From the Intifada to the Peace Process and back again

1
From the Intifada to the Peace Process and back
again

• Background
• The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
• UN Security Council Resolution 242
• From the October War to Camp David
• The First Intifada
• Results of First Intifada
• The Madrid Conference
• The Oslo Accords
• Camp David II
• The Second Intifada
• Conclusions
• Appendix Chronology of Palestine Question (.doc)

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Background 1 PLO

• 1964 Arab League establishes PLO effort to
  control Palestinian nationalism while appearing
  to champion the cause.
• 1967 Six-Day War defeat ? younger, more militant
  Palestinians take over PLO
• PLO includes different political and armed groups
  with varying ideological orientations.
• Arafat leads Fatah, largest group, PLO Chairman
  1968-2005
• Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
  (PFLP) Democratic Front for the Liberation of
  Palestine (DFLP) Palestine Peoples Party (PPP,
  formerly Communist Party, occupied territories)
• 1964-1970 PLO based in Jordan. In 1970-71,
  fighting with Jordanian army ? Lebanon
• 1975 Lebanese civil war PLO involved
• 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon PLO leadership
  was expelled relocated to Tunisia.
• Israeli policy until 1993
• no acknowledgement of Palestinian national rights
  
• no recognition of Palestinians as independent
  party to conflict. Israel refused to negotiate
  with the PLO, arguing it was a terrorist
  organization, dealt only with Jordan or other
  Arab states.
• Rejection of establishment of Palestinian state
  Palestinians should be absorbed by Arab states.
• ...Intransigence ended with Intifada, when
  Israeli representatives entered into secret
  negotiations with the PLO, which led to the
  Declaration of Principles (Oslo Accords)

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Background 2 UN Security Council Resolution 242

• 1967 Six-Day War ? UNSC Resolution 242 notes the
  inadmissability of the acquisition of territory
  by force, violation of UN Charter, Ch. 7 and
  calls for Israeli withdrawal
• N.B. French version says Israel should withdraw
  from les territoires, English version uses
  "territories." (Both English and French are
  official languages) Israel US use English
  version to argue Israeli withdrawal from some,
  but not all, occupied territories satisfies
  Resolution.
• Palestinian rejection of UNSC Res 242
• a) does not acknowledge their right to national
  self-determination or to return to their
  homeland, only a just settlement of refugee
  problem.
• b) By calling for recognition of every state in
  the area, Resolution 242 implied unilateral
  Palestinian recognition of Israel without
  recognition of Palestinians or their national
  rights.

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From October to Camp David

• 1970 Sadat comes to power, indicates to UN envoy
  G. Jarring willingness to sign peace agreement
  with Israel for the return of Sinai ? ignored ?
  organised 1973 war
• 1973 War oil embargo ? US Secretary of State
  Kissinger pursued limited bilateral agreements to
  secure partial withdrawals from Sinai Golan,
  but avoiding negotiations on WBG, Jerusalem, and
  Right of Return (divide rule).
• 1975 no prospect of achieving a comprehensive
  Arab-Israeli settlement
• 1977 November 19 Sadat visits Jerusalem ? Camp
  David Accords

• September 1978 Carter, Sadat, Begin 2
  agreements
• 1. bilateral Egyptian-Israeli treaty (1979)
• 2. general framework for resolution of Middle
  East crisis (i.e. Palestine) autonomy proposal
  for WBG, 5-year interim period ? final status
  negotiations
• PLO Arab states rejected autonomy did not
  guarantee full Israeli withdrawal from OTs or
  establishment of independent Palestinian state.
• Israel sabotaged negotiations confiscates land
  builds settlements.

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The First Intifada

• December 1987 Palestinian population in WBG
  mass uprising.
• not started or orchestrated by PLO leadership in
  Tunis - popular mobilization that drew on the
  organizations and institutions that had developed
  under occupation.
• Civil disobedience demonstrations, strikes,
  refusal to pay taxes, boycotts of Israeli
  products, political graffiti underground
  schools (schools closed by IDF as reprisal).
• Violence stone-throwing, Molotov cocktails,
  barricades impeding IDF movement.
• Activism organized through popular committees
  under umbrella of United National Leadership of
  the Uprising --a coalition of the four PLO
  (Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP and the PPP).
• This mostly non-violent, broad-based resistance
  drew unprecedented international attention to the
  situation facing Palestinians

• MoD Yitzhak Rabin smash intifada with "force,
  power and blows."
• 1987-91 IDF killed 1,000 Palestinians,
  including over 200 under 16.
• 1990 most UNLU leaders arrested intifada lost
  cohesion.
• Political divisions and violence within
  community escalated, esp. growing rivalry between
  PLO Islamists (HAMAS, JI).
• Palestinian militants killed 250 suspected
  collaborators about 100 Israelis.

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Results of First Intifada

• Although the intifada did not end the Occupation,
  it made clear status quo was untenable.
• Intifada shifted the centre of gravity of
  Palestinian politics from PLO leadership to the
  Occupied Territories.
• November 1988 Palestine National Council
  (Algeria)
• recognized the state of Israel (implicitly,
  accepting 242 338 as foundations for
  negotiation)
• proclaimed an independent Palestinian state in
  WBG and
• renounced terrorism.
• Israeli government did not respond, claiming PLO
  was a terrorist organization with which it would
  never negotiate.
• US acknowledged PLO policy change, but did little
  to encourage Israel to change stance.

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The Madrid Conference

• 1991 Gulf War
• US Israeli failure to respond to 1988 PLO
  moderation ? opposition to US-led 1991 Gulf War.
• PLO did not endorse annexation of Kuwait, but saw
  Saddam's challenge to US Gulf monarchies as way
  to focus attention on Palestine.
• Kuwait Saudi Arabia cut off financial support
• ? PLO diplomatically isolated on brink of
  crisis.
• After the Gulf War
• US sought to stabilize its position by promoting
  resolution of Arab-Israeli conflict.
• Despite turning against PLO, Kuwait and Saudi
  Arabia were anxious to resolve the conflict,
  removing potential for regional instability it
  created.
• October 1991 Madrid Conference
• Israeli PM Shamir opens negotiations with
  Palestinians and Arab states at a multilateral
  conference in Madrid in October 1991.
• Shamir's conditions PLO excluded from talks
  Palestinian independence and statehood not be
  directly addressed.

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Madrid 2

• Washington follow-up negotiations Palestinians
  represented by delegation from OTs. Delegates
  were s.t. Israeli approval, residents of East
  Jerusalem were barred on the grounds that J is
  part of Israel. PLO regularly consulted.
• little progress Shamir announced after leaving
  office strategy was to drag out negotiations for
  10yrs --by then WB annexation would be fait
  accompli.
• June 1992 new PM Rabin promised rapid conclusion
  of negotiations stalemate after Dec. 92 Israel
  expels 400 OT residents HR conditions in WBG?
  ? undermined legitimacy of Palestinian delegation
  ? resignations.
• Lack of progress in Washington economic HR
  conditions in WBG? ? growth of radical Islamist
  groups??
• attacks by HAMAS Islamic Jihad further
  exacerbated tensions.
• Ironically, before the intifada, Israeli
  authorities favoured development of Islamist
  organizations to divide Palestinians.
• But popularity of Islamists? ? adaptive
  radicalisation by PLO
• stalemate in Washington talks fear of Islamists
  ? Rabin reverses refusal to negotiate
• secret negotiations in Oslo directly w/ PLO reps
  excluded from Madrid Washington talks
• PLO weakness after Gulf War ? willing to accept
  Oslo process outcomes

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The Oslo Accords

• September 1993 Israel-PLO Declaration of
  Principles, signed in Washington
• Declaration of Principles mutual recognition of
  Israel and Palestine.
• Israel would withdraw from the Gaza Strip and
  Jericho withdrawals from further unspecified
  areas of WB during 5-yr interim period.
• During this period PLO would form Palestinian
  Authority (PA) with "self-governing" (municipal)
  powers in areas of Israeli redeployment.
• Jan. 1996 elections for Palestinian Legislative
  Council PA Presidency

• BUT
• extent of territories to be ceded by Israel,
• nature of Palestinian entity to be established,
• future of Israeli settlements and settlers,
• water rights,
• resolution of refugee problem
• status of Jerusalem
• ....were all set aside to be discussed
  in final status talks.

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Oslo Accords 2

• The Oslo process was supposed to have been
  completed by May 1999.
• Delays due to
• Israel's reluctance to relinquish control over
  OT,
• periodic outbursts of violence by Palestinian
  opponents (e.g. HAMAS JI).
• 1996-99 Likud return to power Netanyahu avoided
  Oslo process, which he opposed.
• 1999 Labor-led coalition led by Barak first
  concentrated on peace agreement with Syria, but
  fails to convince Syrians to sign an agreement
  that would not restore to them all Golan Heights
  ? Barak turned attention to Palestine.
• Both Labor Likud govts expanded existing
  built new settlements in OTs, and constructed a
  network of bypass roads marking out territory
  to annex in final settlement? Oslo Accords had no
  mechanism to block unilateral actions
• mid-1996 date set for Final Status
  Negotiationsonly got underway in mid-2000.
• By then, PA had direct or partial control of 40
  WB 65 G, but
• Palestinian areas surrounded by IDF-controlled
  territory, incl. entry and exit.

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Camp David II

• July 2000 Clinton invites Barak and Arafat to
  Camp David to conclude negotiations on final
  status.
• Israels "red lines" Barak offers more extensive
  withdrawal than any previous PM, but
• 1. no return to pre-1967 borders
• 2. East Jerusalem with its 175,000 Jewish
  settlers would remain under Israeli sovereignty
• 3. Israel would annex settlement blocs in WB
  containing some 80 of the 180,000 Jewish
  settlers
• 4. accept no legal or moral responsibility for
  Palestinian refugee problem.
• Palestinians
• 1. sought Israeli withdrawal from WBG, including
  East Jerusalem,
• 2. recognition of an independent state.
• ? impossible to reach agreement at Camp David
• However, Israeli taboo on discussing future of
  Jerusalem was brokenand some Israelis start to
  consider land for peace

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The Second Intifada

• September 2000 Problems with Oslo process
  frustrations of life in OTs.
• September 28 Likud leader Sharon visited the
  Noble Sanctuary (Temple Mount) with 1000 armed
  guards
• in context of July's tense negotiations over
  Jerusalem's holy places Sharon's call for
  annexation of East Jerusalem provocation ?
  Palestinian protests in Jerusalem. Soldiers kill
  6 unarmed protesters? 1 month of demonstrations
  and clashes in WBG

• Intifada II bloodier than I. Both sides employed
  greater force.
• Fatahs Al-Aqsa Brigades coordinated many street
  actions had a substantial small arms fired
  often on Israeli troops.
• Israeli response escalated after two soldiers
  killed on October 12 by Palestinian mob returning
  from funeral of an unarmed man soldiers had shot
  the day before.
• The IDF attacks PA installations in Ramallah,
  Gaza, etc.
• several international NGOs (e.g. AI HRW)
  condemned Israel (e.g. use of live ammunition to
  control demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians).
• UN Security Council passed a similar
  condemnation US abstained
• 20 October 2000 UN GA Resolution condemns
  Israel. Israel, the US and four Polynesian island
  nations voted no, 1/3 of the Assembly abstained.

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Conclusion

• Truce at Sharm al-Sheikh, a later agreement to
  quell violence between Arafat and Peres and
  Clinton's attempts to restart negotiations in
  January 2001, the Second Intifada did not look
  like it would end soon.
• Since beginning of Second Intifada, thanks also
  to 9/11, pressure on Arafat to either rein in
  militants (which he didnt have either the
  material means or the political capital to do) or
  resign (US Israeli pressure for him to appoint
  PM, Qureya and then Mahmoud Abbas)
• The basic problems remain
• extent of the territories to be ceded by Israel,
• future of Israeli settlements and settlers,
• water rights,
• resolution of the refugee problem
• status of Jerusalem
• PA leadership cant make sellable concessions
  (undermining militants) unless Israel seen to
  reciprocatebut this is politically problematic
  in Israel itself...
• Territoriality (cartography)
• Security discourses (rooted in characterisation
  of alterity)