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Water Vulnerability Assessment

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Water Vulnerability Assessment Col Lisa SWAT Snyder Credit to Ms. Martina Schmidt * BE should present the results of the assessment to the MRSF and the ATWG. – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Water Vulnerability Assessment


1
Water Vulnerability Assessment
  • Col Lisa SWAT Snyder
  • Credit to Ms. Martina Schmidt

2
Overview
  • Water Vulnerability Assessment (WVA) Process
  • OEHSA Overview

3
Water Vulnerability Assessment
4
Dilution is the Solution?
EPA online Water Contaminant Information Tool
(access restricted)
  • CALCULATE the amount of water contaminated to a
    lethal concentration (based on 1 L consumption)
    by 110 lb of Sodium Cyanide.

5
Maybe dilution is not always the solution!
Answer
Dont forget the other route of exposure
Inhalation!
6
Why Vulnerabilities Exist
  • Inherent Water System Design Characteristics
  • Size (large geographic area and miles of
    pipeline)
  • Accessibility (numerous access points, and access
    points often in areas that are remote or
    accessible to the public)
  • Dependencies On Non-AF Water Suppliers/Privatizati
    on
  • On-line Contaminant Monitoring Alarm Systems
    Not Yet Reliable or Practical
  • Lack Of Resources and/or Local Initiatives
    Dedicated To
  • Water System Security Measures
  • Water System Maintenance, Upkeep, Modernization
  • Water Contingency Response Planning, Training,
    Equipment

6
7
Drivers
  • Safe Drinking Water Act 2002 Bioterrorism
    Response Amendment
  • AFI 10-246, Food and Water Protection Program
  • AFI 48-144, Safe Drinking Water Surveillance
    Program
  • DoDD 5160.54, Critical Asset Assurance Program
  • AFPD 10-24, AF Critical Infrastructure Protection
  • Chemical and Water Security Act of 2009

8
WVA Objectives
  • Reduce Unnecessary Risks to Personnel and
    Mission-Critical Operations
  • Identifying Observations (Vulnerabilities
    Concerns)
  • Characterizing Estimating Associated Risks
  • Recommending Credible Control Options

9
Observations
  • Identified through the use of checklists that
    include detailed water-specific criteria that
    were established to ensure the security and
    survivability of potable water supplies.
  • A criterion that is not met is considered a
    deficiency, and one or more deficiencies result
    in an observation for the respective program area
    or asset/access point being assessed.
  • Water-specific criteria consist of basic
    administrative and physical control requirements
    derived from various DoD and AF directives.
  • In the absence of specific requirements, best
    management practices derived from DoD and AF
    guidance documents, or identified by EPAs Water
    Security Division and AF functional experts are
    applied.
  • Additional or more restrictive criteria derived
    from MAJCOM, Primacy Agency, or installation
    regulations or policies may also apply locally

10
Observations
  • WVA Observations fall into the following four
    general areas
  • Water Security
  • System Design Integrity
  • Operations and Maintenance
  • Water Contingency Response

11
Common Water Security Issues
  • Water asset and access point entryways found
    unlocked/unsecured
  • Absence of AT provisions in contracts (water
    utility privatization, construction, bottled/bulk
    water) and insufficient control of contractors
    connecting to system
  • Off-base above ground water supply connections
    with no additional security connections.
  • Easily accessible off-base well facilities
  • Damaged fencing around water storage tanks and
    well houses

12
System Design Integrity
  • No redundant water source or supply connections
  • Deteriorating infrastructure and lack of Capital
    Improvements Plan (CIP)
  • Inadequate looping of mains
  • Inadequate system pressure for fire-fighting
    purposes

13
Operations and Maintenance (OM)
  • No valve exercising
  • No storage tank inspections lack of preventive
    paintenance (PM) (deteriorated vents, unsealed
    openings, excessive corrosion, deteriorated
    coatings, accumulated sediment/debris)
  • Improper tank operation (inadequate turnover, no
    chlorine residual/stagnant water, improper water
    levels

14
Contingency Response Capability
  • Installation Water Contingency Response Plan
    (WCRP) insufficient/incomplete/not executable
  • WCRP not reviewed/updated annually
  • Inadequate Contingency Monitoring Plans,
    Equip,Tng
  • No water-related scenarios in base disaster
    exercises (per AFI 10-246)

15
Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program
(CVAMP)
  • A secure, Web-based data management program
    accessible via SIPRNet by authorized
    administrators and a few other designated
    personnel (not BE)
  • CVAMP enables all base AT observations to be
    prioritized, tracked, and reported by DoD
    installations, Major/Unified Commands, and Joint
    Staff (J3 Deputy Director for AT/Homeland
    Defense).
  • CVAMP can provide an important mechanism to
    elevate visibility and support needed for water
    capital improvements, equipment and process
    upgrades, and other measures that improve the
    overall security, safety, and reliability of the
    potable water system.

16
WVA Process Overview
Phase 1 Pre-Assessment
Phase 2 Information Gathering
Phase 3 Information Processing
Assess Security Survivability Programs
Plan Approach
Delineate Observations
Coordinate With Stakeholders
Assess Water Assets and Access Points
Analyze Risk
Document Review
Identify Control Options
Develop Report
Coordinate With Stakeholder
17
Phase 1 - Pre-Assessment
  • Plan the Approach
  • Threat Level and Force Protection Condition
  • Deployment vs. Fixed Installations
  • Baseline Assessment and Assessment Updates
  • Coordinate with Stakeholders
  • Document and Key Reference Review

18
Phase 1 - Stakeholders
  • Primary Stakeholders
  • CE Water Utilities
  • Contractor Privatized Water System
  • CE Programs
  • CE Asset Manager
  • Anti Terrorism Officer (ATO)
  • Secondary Stakeholder
  • Private/Municipal Purveyor
  • Contractor Privatized Housing
  • CE Emergency Management
  • CE Hearing, Ventilation Air Conditioning
  • CE Power Production
  • CE Exterior Electric
  • Fleet Services
  • Base Contracting

Consolidated Interview
Primary May Refer You To Secondary Stakeholder
19
Phase 1 Key Documents
  • Key Documents
  • WVA
  • Sanitary Survey
  • WCRP
  • Primary References
  • AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT)
  • AFI 10-246, Food and Water Protection Program
  • Secondary References
  • 32-1066, Backflow Prevention Program
  • 32-1067, Water Systems

20
Phase 2 - Information Gathering
  • Assess Water Security and Survivability Programs
  • Interview SMEs
  • Review Program Documentation
  • Checklists 1-3 Questionnaires
  • Checklists 4-8 Program Review
  • Assess Water Assets and Access Points
  • Checklists 9-15 Physical Assessment

21
Checklists
22
Physical Security Observations Examples
Secluded area along fence line
Ladder is easily accessible
Corroded Lock
23
Physical Security Observations
  • Contractors, Base Construction, Grounds
    Maintenance, Pest Management, etc. who need to
    draw water should be directed to a non-potable
    water filling point if possible.
  • If the Potable Water System is used, then filling
    points must be protected against temporary
    Cross-Connections by use of BPDs.
  • Filling points should be located where activities
    can be observed, and preferably on a dead-end or
    otherwise in an area without high-value targets
    or with minimal consume
  • Absence of protected fill point(s) is a concern
    (for both intentional and accidental incidents).

24
Physical Security Observations
Example
Examples
Examples
Options Remove exposed valve handles or at
least chain them, and/or enclose valves within a
locked barrier (e.g., fence or tough cage).
Secure critical valve vaults/pits under hardened,
locked covers. Use high security locks (shrouded
shackle type).
Benchmark (Lock and IDS)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
25
System Integrity Observations
26
Phase 3 - Information Processing
  • Delineate Observations
  • Vulnerability A situation or circumstance that,
    if left unchanged, may result in the loss of life
    or damage to mission-essential resources.
  • Concern An existing condition that is
    exploitable and can indirectly lead to the death
    of DoD personnel and/or damage resources.
  • Neutral An existing condition that is neither
    exploitable nor can be reasonably assessed as
    leading to the death of DoD personnel and/or
    damage to resources, but is being identified to
    suggest consideration of modification and/or
    continuance.

27
Observation Table/CVAMP Inputs
OBSERVATION DISCUSSION (Deficiencies) DISCUSSION (Deficiencies) RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS
Designation Concern Classification FOUO Description The potable water source lacks sufficient redundancies. The base does not have an alternative source of water in the event of a supply interruption, and only one supply connection to the off-base water supplier. AT Benchmark Code IE-PLN-17 DoD AT Standards 21 AFI 10-246, UFC 3-600-01 Repeat Observation? No Classification FOUO Although the City of XXX water supply has been historically reliable, the AF has no control over the continued reliability of this source. To avoid potential interruptions of the water supply and of the critical operations that depend on water, the base should have an alternative water source IAW AFI 10-246. Also, because the base water supply is provided exclusively by an off-base purveyor, there should be two or more supply connections to provide adequate looping and back-feed capability. Classification FOUO Although the City of XXX water supply has been historically reliable, the AF has no control over the continued reliability of this source. To avoid potential interruptions of the water supply and of the critical operations that depend on water, the base should have an alternative water source IAW AFI 10-246. Also, because the base water supply is provided exclusively by an off-base purveyor, there should be two or more supply connections to provide adequate looping and back-feed capability. Classification FOUO Recommendation/Mitigation Type Programmatic ATWG, consider the following actions Initiate a feasibility study to assess viable options for an alternative source of water that can provide sufficient quantities of potable water to meet demands during all mission modes in the event the primary source of water is interrupted. Options include, but are not limited to, installing a connection to the county water system, and installing one or more wells on base. Install one or more additional connections between the City of XXX water system and the base distribution system to provide adequate looping and back-feed capability on base. Classification FOUO Recommendation/Mitigation Type Programmatic ATWG, consider the following actions Initiate a feasibility study to assess viable options for an alternative source of water that can provide sufficient quantities of potable water to meet demands during all mission modes in the event the primary source of water is interrupted. Options include, but are not limited to, installing a connection to the county water system, and installing one or more wells on base. Install one or more additional connections between the City of XXX water system and the base distribution system to provide adequate looping and back-feed capability on base.
CVAMP DESCRIPTOR INPUTS CVAMP DESCRIPTOR INPUTS CVAMP DESCRIPTOR INPUTS CVAMP DESCRIPTOR INPUTS CVAMP DESCRIPTOR INPUTS
Installation Access Controls Symbolic Value Population Centers Mitigate Vulnerability With Security Equip./Construction
Uncontrolled/Open Activity/Off Installation High Visibility/Large News Coverage 301 Personnel and Over Equipment None
28
Observation Risk Analysis
  • The WVA risk analysis methodology incorporates
    principles, concepts, and techniques derived from
    ORM as well as the DoD AT tools MSHARPP and
    CARVER.
  • ORM risk estimate categories of Extremely High,
    High, Medium, and Low provide a common frame of
    reference across DoD for relative risk ranking
    purposes (these designations are not associated
    with an absolute risk scale there is no absolute
    scale for risk).
  • Risk levels of Extremely High or High, however,
    generally indicate conditions of unacceptable
    risk to personnel and/or the mission due to the
    probability and severity of a water degradation
    and/or disruption incident, and warrant
    corrective actions on a priority basis.

29
Observation Risk Analysis
  • Probability
  • Incident History
  • Confidence in Existing Controls
  • Recovery Difficulty
  • Importance
  • Psychological Impact
  • Accessibility
  • Severity
  • Health and Safety
  • Mission-Essential Systems and Services

30
WVA Report
  • Section 1 Introduction
  • Section 2 Overview of Potable Water System
  • Section 3 Observations
  • Appendix A References, Acronyms
  • Appendix B Risk Analysis
  • Appendix C Water Security Operational Measures
  • Appendix D Representative Photographs

Note Use the example report from USAFSAM
31
Classification Instructions
  • Definitions
  • Secret Unauthorized disclosure could be
    expected to cause serious damage to national
    security that the original classification
    authority is able to identify or describe
  • Confidential Unauthorized disclosure could be
    expected to cause damage to national security
    that the original classification authority is
    able to identify or describe
  • For Official Use Only (FOUO) is a designation
    (not a classification) that is applied to
    controlled unclassified information that is
    exempt from mandatory release to the public under
    the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

32
Question
  • Have you been involved with a water vulnerability
    assessment?

33
Food handling and storage
  • Temperature control
  • Handling
  • Storage
  • Problematic public health concerns in a deployed
    location

34
The End
  • That was a brief overview
  • Questions (your BEO can help you!)

35
Classification Instructions
  • Key References
  • AFI 10-245
  • DoDI 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards
  • DTRA, Security Classification Guide for
    Vulnerability Assessments
  • Decision to Classify
  • The unauthorized disclosure of the information
    could reasonably be expected to cause damage to
    national security, and that the damage can be
    identified or described
  • Determine the probable operational,
    technological, and resource impact of
    classification

36
Classification Instructions
  • According to DTRA SCG, vulnerabilities are always
    classified. Concerns may or may not be
    classified, and neutral observations are
    typically not classified

When in doubt check with your ATO
37
Whats Next?
  • Provide Observations to CVAMP administrator
    within 90 days
  • All observations must be in CVAMP within 120 days
  • Coordinate and brief results with MRC, FPWG,
    EMWG, or ATWG
  • Review and validate annually
  • Use WVA to improve upon emergency response
    procedures
  • Do not submit the report to non-AF water
    suppliers or agencies, or base contractors (the
    commander and ATO should make that decision).

38
Questions?
39
TIC/TIM Vulnerability Assessment
40
Background
  • Bhopal, India Disaster
  • Fatal Ammonia incident in Swansea, SC
  • Texas City refinery accident
  • Train Collision in Graniteville, SC
  • Minot Train Derailment

41
Why TIC/TIM VA?
  • Provide valuable information to various
    installation personnel (e.g., emergency
    management, fire, medical, and antiterrorism
    personnel)
  • Provides identity, quantity, and location of
    local TIC/TIM
  • Identifies potential risk levels associated with
    local TIC/TIM
  • Enables personnel to better plan/train for
    possible releases

42
Drivers
  • AFI 41-106, Unit Level Management of Medical
    Readiness Programs, 14 Apr 08 (Updated 28 Jul
    09).
  • AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (EM)
    Program Planning and Operations, 24 Jan 07
    (Updated 6 Apr 09).
  • BE Capability 1 (Execute SG related VA) To
    identify potential TIC/TIM concerns and assess
    the probability or potential consequences of an
    accidental/intentional release

43
Key Terms
  • Toxic Industrial Material (TIM) All toxic
    industrial materials manufactured, stored,
    transported, used in industrial or commercial
    processes. It includes toxic industrial
    chemicals, toxic industrial radiologicals, and
    toxic industrial biologicals. TIMs produce toxic
    impacts to personnel, materials, and
    infrastructure.
  • Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TIC) Chemical
    compounds used or produced in industrial
    processes that are toxic to humans and animals.
  • Toxic Industrial Biologicals (TIB) Biological
    materials found in medical research,
    pharmaceutical, or other manufacturing processes
    that are toxic to humans and animals.
  • Toxic Industrial Radiologicals (TIR)
    Radiation-emitting materials used in research,
    power generation, medical treatment, and other
    non-weapon developmental activities that are
    harmful to humans and animals if released outside
    their controlled environment.

44
TIC/TIM Overview
  • Planning Coordination
  • Data Collection
  • Data Analysis
  • Report

TIC/TIM Process
45
Planning Coordination
  • Identify Lead Assessor
  • Manages assessment team performs overall
    coordination assigns tasks ensures VA
    completion according to schedule
  • Identify Team
  • Multi-disciplinary team with strong technical
    background
  • Familiarity with overall assessment methodology,
    base operations/infrastructure, off-base
    industries, TIC/TIM characteristics health
    effects, transport of contaminants
  • Develop List of Stakeholders
  • On-base stakeholders
  • Off-base stakeholders

46
Stakeholders
  • Bioenvironmental Engineering (BE)
  • Radiation Safety Officer (RSO)
  • Civil Engineering (CE)
  • Emergency Management
  • Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)
    representative
  • Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know
    Act (EPCRA) POC
  • Fire Department
  • Pest Management
  • Hazardous Waste Program Manager
  • Antiterrorism Officer (ATO)
  • Office of Special Investigations (OSI)/Intel
  • Security Forces
  • Base Contracting
  • Hazardous Material Pharmacy Manager
  • Weather Office

47
Data Collection
  • Off-Base TIC/TIM Data (20 mile radius)
  • Transportation TIC/TIM Data
  • On-Base TIC/TIM Data
  • Verify Data
  • Compile Comprehensive TIC/TIM Inventory
  • Obtain Base Map
  • Collect Meteorological and Terrain Data
  • Collect Natural Disaster and Accident Data
  • Collect Data on TIC/TIM Characteristics

48
Data Collection
  • TIC of Concern includes toxic substances
    regulated under the EPA RMP and toxic chemicals
    that have an established NIOSH IDLH concentration
    value.
  • List of substances regulated under the EPA RMP
  • http//frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/get-cfr.c
    gi?TITLE40PART68SECTION130TYPETEXT
  • List of NIOSH IDLH chemicals
  • http//www.cdc.gov/niosh/idlh/intridl4.html
  • Toxic no-volatile liquids are inventoried but not
    evaluated
  • Primary Focus
  • Chemicals or materials with acute toxicity
  • Primary route of concern Inhalation

Do not consider Explosives, Flammables, Weapons
or Non-Respirable Solids
49
Tier 2 Data Example
  ID Facility Name Location City SIC Chemical CAS Amount, lb
1 Site 1 A A Engraving, Inc 2301 East St Charles Street San Antonio 7 6 6 9 Used Motor Oil 0 6 4 7 4 2 - 6 5 - 0 500
2 Site 2 A B Welding Supply 914 East Chicago Street San Antonio 0 9 0 4 Portland Cement 0 6 5 9 9 7 - 1 5 - 1 400
3 Site 3 Hubbard Feeds Inc. 426 Omaha Street San Antonio 2 0 4 1 Sulfur Dioxide 0 0 7446-09-5 10000
4 Site 4 Merillat Industries, Inc 4300 South Highway 79 San Antonio 2 4 9 2 Diesel Fuel 0 6 8 3 3 4 - 3 0 - 5 8000000
5 Site 5 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of the Black Hills 2150 Coca-Cola Lane San Antonio 2 0 8 6 Anhydrous Ammonia 0 0 7 6 6 4 - 4 1 - 7 200000
6 Stie 6 Browning Resources U.S. 3290 Lien Street San Antonio 3 3 4 1 Soda ash 0 0 0 4 9 7 - 1 9 - 8 200
7 Site 7 Black Hills Corporation - Ben French Plant Service Center 409 Deadwood Avenue San Antonio 4 9 1 1 Chlorine 0 0 7 7 8 2 - 5 0 - 5 300
8 Site 8 Rapid City Regional Hospital-Main 353 Fairmont Boulevard San Antonio 8 0 6 0 Diesel Fuel 0 6 8 3 3 4 - 3 0 - 5 75000000
9 Site 9 Gillette Dairy of the Black Hills 1699 Sedivy Lane San Antonio 2 0 2 6 Chlorine 0 0 7 7 8 2 - 5 0 - 5 100000
10 PE 0078 Dakota Masonry Supply 1543 Deadwood Avenue San Antonio 5 2 1 1 Calcium Hydroxide 0 0 1 3 0 5 - 6 2 - 0 500
11 PE 0084 Hills Materials Company--Emulsion 3730 Sturgis Road San Antonio 1 4 4 2 Acetylene 0 0 0 0 7 4 - 8 6 - 2 300
12 PE 0085 Hills Materials Company--N Shop 702 Spruce San Antonio 1 4 4 2 Acetylene 100
13 PE 0087 Hills Materials Company--Red-E-Mix 225 East Main Street North San Antonio 1 4 4 2 Acetylene 100
14 PE 0091E Horace Mann Pool 818 Anamosa Street San Antonio Sodium Hypochlorite 0 0 7 7 8 2 - 5 0 - 5 100
15 PE 0092 Hubbard Feeds Inc. 426 Omaha Street San Antonio 2 0 4 1 Bentonite Clay 0 0 1 3 0 2 - 7 8 - 9 500
16 PE 0100 Landstrom's 405 Canal Street San Antonio 3 9 1 1 Acetone 0 0 0 0 6 7 - 6 4 - 1 10
17 PE 0101 Merillat Industries, Inc 4300 South Highway 79 San Antonio 2 4 9 2 Diesel Fuel 0 6 8 3 3 4 - 3 0 - 5 5000000
18 PE 0114 Nash Finch Company 1313 East St Patrick San Antonio 5 1 4 1 Ammonia 0 0 7 6 6 4 - 4 1 - 7 410
19 PE 0133 Rapid City Regional Hospital-Main 353 Fairmont Boulevard San Antonio 8 0 6 0 Diesel Fuel 0 6 8 3 3 4 - 3 0 5 500000000
20 PE 0151 The Icehouse Inc. 1703 East St Patrick Street San Antonio Anhydrous Ammonia 0 0 7 6 6 4 - 4 1 7 200
21 PE 0153 Riddle's Group 2707 Mount Rushmore Road San Antonio 3 9 1 1 Sulfuric Acid 98 0 0 7 6 6 4 - 9 3 9 250
22 PE 0161 Suds and Duds, Inc 410 4th Street San Antonio 7 2 1 8 Nonylphenol Ethoxylates 0 0 9 0 1 6 - 4 5 - 9 350
23 PE 0168 Stamper Black Hills Gold Jewelry 7201 South Highway 16 San Antonio 3 9 1 1 Ammonia 0 0 7 6 6 4 - 4 1 - 7 410
24 PE 0180 Warne Chemical Equipment Company 2680 Commerce Road 3 5 2 3 Aluminum Phosphide 0 2 0 8 5 9 - 7 3 - 8 200

50
Tier 2 Data Example
51
Data Collection
  • TIB of Concern should include, at a minimum,
    those substances regulated by the Department of
    Health and Human Services as HHS Select Agents
    and Toxins and Overlap Select Agents and
    Toxins
  • HHS Select Agents and Toxins are listed in 42 CFR
    73.3 and can be found at the following website
  • http//frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/get-cfr.c
    gi?TITLE42PART73SECTION3TYPETEXT

52
Data Collection
  • TIR of Concern should include radiological
    materials that are regulated by the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission (NRC) as Nationally
    Tracked Sources that equal or exceed Category 2
    quantity thresholds.
  • The list of nationally tracked sources is
    provided in Appendix E of 10 CFR 20, and can be
    found at the NRC website listed below
  • http//www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr
    /part020/part020-appe.html
  • Contact the LEPC or state radiation safety
    officer

53
Transportation TIC/TIM Data
  • Highways
  • Contact the Department of Transportation
    (National HM Route Registry)
  • Railways
  • CSX/Norfolk Southern/Union Pacific/Burlington
    Northern
  • Use Google Earth/Google Maps to locate rail roads
    in your area
  • Contact the Federal Railroad Administration
    (Regional POCs) http//www.fra.dot.gov/
  • Waterways
  • Contact the local port authority
    http//www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/contacts/ports/

54
Example Rail Density Study
55
On-Base TIC/TIM Data
  • HAZMART Pharmacy
  • Hazardous Waste Program Manager
  • Central Hazardous Waste Storage Facility Manager
  • Base Supply
  • CE Storage Tank Manager
  • Fire Department and/or Emergency Management
  • Installation Radiation Safety Officer (RSO)

56
TIC/TIM Inventory
  • Once the data is collected and verified, all
    TIC/TIM should be compiled into a combined
    inventory.

TIC/TIM Name Facility/Location EmergencyContact Lat./Long. Max. Quantity (lbs) Dist. (mi)/ Dir. from Base Notes
1 CHLORINE AIRGAS SOUTH INC. MERIDIAN 202136 BONITA ROADMERIDIAN, MS 39301LAUDERDALE TIM TRAMMEL 601-483-4846 32º 21.97 88º 40.18 2400 4.47 mi.70.04º448 ft. Worst-Case scenario plume impacts the base alternative scenario does not
2 SULFURIC ACID ATT INTERSTATE DIVISION4600 SKYLAND DRIVEMERIDIAN, MS 30094LAUDERDALE LESTER CAGLE 6622569347 32º 19.32 88º 41.09 1,163 3.63 mi.116.98º394 ft Worst-Case scenario plume impacts the base alternative scenario does not .
3 SULFURIC ACID, Batteries AVERY DENNISON4100 HWY 45 N.MERIDIAN, MS 39301 KEVIN STEIFEL 601-481-6903 32º 23.72 88º 39.82 99,999 5.67 mi. 50.86º 376 Chemical does not meet the definition of volatile toxic liquid. Plume model not required.
4 SULFURIC ACID Batteries BELLSOUTH 741808789 OLD MERIDIAN DEKALBMERIDIAN, MS 32063LAUDERDALE EHS HOTLINE 1-800-566-9347 32º 28.61 88º 41.10 606 9.22 mi.19.14º461 ft Chemical does not meet the definition of volatile toxic liquid. Plume model not required.
5 CHLORINE CITY OF MERIDIAN2304 HWY 11 SOUTHMERIDIAN, MS 39307LAUDERDALE YOLANDA BROWN601-485-1815 32º 19.1688º 45.13 2400 1.8 mi. 199.07º 292 ft Worst-Case scenario plume impacts the base
6 SULFUR DIOXIDE CITY OF MERIDIAN2304 HWY 11 SOUTHMERIDIAN, MS 39307LAUDERDALE YOLANDA BROWN601-485-1815 32º 19.1688º 45.13 9,999 .8 mi. 199.07º 292 ft Worst-Case scenario plume impacts the base
57
Base Map
  • The assessment team should obtain a base map that
    includes a 20-mile radius around the base.

TIC/TIM 4 Burns Chemical Co TIC/TIM 1-6 ESCO
Plant TIC/TIM 8-12 City of XYZ Water Treatment
Plant TIC/TIM 15-21 Petro Chemical
58
SME Interviews
  • Antiterrorism Officer (ATO)
  • Provide overall threat briefing
  • LEPC Representative
  • Tier 2 reports
  • Validate chemical inventory
  • Provide insight to past accidents incidents
    within county
  • Emergency Management
  • Assist with plume modeling
  • Response capabilities
  • Fire Department/ HazMat Response
  • Response capabilities

Also a great forum to assess the bases overall
response capability and establish rapport with
local LEPC
59
Plume Modeling
  • Modeling and/or Calculations Are Used to
    Determine the Hazard Zones Associated With a
    TIC/TIM Release Scenario
  • The following options are currently available for
    chemical release scenarios
  • Area Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA)
    model
  • Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability
    (HPAC) model
  • Joint Effects Model (JEM)
  • Spreadsheet Calculation Method
  • For radiological release scenarios, a manual
    calculation or HPAC can be used

60
Worst Case and Alternative Scenarios
  • Worst Case Release Scenario
  • Based on maximum quantity released and worst-case
    meteorological conditions
  • Used to determine which sources listed in the
    comprehensive inventory have the potential to
    impact the base and to determine the highest
    level of risk associated with those sources
  • Alternative Release Scenario
  • Performed only on those sources identified by the
    worst-case release scenario as potentially
    impacting the base
  • Based on average/typical quantity released and
    average/predominant meteorological conditions
  • Used to determine a more realistic/typical risk
    level

61
Plume Modeling
Release Quantities used for Worst-Case and
Alternative Scenarios
Number of Containers Worst-Case Release Quantity Alternative Release Quantity
Multiple (two or more) Full contents of all containers Full contents of one container
One Full contents of one container Two-thirds contents of one container
Unknown Total quantity listed for the source Two-thirds the quantity listed for the source
62
Scenario Examples
  • Railcar/Chlorine
  • Density Study 780 total railcars carried
    chlorine through the location per year.
  • Tech Guide Assume 365 as the estimated number
    of days a railcar can be
  • expected to travel through the area.
  • 780 loads/365 times per year a rail car
    travel by the area 2.14
  • Tech Guide Average railcar capacity 180,000
    lbs.
  • Worst Case Plume Modeling 180,000 lbs
    x 2.14385,200 lbs
  • Alternative Case Plume Modeling
    180,000 lbs
  • Truck/Chlorine
  • Tech Guide 34,000lbs truck capacity
  • Worst Case Plume Modeling 34, 000 lbs
  • Alternative Case Plume Modeling
    34,000 lbs x 0.67 22,780 lbs (2/3 of truck
    capacity)
  • Fixed Facility
  • RMP inventory 99,999lbs listed on report

63
Meteorological Conditions
Condition Worst-Case Alternative
Wind Direction Toward Base Insert base data
Wind Speed 3.35 Insert base data
Temperature (F) 77 Insert base data
Relative Humidity 50 Insert base data
Cloud Coverage 50 Insert base data
Stability Class F Insert base data
Roughness Most Appropriate Insert base data
Obtain meteorological conditions from the Air
Force Climatology Center Website
https//notus2.afccc.af.mil/SCISPublic/
Wind Speed Wind Speed Daytime Solar Radiation Daytime Solar Radiation Daytime Solar Radiation Nighttime Cloud Cover Nighttime Cloud Cover
meters/ second miles/ hour Strong Moderate Slight gt50 lt50
lt 2 lt 5 A A B B E F
2 3 5 7 A B B C E F
3 5 7 11 B B C C D E
5 6 11 13 C C D D D D
gt 6 gt 13 C D D D D
64
Example Weather Data
  • Predominant Wind from 310o

65
Plume Modeling
SITE DATA Location Building Air Exchanges
Per Hour 0.38 (unsheltered single storied)
Time May 14, 2012 0929 hours CDT (using
computer's clock) CHEMICAL DATA Chemical
Name CHLORINE Molecular Weight
70.91 g/mol AEGL-1 (60 min) 0.5 ppm AEGL-2
(60 min) 2 ppm AEGL-3 (60 min) 20 ppm
IDLH 10 ppm Ambient Boiling Point -30.4 F
Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature greater
than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration
1,000,000 ppm or 100.0 ATMOSPHERIC DATA
(MANUAL INPUT OF DATA) Wind 3.35 miles/hour
from 307.08 true at 3 meters Ground
Roughness open country Cloud Cover 5
tenths Air Temperature 77 F
Stability Class F (user override) No
Inversion Height Relative
Humidity 50 SOURCE STRENGTH Direct Source
36,000 pounds/min Source Height 0
Release Duration 10 minutes Release Rate
36,000 pounds/min Total Amount Released
360,000 pounds Note This chemical may flash
boil and/or result in two phase flow. THREAT
ZONE Model Run Heavy Gas Red
greater than 6 miles --- (20 ppm AEGL-3 60
min) Orange greater than 6 miles --- (2 ppm
AEGL-2 60 min) Yellow greater than 6
miles --- (0.5 ppm AEGL-1 60 min)
Hazard Zone Effects
Zone 1 Life Threatening Effects (AEGL 3, ERPG 3, TEEL 3)
Zone 2 Serious Long-Lasting Effects (AEGL 2, ERPG 2, TEEL 2)
Zone 3 Notable Discomfort (AEGL 1, ERPG 1, TEEL 1)
65
66
Form 1 5 TIC/TIM Inventory Hazard Zones
TIC/ TIMNO. Chemical Scenario Type Quantity (lbs) Zone 1 Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 3 Distance to Base (mi) Time to Impact Base5 (min)
TIC/ TIMNO. Chemical Scenario Type Quantity (lbs) Furthest Extent3 (mi) Time to Extent4 (min) Furthest Extent3 (mi) Time to Extent4 (min) Furthest Extent3 (mi) Time to Extent4 (min) Distance to Base (mi) Time to Impact Base5 (min)
1 Chlorine Worst-Case 2,400 2.5 44.7 3.5 5.5 4.5
1 Chlorine Alternative 1,200 1.5 2.2 4.2 4.5
9 Ammonia Worst-Case 2,400 0.28 0.88 2.1 2
9 Ammonia Alternative 1,200 0.5 1 2.1 2
Equation t60d/v Where . t time to impact d
distance from point of release to closest point
on base perimeter (mi) v scenario wind speed
Example calculation Worst Case 602.5/3.35
44.77
Remember the wind speed for an alternative
scenario are the prevailing winds
67
Severity
  • Severity of a TIC/TIM release scenario is based
    on hazard zones. Either modeling or calculations
    are performed to identify up to three hazard
    zones for each release scenario
  • Zone 1 Its the area that is closest to the
    source where death may result (i.e., area where
    levels are greater than the LOC-3 value)
  • Zone 2 Its the area where severe
    injuries/illnesses may result (i.e., area where
    levels are greater than the LOC-2 value)
  • Zone 3 Its the area further from the source
    where minor injuries/illnesses may result (i.e.,
    area where levels are greater than the LOC-1
    value)

Hazard Zone Impacting the Base Severity Level
Zone 1 Catastrophic
Zone 2 Critical
Zone 3 Moderate
No Zone Negligible
68
Probability
  • Probability of a TIC/TIM release scenario is
    based on the following definitions and on
    accident/natural disaster data
  • Frequent and/or Likely May occur immediately,
    with in a short time, or repeats every other year
  • Occasional More than likely will occur in time
  • Seldom May happen, if given enough time.
  • Unlikely May never happen

Natural Disasters In U.S. - National Climactic
Data Center (NCDC) Storm Event Database Outside
U.S. Center for Research on the Epidemiology of
Disasters (CREDs) Emergency Events Database
(EM-DAT) Accidents On-base and off-base
emergency response personnel National Response
Center (NRC) Database
69
Risk Level
  • Severity Probability Risk Level

ORM Risk Assignment Matrix ORM Risk Assignment Matrix ORM Risk Assignment Matrix ORM Risk Assignment Matrix ORM Risk Assignment Matrix ORM Risk Assignment Matrix
Severity Probability Probability Probability Probability Probability
Severity Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely
Catastrophic Extremely High Extremely High High High Moderate
Critical Extremely High High High Moderate Low
Moderate High Moderate Moderate Low Low
Negligible Moderate Low Low Low Low
70
Form 1 6 Risk Table
TIC/TIM No. Facility Chemical Scenario Type Severity Probability Risk Level
1 Bowater Pulp Paper 27 S. Highway 161 Perryton, TX 79021 Anhydrous Ammonia Worst-Case Catastrophic Seldom High
1 Bowater Pulp Paper 27 S. Highway 161 Perryton, TX 79021 Anhydrous Ammonia Alternative Moderate Seldom Low
Worst-Case
Alternative
71
TIC/TIM Assessment Report
  • The report should include the following
  • Executive Summary
  • Introduction
  • Methodology
  • Scope Limitations
  • TIC/TIM Assessment Inventory
  • Risk Assessment
  • Conclusion
  • References
  • Appendices (forms, maps/plots, weather data,
    comprehensive inventory)

72
Whats next?
  • Coordinate and brief results with MRC, FPWG,
    EMWG, or ATWG
  • Identify equipment shortfalls and order critical
    items
  • Incorporate TIC/TIM scenarios into base exercises
  • Update emergency response checklists
  • Build relationship with local LEPC or equivalent
  • Verify actual quantity on-site
  • Update annually

73
Questions?
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