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Lockpicking

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Title: Lockpicking


1
Lockpicking Physical Security
Deviant Ollam ekoparty 2009/09/16
2
Who am i ?
3
Who am i ?
4
Who am i ?
auditing assessments research trainings
5
Who am i ?
auditing assessments research trainings
workshops public lectures lockpick
village contests games
6
Who am i ?
7
Who am i ?
8
Who am i ?
9
But on to locks…
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  • Methods of Defeat
  • Destructive Entry (Drilling or Cutting)
  • Loss of Key Control (Key Theft or Duplication)
  • Lock Manipulation (Picking or Bypass)

15
Destructive Entry
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Non-Destructive Entry
25
  • Picking Theory
  • Lock Components Function
  • How Keys Operate
  • Opening Without a Key
  • Binding Pins
  • Setting Pins
  • Common Errors

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photo courtesy of datagram
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Pin by Pin
42
  • Demonstration
  • Cross Your Fingers!
  • Think No Demonstration Effect
  • Common Errors
  • Excessive Tension
  • Over-lifting

43
Raking
44
Half-Diamond
45
Half-Diamond
46
Half-Diamond
47
Tensioner Placement
48
Its That Simple
Lifting Technique Raking Technique Hybrid
Technique
49
Combination Locks
50
  • Combination Locks
  • Show of Hands

51
  • Combination Locks
  • Show of Hands
  • Immensely popular in the USA
  • Schools
  • Gyms
  • Etc.

52
  • Combination Locks
  • Show of Hands
  • Immensely popular in the USA
  • Schools
  • Gyms
  • Etc.
  • These Locks Provide
  • Essentially Zero Security

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  • Padlock Shims
  • Simple
  • Cheap
  • Commercial
  • Do-It-Yourself (DIY)

56
DIY Shims - A Real-Life Example
57
DIY Shims - A Real-Life Example
58
DIY Shims - A Real-Life Example
59
DIY Shims - A Real-Life Example
60
DIY Shims - A Real-Life Example
61
  • Combination Locks
  • Also possible to decode
  • Find the sticking points
  • Eliminate half numbers
  • Eliminate same numbers
  • You have the last number
  • Simple math from that point
  • Calculation tools available

MasterLock.xls
62
  • Combination Locks
  • Also possible to decode
  • Find the sticking points
  • Multiple dials stick, too

63
Warded Locks
64
  • Warded Locks
  • Inexpensive
  • Simple Design
  • Popular Outdoors
  • Rudimentary Mechanism
  • Resists Dirt Fouling
  • Internal Latch
  • Cant Use Conventional Picks
  • However, Other Tools Exist

65
  • Warded Innards
  • Simple latch spring mechanism
  • Unlike pin tumblers, where every
  • segment of the key is important,
  • warded keys have only one
  • useful segment
  • The rest of the key simply gets in
  • in the way

66
  • Warded Picks
  • Store bought
  • Homemade
  • All very simple

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Tubular Locks
77
  • Tubular Locks
  • Still traditional pin stacks
  • Pins simply arranged in
  • unconventional pattern
  • Need specialized tools
  • (well… sometimes)

Cormu picking tubular locks Low-tech Kryptonite
bypass
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Dimple Locks
83
  • Dimple Locks
  • Traditional pin stacks
  • Horizontal keyway

84
  • Dimple Locks
  • Traditional pin stacks
  • Horizontal keyway
  • Nearly impossible to
  • insert usual pick tools

dev
85
  • Dimple Locks
  • Traditional pin stacks
  • Horizontal keyway
  • Nearly impossible to
  • insert usual pick tools
  • Other means to bypass
  • Impressioning
  • Bump keying

Barry Wels Laz impressioning a dimple lock
86
Wafer Locks
87
  • Wafer Locks
  • Compact Design
  • Popular in cars, cabinets
  • Totally Different Mechanism
  • No pin tumblers
  • Difficult to pick traditionally
  • Raking and jiggling attacks

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Lever Locks
103
  • Lever Locks
  • Long-Standing
  • Some of the very first metal locks
  • No major changes for centuries
  • Sometimes Very Strong
  • Supremely tough springs
  • Use of teeth to prevent picking
  • Common in safe deposit boxes

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Lever Locks
106
Lever Locks
107
Lever Locks
108
  • Lever Locks
  • Often simple picking
  • Just takes a lot of effort
  • Sometimes special tools
  • High-security levers are
  • all but impossible

Picking lever locks
109
Bumping
110
  • The Bump Key Attack
  • Popping a lock open with a special key
  • Takes little skill, almost no training, no
    special tools
  • Vast number of locks are vulnerable
  • The media (and public) is finally taking notice
  • Exploit closely related to physics of a pick gun
  • Best explained via billiard ball analogy…

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  • The Bump Key Attack
  • Modifying a key designed for the lock
  • Not necessarily a key that opens the lock
  • Just a key that fits the keyway of the lock
  • Cut all notches to the deepest bitting depth
  • Professional key machine, grinder, dremel, etc.

115
The Bump Key Attack
116
The Bump Key Attack
http//toool.nl/bumping.pdf
117
  • The Bump Key Attack
  • Modifying the key
  • Cutting points

118
  • The Bump Key Attack
  • Modifying the key
  • Cutting points
  • Cutting depths

119
The Bump Key Attack
120
The Bump Key Attack
121
The Bump Key Attack
Make your own keys sloppily? Not to worry… they
self-align.
122
The Bump Key Attack
photos courtesy of datagram
123
Are all locks this simple? What can we do?
124
Are all locks this simple? What can we do?
Not to worry… better security exists.
125
Better Security
126
  • High-Security Features
  • Advanced Keyways
  • Unshimmable Padlocks
  • Pick-Resistant Pins
  • Auxiliary Locking Systems
  • Rotating Disk Mechanisms
  • Magnetic Key Designs
  • Unimpressionable Keys
  • Bump-Resistant Locks

127
  • Advanced Keyways
  • Simple… straight and wide

128
  • Advanced Keyways
  • Simple… straight and wide
  • Medium… straight but narrow

129
  • Advanced Keyways
  • Simple… straight and wide
  • Medium… straight but narrow
  • Complex… thinner and curvy

130
  • Advanced Keyways
  • Simple… straight and wide
  • Medium… straight but narrow
  • Complex… thinner and curvy
  • Harder… lots of angles

131
  • Advanced Keyways
  • Simple… straight and wide
  • Medium… straight but narrow
  • Complex… thinner and curvy
  • Harder… lots of angles
  • Fiendish… overlapping wards

132
Un-Shimmable Padlocks
133
  • Pick-Resistant Pins
  • Spool

134
  • Pick-Resistant Pins
  • Spool

135
  • Pick-Resistant Pins
  • Spool
  • Mushroom

136
  • Pick-Resistant Pins
  • Spool
  • Mushroom
  • Serrated

137
  • Pick-Resistant Pins
  • Spool
  • Mushroom
  • Serrated

138
  • Pick-Resistant Pins
  • Spool
  • Mushroom
  • Serrated

139
  • Side Bars
  • Similar to side pins
  • Restrict plug movement
  • Harder to pick
  • than pin stacks

140
Side Bar Finger Pins
141
Side Bar Finger Pins
142
Side Bar Finger Pins Schlage Primus
1430
143
Side Bar Sliders
144
Side Bar Sliders
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147
  • Rotating Disks
  • Tremendous Security
  • Mimics a safe lock
  • Very Difficult To Pick
  • Takes much time and great skill
  • Specialized tools required

148
  • Rotating Disks
  • Tremendous Security
  • Mimics a safe lock
  • Very Difficult To Pick
  • Takes much time and great skill
  • Specialized tools required
  • Two-in-One Tool
  • Manipulates disks individually
  • John Falle, English safecracker
  • Decodes cut positions

Barry Wels picking a rotating disk lock with Mike
Glasser
149
  • Rotating Disks
  • Abloy Protec
  • Not just rotating disks
  • Disk blocking mechanism
  • False cuts everywhere
  • Unpickable?
  • Closest I ever come to using that word
  • Two-in-one tools cannot be used

150
  • Magnetic Locks
  • Miwa
  • Japanese company
  • Array of magnetic pins
  • Simple North / South
  • Evva MCS
  • Austrian company
  • Axial-rotated magnets
  • Interaction with sidebar

151
  • Evva Magnetic Code System
  • Possibly most duplication-resistant lock out
    there

152
How to Stop Bumping
153
  • Countermeasures to Bumping
  • Some sidebars rock
  • Slider-based sidebars
  • Rotating Disk locks (Abloy clones)
  • Magnetic Key systems (Evva MCS)
  • Other sidebars do not always help
  • geographically exploitable systems
  • Medeco Mul-T-Lock can be bumped
  • even my beloved Schlage Primus?? Say it aint
    so!
  • Simpler Approaches
  • Trap Pins
  • Shallow Drilling
  • Joined Pins
  • Top Gapping
  • Fluids Gels

1500
154
Trap Pins
155
Trap Pins Normal Key Operation
156
Trap Pins Attempt Without a Key
157
  • Trap Pins
  • A Double-Edged Sword
  • Absolute evidence of any
  • any attempted pick or bypass
  • Only one course of action
  • after trap pins have fired
  • Remove lock from door and
  • replace with a new one
  • Shallow drilling is simpler and
  • offers more elegant protection…

158
Shallow Drilling Normal pin stack chambers being
drilled…
159
Shallow Drilling Notice the difference with
shallow drilling…
160
Shallow Drilling Pin stacks have differing
heights in their default position
161
Shallow Drilling Attempts at bumping will fail,
not all pins touch the key
162
Shallow Drilling No easy, outward evidence of
this protection
163
Shallow Drilling Conceivably possible to examine
for shallow stacks…
… but what then, carry a whole ring of bump keys?
164
Joining Pins Mechanically or Magnetically
Corbin Emhart
165
Top gapping This design offers the most promise
for fully hardening basic pin tumbler locks
against the bump key attack.
166
Top gapping Master Lock has published on this
topic and begun equipping locks with specialized
top pins. Look for part numbers ending with the
letter N or ask a locksmith.
167
Ilcos Design Ilco (maker of many aftermarket
lock parts, keys, etc) has created their own
anti-bump top pin…
168
Ilcos Design Ilco (maker of many aftermarket
lock parts, keys, etc) has created their own
anti-bump top pin…
169
Ilcos Design Ilco (maker of many aftermarket
lock parts, keys, etc) has created their own
anti-bump top pin…
170
Kwikset? When even this company is making locks
designed to prevent bump keying, its finally
gotten proper attention … pity
that their new lock design is flawed.
171
  • What locks have these countermeasures?
  • Short answer very few, at least at present
  • Trap Pins MC (Mitchel Collin)
    "Antiklop" model
  • Shallow Drilling CES (Carl Eduard Schulte)
    VA5 VB7 models
  • Joining Pins Corbin Emhart (no longer
    sold)
  • Top Gapping Master Lock / American Lock
    (retail or re-pinned)

172
  • Fluids Gels
  • Pickbuster
  • Invented by Mark Garratt
  • Distributed by Almore
  • based in Pontypridd, Wales
  • Impedes Pin Movement
  • Mixed Industry Reaction
  • Pros inexpensive, simple, bump resistant
  • Cons not permanent, not perfect, and...
  • Significant concern about fouling
  • Weigh Costs and Benefits Yourself

173
  • A Word About Lubricants
  • Three Main Kinds
  • Wet (Oil, Silicone)
  • Dry (Graphite)
  • Drying (WD-40)
  • Different Products for
  • Different Situations
  • Considerations
  • Precision mechanisms
  • Dirt other fouling
  • How much you care about the lock
  • When to use which product

174
  • Large Facilities
  • Unique concerns
  • Key management
  • Varied permissions

175
Mastering
176
  • Master Key Theory
  • Remember standard
  • pin tumbler stacks?
  • Same operation, with extra
  • pin (or wafer) in the middle
  • Potential for varied
  • levels of clearance
  • Also potential for many
  • additional shear lines

177
Master Pinning
178
Master Pinning Users Change Key
179
Master Pinning Top Master Key
180
Master Pinning Imagine a crafty user…
181
Master Pinning They modify their key… it doesnt
open
182
Master Pinning They modify their key… it doesnt
open
183
Master Pinning They modify their key… it doesnt
open
184
Master Pinning They modify their key… suddenly it
opens!
185
Master Pinning This last chamber is now at the
master height
http//www.crypto.com/papers/mk.pdf
186
Master Pinning This bitting can be measured
http//www.crypto.com/papers/mk.pdf
187
Master Pinning This is how intermediate master
keying works
Keep in mind… in a large, mastered facility all
doors have within them the full top master
pinning. Compromise of any single door can give
access everywhere.
188
SFIC Locks
189
  • SFIC Locks
  • Small Format
  • Interchangeable Core
  • BEST
  • Yale
  • Others
  • Easy to Manage
  • Plug and pins all eject as
  • a single, contained unit
  • Hard to Pick
  • Multiple independent shear lines
  • Keyways are worse than any nightmares you could
    find at
  • the bottom of a bottle or at the hands of the
    U.S. Congress

190
  • SFIC Locks
  • Very popular in large institutions
  • Cores remove with a control key
  • Two independent shear lines
  • Raising pins to one level allows
  • plug to rotate freely
  • Raising pins to other shear line
  • locks plug and control sleeve together
  • and they turn as one, either exposing
  • or retracting cores retaining tab
  • Picking attempts typically fail with standard
    tools
  • Tension binds across both shear lines

191
SFIC Locks Pin Stacks
top pins
control pins
bottom pins
core housing
control sleeve
plug
192
SFIC Locks Operating Key
193
SFIC Locks Control Key
194
  • SFIC Locks
  • Normal picking attempts typically fail
  • Tension binds across both shear lines
  • Extremely likely to set pins in various places

195
  • SFIC Locks
  • There are specialized tools
  • Torsion wrench with fingers puts pressure on
    only one shear line
  • Still very difficult, however, due to tight
    tolerances and keyways

196
  • SFIC Locks
  • Matt Blazes modified sleeve
  • Nothing for specialized finger wrench to grab

197
  • SFIC Locks
  • New BEST design
  • I believe the locks are manufactured this way now

0915
198
Elevators
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1030
208
Key Control
209
  • Key Control
  • Using Restricted Keyways
  • Patent Law to Restrict Blanks
  • EZ Entrie Machine
  • Side Milling, etc. cant be duplicated as
    easily
  • Rotating disks, esp. Primus, are even
    harder
  • Interactive keys… Nearly impossible
  • Magnetic keys? Virtually inconceivable

210
Police Locks
211
Physical Security at its Most Basic
212
Handcuffs
213
  • Handcuffs
  • Simple mechanism

214
  • Handcuffs
  • Simple mechanism
  • Pawl arm

215
  • Handcuffs
  • Simple mechanism
  • Pawl arm
  • Ratchet latch

216
  • Handcuffs
  • Simple mechanism
  • Pawl arm
  • Ratchet latch
  • Spring

217
  • Handcuffs
  • Simple mechanism
  • Pawl arm
  • Ratchet latch
  • Spring
  • Double lock bar

218
  • Handcuffs
  • Simple mechanism
  • Pawl arm
  • Ratchet latch
  • Spring
  • Double lock bar

219
  • Handcuffs
  • Simple mechanism
  • Pawl arm
  • Ratchet latch
  • Spring
  • Double lock bar
  • Simple operation
  • Opening closing
  • Shimming
  • Deviants Escape
  • Rendermans Escape
  • Double lock

220
  • Gun Locks
  • Trigger Locks
  • Slide/Action Locks
  • What they are…
  • … and what they are not

221
  • Trigger Locks
  • Typically offered
  • in two models
  • Bad and
  • Colossally Bad
  • Many vendors, all essentially
  • exploring these two designs

Deviant bypassing a particularly bad trigger lock
222
Trigger Locks Colossally Bad Models
223
  • Slide/Action Locks
  • Improved design, but still potentially weak
  • Much depends on the quality of the lock itself

224
  • Gun Locks
  • These are locks to stop
  • accidents with children
  • These are NOT
  • theft deterrents
  • These are NOT designed
  • to thwart criminals
  • Kids are smarter
  • than you think
  • Consider a safe or
  • a locking cabinet

225
Safes
226
  • Safes
  • Mechanism Operation
  • Wheels
  • Gates
  • Fence
  • Nose
  • Cam

227
photos courtesy of Don the Shadow
228
photos courtesy of Don the Shadow
229
photos courtesy of Don the Shadow
230
photos courtesy of Don the Shadow
231
photos courtesy of Don the Shadow
232
photos courtesy of Don the Shadow
233
photos courtesy of Don the Shadow
234
  • Safes
  • Mechanism Operation
  • Wheels, Gates, a Fence
  • Insurance Ratings
  • Underwriters Labs (TL, TRTL, TXTL )

235
  • Safes
  • Mechanism Operation
  • Wheels, Gates, a Fence
  • Insurance Ratings
  • Underwriters Labs (TL, TRTL, TXTL )

236
  • Safes
  • Mechanism Operation
  • Wheels, Gates, a Fence
  • Insurance Ratings
  • Underwriters Labs (TL, TRTL, TXTL )

photo courtesy of Barry Wels
237
  • Safes
  • Mechanism Operation
  • Wheels, Gates, a Fence
  • Insurance Ratings
  • Underwriters Labs (TL, TRTL, TXTL )

238
  • Safes
  • Mechanism Operation
  • Wheels, Gates, a Fence
  • Insurance Ratings
  • Underwriters Labs (TL, TRTL, TXTL )

239
  • Safes
  • Mechanism Operation
  • Wheels, Gates, a Fence
  • Insurance Ratings
  • Underwriters Labs (TL, TRTL, TXTL )

240
  • Safes
  • Mechanism Operation
  • Wheels, Gates, a Fence
  • Insurance Ratings
  • Underwriters Labs (TL, TRTL, TXTL )
  • Compromise
  • Manual or Robotic Manipulation

photo courtesy of Barry Wels
241
  • Safes
  • Mechanism Operation
  • Wheels, Gates, a Fence
  • Insurance Ratings
  • Underwriters Labs (TL, TRTL, TXTL )
  • Compromise
  • Manual or Robotic Manipulation
  • Manipulation-Proof Safes (SG 8400)

242
  • Safes
  • Mechanism Operation
  • Wheels, Gates, a Fence
  • Insurance Ratings
  • Underwriters Labs (TL, TRTL, TXTL )
  • Compromise
  • Manual or Robotic Manipulation
  • Manipulation-Proof Safes (SG 8400)
  • Electronic Kaba Mas Hamilton X-series

243
  • Safes
  • Mechanism Operation
  • Wheels, Gates, a Fence
  • Insurance Ratings
  • Underwriters Labs (TL, TRTL, TXTL )
  • Compromise
  • Manual or Robotic Manipulation
  • Manipulation-Proof Safes (SG 8400)
  • Electronic Kaba Mas Hamilton X-series
  • Fire Safes
  • Often terribly weak hardware
  • Also not typically rated for electronic media
  • Hotel Safes
  • Hit or Miss

244
Electronic Locks
245
  • Electrical Systems… Common Weaknesses
  • Hotel safes
  • Deadbolts
  • Access control systems
  • Magnetic door locks
  • Passive IR sensors

Malaysian Hotel (240) Major Malfunction (100)
246
Electrical Systems… Common Weaknesses (Adding
electricity to something isnt a panacea)
247
Electrical Systems… Common Weaknesses (Adding
electricity to something isnt a panacea)
248
Electrical Systems… Common Weaknesses (Adding
electricity to something isnt a panacea)
249
A problematic access control door
250
A problematic access control door
251
Magnetic door and window systems
252
Magnetic door and window systems
wiring protected? fail open or shut?
253
Is this a good access control device?
254
Is this a good access control device?
numbers worn off? default code perhaps? observe
operation?
255
Is this a good access control device?
256
Is this a good access control device?
can you fake it? tied to other token? what
wiring behind?
257
Access control systems
1000
258
Access control systems
259
Access control systems
ethernet
260
Access control systems
ethernet
serial or plain copper
261
Zac Franken… the Gecko project
262
  • Adding electricity isnt a panacea
  • Does it fail safe or fail open?
  • Electromagnets need power
  • Dealing with fire codes, etc
  • Is it layers of security or two routes of
    access?
  • Wired in series or parallel, as it were
  • How well versed are the manufacturers?
  • Often theyre good at either locks or electronics

1045
263
  • Adding electricity isnt a panacea
  • Making the leap from electrons to metal
  • Often the low-tech attacks are most risky
  • Exit systems
  • Conan approach

Winkhaus Blue Chip (242)
264
  • Adding electricity isnt a panacea
  • Making the leap from electrons to metal

265
  • Adding electricity isnt a panacea
  • Making the leap from electrons to metal
  • Maybe just add more metal instead

266
Data Leaks
267
Beware of Information Leakage
268
Beware of Information Leakage
269
Beware of Information Leakage
1100
270
Forensics
271
Forensic Evidence
1115
272
Forensic Evidence
273
Forensic Evidence
274
Forensic Evidence
275
Forensic Evidence 250 uses
276
Forensic Evidence 1500 uses
277
Forensic Evidence 5000 uses
278
Forensic Evidence 250 uses
279
Forensic Evidence 1500 uses
280
Forensic Evidence 5000 uses
281
Forensic Evidence
282
Forensic Evidence
283
Forensic Evidence
284
Forensic Evidence
285
Forensic Evidence
286
Forensic Evidence - picking
287
Forensic Evidence - raking
288
Forensic Evidence - both
289
Forensic Evidence ugh
290
Forensic Evidence leet
291
Forensic Evidence
292
Forensic Evidence pin sides
293
Forensic Evidence
294
Forensic Evidence
295
Forensic Evidence tail cam
296
Forensic Evidence
297
Forensic Evidence
298
Forensic Evidence
299
Forensic Evidence
300
Forensic Evidence
301
Forensic Evidence
302
Forensic Evidence - bumping
303
Forensic Evidence bumping
304
Forensic Evidence
305
Forensic Evidence
306
Forensic Evidence
307
Forensic Evidence Impressioning
308
  • Forensic Evidence
  • Sometimes MAJOR insurance implications
  • Suspect something fishy?
  • Dont compromise the scene
  • Contact a professional
  • Forensic Locksmith vs. Yellow-Pages Locksmith
  • Having newer locks matters
  • Age makes for a mess, internally
  • Also… your locks should be updated as a matter
    of routine

309
Real World Security
310
  • Security in the Real World
  • Technical Finesse or Brute Force
  • Which is more common?
  • Common criminals do not pick locks
  • A 100 lock in a 10 door is little help
  • Doors
  • Solid-core, heavy material
  • Heavy hinges, screws deep into frame
  • Deadbolts with round core(s)
  • Windows
  • Break glass to reach knobs
  • Shatterproof film
  • Visibility
  • Motion-sensing lights
  • Keep bushes trees trimmed

Window Latch
311
basic locks
312
resistant locks
313
high security
314
unpickable
315
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317
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318
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324
protecting against force or finesse?
325
Security is only as effective…
… as the person using it
326
  • A Security Fable
  • American 700 Padlock
  • Solid design
  • Serrated pins
  • Interchangeable cores

327
  • A Security Fable
  • American 700 Padlock
  • Solid design
  • Serrated pins
  • Interchangeable cores
  • Core Operation
  • Back of plug… half circle
  • Control cylinder… quarter circle

328
  • A Security Fable
  • American 700 Padlock
  • Solid design
  • Serrated pins
  • Interchangeable cores
  • Core Operation
  • Back of plug… half circle
  • Control cylinder… quarter circle
  • Peterson Bypass Tool
  • Slips all the way through core
  • Interacts with control cylinder directly

329
  • A Security Fable
  • American 700 Padlock
  • Solid design
  • Serrated pins
  • Interchangeable cores
  • Core Operation
  • Back of plug… half circle
  • Control cylinder… quarter circle
  • Peterson Bypass Tool
  • Slips all the way through core
  • Interacts with control cylinder directly
  • Security Wafer

330
  • A Security Fable
  • American 700 Padlock
  • Solid design
  • Serrated pins
  • Interchangeable cores
  • Core Operation
  • Back of plug… half circle
  • Control cylinder… quarter circle
  • Peterson Bypass Tool
  • Slips all the way through core
  • Interacts with control cylinder directly
  • Security Wafer
  • Wafer Breaker Tools

331
  • A Security Fable
  • American 700 Padlock
  • Solid design
  • Serrated pins
  • Interchangeable cores
  • Core Operation
  • Back of plug… half circle
  • Control cylinder… quarter circle
  • Peterson Bypass Tool
  • Slips all the way through core
  • Interacts with control cylinder directly
  • Security Wafer
  • Wafer Breaker Tools

332
  • A Security Fable
  • American 700 Padlock
  • Solid design
  • Serrated pins
  • Interchangeable cores
  • Core Operation
  • Back of plug… half circle
  • Control cylinder… quarter circle
  • Peterson Bypass Tool
  • Slips all the way through core
  • Interacts with control cylinder directly
  • Security Wafer
  • Wafer Breaker Tools
  • Shackeless Padlock… the American 2000

333
Thank you so much. Thank you to TOOOL.us,
TOOOL.nl, mouse, Dave, Steve, JVR, Mr. E, Barry
Han, Laz, valanx the FOOLS, Matt Blaze,
jackalope, calypso, renderman, Bruce Heidi …
and thank you so so much to Daisy Belle! D
334
Security is only as effective…
… as the person using it
335
  • So which locks are which?
  • Unpickable
  • Protec
  • MCS (magnetic)
  • MT5 and MT5
  • Electronic Safe
    Dials
  • High Security
  • Granit Diskus
  • Armory Locks, Safes
  • 3KS (sliders)
  • Primus (if done properly)
  • Resistant
  • Padlocks (heavy duty
    models)
  • Interchangeable Cores (modern)

http//deviating.net/lockpicking
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