Title: The Impact of Demographics on Investment in Japan and China
1The Impact of Demographics on Investment in Japan
and China
- JOHN GREENWOOD, WIESBADEN, 2. JUNE 2005
2The Impact of Demographics on Investment in
Japan and China
THE IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHICS ON CAPITAL MARKETS
China will grow old before it grows rich
Stuart Leckie
3OUTLINE
THE IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHICS ON CAPITAL MARKETS
01 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN JAPAN CHINA 02 -
IMPACT OF AGING ON SAVINGS, INVESTMENT
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES 03
IMPACT ON ECONOMIC GROWTH INVESTMENT
RETURNS
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE All material presented is
compiled from sources believed to be reliable and
current, but accuracy cannot be guaranteed. This
is not to be construed as an offer to buy or sell
any financial instruments. It is not our
intention to state, indicate or imply in any
manner that current or past results are
indicative of future profitability or
expectations. As with all investments there are
associated inherent risks. Please obtain and
review all financial material carefully before
investing. This publication may contain
confidential and proprietary information of
INVESCO Institutional and/or AMVESCAP
International Companies. Circulation, disclosure,
or dissemination of all or any part of this
material to any unauthorized persons is
prohibited. Unauthorized reproduction or
distribution of all or any part of this material
is prohibited.
4Demographic Trends in Japan China
01
5Demographic Trends in Japan China
- The Populations of Japan and China are...
- At different stages of development
- Japans population has already peaked and is now
starting to decline - Chinas population is still increasing, and will
continue to do so until around 2030, and then it
too will start to decline - Indias population, however, will continue to
increase beyond 2050, exceeding Chinas
population by around 2030.
6Demographic Trends in Japan China
Title
Source United Nations, World Population
Prospects, 2004 Revision, Medium variant
7Demographic Trends in Japan China
- Two Key Developments are Aging and the Increase
in the Dependency Ratio, driven by - Falling birth rate and increased life expectancy
- Decline in working age population as of total
population - Again, Japan and China are at different stages of
development, notably - -- Japan already has the longest life
expectancy in the world (78.3 for men, and 85.3
for women), but it is expected to increase
further (to 84.1 and 92.5 respectively in 2050) - -- Chinas dependency ratio is still falling as
the birth rate is very low and the working age
population is increasing, but the country is
still younger than Japan (median age 32.6
versus 42.9 in Japan in 2005).
8Demographic Trends in Japan China
Source United Nations, World Population
Prospects, 2004 Revision
9Demographic Trends in Japan China
Source United Nations, World Population
Prospects, 2004 Revision
10Demographic Trends in Japan China
Total Population (million)
Asia
Japan
China
India
2005
128.1
1,315.8
1,103.4
3,905.4
2050
112.2
1,392.3
1,592.7
5,217.2
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)
Japan
China
India
Asia
2005
81.9
71.5
63.1
67.3
2050
88.3
78.7
75.9
77.2
Elderly (65) as of Population
Japan
China
India
Asia
2005
19.7
7.6
5.3
6.4
2050
35.9
23.6
14.8
17.5
Source United Nations, World Population
Prospects, 2004 Revision
11Demographic Trends in Japan China - Summary
- Japan is leading the world trend in aging
- Japan has the highest life expectancy in the
world, a high median age (42.9), and will have a
dependency ratio by 2050 that implies one worker
per dependent. - Chinas median age is lower (32.6 versus 42.9 in
Japan), and will remain lower even after 2050
(44.8 versus 52.3 in Japan). - Chinas dependency ratios are lagging about 20
years behind Japans - This should be advantageous to China. However,
Chinas per capita income is far lower than
Japans (1,100 versus 34,180), and will not
catch up for many decades.
12Savings, Investment Current Account Balances
02
13Savings, Investment Current Account Balances
- Modigliani Brumberg Life Cycle Savings
Hypothesis - Low income households are disproportionately
young and elderly - High income households tend to be middle-aged
- Young and old households have high average
propensity to consume - Therefore societies with more middle-aged
households will tend to have lower average
propensity to consume, or higher average savings
rate - National Savings Current Account Balance
Investment - Japan model based on population projections,
working age population, growth of output per
worker.
14Savings, Investment Current Account Balances
- Chinas Savings Rate Still Rising
- Comparable to Japan in 1950-70
- Working age population still increasing,
therefore we should expect high and rising
savings rate - Actual level between 45-50 of GDP
15Savings, Investment Current Account Balances
SourceThomson Datastream, May 2004
16Savings, Investment Current Account Balances
- Japans Saving Investment Rate Declining since
1991 - Reaction to over-investment during asset bubble
of 1985-90 - Impact of aging society starting to be apparent
- Working age population falling since 1998
- Corollary of Modigliani Brumberg hypothesis
Societies with more older-aged households will
tend to have higher average propensity to
consume, or lower average savings rate
17Savings, Investment Current Account Balances
Peak, 1991
Verteilung der Weltbevölkerung
Source Thomson Datastream, May 2004
18Savings, Investment Current Account Balances
- Japan Model based on population projections,
working age population, growth of output per
worker. - Population projection to 2050 (United Nations)
- Working age population projection (United
Nations) - Based on recent decade, assume stable
participation rate (74) - Estimate labour productivity based on 1991-2004
average (1.2 p.a.) - Calculate output per worker and output per capita
- Difference represents net amount of goods and
services required to be imported - Apply required net imports to current trade
balance (as GDP)
19Savings, Investment Current Account Balances
JAPAN MODEL
Source Thomson Datastream, May 2004 and INVESCO
calculations
20Savings, Investment Current Account Balances
JAPAN MODEL
Source Thomson Datastream, May 2004 and INVESCO
calculations
21Savings, Investment Current Account Balances
JAPAN MODEL
Source Thomson Datastream, May 2004 and INVESCO
calculations
22Savings, Investment Current Account Balances -
Summary
- Theory (Modigliani Brumberg) suggests (1)
societies with more middlle-aged households will
tend to have lower average propensity to consume,
or higher average savings rate, and (2) societies
with more older-aged households will tend to have
higher average propensity to consume, or lower
average savings rate. - Evidence from China (rising population of working
age and rising savings rate) confirms hypothesis
(1). - Evidence from Japan (falling population of
working age and falling savings rate) confirms
hypothesis (2). - Japan model based on population projections,
working age population, growth of output per
worker to explore current account implications.
23Economic Growth Investment Returns
03
24Economic Growth Investment Returns
- With aging population and rising dependency
ratios, savings and investment rates tend to
decline - Adverse impact of aging on fiscal balance.
Government revenues reduced by impact of lower
working population on incomes, profits and
output. Government expenditures increased by
enhanced spending on pensions, health care, and
long term residential care. - In OECD, spending on the elderly estimated to
rise by an average of 7 of GDP between 2000 and
2050, with additional expenditures on health care
exceeding those on pensions in a number of
countries. (Casey 2003, European Commission 2001)
.
25Economic Growth Investment Returns
- JAPANESE GROWTH PROSPECTS
- Output per worker 1991-2004 increased at 1.2
p.a. - Working population now declining
- Savings rate on long-term decline
- Rising dependency ratios implies higher social,
pension and health care burdens - Numerous negatives imply GDP growth only 0.9
p.a. and per capita GDP growth only 1.2 p.a.
(2000-2050) (McMorrow Roger, EC, April 2003)
26Economic Growth Investment Returns
(McMorrow Roger, EC, April 2003)
27Economic Growth Investment Returns
Deviation from baseline
(McMorrow Roger, EC, April 2003)
28Economic Growth Investment Returns
- Both Japan and China face difficult challenges
- Japan is rich, but has the greatest longevity and
faces the highest dependency ratios. - China is aging more slowly than Japan today, but
it will not be so wealthy when its dependency
ratios start to rise. - Assuming Japans per capita income grows at 1
p.a., and Chinas grows at 8 p.a (until 10,000)
then 5 p.a., Chinas per capita income will be
less than half of Japans in 2050.
Source World Bank, December 2004, and INVESCO
calculations
29Economic Growth Investment Returns
- INVESTMENT RETURNS
- Hypothesis A Profits f (Economic Growth Rate)
- Hypothesis B Integrated capital markets imply
return on capital is equalised across
economies and asset classes - However, Chinas capital markets not integrated
with global financial markets (due to foreign
exchange controls) - CURRENCY PROSPECTS
- Will RMB benefit from Balassa-Samuelson effect as
the Yen did?
Source Bloomberg, May 2005
30Economic Growth Investment Returns - Summary
- JAPANs economic growth rate already impacted by
decline of working age population and by aging. - Prospects negative due to inability to expand
labour supply, savings and investment rate
falling, structural reforms proving difficult. - CHINAs growth rate likely to remain high for
next 2-3 decades - Catch-up in productivity, import of capital and
technology. - INVESTMENT RETURNS Outlook ambiguous.
- Closed capital market implies differential
returns, and not necessarily favourable, viz.
Chinas A-share market. - CURRENCY RMB could benefit from
Balassa-Samuelson effect (real appreciation
due to incremental productivity gains).
31OUTLINE
THE IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHICS ON CAPITAL MARKETS
01 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN JAPAN CHINA 02 -
IMPACT OF AGING ON SAVINGS, INVESTMENT
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES 03
IMPACT ON ECONOMIC GROWTH INVESTMENT
RETURNS
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE All material presented is
compiled from sources believed to be reliable and
current, but accuracy cannot be guaranteed. This
is not to be construed as an offer to buy or sell
any financial instruments. It is not our
intention to state, indicate or imply in any
manner that current or past results are
indicative of future profitability or
expectations. As with all investments there are
associated inherent risks. Please obtain and
review all financial material carefully before
investing. This publication may contain
confidential and proprietary information of
INVESCO Institutional and/or AMVESCAP
International Companies. Circulation, disclosure,
or dissemination of all or any part of this
material to any unauthorized persons is
prohibited. Unauthorized reproduction or
distribution of all or any part of this material
is prohibited.