Nigeria Avian Influenza

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Nigeria Avian Influenza

• January 2006
• To Date

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Some Highlights

• Major involvement in February 2006
• Kano more than 20 kilometers across involved
• President asked that Military not be involved.
• PPEs, Sprayers, Phone cards, gas cans, and other
  supplies delivered. (400,000 USD)
• Initial delays in response much due to country is
  so big and trained resources limited.
• Two trainings held for State Veterinary officers.

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Background Information

• Human Population 140mil
• Federal System 3 tiers, Federal, States (36)
  Federal Capital Territory Local Government
  Areas (LGAs) 774
• Poultry population 140m
• Commercial 25
• Semi-commercial 15
• Rural/Backyards 60
• Net worth 250m
• Agric GDP 9-10

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Present Situation

• Total Number of suspicions 860
• Total Number of ve cases 248
• States with Suspicions 30
• States with ve results 25
• LGAs with ve results 85
• Total depopulated Birds 885365
• Total dead birds (estimated) 711000

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Some Background (36 states FCT)

• States with only one outbreak 4
• States with repeat outbreak (gt2) 21
• LGAs with only one outbreak 67
• LGAs with repeat outbreak (gt2) 18
• Open Admission of AI
• Negative Publicity
• Sharp drop in sales.
• Poultry and poultry Products.
• Drop feed Sales
• Negative livelihood impact.

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Disease Trends
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Nature of the outbreaks

• Commercial with contamination mostly due to lack
  of farm bio-security.
• Major problem with small farmers disposing of
  birds as soon as sickness was noted but before
  major mortalities set in.
• Economically the poultry industry takes a big
  hit, even those with no disease were affected.
• Some levels of disease cover-up starts as
  economic stress is realized.

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Activities and Achievements

• 2003/4 Early preparation.
• Document on Prevention Strategy
• Active disease search conducted by National Vet.
  Research Inst. (NVRI) Federal Dept.
• Nov/2005.Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness
  Plan (EPP)
• 1st suspicion Jan 16 2006 - NVRI
• Confirmation on Feb 7 2006 by Padova
• FGN official announce Feb 8 2006

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Progress of Government of Nigeria

• National Committees FGN
• Technical Committee
• National Inter-Ministerial Committee
• (MOA, MOH, MOI)
• AI Crisis Management Centre
• EPP Implementation FGN Devt.P
• Creation of HPAI Special Unit
• Enhanced Surveillance
• Case definition
• SOP on Depop Decontamination (48/72hrs)
• Compensation
• Movement Control. Gazette of 20/2/06. FGN
• National Vet Stockpile Dev.P FGN
• Negotiated 50m (29.2m) IDA Loan. FGN Devt.P
• Compensation N451.6m (3.5m) FGN

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More Key Activities

• Equipped Upgraded Cental Lab. FGNDevt.P
• Training Capacity building Devt.P FGN
• Improved Budgetary Allocation FGN (MDG)
• Active virus search Project FGNFAOEU
• AI Multi-Donor/ECTAD FAO/USAID/UNDP
• Integrated National AI Plan Devt.P FGN

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• Pattern of disease spread
• Mainly between commercial farms
• Live bird markets source of infection
• Fomites and Animal health service providers
  spread HPAI
• Siting of farms
• Risk associated with megacities (Lagos Kano)
• Movement Control of Livestock and Livestock
  Products
• FGN Gazette No1/2006 on movement control (20th
  Feb 2006).
• Poor state of Veterinary Quarantine facilities.
• Socio-cultural traditional practices.
• Difficulty in determining the origin(s) of HPAI
  infection.
• Backtracing of infections
• National Veterinary Stockpile
• Critical inputs (PPEs, disinfectants etc)
• Distribution Nationwide-substations

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Key Constraints Challenges

• Resurgence/Persistence of infection in some
  States
• Live Bird Markets
• Politics
• Restructuring
• Enhanced disease surveillance
• Engaging Private Vets others on disease
  surveillance reporting
• Movement Control
• Poor Vet Quarantine facilities
• Poor enforcement of Movement permit.
• Lack of appreciation of dangers of AI by security
  agents others
• Information dissemination and Communication
• High level of sensitization but low risk
  perception
• Public perception about AI vis-a- vis ND
• Sustainability of the Compensation Fund

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Some Problems

• How do you kill 5000 birds (cervical dislocation)
  (gassing) (bagging) catching)
• No money to burn or bury. No money to send
  sample to lab. Buildings destroyed to get
  chickens, chickens in wells, CNN picture of kids
  taking chickens from trenches.
• Not all Commercial systems fit traditional
  paradigm eg Feeding systems, sanitation, disease
  masking (50 bird loss not unusual for season
  loss Newcastle disease

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Progress in Year one

• Veterinary laboratory comes up to capacity, but
  the communications and support to field staff
  remain weak and early on reporting lagged
  outbreaks sometimes up to 60 days
• Field staff trainings are conducted and
  motorcycles distributed.
• In 2006 many small farmers were wary of the
  promised compensation and sold birds rather than
  take major losses.

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Project Delays

• November 06 the ministry asked FAO to delay
  project start to the fasting and prayer period
  which many ministry people were participants
• December 06 many ministry people were out of
  Abuja for the Christmas holidays and the Ministry
  requested FAO not start the project during that
  month.
• January 07 the Ministry asks for a couple of
  weeks to review their role in the project before
  fully engaging
• February 07 the Chief Veterinary Officer sent a
  memo the FAO stating that FAO could not engage in
  field information gathering and could not access
  information until fully vetted by proper ministry
  authorities (Please note that the major part of
  the project was to engage in information
  gathering)

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Project Delays

• March 07 the Guardian News paper highlighted an
  Interview with the Nigeria Poultry association
  president stating that there was no Avian
  Influenza in Nigeria thus leading to the
  apprehension and interrogation of all GON
  Ministry people involved in Avian Influenza by
  the Economic Crimes Commission. This claim, that
  millions of dollars were stolen completely
  stalled all of FAOs efforts to start the
  project.
• With the election process underway and a lame
  duck Minister, FAO was requested to wait for a
  new minister before initiating the project.

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Late 2006 early 2007

• Disease tapers off in October and November
• New cycle of outbreaks in December 2006
• Documented human fatality in January 2007
• All back compensation was paid to documented
  farmers
• Active surveillance collects 3000 plus samples
  with no positives in backyard flocks detected.

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National Veterinary Research Institute
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Progress in 2007

• National laboratory develops specimen transport
  system. (delivery fund established)
• Time from suspicion to confirmation averaging 48
  hours.
• Improved disease tracking with documentation of
  suspected disease vectors and modes included in
  reports.
• Bio-security issues on commercial farms.
• Wet markets unsanitary and serve as disease
  reservoirs
• Back yard flocks minimal involvement.

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Progress 2007

• FAO project on the ground and extended
• AI commodity trainings (4) with 10 students each
• AI communication trainings (2) with 10 to 12
  trainees.
• Wet market disinfecting and training (SEPT)
• Road patrol training (SEPT)

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Mission Tripwires

• Tripwire 2 - HSN1 Avian Flu is confirmed in
  humans in Africa, and particularly in West
  Africa. - One documented human fatality in
  country.
• 2.1 Low incidence in poultry
• 2.2 High incidence in poultry - greater than one
  farm/case per week
• Warden messages are sent out
• Town Hall meeting
• Possible ordered departure
• All USG vehicles issued disinfecting equipment
  and drivers given training
• Warnings on traveling to infected areas
• Masks are to be worn in markets and areas of high
  incidence.
• Training in "fit" test

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Mission Tripwires

• 2.3 New human case and confirmed by CDC/WHO
• Warden messages are sent out
• Begin temperature monitoring at ports of entry
• Masks issued when traveling to critical areas
• 2.4 More than one new human case in country
  confirmed by CDC/WHO
• 2.5 Documented cluster- authorized departure
• 2.6 Multiple clusters - ordered departure
• Tripwire 3 - Sustained human to human influenza
  transmission f a highly pathogenic nature is
  confirmed by CDC/WHO or anywhere in the world

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Priority Recommendations

• Restructuring of the Poultry Prod.System/Live
  bird market.
• Break infection circle
• Focal Point for surveillance / monitoring
• Registration Geo-reference
• Movement control.
• Enforcement of movement permits.
• Upgrading VQS.
• Collaboration with law enforcement agents
  stakeholders