Case Study 1 Suspect donation to the party foundation Democracy of the United Democratic Forces
Case Study 2Privatization of Bulgartabac Holding (BTH)
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Data Generation
Documents related to the two particular cases - media materials, NGO analysis, Verdicts, Parties leaders statements etc.
General materials on corruption from the target groups we were not able to obtain documents to the cases.
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Codes development
1st level Most explicit ideas, usually associated with specific words and phrases
2th levelbeyond the basic meanings of the concepts, deeper argumentations and perceptions
3rd level hidden ideas or concepts with more abstract character
Interpretation building a single story to place findings in appropriate position.
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Case study 1
Michael Chorny announcing his donation to the Democracy foundation in October 2003
The pre-history of his expulsion from the country in 2000
Immediate start of several investigative proceedings
Huge media coverage
Libel cases won by Chorny 2004-2006
Nicosia court decision that Chorny was not the owner of the company which made the donation
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Background facts
Party financing is a poorly regulated area the issue of structural corruption (problems with disclosure, parties-foundations)
Party funding and organised crime. What is organised crime? Gap between judicial pronouncements and public knowledge
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Major dichotomies in the understanding of crime and corruption
Legalistic conceptions v. public-interest-based conceptions
Pro- and contra-foreign financial participation in domestic politics (no special worries about the foreign element)
What to do with money from illegitimate sources accept to make good use of them or reject and blacklist?
Legitimate lobbying v. corrupt influence. How to build a social base for a political platform
Private use of political money v, public use of political money
Transparency v. egalitarianism
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Target Group Politics
From legalistic to inflated interest-based conceptions of corruption favouritism in privatisation state control of smuggling channels turning the party into a corrupt hierarchical structure
Gap between the understandings of accusers (Sugarev) and accused (Kostov) government and opposition
Attempt to normalise inflated conceptions of corruption the circle of firms idea (clientelism and favouritism in defence of the public good)
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Target Group Judiciary
Heavy emphasis on legalistic conceptions
Transformation of corruption allegation into libel
Was it an attempt to setup Kostov, or an instance of a kickback for a governmental favour?
Inconclusive character of judicial involvement neither confirm or reject allegations conclusively, which provides ground for the production of myths
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Target Group Police and Prosecutors
Wide-spread use in official documents of inflated public interest based conceptions of corruption circles of friends, favouritism, party machines, political umbrella against investigation, massive theft through privatisation
Naming people as part of mafiotic structures including a minister of interior
Use of such documents in election campaigns
Lack of judicial confirmation of allegations these rarely reach the courts as formal indictments
More politicians than magistrates in terms of discourse
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Target Group Media
Corruption as an all-embracing metaphor criminal and bad government
Main theme The elite is stealing from the people on a massive scale.
Solutions convictions. But also, people want to share in the spoils of corruption. Participatory corruption ideal.
Role of the media to hook in the people in the process of grand stealing, to make them a witness, rather than to condemn and sanction corruption.
Arguments disproportionate interest in the outbreak and unfolding of scandals, and lack of interest in its resolution
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Target Group Civil Society
Most sophisticated discourse, dictating the fashion in general
Corruption is measurable, and it is increasing or at least is very high. It is bad for the economy.
It is a problem which could be dealt with through institutional change and a change in the incentive structure of important actors (Stanchev on party funding)
Results could be expected quickly
Civil Society discourse raises dramatically public expectations, delegitimises governments, creates new populist political actors (necessity of political will, new facs, etc.)
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Target Group Economy
The discourse of silence
Corruption as an economic problem stemming from read tape
Depersonalised speak of corruption structural problems come to the fore
Disparity between popular perceptions and business community perceptions
Corruption as grease the business community will never surrender this option
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Conclusions
From legalistic, quid pro quo understandings of corruption to the predominance of the metaphor of criminal government
Delegitimation of mainstream politics
Preparation of ground for new populist actors
The wearing out of the effect of the corruption discourse
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Case Study 2 Privatization of Bulgartabac Holding
BULGARTABAC Holding
leading tobacco company in SEE
state-owned and managed
tobacco buying, processing and leaf trade, manufacturing and export of cigarettes
1998 First put up for sale by the UDF Government in.
July 2000 Privatization Agency (PA) cancels tender and invites new bids.
March 2001 privatization procedure terminated.
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Case Study 2 Privatization of Bulgartabac Holding
The parliamentary elections in 2001 were won by Simeon II National Movement (SIINM)
New Minister of the Economy and Vice Prime-Minister Nikolay Vasilev announced that the privatization of the Bulgartabac tobacco holding would be completed by the end of 2001.
Due to political and economic constraints, the new bidding did not start until the spring of 2002.
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Case Study 2 Privatization of Bulgartabac Holding
March 25, 2002 procedure opened
June 5, 2002 - start of second phase with 5 candidates remaining
July 22, 2002 final bids submitted
August 23, 2002 PA chooses Deutsche Bank
Chorni appeals PA decision at SAC
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Case Study 2 Privatization of Bulgartabac Holding
March 25, 2002 procedure opened
June 5, 2002 - start of second phase with 5 candidates remaining
July 22, 2002 final bids submitted
August 23, 2002 PA chooses Deutsche Bank
Chorni appeals PA decision at SAC
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Case Study 2 Privatization of Bulgartabac Holding
October 2002 3 member SAC panel declare the procedure illegitimate and cancels the choice of buyer
December 2002 5 member SAC panel confirm decision of 3 member panel. Final decision
Chorni succeeds to block the deal with Deutsche in court, but not to buy BTH
February 7, 2003 Government prepared a special privatization law to overrule court decision
April 3, 2003 due to opposition in Parliament, PA stops negotiations, and Council of Ministers stops the procedure
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Target group Politics
Political vs. technical privatisation
National security (ab)use
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Target Group Judiciary
Economically effective
privatisation
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Target Group Media
Non-transparency, lack of transparency
Favouritism, Friendly connections
Violation of journalistic ethics
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Target Group Civil Society
Political rent seeking
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Target Group Economy
Definitions of corruption
Power abuse for personal benefit
Pressure exercised by state agencies/local authorities
Way to get things done
Corruption as a deal
Compensatory corruption
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Target Group Economy
Hierarchic structure of corruption
1st level Favors exchange
2nd level preferable treatment in return to bribes
3rd level corruption in procurement
4th level corruption in the legislative process and at governmental level