History of Biological Warfare Globally

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History of Biological Warfare - Globally

• 1925 Geneva Protocol
• 1972 Biological Weapons
• Convention
• signed by 103 nations
• 1975 Geneva Conventions
• Ratified

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PROTOCOL FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE IN WAR OF
ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS OR OTHER GASES, AND OF
BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE

• Opened for signature 17 June 1925, entered into
  force 8 February 1928
• Geneva Protocol

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Biological Weapons Convention

• Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
  Production and Stockpiling of
• Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
  and on Their Destruction
• Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow April
  10, 1972

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Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and
President Vladimir on Cooperation Against
Bioterrorism

• November 13, 2001
• At Shanghai, we resolved to enhance cooperation
  in combating new terrorist threats, including
  those involving weapons of mass destruction.
• We agree that, as a key element of our
  cooperation to counter the threat of terrorist
  use of biological materials, officials and
  experts of the United States and Russia will work
  together on means for countering the threat of
  bioterrorism, now faced by all nations, and on
  related health measures, including preventive
  ones, treatment and possible consequence
  management.

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What role can Russia play in Combating Infectious
Diseases And Bioterrorism Threats

• The threat of biological weapons and their use in
  bioterrorism have increased. At the same time
  there are huge improvements in the knowledge of
  infectious diseases. How do we contain the threat
  of biological warfare (BW) and bioterrorism and
  continue to make progress in eliminating and
  treating infectious diseases?

S.V. Netesov, L.S. Sandakhchiev, VECTOR,
Novosibirsk
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In the past 20 years, more than 30 previously
unknown infectious agents have been identified.

• They causing such diseases as AIDS, hemorrhagic
  fevers, antibiotic resistant bacterial strains,
  hepatitis C, etc., A significant part of these
  infectious diseases result from the ability of
  microorganisms to mutate and adapt to humans and
  their medical treatment environment of medical
  prophylaxes and treatments. These properties,
  combined with increasing human mobility and
  migration and the increasing number of people
  with suppressed immunity, and several other
  factors, make the emergence of new diseases and
  variants more likely.

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Biological Warfare Nonproliferation and Threat
Reduction

• The issues of nonproliferation and threat
  reduction of biological weapons based on
  infectious agents are different from other
  weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
• We believe that the major nonproliferation and
  threat reduction efforts should focus on already
  working with emerging pathogens research centers,
  which might present a source of expertise for
  potential bioterrorists.

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Russias Role in Infectious Disease Research and
International Cooperation

• Russia has great potential in the area of
  infectious disease research, as well as in
  development and manufacture of therapeutic and
  prophylactic preparations at facilities of the
  Russian Ministry of Public Health, those of
  BIOPREPARAT and of local public health
  establishments. Two large State Research Centers
  of the Russian Ministry of Public Health for
  Applied Microbiology (Obolensk, European region)
  and Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR (Koltsovo,
  eastern region) were involved in biological
  defense programs of the former Soviet Union
  before 1990.

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VECTOR

• The State Research Center of Virology and
  Biotechnology VECTOR, operated by the Russian
  Ministry of Public Health, is a large research
  and production complex, whose primary activities
  are focused on basic and applied research in the
  theoretical virology, molecular biology,
  virology, immunology, aerobiology, epidemiology,
  and biotechnology. VECTOR also develops and
  manufactures preventive, therapeutical and
  diagnostic preparations.

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• VECTOR is one of two scientific and experimental
  facilities in Russia mainly focusing on virus
  infection research. The State Research Center for
  Applied Microbiology, Russian Ministry of Public
  Health (Obolensk, Moscow Oblast), is a similar
  scientific and experimental center, involved in
  bacterial infections research. VECTOR and
  Obolensk are the only institutions in both Russia
  and the rest of the CIS countries in which
  studies of highly dangerous pathogens can be done
  at an up-to-date level.

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VECTOR

• VECTORs research and production facilities
  amount to more than 250,000 m2 on over 8,000
  hectares (19,768 acres). The research and
  experimental facilities at VECTOR are equipped
  for up-to-date scientific work with highly
  pathogenic human and animal viruses, under
  conditions of complete biosafety. Several
  buildings meet special biosafety requirements for
  high containment facilities (BSL 2, 3, and 4) an
  air-tight external perimeter, negative pressure
  in the working zone, complete sterilization
  (liquid, and solid) or reliable filtration (air)
  of all types of discharge.

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VECTOR

• The research and technical staff of the Center
  are highly qualified personnel, specializing in
  the field of genetic engineering, molecular
  biology, virology, theoretical virology,
  immunology, epidemiology, and ecology. The staff
  has extensive experience in highly dangerous
  viruses research and in production of diagnostic
  and prophylactic preparations for public health
  and veterinary needs.

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VECTOR

• The Collection of Cultures of Microorganisms in
  VECTOR contains over 10,000 deposit entries
  various viral strains, including the national
  collection of variola virus strains and strains
  of BSL-4 viral pathogens recombinant viral
  strains strains of microorganisms, including
  producer strains. The Collection received
  international recognition in 1995 when it was
  affiliated with the European Culture Collection
  Organization (ECCO).

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VECTOR

• VECTOR also houses one of the two WHO
  Collaborating Centers for orthopoxvirus diagnosis
  and repository for variola virus strains and
  their DNA. The other WHO Collaborating Center for
  smallpox and other poxvirus infections is at the
  CDC in Atlanta, USA. As a WHO Collaborating
  Center, VECTOR preserves and studies the Russian
  collection of variola virus isolates. The
  research collaboration between these two Centers
  is promising in terms of basic science and
  confidence building.

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VECTOR

• VECTORs Breeding and Holding Facility for
  laboratory animals, which includes one of only
  two monkey breeding facilities operating in
  Russia, is used for testing therapeutic and
  diagnostic preparations. Facilities for the
  performance of preclinical and clinical trials of
  new medicinal preparations are available at
  VECTOR.

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VECTOR

• Possible research at the proposed International
  Center could focus on arboviruses, including
  tick-borne encephalitis virus that is endemic in
  Russia HFRS virus, Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus
  both endemic in Siberia filoviruses Marburg
  and Ebola orthopoxviruses smallpox virus,
  monkeypox, and cowpox viruses viruses causing
  hepatitis A, B, C paramyxoviruses, rabdoviruses,
  influenza viruses, etc. This list of viruses
  could be extended by bacteria and parasites, such
  as tuberculosis, which is increasing sharply now
  in Russia, and opisthorchiasis human parasitic
  disease affecting the liver. The latter is
  endemic in Siberia, too.

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The aims of the Federal Center of Hygiene and
Epidemiology

• Sanitary and Epidemiological measures in case of
  situation with the outbreaks of infectious
  diseases or during disasters
• Statistical monitoring for control of infectious
  diseases at the federal level, reporting

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The structure of the Federal Center of Hygiene
and Epidemiology

• Disaster department
• Epidemiological department
• Laboratory services

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The period until 1991Life expectancy (both
sexes)
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The period until 1991Life expectancy in 1965
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The health care principles upon which the Soviet
health care system was to be based (Nikolai
Semashko)

• government responsibility for health
• universal access to free services
• a preventive approach to social diseases
• quality professional care
• a close relation between science and medical
  practice
• continuity of care between health promotion,
  treatment and rehabilitation.

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Next steps following the establishment of the
Semashko model in 1918

• The health care system was under the centralized
  control of the state, which financed services by
  general government revenues as part of national
  social and economic development plans.
• All health care personnel became employees of the
  centralized state, which paid salaries and
  provided supplies to all medical institutions.
• The main policy orientation throughout this
  period was to increase numbers of hospital beds
  and medical personnel.

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Next steps following the establishment of the
Semashko model in 1918 (cont.)

• Russia made massive strides in arresting the
  spread of infectious diseases.
• Drastic epidemic control measures were
  implemented, particularly in the cases of
  tuberculosis, typhoid fever, typhus, malaria and
  cholera.
• These involved community prevention approaches,
  routine check-ups, improvements in urban
  sanitation and hygiene, quarantines, etc.

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Health crisis

• The diverging paths of Russia and other
  industrialized nations with respect to health
  status from the 1960s onward has been attributed
  to the failure of the Russian health care system
  to successfully respond to the epidemiological
  transition.

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The leading causes of death in the Russia
Federation

• Cardiovascular diseases with rates that are the
  highest in the European Region.
• External causes of injury and poisoning
• Cancer

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CVD
Injury
Cancer
Average for 1999-2001
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WHY was prophylaxis with Ciprofloxacin extended
to 60 days?
More on Sverdlovsk ?
Source New York Department of Health
BECAUSE in Sverdlovsk cases appeared more than 40
days after exposure, and because of data from
animal experiments
Source New York Department of Health
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Lidia Tretyakova looks at the tombstone of her
father, Lazar Karsayev, at a cemetery in
Yekaterinburg, Russia, Thursday, Oct. 18, 2001. A
mysterious outbreak of anthrax killed at least 68
people, including Karsayev, 22 years ago in the
Russian industrial center of Sverdlovsk, today
known as Yekaterinburg. At the time, neither the
victims nor their families suspected they had
been hit by a biological weapon. (AP Photo/Alexei
Vladykin)
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Laboratory workers at the Sverdlovsk regional
epedemiological service put on the special suits
they wear when working with anthrax and other
dangerous bacteria in Yekaterinburg, Russia,
Wednesday, Oct. 17, 2001
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Terrorism

• Is an unlawful act of violence
• Intimidates governments or societies
• Goal is to achieve political, religious or
  ideological objectives

Arthur H. Garrison
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Prevention of Terrorism

• Primary prevention
• Education!!!
• Understand the differences in cultures,
  religions, beliefs and human behaviors
• Think of the peace, freedom and equality of all
  human beings, not just my group of people
• Eliminate the root of terrorism

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Prevention of Terrorism

• Secondary prevention
• Establish surveillance and monitoring system on
  terrorism attack
• Improve protective system for citizens

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Prevention of Terrorism

• Tertiary prevention
• Early detection of the sources
• Prevent the extension of impairments
• Rescue the survivors
• Console the rest of the population

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Proportion of death from terrorism in total death
in the United States
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Risk of Dying
Penguin Books, 1987
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Death Rate of Various Causes in 2000 USA and that
from Terrorism
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Why did terrorism draw considerable attention in
2001?

• The risk of dying from terrorism was extremely
  low in 1990s, and was still relatively low
  compared with some diseases in 2001
• But the death rate increased by 500 times in 2001
  due to Sept. 11
• Overall the death rate of terrorism has not been
  high
• Despite the low risk, shock, surprise and fear
  engulfed the United States and world

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Conclusion

• Terrorism is unlawful act
• Terrorism has a long history of being used to
  achieve political, religious and ideological
  objectives
• Terrorism can be conducted through firearms,
  explosive devices and biological, chemical,
  nuclear materials
• Even through the events of 2001, the risk of
  dying from terrorism has remained much lower than
  that from motor vehicles, smoking, and alcoholic
  beverage.