LEARNING AND ADAPTING: COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN

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LEARNING AND ADAPTING COUNTERINSURGENCY IN
AFGHANISTAN

• Dr Daniel Marston
• SDSC ANU

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• I'm generally reluctant to talk about myself
  when I'm making a presentation in fact, I have
  been known in the past to plunge straight into my
  topic without telling anyone my name. However,
  I've been advised that for this group, I need to
  provide a bit of background information. Since
  I'm not that comfortable with the idea, I've
  decided to let someone else do the job, and
  provide you with a summary of my involvement with
  the Iraq campaign written by a senior British
  officer.

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Opening Thoughts

• I am not an expertone is not learning if one
  calls himself an expert
• Learning and adapting are key in all aspects of
  warfare, not just COIN
• Met and worked with Australian officers and NCOs
  since 2004
• Do not formally speak for the US or UK armies,
  however, I am involved with many of the
  discussions
• Will discuss learning curve in MND SE first and
  then Afghan

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• The British campaign in MND (SE) was not a
  glowing success, as some within Whitehall and
  PJHQ may try to claim. The fact that it will end
  on a positive note, as of the summer of 2009, has
  more to do with bottom-up reform within units and
  formations in theatre, and less to do with
  planners in Whitehall and PJHQ. The war has been
  changing in Iraq since the beginning of 2007, and
  many within MND (SE) recognised early on that
  different approaches might be needed. Some
  British commanders expressed concern that the
  withdrawal strategy from Basra to the COB would
  cause major splits with MNF-I. The decisions
  taken in Whitehall in 2006 and 2007 promoting
  Provincial Iraqi Control and handover, as well as
  withdrawal to the COB, were not linked to the
  eventual success of the CotK they could not have
  been, since the COTK was not part of this
  strategy. In some significant ways, they were two
  different campaigns.

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• The British Armys campaign in Iraq, its overall
  impact, and whether it has been a success or
  failure, are currently topics of intense
  discussion in the UK press, military and
  government communities. Recently, the Chief of
  Defence Staff referred to Britain as having
  become too complacent and smug about its
  experiences in Northern Ireland and Bosnia and
  their application to operations in Iraq. Many
  within the Army do not dispute this, but I think
  the opposite viewpoint is also worth stating
  that there were an equal number, if not more
  officers, NCOs and soldiers who were not smug,
  and who actively sought to know more about how to
  reform and adapt for the counter-insurgency
  (COIN) campaign in Iraq

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Learning and adapting in MND SE

• What was the mission?
• Arrogance
• Hands off approach with ISF
• Many mistakes by US and UK that forced
  decisionschanged in 2007
• Envy for success of al Anbar and the north
• Distrust of British position
• Recognition to learn from mistakes and humility
  to learn from othersbottom up reform and did not
  wait for mother army to fix things
• Frustration by many
• Things finally changed for the betterCharge of
  the Knights and MiTTs
• Honour was restored
• Major tactical, operational and strategic
  assessment taking place about what happened in
  Iraq and the need to avoid similar pitfalls in
  Afghanistan
• Reform was disjointed and needed to be better
  unified and this is now being worked out
• Many know there is a need for long and deep
  reform and no band-aid applications for the
  fight in Afghanistan

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Training issues identified in Iraq

• Once a unit is warned off for operations, it
  should be taken off any other taskings and left
  to use the limited time training and preparing
  for operations.
• Prior to deployment, opportunities must be made
  to conduct training for COIN rather than
  traditional warfighting.
• Lack of knowledge of the incoming troops in
  regard to TTPs and theatre specific issues.
• Have a team commander per multiple deploy
  earlier to embed with outgoing BG/COY to deepen
  the understanding of TTPs and theatre specific
  issues.

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Education problems and solutions

• Education in COIN had been shown to be wanting
  from the lieutenants to the senior officers
  level
• Lack of knowledge regarding previous successful
  and unsuccessful COIN campaigns across all ranks
• Less than 15 of officers and NCOs had read the
  doctrine or understand what COIN was about
• Reform began bottom up RMASETS was against it as
  were some senior officers
• This is now changing as many within the Army
  recognized the need to finally educate as well as
  train
• It needs to be a building block piece from NCO,
  RMAS, Captains MOD, Staff College, RCDS
• Things are finally shifting
• Formal COIN Cadreswith input from academe, US
  and Coalition partners
• COIN and Stability Centre finally set up
• Support of CTC A in Afghanistanwill like to
  discuss the recent comments regarding CTC-A from
  CDF in the discussion period

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Feedback from Captains COIN course

• I thoroughly enjoyed the course (MOD C). . . . I
  feel far better armed . . . to go forward and act
  pragmatically with the benefit of others
  hindsight for the mistakes of the past. I am more
  than slightly concerned that I have gone this far
  through my career without being armed with this
  knowledge of this sort!
• Thank you again for the COIN module. Fascinating
  and professionally useful, I only wish that I had
  been taught that before Op TELIC 5!
• COIN module was excellentshould this be
  pre-deployment education rather than Captains
  education? This should be for all officers.
• Personally I feel that British doctrinal
  knowledge of COIN is actually a bit of a myth so
  to be taught it in the classroom prior to
  deploying to Afghanistan is extremely useful.

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Feedback from Cos for study nights in theatre

• Thank you for your support and time you have
  given . . . and for an excellent insight into
  COIN. . . . This was valuable for the unit and
  helped us focus the minds of the officers and
  men.
• You gave a fascinating insight into the
  recurring themes of British operations over the
  past fifty years and what you had to say has made
  us aware that we need to implement those lessons
  learnt by our predecessors. As a result of your
  talk the officers are now burying their heads
  into the doctrine and readings that you
  recommended so highly.

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Issues with some commanders

• I think you have got to recognise that if you
  took the attacks on the Coalition out of the
  equation, what you are left with is actually a
  very low level of residual violence within Iraqi
  society compared to anywhere else across Iraq. .
  . .This is not a war zone. This is nothing like
  you are seeing on the streets of Baghdad and here
  you have got to ask the question what is the most
  appropriate force or capability to deal with this
  problem and I would argue that a foreign army is
  particularly ill suited to resolving those kinds
  of societal problems.

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• Many of us feel that, notwithstanding limited
  political and popular support for the Iraq
  campaign, too much military advice from theatre
  was watered down on the basis of perceptions of
  what the market would bear. In contrast with the
  US our people in Basra struggled to get their
  views over, as reflected in our lukewarm response
  to the SSR challenge right up to Charge of the
  Knights (CotK). Personally I point the finger at
  PJHQ who, in my view, filter straight up advice
  on our requirements. The whole construct lacks
  the dynamism and necessary tension that you see
  in the US relationships.

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Major issues with lack of continuity

• Your points relating to rotation of commands
  through the 6 month tour structure is at the root
  of most of our problems from Basra and also now
  in Afghanistan. Not only does it work against our
  accumulation of knowledge and understanding of
  the situation, but it also ultimately undermines
  our reputation in the face of our US allies who
  think it's a joke that we scuttle back home after
  only 6 months in theatre. The extension to 9
  months for Staff officers is an improvement but
  still doesn't compare to the American system.
  Collation of intelligence was dire when I was out
  there. It was clear that intelligence from the
  previous BG's in Maysaan had either been thrown
  away or never collected in the first place. We
  started on a blank canvas. My patrol reports were
  always praised for their level of detail, but
  there was never any follow-up, never any pursuit
  of some significant leads I uncovered when in
  lengthy dialogue with the local Sheikhs. I think
  this was inherent throughout the chain of
  command.

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4th Mech Brigade how it changed

• Meeting with Brigadier Julian Free
• General Mohans (COIN) plan for the retaking of
  BASRA is a key development14 DIV must win this
  fight and the British must support it in all
  aspects
• British assets in terms of 4 Brigade and future
  TELICs need to support this effort in many
  mannersthis will provide a focus of effort for
  the British officers and soldiers as well as
  playing a role in the future pacification of
  BASRA and BASRA province
• British officers, NCOs and soldiers can be
  embedded across many lines of operation within 14
  DIVfrom staff officers, ISTAR etc to platoon to
  coy embedded roles
• This future plan will need to be briefed to MNC-I
  and MNF-I so they clearly see a plan developing
  for this important area of IRAQ with major
  British supportwhich will be well received by
  many sceptics in BAGHDAD.
• Urban ops center to train a coy for two weeks
• Briefed across the BDE that mission is now MiTT
  throughout
• Joint operations carried out along the Shatt
• MNF-I staff what about PJHQ?

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Post CoTK

• 3 of the 4 battlegroups were MiTTs
• Working alongside the USMC/USA MiTTs
• Campaign plan embedded within MNF-I
• Marsh Arab Levy
• Constant need to adapttalks and working with 14
  DIV as well as 7 Brigadedifficult at times
• FP less of an issue
• 13 in IA vehicles
• At BN level
• Last British GOC Thank you for all that you did
  for us.  Your advice proved prophetic - but I
  can't discuss over this means.  Keep in touch and
  I'll tell you why. Let's get together in the
  Autumn.

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New thinking on Afghanistan

• COIN is a strategy not a tacticCT is not the
  message anylonger
• Population centric approach is needed (has
  occurred at tactical and maybe operational levels
  at time) lack of forces
• It is not the simplistic hearts and minds as
  there will be some killing and dying in the
  coming years
• Reconciliation is important and not new and very
  complicated
• COIN through education and training reform has
  impacted the key military allies US/UK/Can (not
  so much with AuZaccording to many within the
  Army)
• More forces, both Coalition and Afghan (ANA,
  local aux.) neededalso operating jointly
• Advisory mission (civ/mil) has been a work in
  progress and still needs more workmajor shifts
  are about to occur
• There are major questions in regards to the
  selection of the OMLT or ETT concept within the
  US and UK militaries and different thinking
• AATTV concepts of recruiting across Army needs to
  be discussed

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McChrystal to LA Times

• Do you think there has been too much focus on
  counter-terrorism? I think there hasn't been
  enough focus on counterinsurgency. I am certainly
  not in a position to criticize counter-terrorism.
  But at this point in the war, in Afghanistan, it
  is most important to focus on almost classic
  counterinsurgency.I don't want people to think
  it is inflexible it should be uniquely adapted
  to the conditions in each part of the country.

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McChrystal La Times

• Another priority you have outlined is the Afghan
  security forces. You want to expand their numbers
  faster. It sounds like the main way to do that is
  to expand the partnerships between Afghans and
  alliance forces. Is there a way to improve there?
• After analysis, we've determined we could
  increase the rate of their growth and their
  target numbers. The results of our analysis are
  not approved up the chain of command yet. But all
  of our analysis tells us that is something we
  need to recommend, so that is my intent.Whether
  we grow the Afghan security forces larger or not,
  partnering closer is to our benefit and we can do
  it better than we have in the past.We need a
  combination of mentoring and partnering.
  Mentoring is people who stay with a unit all the
  time and teach and evolve as units. Partnering is
  where you operate together. Our thought is to
  bring the concepts much closer together. So a
  unit is partner, is partnering in a much tighter
  relationship. Then two things happen. The
  coalition force gets much better performance on
  the ground because Afghans are great soldiers and
  they have huge cultural acuity that a coalition
  soldier is not going to have. And the other part
  is as we operate we think we can give them best
  practices

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GEN McC 8 imperatives for success 13 06 2009

• Protect and partner with the people
• Conduct a comprehensive campaign
• Understand the Environment
• Ensure values underpin our effort
• Listen closelyspeak clearly
• Act as one team
• Constantly adapt
• Act with courage and resolve

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Practitioner

• At the time beginning of 2003 the US military
  had not published COIN doctrine since Vietnam,
  and units had relatively little training in COIN
  before their arrival in country. There was much
  learning by doing and even disagreement as to
  whether the fight in Afghanistan was a COIN fight
  at all. In fact unit commanders were forbidden to
  from using the word COIN in describing their
  missionsthey were executing a CT mission in
  keeping with US strategic guidance and an
  operational focus on the enemy.COIN narrative
  in Australia?

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2007 Gen Barno

• Continual turnover of US senior leaders has made
  continuity of effort a recurrent challenge in
  this very complex fight Since mid-2005, the
  comprehensive US led counterinsurgency
  strategyhas been significantly altered by
  subsequent military and civilian leaders who held
  differing views. With the advent of NATO military
  leadership, there is today no single
  comprehensive strategy to guide the US, NATO, or
  international effort. Unity of purpose both
  interagency and international has suffered
  unity of command is more fragmented.

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Practitioner UK IV Examples of reform mindset

• Additionally as in previous counter-insurgency
  campaigns, WARFIGHTING is an element of COIN. . .
  . Many of the lessons learned from the BGs
  resulting experiences are not new. Common themes
  from previous UK COIN campaigns and conflicts
  were all evident in operations conducted in
  HELMAND Province. The key lesson is that we
  ignore previous experience of such campaigns, and
  those of our allies, at our peril.

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Practitioner UK VII(coalition ability)

• TASK FORCE FURY were highly experienced, having
  been in Afghanistan at that point for 12 months
  and they were a very capable force. It was
  illuminating to see their approach to COIN and
  the extent that it had become a part of them.
  They were equipped for it, had the training and
  doctrine behind them, really understood it. . .
  You sensed in them the extent the US Armed Forces
  have transformed since it looked over the Iraqi
  precipice and did something about it. What, to my
  mind, is all the more remarkable is how they have
  undergone that transformation, the momentum that
  has been generated and the commitment and
  attention to detail that has left no stone
  unturned in seeking out better solutions.

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Practitioner USMC

• The Marines and sailors leveraged Pashtunwali
  to our advantage when able. We sought to
  establish relationships, which incurs obligations
  of reciprocation for deeds and respect. This
  pulled some Afghan tribes and villagers to us.
  Understanding and use of Pashtunwali assisted in
  our understanding of the environment, maintaining
  the neutral to the positive outlook of our
  operations and presence, and countered Taliban
  information ops and resurgence. . . In general,
  people fight based upon the norms of their
  cultural, historical, economic and political
  influences that exist in their environment.
  Connect the critical cultural thinking and
  understanding in our training and education
  program. Do not make the assumption that it is
  too complicated for the junior Marines. They
  understand these concepts and will care about
  this if the leadership cares .

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Where does Australia go from here

• The Rudd government needs to decide if the
  narrative for Afghanistan needs to
  changealliance debate, in your national
  interests, CT not COIN what is COIN
• The narratives are changing in the northern
  hemisphere
• Population focused COIN is the way forward in the
  East/South
• Provincial boundaries are breaking down in the
  South
• Advisory mission is a work in progress and major
  changes are being discussed
• AATTV? Serve throughout the South? Selected from
  across Army?
• The Australian Army prides itself in COIN
  training and tactical excellence, however, the
  US/UK militaries have now recognised the
  importance of education for all commanders and
  OGDs to implement a COIN strategy that is
  properly resourced and focusedmajor issues in
  Australia with OGDs
• Education is key and there needs to be a building
  block systemWeston Creek is doing COIN education
  for Lt Colonels and Majors, is it linked with the
  Lts and Captains and the NCO courses? Do the
  other courses need to be expanded in terms of
  content?
• Assessment of what happened in Iraq is being
  done, however, will it be as open and critical as
  other armies assessments? Advisory mission
  heavily questioned2 BNs from 10 Div in surge
• There is talk of reform within the Australian
  Army, however, how linked is it and does it go
  long and deep? Many within the Army are
  questioning this

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Keys to past success in COIN

• Comprehension of existing doctrine
• Adaptation to local situations and learning from
  mistakeshumility to learn from others
• Risk-taking organizations
• Harmony of effort
• Small-unit approach
• Corporate memory within theatre HQs
• Appropriate training
• Reconciliation amongst their enemies
• Ongoing education in COIN
• Population security
• Understand local perspectivesnon-western metrics
  
• Raise, mentor and fight alongside indigenous
  forces (army/paramilitary police/local
  auxiliaries)
• Regular and aux indigenous forces needed

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Thinking within the US/UK

• We have seen that it is only by a close
  combination of civil and military measures that
  insurgency can be fought, so it is logical to
  expect soldiers whose business it is to know how
  to fight, to know also how to use civil measures
  in this way. Not only should the army officers
  know about the subject, they must also be
  prepared to pass on their knowledge to
  politicians, civil servants, economists, members
  of the local government and policemen where
  necessary. The educational function of the army
  at these critical moments is most important.
  Amongst senior officers in particular, ignorance
  or excessive diffidence in passing along such
  knowledge on can be disastrous.

Kitson, Bunch of Five