Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control TradeOffs

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Future Security in SpaceCommercial, Military,
and Arms Control Trade-Offs

• Dr. Clay Moltz
• Center for Nonproliferation Studies
• Monterey Institute of International Studies

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Space History and Weapons

• Numerous assumptions about space weaponization in
  1950s
• U.S. Military Programs
• Nike Zeus (1955-61)
• Project Defender and BAMBI (1958-68)
• Dyna-Soar (X-20)(late 1950s-1963)
• Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1962) There is an
  increasing danger that outer space will become
  mans newest battle-field.

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Generations of Nike Missiles
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Counterfactual Weapons in Space

• Continued nuclear testing in 1960s
• Manned military programs
• Arms race in space vs. Soviets
• Claiming of Moon by the United States
  counterclaims by USSR
• Possible battles on Moon or in orbit
• Likely nuclear tests in space by China, France, UK

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Trade-Offs Facing Decisionmakers in the 1960s

• No civilian manned program
• Very limited commercial applications
• Serious problems for military communi-cations and
  reconnaissance from LEO
• Possible spillover of space conflict to Earth
• Arms race in space also very expensive

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Result Restraint in Space and Development of
Treaties

• Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy (1958) We
  should not spend hundreds of millions of dollars
  pending general confirmatory indications that we
  know what we are doing.
• Militarization of space, but not weaponization
• Spending on civilian, manned program and passive
  military programs
• Major commercial and political victories over
  Soviets by late 1960s

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Apollo Lunar Mission
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Today Space Weapons Again on the U.S. Agenda

• Vision 2020 and Rumsfeld II Commission identify
  U.S. vulnerabilities
• Suggest need for weapons to prevent Pearl
  Harbor in space
• But no analysis of responses or implications
• How might other aspects of U.S. space policy be
  affected?

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Analysis Needed TodayWhat are the Trade-Offs?

• Are the threats worse than during the Cold War?
• Are there realistic alternatives to weapons?
• Are there risks in deploying weapons in regards
  to existing commercial, scientific, and passive
  military missions in space?
• What kind of military action-reaction cycles
  might be played out in space?

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Rest of My Remarks

• Examine existing arms control framework in space
  (what limits exist, what is allowed)
• Discuss dilemmas U.S. faces in seeking to use
  space safely in the 21st century
• Discuss three alternative U.S. strategies for
  addressing possible vulnerabilities in space
• Follow McElroys advice to first know what we
  are doing

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Initial Treaty Developments (1963-66)

• Partial Test Ban Treaty (October 1963)
• U.N. Space Resolution (December 1963)
• Rising cost of Vietnam and U.S.-Soviet arms race
• Negotiations began in COPUOS in Vienna in July
  1966 based on 1963 U.N. resolution
• Treaty approved at U.N. in December 1966

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The Outer Space Treaty(signed in 1967, entered
into force in 1967)

• Bans nuclear tests in space
• Bans the stationing of weapons of mass
  destruction in space
• Bans stationing of military forces on the planets
  and celestial bodies (including the Moon)
• Inspections through base access on Moon and in
  orbit via peaceful uses clauses

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Relevant Language

• The explorationof outer spaceshall be carried
  out for the benefit and interests of all
  countries, irrespective of their degree of
  economic or scientific development. (Article I)
• States Partiesshall carry on activities in
  outer spacein the interest of maintaining
  international peace and security and promoting
  international co-operation and understanding.
  (Article III)

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Relevant Language

• If a State Partyhas reason to believe that an
  activity or experimentwould cause potentially
  harmful interference with activities of other
  States Partiesit shall undertake appropriate
  international consultations before proceeding
  with any such activity. (Article IX)
• States Partiesshall bear international
  responsibility for national activities in outer
  space. (Article IX)

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Other Arms Control Agreements Regarding Space

• ABM Treaty (prohibits space-based testing of
  nation-wide defenses)
• SALT I (prohibits interference with NTM of
  verification)
• Various draft treaties Treaty on the Prohibition
  of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer
  Space (1981) Soviet anti-ASAT treaty (1983)

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What is Permitted Today?

• Conventional arms in space (space mines, ASATs,
  direct ascent weapons)
• Lasers (as long as they are not ABM systems)
• Mixed use systems (space shuttle as ASAT)
• Testing of a variety of systems from Earth to
  space

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Could Loopholes Be Plugged?

• Ban on ASAT testing and use
• Ban on use and testing of all weapons in space
• Ban on use of weapons both from space and against
  space
• More limited bans on systems at certain altitudes
  (LEO vs. GEO)

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Assumptions of Current Pentagon Approach

• Arms control is futile and ineffective (or is it
  just inconvenient?)
• Space is like the sea and air (true?)
• Weapons are inevitable (other examples?)
• U.S. needs to be first (has advantages today)

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Non-Treaty Approach Favored Today

• Pursue defensive and offensive weapons
• Promote NMD missions in space (Brilliant Pebbles,
  space-based laser, and sensors)
• Develop ASAT capabilities for space denial
• Unilateral action no consultation with other
  space actors (either U.S. or foreign)

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SBIRs
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What Affects on Existing Users of Space?

• NASA, space scientists, and international efforts
  (ISS)
• Commercial space (communications, remote sensing,
  weather, and materials science)
• Passive military users (reconnaissance,
  tracking, early warning, etc.)

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Milstar
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Todays Dilemma Treaty Loopholes and Lack of
Weapons

• Possible threats to U.S. (and foreign) space
  systems do exist
• Existing treaties allow some weapons
• U.S. is not prepared in current deployments for
  effective defense or treaties
• Three possible U.S. strategies a) weapons only
  b) strengthened treaties only c) mixed strategy

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Necessary Analysis

• What are the options in each area?
• What are the costs/benefits of each option?
• How to weigh what option, overall, best serves
  U.S. interests in space?

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Option One Weapons First Strategy

• Advantages
• Helps maintain current lead in space
• Supports NMD efforts on ground, sea, and air
• Maximizes force projection/space denial
  capabilities
• Disadvantages
• Stimulates foreign military space programs
• Likely debris problems for testing in LEO
• Unpredictable commercial/political implications

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Components of Space-Based Lasers
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Option Two Strengthened Treaties Strategy

• Advantages
• Supports maximum international cooperation
• Provides positive political signals
• Maximizes scientific/commercial development
• Disadvantages
• Requires greater verification
• Could risk possible break-out
• Negotiations will require time, compromises

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International Space Station
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Communications Satellite
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Option Three Mixed (Weapons/Treaties) Strategy

• Advantages
• Secures basic defensive capabilities
• Legitimizes use of force in space
• Protects GEO or other regions from weapons
• Disadvantages
• Still stimulates foreign space weapons
• Verification requirements may be even higher
• Legitimizes weapons in LEO

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Conclusion

• Need for greater analysis of long-term space
  trends
• Need to consider action-reaction dynamics in an
  international context
• Need to consider technical characteristics of
  space (inherent vulnerabilities, orbital issues)
• Possible solution Treaties first, but keep
  weapons option in reserve

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Possible Policy

• Negotiate a ban on further ASAT testing (freeze
  U.S. advantage)
• Keep NMD weapons limited to ground-, sea-, and
  air-based platforms (Sen. Lugar)
• Require China to sign LTBT (or CTBT) and North
  Korea to join OST
• Investigate options for government/ commercial
  verification system