Title: GOVERNMENT CONSULTATION ON THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM
1GOVERNMENT CONSULTATION ON THE REVIEW OF THE
NATIONAL COUNCIL HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM
- Presentation to the Residents Panel
- October 2009
2Questions 1 and 2Should there be separate
Housing Account (HRA). Should the ring fence be
strengthened? Any ambiguities?
- There should be a separate account for the
landlord service. (There is a separate income
stream) - Services received by the wider public should not
be subsidised by the Housing Revenue Account - Greater clarity is required on the definition of
landlord services (e.g Housing Register)
3Questions 3 and 4Should the system be based on
the Decent Homes standard?
- Decent Homes standard is too low (even with the
extension to cover communal areas) and does not
cover improvements to the stock or communal
facilities - We want to be able to achieve the Poole
Standard-this should be a national standard
4Questions 3 and 4Should any backlogs be funded
through capital grants? How to fund energy
efficiency improvements?
- Capital grants require us to apply for
them-creates uncertainty and may be inflexible,
linked to specific works - Energy efficiency improvements require financial
incentives, they should not be funded by savings
of tenants. (Residents in fact accept logic of
funding via savings but must be equitable and not
penalise low users)
5Question 5 Should leaseholders pay into sinking
funds? Should LAs have to set up sinking funds
or should it be voluntary?
- Lessees are not in favour of compulsory sinking
funds - What if the sinking fund is insufficient? Could
the LA borrow funds and charge interest to
leaseholders? Admin costs? - Charge a higher sale price to leaseholders to
take into account future investment? - Better information to future leaseholders on
potential liabilities.
6Questions 6-11The Debt Question (Slide 1)
- Present system
- a) LA pays negative subsidy back to central
government. - b) The HRAs resources are based on annual
assumptions by central government on management,
maintenance and major repairs costs - c) Central government takes the inflation and
interest rate risks
7Questions 6-11The Debt Question (Slide 2)
- The self-financing proposal
- Instead of paying negative subsidy, Poole takes
on higher debt. - The HRA takes inflation and interest rate risks.
- The amount of debt to be supported by Poole would
be based on what is affordable after managing,
maintaining and investing in the stock to reach
decent homes standard. This is the present value
calculation.
8Questions 6-11The Debt Question (Slide 3)
- The response
- (i) Assumptions about the standards to be
reached, (and how much they cost and how these
costs are calculated) are crucial - (ii) The decent homes standard is too low a
standard - (iii) Local circumstances need to be considered
- (iv) Include adaptations in calculations
9Questions 6-11The Debt Question (4)
- Response continued
- (iii) The new debt may also have additional costs
because of differences in interest rates and the
way in which the debt will be accounted for. We
would prefer these additional costs to be built
into the present value calculation so that the
new debt is not unaffordable.
10Questions 6-11The Debt Question (5)
- Response continued
- (iv) The self financing system transfers risk
from central government to the Council. (Under
the current system changes in inflation or
interest rates result in an adjustment to the
amount of negative subsidy payable-it does not
affect the Council). Therefore a self financing
system must build in margins to take account of
potential risks
11Questions 6-11The Debt Question (6)
- Response continued
- (v) Councils might generate uncommitted surpluses
through - Efficiency improvements
- More favourable than anticipated
interest/inflation rates - Other miscellaneous income
- Councils should also be able to borrow against
these surpluses
12Questions 6-11The Debt Question (7)
- Response continued
- (vi) Councils should have discretion on how to
spend this money. If we are able to achieve high
standards then surpluses could be put towards new
homes-if we cannot achieve high standards the
surpluses should be spent on existing stock (e.g.
environmental improvements/sustainability)
13Questions12-14Capital receipts
- Currently receipts from RTB, in principle, go to
central government and are spent principally on
developing new homes across the country - The risk in allowing RTB receipts being spent
locally is a reduction in house building
particularly in areas which may need it most and
which have benefitted under the current system
14Questions12-14Capital receipts (continued)
- But there is no point in building new homes if we
allow the existing homes to deteriorate - Councils should therefore have discretion on how
to spend receipts from RTB. - Review after a period to check for regional
inequities
15Questions 15-17Do proposals affect any groups
disproportionately?
- a) No obvious potential discrimination except if
the proposals prevent higher standards being
reached this affects the most vulnerable people
in society - b) There is a particular concern however about
funding for adaptations. We think the required
funding for adaptations should be built into the
initial business plan -
16Other Questions Stock Transfer
- The consultation paper suggests creation of a
level playing field between the self financing
and stock transfer options - We require more clarification on the exact
meaning of this - We also think that if self-financing is not an
attractive proposition for tenants there should
remain the opportunity to achieve higher
standards through a transfer option. This would
depend on being able to negotiate debt write off. -
17Other Questions ALMOs and other social landlords
- We think the ALMO model has been successful
and would support the idea that ALMOs should be
able to secure funding from external sources and
to take on the management of other social
landlords stock. -