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Thierry G. JACQUES

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Setting the scene the history. Legal foundations. Features ... 1997 Bona Fulmar 7,000 t gasoline lost. 1997 Mundial Car oil. 1997 Vigdis Knutsen oiletanker ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Thierry G. JACQUES


1
MUMM - Management Unit of the North Sea
Mathematical Models RBINS - Royal Belgian
Institute for Natural Sciences
National North Sea Contingency Plan the Shaping
of Operational Arrangements
  • Thierry G. JACQUES
  • Marine Environmental Management Section
  • MUMM
  • 2006

http//www.mumm.ac.be/
http//www.mumm.ac.be/
2
The Shaping of the Plan
  1. Setting the scene the history
  2. Legal foundations
  3. Features of the response strategy
  4. Operational arrangements
  5. Conclusions

3
Rotterdam, Hamburg
1. Setting the scene
Antwerp
65 km of coast
Dover Strait
4
The eighties 19 accident alarms
  • 1981 World Dignity 100,000 t crude
  • 1982 Jumpa containers, toxic
  • 1982 Saint Anthony 38,000 t crude
  • 1982 Molesta fuel
  • 1982 Benetank 3,000 t heavy fuel
  • 1983 Sterling 55,000 t crude
  • 1984 Mont-Louis nuclear reprocessed
  • 1985 Stamy fuel
  • 1985 Contract Voyager dangerous drums
  • 1986 Staffortshire light petroleum gas
  • 1987 Herald of Free Ent. 5 dangerous lorries
  • 1987 Olympic Dream 2,100 t gasoline
  • 1987 Skyron 137,000 t crude
  • 1988 Borcea fuel
  • 1988 Seafreight Fariway 3 dangerous lorries
  • 1988 Anna Broere 550 t acrylonitrile
  • 1988 Westeral dangerous containers
  • 1989 Paul Robeson grounding
  • 1989 Perintis 5.8 t lindane

5
Mont Louis 1984 building awareness
  • 30 50-t cylinders of UF6
  • just off limits, out of control

6
1987 HFE
gt 100 different chemicals
From passive to reactive 1988 North Sea Plan
approved
7
The nineties
29 accident alarms
British Trent (1993)
8
  • 1990 Bussewitz 14,000 t ammonia
  • 1990 Thomas Weber 221 dangerous drums
  • 1990 Viva fuel
  • 1991 Tomisi fuel
  • 1991 Globel Ling fuel
  • 1991 Clipper Confidence Pb concentrate, Cu, Zn
  • 1991 Grete Turkol ethylbenzene
  • 1991 British Esk naphtha
  • 1992 Jostelle fuel
  • 1992 Atlantic Carrier fuel
  • 1992 Nordfrakt 3,252 t lead sulphide
  • 1992 Long Lin fuel
  • 1992 Amer Fuji fuel

9
  • 1993 Fleur de Lys fuel
  • 1993 Alexandros fuel
  • 1993 Zaphos 68,000 t condensate?
  • 1993 Sherbro bags pesticides
  • 1993 Hyaz fuel
  • 1993 British Trent 24,000 t gasoline
  • 1993 Aya fuel
  • 1994 Shoeburyness 90 M14 mines
  • 1994 Elatma 1,378 t NH4 NO3
  • 1994 Ming Fortune 38 t sodium chorate
  • 1995 Carina oil
  • 1995 Spauwer capsizal, oil
  • 1997 Bona Fulmar 7,000 t gasoline lost
  • 1997 Mundial Car oil
  • 1997 Vigdis Knutsen oiletanker
  • 1999 Ever Decent containers toxic

10
1994 MUMM signs first oil recovery contract MUMM
obtains first compensation for .be!
11
2. The Legal Foundations
  • 1987 law on the territorial sea
  • 1989 new Bonn Agreement
  • 1990-95 intl. concertation on the EEZ regime
  • 1990-96 continental shelf treaties (FR, UK, NL)
  • 1998 law ratifying UNCLOS
  • 1999 law on the EEZ
  • law on the marine environment
  • - Strict liability of the polluter
  • - ex officio intervention o/b if needed
  • - compensation for environmental disruptions

12
The 2000s getting at it!
13
  • Buying oil combating equipment
  • Strict liability for remediation
  • From reactive to offensive
  • and operational!

14
3. Special features
  • The driving force behind was Science Policy
  • Five federal departments have authority
  • Principles
  • - Strict liability of the polluter
  • - compensation for environmental disruptions
  • - ex officio intervention o/b if needed
  • 2005 Coast Guard Structure

15
(features and goals)
  • to maximize enforcement capabilities
  • to pool resources
  • (there is no dedicated response vessel)
  • to co-ordinate in a single structure
  • (good sense)
  • to make the Environment central
  • NEBA

16
4. The Operational Arrangements
  • 1988 the North Sea Alarm Plan
  • who is responsible
  • how to alarm them and when
  • where to go
  • but not what to do !
  • 21.06.2005 oiled birds
  • 21.01.2005 shore cleanup
  • 10.08.2006 operations at sea

17
Action at sea the philosophy
  • The Fed. Dept. Env. takes the lead
  • The Navy takes command at sea
  • MUMM evaluates impact (NEBA)
  • Step by step development of the intervention

18
Action at sea the structure
  • 7 phases
  • alarm
  • assessment
  • initial counter-mesures
  • choice of strategy
  • intervention
  • follow-up
  • debriefing
  • 3 scenarios
  • S1 danger of poll.
  • S2 confirmed
  • S3 major

19
the assessment
  • Search for information in one location
  • Site-specific modelling (natural processes,
    behaviour of the pollutant)
  • On scene monitoring
  • Aerial guidance

20
role of the scientist (worse case scenario,
scaling, monitoring methodology)
21
the strategic options
  • Mechanical recovery
  • Chemical dispersion
  • Mechanical dispersion
  • Do nothing ( monitoring)
  • Requisitions
  • International assistance
  • operations, methods, communications etc.

22
How good are these plans?
  • They are sound, professional instruments
  • But
  • they are coined to deploy existing means
  • they are typical Tier 1 instruments
  • Tier 2 (Rampenplan) and Tier 3 (internl.) require
    further elaboration

23
What do we miss?
Public Affairs Safety Health Science Environment T
echnical Legal
OSC
Support Staff Advisors
Deputy OSC
Operations
Logistics
Finance
Planning
24
PublicAffairs Safety Science Finance Logistics
Lead Agency
Support Staff Advisors
OSC
Operations Area 2
Operations Area 3
Operations Area 1
Operations Area 4

What we miss
25
What do we miss to fulfill the needs of Tiers 2
3?The Future
  • Strong technical support for the co-ordinators
    OSC-AR
  • IMO/OPRC contingency organization
  • administrative, financial, legal support
  • centralized logistics
  • organizational support for volunteers
  • 2 oil-recovery vessels (inshore, offshore)

26
5. Conclusions
  • The alarm procedures are sound
  • We have a professional approach
  • We have a potential structure (Coast Guard)
  • The IMO doctrine should be implemented
  • The ops plans must be scaled up to Tiers 2 3
  • Technical advice must be made explicit in the
    plans
  • The pooling of resources must be made effective
    to ensure the availability of specialized vessels

27
The End
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