MidTerm Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan

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Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in
Juba, Sudan

• Presentation to Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
  Affairs
• Oslo, 4th June 2009
• Jon Bennett

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Introduction

• Methodology
• Field visit
• Survey (50 respondents)
• Documentation review
• Difficult to attribute JDT outcomes and impact on
  capacity building/poverty reduction.
• Lack of consistent ME over 3 years. JDT
  reporting very activity-driven.
• Report outline
• Relevance
• Effectiveness
• Efficiency
• Main Findings Recommendations

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1a. Relevance

• JDT original mandate was highly relevant to the
  aid effectiveness agenda
• Use of Programme-Based Approach Joint Donor
  Office etc.
• JDT initiative was relevant to the South Sudan
  context
• MDTF and link with JAM low government capacity
  integrated approach with programmes outside MDTF

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1b. Relevance

• BUT.. the assumptions that underpinned the JDT
  initiative at the time of signing the MoU in 2006
  have not materialised.
• JDT mandate remained unclear, and in practice,
  relevance of JDT initiative restrained by
• Proliferation of aid instruments outside MDTF
• Lack of common policy frameworks and no
  agreement on post-bilateral programmes
• Programme management outside MDTF has remained
  limited, with JDT being responsible for only two
  small funds
• Fragile States Dimensions missing

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2a. Effectiveness

• Technical support to MDTF Secretariat was
  effective (including chairing the Oversight
  Committee)
• But impact on poverty reduction reduced by
  disappointing performance of the Fund
• Programme Management effective for the two small
  funds, but unclear why donors were reluctant to
  disburse additional funds through JDT.
• Civil Society Fund never materialised. BSF was
  essentially DFID-led.
• Sector work was best in GoSS planning, budgeting
  and public sector reforms. Also some impacts in
  Health and Governance (co-chairing BSWGs).
• But constrained by staff numbers/skills

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2b. Effectiveness

• JDTs greatest value has been in promoting policy
  dialogue and donor coordination.
• JDTs contribution to GoSS ownership also seen as
  high (ownership of aid budget planning)
• Some successes outside JDT original mandate (UN
  agencies NGOs)
• JDT had reduced influence on Joint Donor
  Partnership working
• JDT spent more time than envisaged organising
  field visits for Donor Partners.
• JDT invested considerable efforts drafting a
  multi-annual strategic plan, which SMB did not
  approve.

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3a. Efficiency

• JDTs strategy has lacked transparency and
  consistency over the evaluation period
• Flexibility / opportunistic approach has allowed
  JDT to adjust to policy environment.
• Communication/reporting has improved
• Cost saving for JDPs
• Institutional constraints to JDT delivery
  included
• Lack of a Joint Development Assistance Strategy
  for Southern Sudan
• Staff shortages and inappropriate mix of skills
• Ill-defined level of delegation between JDT and
  JDPs

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3b. Efficiency

• The joint donor partnership concept was never
  discussed in terms of rules of engagement among
  the six partners and if and how the JDT should
  represent donor members in the South has
  remained a contentious issue.
• Vertical and at times informal communication
  channels have reinforced existing differences in
  communication flows among the Donor Partners and
  undermined the principle of joined approaches as
  well as the Teams morale.
• Close proximity of Donor Partner representatives
  in Khartoum led the AG to wrest the management
  initiative from the SMB and impose a more
  hands-on style of interaction with the Team.

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4a. Survey results - harmonization

• 66.9 agree that the JDT has helped to strengthen
  donor alignment with GoSS policies.
• 51 agree that the JDT has helped to strengthen
  donor alignment with GoSS systems
• 64.7 agree that the JDT has helped to strengthen
  government capacity in Budget Planning.
• 80 agree that the JDT has helped to strengthen
  government capacity in aid coordination
• 82.6 agree that the JDT helped strengthen donor
  coordination among the Joint Donor Partners
• 54.2 agree that the JDT has helped strengthen
  donor coordination among other donors
• Large proportion often unable to comment
• Confirms JDTs value-added but also confusion
  about JDT mandate.

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5a. Fragile States

• JDT has been strong in adjusting to the Sudanese
  context, by seizing opportunities when they
  arose.
• Lack of a joint diplomatic and developmental
  approach. The division between politics and aid
  derives from the difficulty of merging the JDTs
  six donor countries political relationships with
  Sudan.
• For example, the lack of a common policy
  framework meant that partners failed to agree on
  a shared conceptual understanding of the nature
  and scope of Security Sector Reform, recognised
  as perhaps the most important sector in the CPA.
  The propensity of donor members to take this and
  other political matters on bilateral channels has
  tended to demote JDT to solely development
  matters.
• GoSS as a whole has been inclined to let donors
  lead on development while it focuses on security
  issues. Meanwhile the plethora of aid projects
  (including those of JDPs) and the lack of
  ownership by GoSS - has to some extent undermined
  efforts to strengthen the governments management
  of aid. State capacity has increased in budget
  planning, but there are differences among the
  quality and results of all Budget Sector Working
  Groups.

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5b. Fragile States

• The focus on building the Southern Sudan state
  meant comparatively less attention given to
  building the overarching relationship between the
  Government of South Sudan and the national
  government the latter being a central plank of
  the Peace Agreement under the Make Unity
  Attractive agenda.
• Little work has been done that outlines the
  political economy of Southern Sudan and how this
  might determine medium-term donor priorities.
  More attention has been paid to internal risk
  analysis of JDT (pertaining to its governance)
  than to external political/security threats.
• JDT was tasked to make a major contribution to
  policy dialogue with the Government of Southern
  Sudan (GoSS) on issues of governance, poverty
  reduction and service delivery. Yet JDT has had
  only two specialist advisors health and
  governance/RoL.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

• Invest greater resources both in staff numbers
  and quality.
• Revise JDT mandate
• Stronger role in monitoring the bilateral (and
  post-bilateral) programmes of Donor Partners
• Formalize JDTs advisory role in pooled funds
  managed by UN agencies
• Further encourage JDTs work with NGOs

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RECOMMENDATIONS

• 3. Redesign JDT governance structure
• The SMB should promote strategic direction on
  political and development policies and role of
  JDT within this
• AG should remain in an advisory role including
  coordination between strategy and national
  policy.
• Clarify rules of engagement of donor partners
  with regard to joint donor mission and political
  and development presence in Juba

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RECOMMENDATIONS

• 4. Context analysis, rather than the availability
  of advisers and/or bilateral interests, should
  dictate the choice of sector priorities
• 5. Clear political and developmental Benchmarks
  should be agreed upon to support the period
  leading to the 2011 referendum which is the
  year JDT mandate expires.

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• Thank you