A Model of OASIS RoleBased Access Control and Its Support for Active Security - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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A Model of OASIS RoleBased Access Control and Its Support for Active Security

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Title: A Model of OASIS RoleBased Access Control and Its Support for Active Security


1
A Model of OASIS Role-Based Access Control and
Its Support for Active Security
Rick Murphy, IT 862, Spring 2005
2
The Open Architecture for Securely Interworking
Services (OASIS)
  • Built to support healthcare in the UK
  • Role-based access control for services
  • Roles and policies at the service level
  • Local policies
  • Service-Level Agreements between administrative
    domains
  • Parameterized roles and permissions
  • Allows policy to express policy exceptions

3
OASIS RBAC
  • Issues with role hierarchies
  • Senior roles inherit, violating least privilege
  • Conflicting constraints
  • Activation Hierarchies are one solution
  • Choose to activate roles when necessary
  • Hierarchies are static, OASIS is dynamic
  • Dynamic role-role relationship/dependencies

4
Credential-Based Role Activation
  • Authorization to activate role depends on
  • User Credentials
  • Environmental State
  • Prerequisite roles
  • User activates subset of potential roles
  • Least privilege
  • Active security takes context into consideration
  • OASIS Role Activation similar to sessions
  • Except that user does not deactivate

5
Role Activation Rules
  • Specify necessary conditions to activate a role
  • Prerequisite Roles (Session-based)
  • Appointments
  • Constraints (Separation of duties, etc.)
  • Active security uses time-based constraints
  • Parametric model based on first-order logic
  • Variables bound to time, userids, object
    attributes
  • Predicates tested at both activation and access
    time

6
Appointment vs. Delegation
  • Delegation allows user to grant role to others
  • Delegation grants target roles permissions
  • Appointment
  • Appointer role grants credential to user
  • Credential can be used to activate role(s)
  • Appointed role is task-based and restricted
  • Tightly controlled privilege propagation
  • Appointment does not confer privileges
  • Appointer can confer privileges they do not
    possess

7
Task Assignments and Qualification
  • OASIS allocates privileges by controlling role
    activation
  • Task Assigned to principal
  • Privileges aggregated into associated role
  • Combined with appointments
  • Delegator may not have permission granted
  • Granted due to holding qualification or
    credential
  • May be necessary but not sufficient

8
Appointment, Role-Based Delegation, and
Administrative Roles
  • Appointment and Role-Based Delegation enable
    privilege propagation
  • Delegation need not grant all permissions
  • Some models allow partial delegation
  • Role delegation associated with task assignment
  • Appointer may not themselves have role
  • As with administrative roles
  • Appointee granted only permissions necessary to
    task

9
Appointment Characteristics
  • Type Task assignment, qualification
  • Appointer Principal who initiates
  • Appointer role must permit issuance
  • Appointee Principal receiving appointment
  • Activation rules restrict usage
  • Identity match, validity rules
  • Revocation Triggered by invalidating CR

10
Appointment Revocation
  • Appointer-only
  • Manager delegates and monitors
  • Appointer-role
  • Limits error/damage if appointer unavailable
  • System-managed
  • Revoked automatically if conditions met
  • Periodic renewal
  • Task-Based
  • Session-Based

11
OASIS Basic Model
  • Based on first-order propositional logic
  • Basic Sets
  • U set of all user sessions
  • S set of all services
  • N set of all role names
  • E set of all environmental constraints
  • O set of all objects
  • A set of all access modes for objects
  • Extended Sets
  • R set of all roles
  • P set of all privileges
  • ? set of all appointment certificates

12
Definitions
13
Role Activation Rules
  • All of the xj conditions must be satisfied
  • These are called activating conditions
  • Examples
  • R r1, r2, r3, r4 and ? ?1, ?2
  • r1, ?1 r4
  • user in role r1 holding certificate ?1 can
    activate role r4 (providing appointment
    certificate conditions are met)
  • (r1 v r2) ?1 r4
  • Either role r1 or r2 holding ?1 can activate r4

14
Role Activation
  • Initial roles depend on ?, E only
  • Allow users to start session with some roles
  • Assumes user authentication/session setup
  • Can have roles with no antecedent conditions, r.
  • Initial roles activated after authentication
  • Additional roles activated during session
  • Restricted by
  • Activation rules
  • Parameter evaluation

15
Activation Interpretation Function
  • Activation Rule Predicates must be satisfied to
    activate a role
  • Activation Function evaluates those
  • Interpretation function for user u and variable x

Note that activation rules do not include
negation.
16
Role Activation
  • Given, G, the set of role activation functions
  • Definition depends on context session,
    environment.
  • Deactivation may be automatic when membership
    rule no longer valid

17
Activation Process
  • Each condition of the activation rule verified
  • Some activation variables static
  • Some depend on roles held, environment
  • Service s may register trigger to revoke role
  • Environment changes (timer)
  • Release of prerequisite roles
  • Membership in prerequisite groups
  • Active Security prototype uses database triggers
    to support this

18
Membership Rules
  • Role membership is predicated on Membership Rules
    (?)
  • These must remain satisfied to remain active in
    role

19
Role Deactivation
  • Deactivated when predicates no longer satisfied
  • May lead to cascading deactivation
  • OASIS has event infrastructure for triggers

20
Role-Privilege relation
  • Associates roles with privileges
  • Many-to-Many relation
  • Specified by security administrators
  • Direct Privileges
  • Those assigned to role r directly
  • Effective Privileges
  • Include those that session with user in r must
    necessarily hold.
  • DP(r)
  • EP(x) for prerequisite roles
  • EP(p) for appointment certificates

21
Privilege Sets
  • Some RBAC models allow computation of maximal
    privilege set
  • OASIS policies are more complex
  • Set on a service-by-service basis
  • Multiple, distributed management domains
  • Service-level agreements between domains
  • Appointment certificates may cross levels
  • Appointment scope may vary (local, cross-domain)

22
Extended Model
  • Basic Model decides based on propositions
    evaluated in current context
  • Roles and appointments
  • Permission acquisition policy based on those
  • Extended model allows parameterization of roles,
    appointment certificates, privileges, and
    environmental constraints
  • Define role activation rules using predicates
    rather than propositions

23
Extended Model Constructs
  • Sets as in basic model U, S, N, O, A.
  • Typed parameters
  • Allows static checking
  • Variables, constants, functions
  • Parameter modes in and out
  • P(x, y?) has in-parameter x and out-parameter y
  • Bound variables u is bound in a rule if used as
    an out parameter, else free.

24
Role Activation Rule Example
  • Cannot have free variables
  • Allows clearly-defined activation semantics
  • Example hospital policy where user who is
    employed there may acquire doctor_on_duty role
    whenever she is on duty

25
Another Example
  • All patients in a ward are in the care of the
    doctor currently on duty there.

26
Appointment Certificate Example
  • Doctor must be qualified and a current employee
    to be on duty.
  • Not all elements need be specified

27
Privileges and Authorization Rules
  • Basic model used RP relation
  • Extended model uses role parameters at access
    time
  • Authorization rules
  • (r, e1,,en - p)
  • en are environment variables, authorizing
    conditions

28
Authorization Rule Example
  • Treating_doctor in the ward is allowed to read
    fields 1, 3, and 4 only from the EHR of a patient
    under her care.

29
Model Semantics
  • Basic Model uses truth function
  • Extended Model uses variables
  • Interpretation guides assignment to variables
  • Satisfaction based on variable assignment
  • Interpret environmental predicates
  • Bind parameters
  • Evaluate terms
  • Model provides Term Evaluation rules
  • Must also consider role deactivation conditions

30
Case Studies
  • Detailed case studies provided
  • Anonymity
  • Multidomain Healthcare System

31
Related Work
  • Temporal RBAC Bertino et. al.
  • OASIS uses environmental triggers
  • Team-Based Access Control Thomas Georgiadis
  • OASIS could be extended
  • Content-Based access control Giuri and Iglio
  • Parameterization of roles via templates

32
Conclusion
  • OASIS is a practical approach to real-world
    problems
  • Designed from the start to be a distributed
    system
  • Dynamic, reactive role membership
  • Prototype system has been proposed in UK
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