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When Does Integration Pay

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Consider again the prices that play a role in a customs union integration scheme: ... tariffs on autos and auto parts. Cross-border investment liberalized ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: When Does Integration Pay


1
When Does Integration Pay?
2
  • Europe has been rather spectacularly successful
    in its integration efforts. Many others have been
    far less successful. What makes for success?

3
  • Consider again the prices that play a role in a
    customs union integration scheme

P domestic
P tariff
P part count
P world
4
  • In your groups, discuss the proximities of given
    price lines in the set and elasticities of supply
    and demand that will make integration successful.

P domestic
P tariff
P part count
P world
5
First, check elasticities
The relative sizes of these gains depend on 1.
elasticities, the flatness of the curves.
Imports
Imports
6
First, check elasticities
Where they are relatively elastic (flat), the
imports will be greater and gains go with more
extensive trade.
Imports
Imports
7
Price spread in integration
  • Gains are greatest when the difference is
  • small between partner and world.
  • great between partner countries and us.

c
c
8
  • Large gains here. Large imports at near world
    prices (far better than our prices)

P domestic
P tariff
P part count
P world
9
  • Small gains here. Small imports at prices near
    ours and way above world prices.

P domestic
P tariff
P part count
P world
10
Preferential Trading ArrangementsGainers and
Losers from Regional Trading Blocs,Rosson,
Runge, and Moulton
11
  • More than 23 forms of Preferential Trading
    Agreements (PTAs) or Trading Blocs have been
    identified among 119 countries that account for
    82 of world trade.

12
  • Article 1 of GATT prohibited preferential tariff
    rates, but an exception was allowed by Article
    XXIV. A free trade area was permitted to retain
    barriers to trade with nonmembers.

13
  • This leaves the prospect of the world economy
    fractured into openly hostile trading blocs.
  • But GATT strategy seems generally to have been
    successful, since tariff rates for manufactured
    goods have declined from approximately 40 to
    around 4.

14
  • At the same time, quotas and other barriers have
    risen dramatically, and
  • We still have lots of work to do in freeing trade
    in services.

15
The First Five Years of the NAFTA
AgreementJoanna Moss
16
  • Economic cooperation had been growing with
    Mexico.
  • Bracero program Mexican workers to cross the
    border to do seasonal work (canceled in the early
    60s)
  • Maquiladora program foreign-owned firms could
    set up operations in Mexico and import inputs
    duty-free if products were exported.

17
  • Mexico cut tariffs in half to an average of about
    12 after joining GATT in 1986.

18
  • The Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement was
    inaugurated in 1989. A free trade area formed
    over a 10 year period.
  • Mexican president Carlos Salinas proposed NAFTA
    in 1990. Eliminate tariffs over a 10-15 year
    period.

19
  • Provisions
  • Free trade in agricultural products over 15
    years.
  • Freer trade in textiles
  • No more Mexican tariffs on autos and auto parts
  • Cross-border investment liberalized

20
  • NAFTA Side Agreements
  • Environmental Protocol. Fines and sanctions
    agreed upon if a country fails to enforce its own
    environmental laws. Cleanup funds set aside for
    Mexican-US border.
  • Labor Protocol. Fines for labor abuses, sanctions
    for failure to implement min-wage laws.
  • Snap-back Provision. Safety-net for industries
    endangered by surge of imports.Pre-NAFTA tariffs
    can be imposed for 3 or 4 years.

21
  • First five years of NAFTA
  • With over-valued peso, Mexico went on spending
    spree in early 90s. The capital inflow that
    covered debts dried up and Mexico issued bonds.
    Late 1994 investors began pulling money out.
  • Exhaustion of reserves forced a Peso devaluation.
    The US and Canada bailed them out with loans.
  • The recovery was faster than usual. Heavy exports
    to the US helped the recovery.
  • Investment funds returned to Mexico.

22
  • First five years of NAFTA
  • The US labor market didnt appear to suffer under
    NAFTA as some predicted. The boom of the 90s
    certainly didnt hurt in that respect.
  • NAFTA hasnt met the dire predictions of its
    detractors, nor has it fulfilled the dreams of
    its supporters Economic relations have been
    stable in an otherwise tumultuous period.

23
European Monetary UnionMichael W. Klein
24
  • European cooperation was strengthened by the
    decline of the Bretton Woods system.
  • Europe did not want to follow the US toward
    higher inflation. How does a fixed exchange rate
    help?
  • It allows for less trade uncertainty
  • It shows anti-inflationary commitment.

25
  • European cooperation was strengthened by the
    decline of the Bretton Woods system.
  • The Bretton Woods System was
  • It was eliminated in 1973 by Richard Nixon, a man
    of uncanny economic instincts

26
  • European cooperation was strengthened by the
    decline of the Bretton Woods system.
  • Europe did not want to follow the US toward
    higher inflation. How does a fixed exchange rate
    help?
  • It allows for less trade uncertainty
  • It shows anti-inflationary commitment.

27
  • See the history of progress toward a common
    European currency summarized in the box on p.
    305.
  • Europe did not want to follow the US toward
    higher inflation. Members of the EEC worked
    toward eliminating large inflation rate
    differentials by mid 1980s and capital controls
    were lifted by 1987.
  • Single European Act, 1986, called for removing
    all internal barriers to trade, capital
    movements, and labor migration by end of 1992.

28
  • Maastricht Treaty signed at end of 1981. The
    famous conditions were established for the
    introduction of monetary union.
  • Countries sacrificed monetary sovereignty for
    prospective Euro (formerly ECU) membership.

29
  • Maastricht Treaty signed at end of 1981. The
    famous conditions were established for the
    introduction of monetary union.
  • Countries sacrificed monetary sovereignty for
    prospective Euro (formerly ECU) membership.

30
  • Budget deficit 3 of GDP or less.
  • Gvoernment debt 60 of GDP or less.
  • Inflation no more than 1.5 above the average
    rate of the three members with the lowest
    inflation.
  • Long-term interest rates no more than 2
    percentage points above the average of the three
    members with the lowest rates.
  • Krugmans confusion. Why demand monetary
    management to give up monetary sovereignty?
  • Hazing?

31
  • The convergence pattern of these criteria through
    the 90s.

32
  • European countries strove valiantly to submit
    their sovereignty. So much did they desire to be
    a part of the Euro scheme!

33
  • Benefits of a common currency include ease in
    trading goods and assets over a common currency
    zone. It represents a big reduction in
    transactions costs.
  • Prestige of achieving the closer union of
    European economies. As a step toward political
    union? That is the dream.

34
  • The cost of union is the forgoing of monetary
    policy.
  • In the face of market pressure against a
    currency, a central bank committed to the
    external goal of a fixed exchange rate must raise
    domestic interest rates, even if this means
    forgoing the internal goal of setting interest
    rates with an eye toward domestic economic
    conditions. The only way to maintain monetary
    independence is eithge to allow the currency to
    float or to have in palce controls on the
    international movement of capital. (p, 311)

35
  • The cost of union is the forgoing of monetary
    policy. This has added to the structural
    unemployment problems facing the European
    countries over recent years.
  • Ten is roughly normal for Europe.

36
The Feldstein View
  • For a more detailed discussion of the standard
    American view of the future collapse of the EUs
    Monetary Union, see Martin Feldstein, EMU and
    International Conflict, in the Foreign Affairs
    Anthology.
  • Feldstein reviews the struggle, esp. between
    Germany and France, over whether to make
    unemployment or price stability top EU priority.

37
The Feldstein View
  • Feldstein is convinced that the first significant
    recession will bring serious conflict to Europe
    as countries regret the loss of monetary policy
    and secede from the Union.

38
The Euro as a New International Currency A
Dollar Substitute?
  • Klein concludes that widespread flight from the
    dollar to the Euro is unlikely, at least for the
    next few years.
  • But dollar flight to the Euro, in any major way,
    would cause the value of the dollar to fall
    dramatically.
  • The glut of dollars in the world that would
    result from a lack of willingness to hold it,
    could have major ramifications. What would they
    be?

39
The Euro as a New International Currency A
Dollar Substitute?
  • To review some of the issues that make the dollar
    a strong international currency, that give
    confidence that dollar flight to the Euro need
    not be a future disaster for that currency, see
    The International Use of Currencies The U.S.
    Dollar and the Euro, by George S. Tavlas
  • Why do both the U.S. and the EU have strong
    interests in seeing the dollar and the Euro
    remain competitive currencies, without one
    dominating the other?

40
Why is Europe Forming a Monetary Union?Gwen Eudey
41
  • Make it easier for individuals and institutions
    to buy stocks and bonds in other European
    countries.
  • Cut transactions costs (roughly 0.4 percent of
    the GDP) for member participants.
  • Prevent competitive devaluations (to promote
    exports). Reducing the value of currency is
    inflationary.

42
  • Costs of a Single Currency
  • Loss of independent monetary policy (but all
    member countries have representation in monetary
    policy).
  • Fiscal policy within a member country could
    increase budget deficits and require government
    borrowing, putting upward pressure on interest
    rates. Increasing the money supply to avoid high
    interest rates would threaten inflation. So EU
    members agreed to avoid debt.

43
  • Loss of independent monetary policy (but all
    member countries have representation in monetary
    policy).Still, fiscal policy could be used by the
    EU to address regional imbalances in the currency
    union. See p. 320.

44
  • Labor Market Flexibility can also speed recovery
    when some region experiences recession.
  • If workers are mobile, unemployed or poorly paid
    workers can relocate to countries with higher
    labor demand. That will even out imbalances.
  • But cultural and linguistic differences hinder
    labor movements in Europe.

45
  • Wage adjustments are another important form of
    labor market flexibility. If workers accept lower
    wages in a recession, employers need not lay them
    off. They can also pass on the reduction in
    payroll costs through price reductions. Lower
    prices promote exports and encourage domestic
    consumption. This increase in demand speeds
    recovery.
  • But Europe has problems with wage flexibility
    through legislation and union practices
    preventing it.
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