Cracking Public Opinion on Foreign Policy

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Cracking Public Opinion on Foreign Policy

• Assuming, for the time being, that we have good
  reason to do so.
• The answer to the why question
• What do you ask?
• What are you looking for?
• Dispositions?
• Specific opinions?
• Whom do you ask?
• The general public?
• The elite?

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Looking at elitesTwo Cuts

• Within one nation
• Herrmann and Keller
• Across several nations
• Transatlantic Trends

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The first cut

• Herrmann and Keller Beliefs, Values, and
  Strategic Choice
• American Elites
• Survey aimed at measuring policy preferences
  towards Russia, China, Japan, and Iran
• Main question In the post Cold War era, do the
  traditional categories of internationalist/isolati
  onist, cooperative/assertive, hawk/dove still
  carry analytical weight in predicting foreign
  policy orientation?
• Subsidiary question what is the role played by
  dispositions and perceptions in structuring
  foreign policy orientation?

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Methodology

• Survey administered to elites in executive and
  legislative branches as well as to those in
  business, the military, journalism, etc.
• Aimed at measuring (broadly) the impact of
  ideational factorsdispositions and
  perceptionson foreign policy orientations.

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Perceptions

• Perceived intentions
• Is target state aggressive or not?
• Perceived culture
• Is target state similar or different in terms
  of culture?
• In the US context is the target state
  democratic or not?

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Dispositions

• Assertiveness
• Ideology
• Trade orientation
• Internationalism-Isolationism

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Results (broadly)

• Trade orientation is importantincredibly so
• Assertiveness still important predictor, but
  dominated to a degree by T.O.
• Both perceptions and dispositions seem to exert
  independent influences on strategic choice
• Possible to use trade orientation and
  assertiveness to create typology of foreign
  policy orientation.
• There is room for policy coalitions to formnote
  lack of partisan divide in following slide.

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The second cut

• Transatlantic Trends 2003
• Cross national
• Measuring ideational landscape of Europe
• Basically, what is the nature of the
  Transatlantic Divide?
• Michael Moore vs. Robert Kagan vs. Stephen Walt

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The Major findings

• Fears of isolationism in US and Europe are both
  misplaced
• Both sides hold a dimmer view of one another
  post-Iraq, but this fall in favorability ratings
  is coming from record highs
• Both sides assess threats in similar terms
• Butboth sides differ on how to respond to
  threats
• Europe being much less willing to resort to
  military force and more in favor of multilateral
  approaches

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The Really big finding

• Ideational structure of European nations and US
  radically different in many cases.
• Creation of a four-fold typology of foreign
  policy orientation
• War sometimes necessary to obtain justice vs. not
• Economic power is more efficacious and legitimate
  vs. military power being so

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Who is whom?Hawks vs. Doves vs. Pragmatists vs.
Isolationists

• Hawks
• Believe war is sometimes necessary and military
  more important than economic power
• Wary of international institutions
• Doves
• Disagree that war is sometimes necessary
• Wish to strengthen international institutions

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• Pragmatists
• War is sometimes necessary
• Economic power also important
• Favor strengthening international institutions
• Isolationists
• War is not necessary/rarely necessary
• Buteconomic power is not increasingly important
• Concomitantly, little interest in international
  organizations

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Economic Power
War Necessary
War Unnecessary
Military Power
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What does this mean?

• Argument is that this typology captures the
  ideational structure of public opinion and thus
  the publics openness to arguments concerning the
  desirability of various foreign policy options

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Ideational structures explanation of foreign
policy outcome?

• United states
• Large pool of potential support in hawks and
  pragmatists
• Explains relative ease with which coalition was
  formed in favor of war with Iraq
• Great Britain
• Similar ideational structure, but Blair had to
  pull his support from the pragmatists and doves
  in his own party (and thus picked up less support
  from hawks)
• Argument, therefore, was predicated much more
  heavily on getting UN support

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• Germany
• Hawks and pragmatists only 39 of population
• Little room for pro-war coalition
• Italy Netherlands
• Support from pragmatists in both countries
• Especially notable in Italy, where overall
  support was low, but pragmatists in ruling party
  were in favor.