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Authorization Models in Medical Information Systems

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Title: Authorization Models in Medical Information Systems


1
Authorization Models in Medical Information
Systems
  • Andrei Bretan
  • FAU

  • April 2, 2004

2
Definition of termsAuthorization and
Authentication I
  • Are separate concepts, sometimes misinterpreted
    (Example Access Authorization).
  • Authentication allows entity A to convince entity
    B of As identity with some degree of certainty.
  • Entity A may be trying to perform some task
    (e.g., execute an application, invoke a function,
    or access a file).
  • B needs to know not who A is as much as
    whether A should be allowed to perform this
    task

3
Definition of termsAuthorization and
Authentication II
  • Authorization allows B to make and enforce this
    decision.
  • As identity may be almost irrelevant, useful for
    auditing purposes only. Example all executives
    are allowed to see the quarterly results before
    they are announced
  • Authentication answers the question Who is this
    entity?
  • Authorization answers the question Is this
    entity allowed to do what it is trying to do?

4
Authorization Architecture
  • An Authorization Architecture is the set of
    components and data that allows authorization
    decisions to be made and enforced.
  • A typical Authorization Model for such
    Architecture includes the requesting
    subject/object, the protected object/operation,
    the request interceptor and the entity which
    holds access rights to objects/operations in the
    system.

5
Attributes I
  • An Attribute is a piece of information that may
    be categorized as being associated with the
    subject, action, resource, or environment in an
    authorization architecture.
  • Attributes may be static or dynamic.
  • Static attributes of the subject are referred to
    by many names in various discussions and
    contexts privileges, permissions, rights,
    authorizations, properties, characteristics,
    entitlements, and grants.
  • Static attributes can also be associated with
    resources and with actions. Groups, roles, and
    document labels are all examples of static
    attributes.

6
Attributes II
  • Dynamic attributes are those whose values cannot
    be relied upon to remain unchanged.
  • Example of dynamic attributes of the subject
    include current account balance, amount of credit
    remaining.
  • Dynamic attributes of the resource include the
    number of times it has been accessed.

7
Policies I
  • An access control policy with respect to a
    specific resource or set of resources is the set
    of rules governing who can do what to those
    resources under what conditions.
  • The resources are data/information or
    functions/operations that the subject requests to
    access.
  • The functions/operations will eventually (in most
    cases) translate to access to some
    data/information.

8
Policies II
  • Policy expressions are at many levels of
    abstraction
  • Organizational goals, guidelines, compliance
    rules.
  • Per-system operational policies and organization
    specific or business specific rules.
  • Atomic i.e. per-resource controls.

9
Example An Extended Authorization Architecture
Ssubject, Rresource, PEPpolicy enforcement
point, PDPpolicy decision point, PIPpolicy
information point, SAsubject authority,
RAresource authority, EAenvironment authority,
PRPpolicy retrieval point, PAPpolicy
administration point.
10
Enforcing Policies I
  • Mandatory Access Control (MAC) secures
    information by assigning sensitivity labels on
    data/operations and comparing this to the level
    of sensitivity a user is operating at.
  • MAC is usually appropriate for extremely secure
    systems.
  • Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is a means of
    restricting access to data/operations based on
    the identity of users and/or membership in
    certain groups.
  • Access to information/operations is determined
    based on authorizations specified by access
    control lists.

11
Enforcing Policies II
  • Role Based Access Control (RBAC) access
    decisions are based on an individual's roles and
    responsibilities within the organization.
  • Determines who can perform what actions, when,
    from where, in what order, and in some cases
    under what relational circumstances.
  • Defining roles based on analyzing the structure
    of an organization and is usually linked to the
    security policy of that organization.
  • Each role is designated a profile that includes
    all authorized commands, transactions, operations
    and allowable information access such as all
    access policies of that organization are
    enforced.

12
Research Task Based Authorization (ARPA) I
  • Multiple points of access, control, and decision
    making.
  • Task-oriented or transaction-oriented perspective
    rather than the traditional subject-object view
    of access control.
  • Involves authorizations at various points during
    the completion of tasks in accordance with some
    application logic.
  • The subject-object view typically divorces access
    mediation from the larger context in which a
    subject performs an operation on an object.

13
Research Task Based Authorization (ARPA) II
  • TBA actively takes part in access control
    management in contrast to traditional passive
    subject-object models that merely store primitive
    access control definition (tuples).
  • In the subject-object view, the individual rights
    of subjects to various objects are stored in an
    internal data structure such as an access control
    matrix.
  • The information in the access control matrix (or
    access control lists) represents independent and
    unrelated access control information (tuples).

14
Research Task Based Authorization (ARPA) III
  • TBA utilizes the emerging (flowing) context of
    activities as they progress, when managing access
    control and authorizations.
  • In contrast to the traditional subject-object
    view of access control that usually responds to
    the question Is subject S allowed access A
    (or possess the right A) to object O ? a
    task-based view seeks an answer to the following
    question Can task be authorized to proceed?

15
Research Other types of Authorization Models I
  • Multiple Authorization Model (MAM) limiting
    factors of current access control systems is the
    dependence on a single subject for authorization.
  • It is usually not possible to directly involve
    other entities, i.e., other
  • people in a particular access control
    decision.
  • The drawback is that any access decision occurs
    just on the behalf of the single subject that
    makes the access.
  • MAM Access control model that allows to include
    authorization of multiple subjects thus
    overcoming this drawback.

16
Research Other types of Authorization Models II
  • Authorization Models for Metacomputing
    Applications
  • Metacomputing systems cover large networks
    connecting mutually suspicious domains, which are
    independently administered.
  • Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
  • Shows great promise.
  • Use Public Key Infrastructure standards to
    identify users and create digitally signed
    certificates.

17
Research Other types of Authorization Models III
  • Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) (cont.)
  • Access based on policy statements made by
    stakeholders.
  • Handle multiple independent stakeholders for a
    single resource.
  • Provisional Authorization Models
  • Almost all studies in access control and
    authorization systems
  • have assumed the following model A user
    makes an access
  • request of a system in some context, and the
    system either
  • authorizes the access request or denies it.

18
Research Other types of Authorization Models IV
  • Provisional Authorization Models (cont)
  • The notion of a provisional authorization which
    tells the user that his
  • request will be authorized provided he
    (and/or the system) takes
  • certain security actions such as signing his
    statement prior to
  • authorization of his request.
  • Examples You are allowed to access confidential
    information, but the access must be logged.
  • You are allowed to read sensitive information,
    but you must sign a terms and conditions
    statement first.

19
Research Other types of Authorization Models V
  • Team Based Access Control (TMAC) is a role based
    access control in collaborative environments.
  • Such an approach needs a hybrid type access
    control model that incorporates the advantages of
    broad role-based permissions across object types,
    yet requires fine-grained, identity-based control
    on individual users in certain roles and to
    individual object instances.
  • A second requirement is the need to recognize the
    context associated with collaborative tasks and
    the ability to apply this context to decisions
    regarding permission activation.

20
Medical Information SystemsResearch I
  • There are not many existing Authorization Models
    for Medical Information Systems.
  • The existing ones are mostly adaptations of
    existing models to some aspects of the Medical
    Domain.
  • There is no comprehensive model yet for security
    in the Medical Domain.
  • There are no sets of patterns (corresponding to
    sets of policies) for the Medical Domain.

21
Medical Information SystemsResearch II
  • Examples R.A.Kemmerer, Formal specification of
    a mental health delivery system, Rept.
    TRCS89-31, Dept. of Computer Science, University
    of California Santa Barbara, November 1989.
  • J. Biskup, Protection of privacy and
    confidentiality in medical information systems
    Problems and guidelines, in Database Security
    III, Status and Prospects, Elsevier Science
    Publishing.
  • J. Biskup and G. Bleumer, Reflections on
    Security of Database and Datatransfer Systems in
    Health Care, Procs. of the 13th World Computer
    Congress, IFIP 1994.

22
Medical Information SystemsResearch III
  • I. Mavridis, G. Pangalos, M. Khair, and L.
    Bozios, Defining access control mechanisms for
    privacy protection in distributed medical
    databases, Procs. IFIP Working Conf. on User
    Identification and Privacy Protection, June 1999.
  • G. Pangalos, A. Pomportsis, L. Bozios, and M.
    Khair, Development of secure medical database
    systems, Procs. of DEXA94.
  • M. Wilikens, S. Feriti, M. Masera, A
    Context-Related Authorization and Access Control
    Method Based on RBAC A case study from the
    health care domain.

23
Medical Information SystemsResearch IV
  • Roshan K. Thomas, Team-based Access Control
    (TMAC) A Primitive for Applying Role-based
    Access Controls in Collaborative Environments ,
    Odyssey Research Associates Cornell Business and
    Technology Park.
  • Longhua Zhang, Gail-Joon Ahn,Bei-Tseng Chu, A
    Role-Based Delegation Framework for Healthcare
    Information Systems,
  • College of Information Technology, UNC
    Charlotte.
  • E.B. Fernandez, M.M. Larrondo-Petrie, and T.
    Sorgente, "Security models for medical and
    genetic information.  FAU, Boca Raton FL.

24
Medical Information SystemsResearch and
Implementations I
  • Example PCASSO (Patient Centered Access to
    Secure Systems Online) is a research project and
    technology demonstration that seeks to provide
    secure access to highly sensitive patient
    information over the Internet.
  • Developed by Science Applications International
    Corporation (SAIC) and the University of
    California, San Diego, (UCSD) School of Medicine
    and Healthcare Network.
  • Funded by the National Library of Medicine (NLM)
    of the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
    through its Health Applications for the National
    Information Infrastructure (NII) initiative.

25
Medical Information SystemsResearch and
Implementations II
  • All information in PCASSO is associated with a
    sensitivity label. Information may be
    patient-specific (e.g. patient-record
    information) or patient-independent (e.g.
    clinical research information).
  • Individuals may access information only if they
    are acting in a role
  • authorized for the requested type of access
    (read, upgrade, downgrade, etc).
  • First, the type of information is used to
    determine the default
  • label i.e. certain HL7 message types have an
    associated intrinsic sensitivity.

26
Medical Information SystemsResearch and
Implementations III
  • Second, an individual acting in an authorized
    role (e.g., primary care provider, PCASSO
    administrator) may explicitly assign a label.
  • PCASSO uses label-based access control to
    separate five levels of increasingly sensitive
    patient information
  • Low, Standard, Deniable, Guardian Deniable,
    Patient Deniable.
  • PCASSO also uses label-based controls to protect
    its system software from malicious or misbehaving
    programs and its system data from unauthorized
    disclosure.

27
Medical Information SystemsResearch and
Implementations IV
  • Roles may be patient-specific (e.g., patient,
    primary care provider, secondary care provider,
    emergency provider) or patient independent (e.g.,
    researcher, administrator).
  • Each role is associated with a sensitivity level
    range, a set of rights, and an access control
    list (ACL).

28
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