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Engaging the Adversary as a Viable Response to Network Intrusion

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PST 05 - St-Andrew's NB, Leblanc & Knight. 9 ... PST 05 - St-Andrew's NB, Leblanc & Knight. 12. Characteristics of IO Counter-measures Tools ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Engaging the Adversary as a Viable Response to Network Intrusion


1
Engaging the Adversary as a Viable Response to
Network Intrusion
  • Sylvain P. Leblanc G. Scott Knight
  • Royal Military College of Canada
  • PST 05 Workshop October 12, 2005

2
In a nutshell
We must remain in contact with those who
threaten our cyber infrastructure if we hope to
successfully defend it.
3
Outline
  • Introduction
  • Information Operations
  • IO Counter-measures Tools
  • Honeypots
  • Conclusion

4
1 - Introduction
It is not sufficient to React by cutting off
access.
It is important to gain information about those
who threaten the infrastructure.
5
2 - Information Operations (IO)
IO are defined as actions taken in support of
political and military objectives which
influence decision makers by affecting others
information while exploiting, or fully
utilizing, ones own information.
6
Defensive IO
  • Protection
  • Defensive Counter-Information Operations (IO
    Counter-measures) -
  • Offensive Counter-Information Operations

7
Computer Network Operations (CNO)
  • CNO represent all aspects of computer related
    operations, but they have three specific
    components
  • Defence (CND)
  • Attack (CNA)
  • Exploitation (CNE)

8
Operational Objectives
  • Holding Contact with the Adversary
  • Understanding the Adversary
  • Who is attacking?
  • What are they capable of?
  • What are their current mission and objectives?
  • What is the context of the current attack.
  • Preparing the Adversary

9
Network-based IO counter-measures Principles of
Operations
  • Operational Objectives for Active Response
  • Combined Operations
  • Repeatable Operations
  • Standing procedures
  • Dedicated resources
  • Computer Network Operations Order-of-Battle
  • Risk Management

10
Risk Management
  • Access risks
  • Damage or alter information
  • Exfiltrate more sensitive information than
    expected
  • Push attack to other systems
  • Mount IO counter-counter-measure
  • Denial implications
  • Inability to identify
  • Loss of knowledge on techniques and motivations
  • Loss of ability to influence
  • Encourage adversary to seek other ingress points

11
3 - IO Counter-measures Tools
  • Operational use with very high interaction
  • The attacker must feel that he is in a real
    production environment
  • High fidelity environment
  • New tools
  • Provide legitimate operational activity
  • Capture attackers activity

12
Characteristics of IO Counter-measures Tools
  • Components and mechanisms undetectable from user
    with root privileges.
  • Behaviours and communication patterns appear
    legitimate from vantage point of other host on
    the network.
  • Able to simulate normal human user at the
    interface level.
  • Provide means of observing and collecting
    attacker activity
  • Make de-conflicting attack traffic
    straightforward.

13
Honeypots
  • Stem from the difficulty in discriminating
    attacker activity
  • A honeypots value lies in being probed, attacked
    and compromised.
  • Honeypots have no production value, making
    discrimination of attacker activity trivial.
  • Credited with many successes.

14
Honeypot Classifications
  • Spitzner suggests two main purposes
  • Production honeypots Support operations by
    helping secure the environment.
  • Research honeypots Gain information on
    attackers tools and techniques

15
Honeypot Levels of Interaction
Spitzners proposes a taxonomy is based on the
level of interaction afforded to the attacker.
16
IO Counter-measure example
  • IO Counter-measures tool installed as part of
    baseline

17
IO Counter-measure example
  • Intrusion Detected.

18
IO Counter-measures example
  • Machine is physically isolated
  • IO Counter-measures tool is activated
  • Attacker is monitored and prepared

19
5 - Conclusion
  • Reactive-oriented defence policy is insufficient.
  • Defence must include an understanding of the
    adversary.
  • First response should not always be to break
    contact
  • IO Counter-measures to gain information
  • Principles of Operations for Network-based IO
    counter-measures
  • Operational Objectives
  • Key Research Areas include tools
  • Obfuscate attacker behaviour observation
  • Simulate normal human user behaviour

20
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