Dr' Kerry M' Kartchner Chief, Division of Strategy and Policy Studies Advanced Systems and Concepts

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Policy, Behavior, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
in the Crucible of Strategic Culture An Initial
Framework for Comparative Analysis
UNCLASSIFIED

• Dr. Kerry M. KartchnerChief, Division of
  Strategy and Policy StudiesAdvanced Systems and
  Concepts Office

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Overview

• Revisiting Strategic Culture as an Analytical
  Tool for Threat Assessment
• Relevance
• Methodology
• Developing a Comparative Framework for
  Identifying, Evaluating, and Assessing Selected
  Strategic Cultures
• The Link between Strategic Culture and Weapons
  of Mass Destruction

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Why study strategic culture?

• Understanding strategic culture is vital to
  effectively implementing and safeguarding U.S.
  national security and foreign policy.
• Hostility to U.S. national security goals and
  policies is undermining U.S. power, influence,
  and strategic alliances.
• Much of this hostility is driven by a lack of
  understanding of the cultural and regional
  context for U.S. policy.
• -- 2004 Defense Science Board Study on Strategic
  Communications.
• It is important to know thine enemy better
  assess new and emerging threats.
• But, it is also important to know our friends and
  allies, and the regional context for U.S.
  national security policy.

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Overview of ASCOs Comparative Strategic
Cultures Project

• (2005) Phase I Objectives
• Review status of scholarship in the field.
• Identify any critical outstanding methodology
  issues.
• Assess some preliminary case studies (China,
  Pakistan, India)
• Validate the utility of comparative strategic
  cultures for gaining insights into policy,
  behavior, and incentives for acquiring, using, or
  proliferating weapons of mass destruction.
• (2006) Phase II Objectives
• Develop a framework for comparative analysis.
• Select specific case studies with relevance to
  issues of WMD.
• Derive some policy-relevant insights for WMD and
  strategic culture.
• Craft a curriculum for use in military and
  civilian institutes of higher learning.

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Methodology Issues

• There is no commonly accepted definition of
  strategic culture.Solution Develop
  provisional definitions and a common analytical
  framework.
• Scholars disagree on the intellectual boundaries
  of strategic culture and how it relates
  analytically to other theories/paradigms (eg.,
  realism, constructivism, etc.) Solution
  Determine and assess the geo- and socio-political
  boundaries of those strategic cultures most
  relevant to deterrence and non-proliferation of
  WMD.
• There are debates about the sources of strategic
  culture and rate of transformation within
  selected strategic cultures.Solution Track
  change with respect to specific WMD-related
  events.
• There are obstacles to communication between the
  social science and the policy communities.Soluti
  on Agree on a provisional theoretical framework
  for applying social sciences to specific issues
  of national security.

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Selected Case Studies

• The United States
• Israel
• Iran
• North Korea
• Syria

• Pakistan
• India
• China
• Russia
• Non-State Actors

Criteria for selection Relevance to WMD,
researchability, baseline cases, curriculum
development, and salience for addressing
methodology issues.
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Beyond the Case Studies

• Emerging strategic cultures (including Japan)
• Strategic culture and non-state actors
• Strategic culture and WMD policies and issues
• The future of strategic culture

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Defining Strategic Culture

• For purposes of this project, strategic culture
  has been defined as
• Shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of
  behavior, derived from common experiences and
  accepted narratives (both oral and written), that
  shape collective identity and relationships to
  other groups, and which determine appropriate
  ends and means for achieving security
  objectives.
• Case study authors are asked to evaluate this
  definition against their particular case study,
  and, if necessary, propose revisions.

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Key Elements in a Description of the Selected
Strategic Culture

• What does the given strategic culture have to say
  about conflict and human nature?
• What does the given strategic culture say about
  the enemy?
• What does the given culture have to say about the
  utility of violence, or laws of war?

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Assessing the Importance of Strategic Culture
Relative to Other Factors

• Case study and essay authors are asked to make a
  preliminary assessment of the importance of
  strategic culture versus other factors, in
  shaping the groups
• External and internal threat perceptions.
• Self-characterization, role and placement of the
  group within the overall international context.
• Security policies, including (but not limited to)
  decisions to acquire, use, proliferate, or
  constrain WMD, or to comply/violate international
  norms related to WMD.
• Relationships to other groups (e.g., alliances).

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Policy Implications Strategic Culture and
Weapons of Mass Destruction

• Does culture matter?
• When, under what conditions, and to what extent
  does culture shape behavior and define values in
  discernible and measurable ways?
• Which behaviors and values are most subject to
  cultural influence, or find their origins most
  firmly rooted in cultural grounds?
• Hypothesis understanding culture is necessary to
  successfully
• Assure allies and friends of U.S. commitment to
  their security.
• Dissuade states and non-state actors from
  acquiring WMD.
• Deter states and actors from employing WMD.
• Defeat those states and non-state actors who
  cannot be deterred from using WMD.

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Policy Implications, contd

• Acquisition of WMD does strategic culture
  inform or determine incentives for acquiring WMD?
• Employment of acquired WMD does strategic
  culture influence decisions to use WMD?
• Proliferation of WMD does strategic culture
  promote or inhibit tendencies to proliferate WMD?
• Adherence to International Regimes and Norms
  Associated with WMD does strategic culture
  strengthen or mitigate against international or
  domestic norm-adherence behavior?

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When Does Strategic Culture Matter?

• According to Michael C. Desch
• Cultural variables may explain the lag between
  structural change and alterations in state
  behavior.
• Cultural variables may account for why some
  states behave irrationally and suffer the
  consequences of failing to adapt to the
  constraints of the international system.
• In structurally indeterminate situations,
  domestic variables such as culture may have more
  independent impact.
• - Culture Versus Structure in Post-9/11
  Security Studies, Strategic Insights, vol. IV,
  Issue 10 (October 2005).

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Additional Hypotheses (Policy Relevance)

• Strategic Culture is more salient relative to
  other considerations (economics, geography,
  ideology, leadership style), when
• There is a strong sense of danger to the groups
  existence, identity, or resources, or when the
  group believes that it is at a critical
  disadvantage to other groups.
• There is a strong messiah complex, or sense of
  mission, associated with the groups identity,
  and its relationship to other groups.
• There is a pre-existing strong cultural basis for
  group identity.
• The groups leadership frequently resorts to
  citing cultural symbols in support of its
  national security aspirations and programs.
• There is a high degree of homogeneity within the
  group that is centered on shared narratives.
• Historical experiences strongly predispose the
  group to perceive threats and to respond with
  violent (military) means.

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WMD and Strategic Culture Some Propositions

• Scriptural justification What if significant
  views were emerging among the keepers of the
  culture that using nuclear weapons could be
  justified by the cultures shared oral/written
  narrative?
• Fatalistic assumptions What if the culture
  assumed that a wider conflict with other
  civilizations was inevitable? What if some even
  believed that such a conflict should be
  instigated, and that the instigating culture
  would even emerge from it better off?
• Nuclear naiveté What if the cultures leaders
  did not appreciate how profoundly destructive a
  nuclear war would be?
• Demonization of threat What if the culture
  believed its principal enemy was the Great
  Satan and deserved to be annihilated?
• Messianic status What if the cultures shared
  narrative included a view that it was the
  chosen people of God, that God was on its side,
  that God justified its policies, that God would
  help it vanquish or punish its enemies?

Absence of traditional normative constraints on
using nuclear weapons. Weakening or failure of
the presumption of non-use.
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Concluding Phase II

• Workshop for case study and essay authors (and
  other interested scholars) to be held in Park
  City, Utah on 4-5 May 2006.
• Proposed framework will be presented and
  discussed.
• Preliminary case study efforts will be reviewed.
• Final workshop to be held at Reading University
  in the United Kingdom, 6-8 August 2006.
• Results of case studies and essays to be
  presented for validation by an international
  audience of scholars and experts.
• A curriculum on Comparative Strategic Culture
  will be ready for use in classrooms beginning
  Fall 2006.

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ASCO Project POCs

• Dr. Kerry M. Kartchner
• Tel [phone]
• Email kerry.kartchner_at_dtra.mil
• Ms. Jennifer Perry
• Tel [phone]
• Email jennifer.perry_at_dtra.mil
• Mr. Mike Urena
• Tel [phone]
• Email michael.urena_at_dtra.mil