Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring: Lessons from Experience

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Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring
Lessons from Experience

• Markus Goldstein
• Poverty Reduction Group
• From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton
  (2006)
• Beyond the Numbers Understanding the
  Institutions
• for Monitoring Poverty Reduction Strategies
  World Bank

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Content

• Expectations and realities
• Organizing monitoring activities
• Making use of PRS monitoring
• Organizing participation

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1. Expectations (and realities)

• Objectives of a poverty monitoring system
• Supports decision-making
• Supports accountability to the public
• Promotes evidence-based dialogue
• Supports reporting to donors for their own
  accountability
• Functions of the PRS-MS
• Poverty monitoring
• PRS implementation monitoring
• Expenditure tracking
• Focus on entire results-chain, linking the
  various elements

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1. Expectations (and realities)

• PRS-MS mainly has institutional functions
• Coordinating actors (not duplicating)
• Developing set of indicators and targets
• Building capacity where deficient
• Organizing information flows
• Compiling data
• Linking elements of results-chain
• Organizing analysis and evaluation
• Generating reports
• Disseminating findings
• Organizing participation of civil society

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1. (Expectations and) realities

• Modest achievements Few have established
  functioning links between monitoring and
  decision-making
• Common obstacles
• Practical issues with data collection, especially
  administrative routine data
• Difficulties in coordination, duplication,
  redundancies
• turf battles
• No incentives to participate (and relinquish
  space)
• Formal plans are not translated into actual
  practice

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1. (Expectations and) realities

• Common obstacles (cont.)
• Shortcomings in PRSs themselves
• Lack operational details
• Lack of costing
• Lack of prioritization
• Inadequate indicators and targets
• Deficit in evaluation and analysis
• Limited budget planning and PEM systems
• Weak demand (interest?) from decision-makers
• Donor requirements typically not aligned

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2. Organizing monitoring activities

• Usually, formal plans exist but not implemented
• Problem may be in process of design
• Often narrow some stocktaking, short
  consultations, design (consultant?)no
  stakeholder analysis, no real participation
• Details of system not worked out roles,
  responsibilities, standards, modalities for
  cooperation
• Limited buy-in from actors
• Limited accountability or compliance
• Systems are consensual in nature, function only
  if participants find it useful and legitimate
• w/o common purpose, formal obligations dont work
• ?Need more organic design, common commitment

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2. Organizing monitoring activities

• Common building blocks
• Steering Committee political support and
  oversight
• Coordination Unit or Secretariat convening
  meetings, managing processes, compiling data,
  drafting reports
• Inter-agency committees and working groups
  promote dialogue, inclusive membership, debate
  results
• National Statistics Institute key data producer,
  plus normative and technical-assistance role
• Line ministries liaison point (ME Unit or
  individual)
• Key issues are relationships and modalities

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2. Organizing monitoring activities

• Lessons/considerations
• Leadership
• Coordination
• Liaison with line ministries
• Role of national statistical agencies
• Involving local governments

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2.1. Leadership

• Choice of institutional lead is critical
• Should be close to center of government/budget
  process
• Range of locations
• Ministry of Finance (Mali, Niger, Uganda) ? close
  to budget
• Ministry of Planning (Malawi, Mauritania) ?
  better analysis
• Office of the (vice-)President (Tanzania) ?
  greater authority
• Leadership more effective if in a single agency,
  rather than an inter-agency committee
• A champion is important but danger that system
  becomes tied to a personality
• In any case, leadership may need to change over
  time, need for flexibility

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2.2. Coordination the greatest challenge

• Typically series of inter-agency committees (13
  in Mali) but
• Committee system often over-elaborate
• Run out of steam
• Incentives work against coordination
• Often lack concrete recommendations
• Technical secretariats typically suffer from high
  turnover and limited resources and skills
• ? Avoid burdensome structures, build working
  relationships
• ? Effective secretariat is key to organize
  dialogue, work through the issues, assist its
  members
• ? Process, advocacy, political leadership are
  critical
• ? Donors can
• Limit parallel demands which create wrong
  incentives
• Support the system by providing incentives

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2.3. Liaison with line ministries

• Most PRS-MS are second-tier systems rely on
  routine data from line ministries
• Usually a liaison person in ministry, but often
  w/o the authority, time or incentives to play
  that role effectively
• Quality of sectoral data often an issue
• Project/donor-specific reporting often take
  precedence
• Promote monitoring within line ministries (for
  their own management purposes)
• Change incentives (capacity)
• Choose liaison persons with higher profile
• Requirements from PRS-MS aligned with sectoral
  information systems
• Donors align their reporting requirements

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2.4. Role of statistical agencies

• Often most institutionally advanced element of
  PRS-MS
• But issues
• 1 PRS-MS arrangements sometimes duplicate
  existing statistical structures (master plan).
  Potential rivalry between statistical system and
  PRS-MS. Limited links between central agency and
  line ministries
• ? Ensure complementarity with existing systems
  and plans
• 2 Role of agency in setting standards, technical
  assistance, capacity building often not fully
  played. Often survey and administrative data not
  compatible.
• ? Funding mechanism to leave space for this role.
  Donors to move away from supporting activities,
  towards supporting plans
• 3 Existing data typically not fully utilized
  outside the central agency
• ? More dissemination, more training/statistical
  literacy

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2.5. Involving local governments

• Communication within a sector often an issue
• Incentives differ with degree of decentralization
• Limited capacity (and numerous reporting
  obligations)
• No best practice examples
• ? Limit indicators to reduce burden (make it
  easier to comply)
• ? Central quality control mechanisms
• ? Support and capacity-building
• ? Provide feedback to local level
• ? Build on local civil society (?)
• ? Encourage local accountability (dissemination)
• ? Options
• decentralized monitoring (e.g. Uganda, link to
  grant mechanism)
• central monitoring of local governments (when
  capacity too low)

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3. Making use of PRS monitoring

• In addition to organizing data supply, PRS-MS
  must build demand
• Establish linkages with entry points in
  decision-making processes
• Budget
• MTEF
• Planning
• Review/update PRS
• Parliamentary sessions
• Public dialogue
• Donor strategies and operations
• Processes outside the PRS-MS, but should guide
  activities
• Analysis and evaluation
• Outputs and dissemination
• Linking PRS monitoring and budget
• Role of parliament

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3.1. Analysis and evaluation

• Analysis key to effective use of data
• Area of great deficit
• Lack of capacity
• Lack of incentives (weak accountability)
• Focus on APR production, w/o much analytical
  content
• Often dedicated analytical unit (e.g.Tanzania,
  Uganda)
• ?Work when close to government
• ?Work when focused only on analysis
• ?Issue of funding and sustainability
• Need greater capacity (and incentives) in
  sectoral agencies
• Option joint work with donors (e.g. PERs)

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3.2. Outputs and dissemination

• Information must be disseminated to have an
  impact
• Within governments pushing information back to
• central agencies
• local and regional governments
• service providers
• Outside governments
• Parliament
• Media and general public
• Donors, etc.
• Often not accessible
• Main focus is often donors
• Ensure right format/content for users, including
  public
• Ensure right timing for key moments
• Dissemination strategy

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3.3. Linking with budget/planning

• Most likely incentive for evidence-based
  policy-making
• In practice, often weak link
• Experience to date
• requirement in rules for budget preparation
  (usually in countries with MTEF Uganda,
  Tanzania)
• Challenge function around budget preparation
• Ability to sanction often limited
• Careful
• Results can take time or can be due to exogenous
  factors
• linking funds to ability to monitor or to ability
  to deliver?
• incentives to mis-report?
• Incentives to under-commit?
• Difficult to operationalize, depends on maturity
  of MTEF and PEM system
• Donors should strengthen the budget process,
  rather than bypass it (wrong incentives)

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3.4. Links with parliament

• Relatively low participation in PRS process in
  most countries
• Missed opportunity for oversight function
• Low capacity of committees for analysis
• Low resources
• ? Capacity building, economic literacy,
  committees

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4. Organizing participation

• Belongs to both the supply and demand side
• A means to strengthen the PRS-MS (producer)
• A means to increase accountability (user)
• Experience varies greatly
• Issues of capacity and representativity
• Forms of participation
• Carrying out monitoring activities (including
  action-oriented)
• Participating in PRS-MS structures
• Analyzing and providing policy advice
• Disseminating information
• Typically participation not very formalized

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Further lessons from experiences

• We asked staff in PRS units or national
  statistics agencies (with responsibility for
  poverty monitoring) What are the main barriers
  you see to getting data effectively used in your
  country

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Main issues from Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Political will/leadership (29)
2. Capacity building, local central (19)
3. Coordination _at_ central level (13)
4. Coordination between central and local levels
   (13)
5. ME link to budget (10)
6. ME budget (9)
7. Legislation/regulation (4)
8. Engagement w/civil society (2)

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Issues faced in the Balkans

• Lack of capacity within statistics agency (22)
• Coordination between central and local levels
  (18)
• Coordination at central level (17)
• Political will/leadership (9)
• Inadequate budget (9)
• Missing census/data quality (9)
• Uneducated users (8)
• Overly technical dissemination (3)
• Legislation (3)
• Data access (1)

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Conclusions

• Do not start from blank slate build on existing
• Wont happen overnight gradual improvement
• Goal not an ideal system but a process of change
• Context evolves build flexible arrangements
• Focus on relations, incentives and activities
• Demand needs to be stimulated identify entry
  points
• Users differ and need different formats and
  content
• Donors can support or distort
• Thank you !