of
intending from occurring.
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Speculation dissociation between HOTs and first
order states is brought about by
expectations. Consistently Kirsch (1985, 1991)
Hypnotic experiences are the outcome of
expectations .   Or is there some other
mechanism by which or state in which HOTs are
avoided? Are there individual differences in the
mechanism/extent to which expectations can
determine HOTs independently of first order
content?  
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• Evidence
• General responsiveness of hypnotic subjects to
  demand characteristics
• 2) For suggestions given with no induction,
  correlation between expectation of response and
  response 0.53 (Braffman Kirsch, 1999)
• 3) Post-induction, expectation of number of
  suggestions that will be experienced correlates
  highly with number of hypnotic suggestions
  experienced, r .64 (Council et al, 1986).
• 4) Subjects pass more suggestions after an
  induction rather than without an induction only
  to the extent that they expect to (Braffman
  Kirsch, 1999).

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Problem with expectation being sole
explanation We can 100 expect to see our keys
where we left them, but in clear viewing
conditions that does not mean we see them there
if they are not there. Solution expectations
need only affect higher order thoughts of
intending and not first order states. Will only
see keys if have the intention to imagine them,
and that intention will only happen if it fits in
with other intentions, plans and strategies. gt
Hypnotic hallucinations etc will in general be
contextually appropriate
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• Order of difficulty of hypnotic suggestions
• Simple motor suggestions (80 of people pass)
• Challenge suggestions (50)
• Cognitive suggestions (20)
• Cold control theory provides two types of
  explanation

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Third order HOTs (TOTs I know I am intending to
do X) occur more rarely than second order HOTs
(SOTs I am intending to do X). Assume It is
easier to avoid accurate TOTs (and form
inaccurate TOTs, like I think I am not intending
to do X) than to avoid accurate SOTS (and form
inaccurate SOTs like I am not intending to do
X)
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Mediums can only avoid accurate TOTs (not
accurate SOTs). So on forget four task They
form SOT I am intending to not say four Making
them consciously think about four. An
inaccurate TOT (I think I am not intending to
avoid saying four) also makes them think of
four. So lows/,mediums could not do cognitive
tasks like the forget four task. But could do
other tasks e.g. arm levitation (would not be
introspectively aware of intending the arm to
rise, so would appear involuntary.) gt Cognitive
suggestions harder than motor suggestions
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Highly hypnotizable subjects can avoid SOTs so
can do forget 4 task. They can intend to avoid
4, but have no awareness of that intention. They
can also intend to carry out motor suggestions,
but not consciously think about those actions at
all. (They do not have to be consciously absorbed
in thinking about the activity.)
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• Harder to suppress HOTs of intending for tasks
  which involve most effort in performing.
• Contrast effort in involved in
• Lifting arm (simple motor suggestion)
• Trying to lift arm and failing (challenge
  suggestion)
• Motor suggestions easier than challenge
  suggestions
• (Future research should gather measures of effort
  involved in unsuggested task performance and
  correlate with non-volition ratings after
  suggestion.)

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• Individual differences in hypnotisability.
• Main skill is dissociating HOTs of intending from
  intentions Highs should be able to produce
  nonvolitional actions in many contexts.
• Best correlate of hypnotisability is waking
  suggestiblity (NB not social conformity) r .84.

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2) Being good at executive control is a likely
correlate of hypnotisability, because one can
allow oneself to prevent relevant HOTs if one is
good at executive control without
HOTs. Prediction On average, highs should be
better than lows at executive control. Is this
true? YES on a range of different type of
cognitive tasks
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• Graham Evans (1977) Highs better than lows at
  random number generation
• Naish (1983) Highs can bias perceptual schemata
  more strongly than lows.
• 3) Dienes (1987) When hearing simultaneous lists
  of words, highs can perform difficult selections
  to a greater degree than lows.
• 4) Dixon Laurence (1992) Highs have greater
  strategic control over reversing the Stroop
  effect than lows.

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• Cold control theory gives us a handle on
• How hypnotic responses can be executive tasks
• How expectations seem to have much larger
  effects in hypnotic rather than typical
  non-hypnotic contexts
• Order of difficulty of hypnotic suggestions
• Individual differences in hypnotisability

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Prediction of cold control theory Interfering
with executive ability should degrade hypnotic
performance Contrast Dissociated control theory
of Bowers and Woody (1994) Hypnosis is a
functional prefrontal lobotomy What is the
effect of frontal rTMS (repetitive trasncranial
magnetic stimulation) on measured
hypnotisability? Cold control It will decrease
Hability Dissociated control It will increase
Hability Experiment being planned!
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• Why does hypnotic behaviour exist?
• It is prevalent cross-culturally
• Largely associated with religious rituals and
  spirit possession/divine influence
• If you performed actions, saw images etc that you
  didnt produce gt spirit must have caused them
• Evolved to support religious beliefs?
• Note the need for self deception you must cause
  a behaviour/cognition but not know that you did
  so, so that it can be attributed to
  divine/spiritual intervention

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2) Sociological functions You can perform
behaviours for which you are not
responsible Lewis (1971, 2003) Spirit possession
serves important functions in the possessed. E.g.
Socially marginalised people can acquire the
gifts necessary for the spirit to be exorcised
(e.g. wife demanding more resources from
husband). A person can acquire the authority of
the spirit and rise to positions of political
power. Very common cross culturally. Cold control
would be the ideal way of fulfilling these
functions as it ensures the contextual
appropriateness of the relevant involuntary
behaviours and experiences
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• Conclusions
• Executive function requires intentions. But
  intentions are only conscious mental states if
  one is aware of having them. Executive function
  does not require conscious intentions.
• Hypnotic responding often requires executive
  control, but subjects do not have relevant higher
  order thoughts to make the executive control
  conscious