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CoDoNS: Fast, Resilient, and Scalable Name Service for the Internet

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Title: CoDoNS: Fast, Resilient, and Scalable Name Service for the Internet


1
CoDoNS Fast, Resilient, and Scalable Name
Service for the Internet
  • Venugopalan Ramasubramanian
  • Emin Gün Sirer

Computer Science, Cornell University
2
introduction
  • Domain Name System (DNS)
  • large scale distributed lookup service
  • hierarchical structure
  • extensive caching
  • Changing Internet Environment
  • increasing malicious activity (eg. code red worm)
  • dynamic bindings (server selection)
  • high bandwidth clients (broadband, dsl)

3
DNS problems
  • failure resilience
  • vulnerability to DoS attacks
  • performance
  • high lookup latencies
  • consistency
  • slow update propagation

4
DNS overview
beehive.cornell.edu
5
delegation bottlenecks (1/2)
  • survey 593160 domain names, 164089 nameservers
  • 75 of names have a bottleneck of two nameservers

6
delegation bottlenecks (2/2)
  • 60 of top-500 web sites have small bottlenecks

7
physical bottlenecks
  • majority of names bottlenecked at one network link

8
DoS attacks
  • delegation and network bottlenecks make DoS
    attacks feasible
  • january 2001 attack on Microsoft nameservers
  • DoS attacks high up in the hierarchy can affect
    the whole system
  • october 2002 attack on root servers
  • roots are already disproportionately loaded
    Brownlee et al. 01a, 01b
  • root anycast helps but does not solve the
    fundamental problem

9
performance
  • dns lookups affect web latency
  • 20-40 of web object retrieval time spent on DNS
  • 20-30 of DNS lookups take more than 1s
  • Jung et al. 01, Huitema et al. 00, Wills Shang
    00, Bent Voelker 01
  • lame delegations
  • manual administration leads to inconsistencies
  • 15 of domains have lame delegations Pappas et.
    al. 01
  • introduces latency up to 30 sec
  • server selection
  • disables caching with small timeouts (30 sec)
  • increases latency up to 2 orders of magnitude
    Shaikh et. al. 01

10
consistency
  • DNS caching is timeout-driven
  • conflict in choosing timeouts
  • fundamental tradeoff between lookup and update
    performance
  • large timeouts
  • an emergency remapping/redirection cannot be
    performed unless anticipated
  • 86 of records have TTLs longer than 0.5 hours
  • small timeouts (lt 10 min)
  • increased lookup latency Jung et. al. 01, Cohen
    et. al. 01

11
Cooperative Domain Name System
  • supplement and/or replacement for legacy DNS
  • based on distributed hash tables (DHTs)
  • self-organizing
  • failure resilient
  • scalable
  • worst-case performance bounds
  • naïve application of DHTs fails to provide
    performance comparable to legacy DNS

12
prefix-matching DHTs
object 0121 hash(beehive.cornell.edu)
  • logbN hops
  • several RTTs on the Internet
  • caching along lookup path is ineffective NSDI
    04
  • no performance guarantee
  • cache consistency is expensive

2012
13
key intuition
  • tunable latency
  • adjust extent of replication for each object
  • fundamental space-time tradeoff

0021
0112
0122
2012
14
proactive, analysis-driven caching
  • optimization problem
  • minimize total number of replicas, s.t.,
  • average lookup performance ? C
  • O(1) lookup latency
  • configurable target
  • continuous range, better than one-hop
  • leverages object popularity to achieve high
    performance
  • DNS follows zipf-like popularity distribution
    Jung et. al. 01

15
optimization problem
  • minimize (storage/bandwidth)
  • x0 x1/b x2/b2 xK-1/bK-1
  • such that (average lookup time is C hops)
  • K (x01-? x11-? x21-? xK-11-?) ? C
  • and
  • x0 ? x1 ? x2 ? ? xK-1 ? 1
  • i object replicated at level i shares i digits
    with its servers
  • b base
  • K logb(N)
  • xi fraction of objects replicated at level i

16
optimal closed-form solution
, 0 ? i ? K 1
xi
, K ? i ? K
1
where b b(1- ?) /?
K is determined by setting xK-1 ? 1 ?
bK-1 (K C) / (1 b bK-1) ? 1
17
latency vs. overhead tradeoff
100 x 106 bindings
x106
18
CoDoNS vision
  • a cooperative cache for DNS data
  • composed of local resolvers and DNS nameservers
  • serves the same namespace as legacy DNS
  • supports the same interface as legacy DNS

LegacyDNS
19
CoDoNS operation (1/2)
  • home node initially populates CoDoNS with binding
    from legacy DNS
  • minimum replication level ensures resilience
    against home-node failure
  • proactive caching in the background replicates
    binding based on analytical model
  • local measurement and limited aggregation to
    estimate popularity of names and zipf parameter
  • discards bindings or pushes bindings to neighbors

20
CoDoNS operation (2/2)
  • dynamic adaptation
  • continuously monitor popularity of names and
    increase replication to meet unanticipated demand
  • handles DoS attacks and flash-crowds
  • fast update propagation
  • replication level indicates the locations of all
    the replicas
  • the home node initiates a multicast using entries
    in DHT routing tables

21
CoDoNS name management
  • explicit cache management
  • records stored until invalidated by updates
  • TTLs used only for clients, not necessary for
    consistency in the ring
  • upon TTL expiration, the home node checks binding
    for change
  • local names treated specially
  • a copy of the record retained at the local
    nameserver in addition to the home node
  • queries can be resolved locally without
    introducing load into the ring
  • server-side computation supported
  • low-TTL records not cached, replaced with
    forwarding pointers
  • supports Akamai and other CDN trickery

22
CoDoNS name security
  • all records carry cryptographic signatures
  • if the nameowner has a DNSSEC nameserver, CoDoNS
    will preserve the original signature
  • if not, CoDoNS will sign the DNS record with its
    own master key
  • malicious peers cannot introduce fake bindings
  • delegations are cryptographic
  • names not bound to servers

23
CoDoNS implications
  • name delegations can be purchased and propagated
    independently of server setup
  • naming hierarchy independent of physical server
    hierarchy
  • domains may be served by multiple namespace
    operators
  • competitive market for delegation services

24
evaluation
  • MIT trace
  • 12 hour trace, 4th December 2000
  • 281,943 queries
  • 47,230 domain names
  • Planetlab deployment
  • 75 nodes
  • Lookup performance
  • Adaptation to flash crowds
  • Load balance, Update propagation SIGCOMM 04

25
CoDoNS lookup performance (1/2)
26
CoDoNS lookup performance (2/2)
Legacy DNS CoDoNS
median 39 ms 2 ms
mean 382 ms 199 ms
90th 337 ms 213 ms
27
CoDoNS flash crowds
reverse popularity injected
28
advantages of CoDoNS
  • resilient
  • self configures around host and network failures
  • resilient against denial of service attacks
  • load balances around hotspots
  • high performance
  • low lookup latency
  • updates can be propagated at any time
  • autonomic
  • no manual configuration, no lame delegations

29
CoDoNS deployment
  • incremental deployment path
  • uses legacy DNS to populate resource records on
    demand
  • completely transparent to clients
  • can operate without legacy DNS
  • deployed on planet-lab
  • 50 to 100 hundred nodes at any given time
  • planned expansion to ISPs (e.g. CNNIC)

30
conclusions
  • proactive, model-driven caching enables DHTs to
    support latency-sensitive applications
  • CoDoNS can serve as a self-configuring, failure
    and DoS-resilient, automatic system for
    disseminating DNS records
  • can act as a safety net for legacy DNS
  • prototype deployed on Planetlab
  • http//www.cs.cornell.edu/people/egs/beehive/

31
CoDoNS servers
planetlab3.cs.duke.edu 152.3.136.3
planetlab01.ethz.ch 129.132.57.2
planetlab03.ethz.ch 129.132.57.4
planetlab1.netmedia.gist.ac.kr203.237.53.170
planet1.cc.gt.atl.ga.us 199.77.128.193pli2-br-1.h
pl.hp.com 192.170.103.20planet1.ics.forth.gr
139.91.70.61 planet1.cavite.nodes.planet-lab.org2
03.177.76.242
planet1.leixlip.nodes.planet-lab.org
192.198.151.98 planetlab1.postel.org 206.117.37.4
planetlab1.netlab.uky.edu 206.240.24.20
planetlab1.eecs.umich.edu 141.213.4.201
planetlab3.csail.mit.edu 128.31.1.13
planetlab5.csail.mit.edu 128.31.1.15
phys0bha-5a.chem.msu.ru 212.192.241.155soccf-pla
net-001.comp.nus.edu.sg 137.132.80.104
planet1.att.nodes.planet-lab.org 192.20.225.130
planetlab1.ias.csusb.edu 139.182.137.141
planlab1.cs.caltech.edu 131.215.45.71planetlab-1
.cmcl.cs.cmu.edu 128.2.198.188 planetlab-3.cmcl.c
s.cmu.edu 128.2.198.199 planetlab1.cs.cornell.edu
128.84.154.49 planetlab2.cs.cornell.edu
128.84.154.71 planetlab1.ewi.tudelft.nl
130.161.40.153
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