Preserving the ABM Treaty

1
Preserving the ABM Treaty

• Written By
• Sidney D. Drell Philip J. Farley David Holloway
• International Security, Vol. 9, No. 2. (Autumn,
  1984), pp. 51-91
• A Presentation By Judy Wang, pp. 51-78

2
The Case against Missile Defense

• Futile Offensive missiles would prevail in a
  competition
• Costly Maintain deterrent threat
• Destabilizing Speed up arms race
• -compete to build defensive system
• -come to build offensive missiles to overcome
  opponents defensive system
• -pressure to strike first (fear other sides
  defensive capabilities)

3
Preventing War and Reaching a Common Goal

• Other Measures besides ABM Treaty
• 1971 agreement on hotline reduce risk of
  accidental war by allowing leaders to communicate
  during crises
• 1973 agreement to prevent nuclear war and to act
  to avoid a nuclear war during crises
• Agreed to ABM Treaty in 1972 to avoid nuclear
  war and its devastating consequences for all
  mankind
• -accepts deterrence as a necessary condition
  instead of as a threat
• Self-deterrence suicidal for any country to
  start a nuclear war
• Does self-deterrence still apply today? Does it
  apply to rogue states? If self deterrence works,
  why fear a nuclear threat at all?

4
About the ABM Treaty and Reagan

• Article V.1 each party undertakes not to
  develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or
  components which are sea-based, air-based,
  space-based, or mobile land-based.
• Vague on purpose so as not to rule out other
  devices that can be developed in the future. As
  long as treaty is amended, these devices are not
  exempt.
• Reagan, March 23, 1984 Wants to build a
  Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
• Escape from reliance on mutual deterrence, but
  interim goal is to enhance deterrence
• 1985-1989 a cost of 26 billion dollars
• Says it is consistent with ABM.for now

5
The Soviet Perspective

• Late 1960s, Soviets began to doubt effectiveness
  of ABM systems.
• Increased confidence in deterrence, realized that
  both sides vulnerable to a devastating
  retaliatory strike if it attacked first.
• Desired ABM Treaty b/c without it
• Upset the nuclear balance
• Lead to an unconstrained race in ABM systems and
  the further deployment of offensive forces
• Not effective vs. offensive missiles

6

• View U.S. weapons program as a way to gain
  strategic superiority.
• Criticized Reagans speech as a way for the U.S.
  to undermine its commitment of making progress in
  limiting and reducing offensive weapons
• Serious Threat and Rejection of ABM Treaty
• Soviets would respond by building their own

7
Soviet Activities

• Soviets still focus on how to wage a war and
  defeat the enemy
• Soviet Activities in ABM technologies
• Upgrading the Moscow ABM system, fully
  operational since 1970 or 1971
• Replace Galosh interceptor missiles with SH-04
  and SH-08 nuclear-armed missiles (allows them to
  use atmospheric sorting to differentiate between
  real vehicles and ecoys)
• New phased-array radars to complement missile
  detection

8
Soviet Activities (cont)

• SH-04 and SH-08 could be used to create a
  nationwide defense
• Building a radar that fills a gap in the Soviet
  early warning system, claim the radar is designed
  for space tracking and thus, consistent with the
  Treaty
• Surface-to air missiles (SAMs) improved
  capability to deal with smaller radar cross
  sections and shorten reaction times
• SA-12?reported to have been tested vs. ballistic
  missile reentry vehicles, a violation of Article
  VI.a of the ABM Treaty.
• No concrete evidence that Soviets will pull out
  of ABM Treaty

9
Missile Defenses

• Space-Based Chemical Lasers
• Can travel the speed of light in space above the
  atmosphere
• Complex, expensive, vulnerable to attack,
  effective countermeasures, must function above
  atmosphere.
• Complexity of defense system page 68.
• Three Layer Defense system, if 90 effective,
  would allow only 8 out of 8,000 to arrive on
  target
• Other weaknesses
• Vulnerable to direct enemy attack with space
  mines
• Countermeasures such as disruption of operations,
  like sensors and communication links, would
  render it inoperable.
• Decoys

10
Pop-up systems

• X-ray lasers, driven by nuclear explosives and
  mounted onto a missile that can be launched
  rapidly.
• Idea is to mount this system on a rocket to be
  boosted into space upon detection of a missile
  attack
• Most important conflict is if the system can be
  deployed rapidly enough to attempt a boost-phase
  intercept
• Must be based near Soviet territory due to the
  shape of the Earth
• Countermeasures
• High-thrust hot missiles that burn below the
  top of the atmosphere
• Alter trajectory of launch

11
Hybrid System

• Ground-based lasers whose beams are aimed up to a
  small number of large relay mirrors that then
  direct the beams to mission mirrors, which then
  redirect the beams onto their targets.
• Fewer parts in orbit that space-based system,
  avoids time constraint of pop-up
• Unavoidable technical and operational problems
• Vulnerable to attack

12
Mid-Course Intercept and Battle Management

• Target the post-boost vehicles, then target the
  individual warheads.
• Generally harder to target smaller
• Warheads are smaller and harder still and more
  numerouscan also dispense light decoys, which
  follow the same path
• Can confuse sensors with anti-simulation (making
  warheads look like decoys)
• No real viable defense

13
Terminal Defense

• No prospect for defending the nation against a
  massive attack
• Easier to do b/c of recent technological
  advances, and b/c the goal is to destroy enough
  warheads to cause the attacker to expend more of
  his force than he destroys