VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

1
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

• KALUBA CHITUMBO
• DIRECTOR
• DIVISION OF OPERATIONS A
• DEPARTMENT OF SAFEGUARDS

2
TOPICS TO BE COVERED

• BACKGROUND
• IAEA Safeguards
• Design and Implementation of Safeguards
  Approaches
• Organizational Structure of the Department of
  Safeguards
• Budget
• VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES
• Inspections
• Facilities and Materials under Safeguards in 2006
• Accountancy
• Containment/Surveillance (C/S)

3
TOPICS TO BE COVERED (contd)

• VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd)
• Design Information Verification (DIV)
• Non-Destructive Assay (NDA)
• Destructive Analysis (DA)
• Environmental Sampling
• Remote Monitoring (data collection/transmission)
• INFORMATION ANALYSIS
• Satellite Imagery
• CONCLUDING REMARKS

4
BACKGROUNDIAEA SAFEGUARDS
Purpose of IAEA Safeguards
Verify Compliance with Safeguards Agreements
Timely detection of diversion and
deterrence through risk of early detection
Detection of undeclared Nuclear Material and
Activities
Assurance about the exclusively Peaceful use of
NM and Facilities in States
5
BACKGROUND Design and Implementation of
Safeguards Approach
Field Operations
Inspection Reports, Samples,etc
State Reports
Evaluation Conclusions
Safeguards Implementation Report
Statements
Effectiveness Evaluation
6
BACKGROUNDORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
International Atomic Energy Agency
SGOA
SGOB
SGOC
SGIM
SGTS
SGCP
Division of Operations A
Division of Operations B
Division of Operations C
Division of Information Management
Division of Technical Support
Division of Concepts and Planning
TTS
CCA
OBC
OCC
OAC
ICO
Section for Technical Support
Section for Concepts and
Coordination and Support Section

Coordination and Support Section
Coordination

Support Section
Customer Service and Operations
Coordination
Approaches
Section OB
1
Section OC
1
IAP
TIL
CPD
OA
1
-

Section
Information Architecture and Projects
Section for Inspection Logistics
Section for Process Design
TSR
OA
2
-

Section
Section OB
2
Section OC
2
ICA
CPR
Section for Surveillance
,
Seals and
Information Collection and Analysis
Section for Programme

Resources
Remote Monitoring
IDS
TAU
OA
3
-

Section
Section OB
3
Section OC
3
CTR
Declared and Statistical Information
Section for Attended and Unattended
Section for Safeguards Training
Analysis
NDA
Toronto Regional Office
Section OC
4
OAT
-

OBT
Tokyo Regional Office
P

\
SPRDATA
\
ORGANIGRAMS
\
ORGANIGRAM SH
-
SPR
2007
\
S
.
Singh

A
-
1917
\
26855
7
Background (contd)

• BUDGET 2006
• Regular Budget US 106.4 million
• Extra budgetary US 13.6 million

8
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

• INSPECTIONS 2006
• Number of Facilities and LOFs under SG 929
• Number of Inspections 2,144
• Number of Person Days 9,232

9
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd)
FACILITIES UNDER SAFEGUARDS IN 2006
10
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd)

• NUCLEAR MATERIAL COVERED
• Elements Isotopes
• Uranium (U) 238 U, 235 U, 233 U,..
• Plutonium (Pu) 239 Pu, 240 Pu,..
• Thorium (Th) 232 Th

11
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd)
Significant Quantity Approximate quantity of
nuclear material in respect of which the
possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive
device cannot be excluded Pu, 233U
8 kg U with 235U 20 (HEU) 25 kg 235U U with
235U lt 20 (LEU) 75 kg 235U NU (235U 0.72)
10 t Th, DU 20 t
12
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd)

• Nuclear Material under SG Significant Quantity
• Pu (un-irradiated) 11,000 SQs
• Pu (irradiated) 99,400 SQs
• HEU (un-irradiated) 430 SQs
• HEU (irradiated) 630 SQs
• DNLEU Th 23,600 SQs

13
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd)
Detection/Conversion Time

Un-irradiated Direct-use Material 1
monthIrradiated Direct-use Material 3
monthsIndirect-use Material 12
monthsThis generally indicates the time
required for detection and conversion of nuclear
material to an explosive device it also
determines the frequency of inspections
14
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd)

• EXAMPLES OF VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES

15
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd)

• NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY (NMA)

Records Examination, Book Auditing
Item Identification and Counting
16
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd)

• CONTAINMENT AND SURVEILLANCE (C/S)

Cameras
Sealing
Containment
Surveillance
17
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd)

• BACK-UP SEALING SYSTEM IN USE

18
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd) SEALS
VERIFICATION
Seals (E-type)
19
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd) DESIGN
INFORMATION VERIFICATION
DIV must be performed prior to plant
start-up and continues throughout the plant
lifetime
20
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd)
DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION (contd)

• Performed throughout the lifetime of the facility
  to assure
• that it is being used as declared and that the
  safeguards measures remain adequate.

21
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd) NON-DESTRUCTIVE
ASSAY

• IAEA inspectors have to make independent
  measurements to verify declared material
  quantities

22
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd) WEIGHING OF
NUCLEAR MATERIAL
Load-Cell
To measure large quantities of material, e.g.,
uranium, particularly UF6 mass in cylinders
(weight)
23
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd) Pu-Isotopics
measurements
HLNC
To verify Pu Isotopics
24
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd) SPENT FUEL
VERIFICATION
ICVD To verify spent fuel assemblies at Nuclear
Power Plants
25
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd) ENVIRONMENTAL
SAMPLING
Swipe Sampling Kit
Aluminum Foil
Labels
Pen
Working Papers
Bag with cotton swipe
Gloves
Large bag for double bagging
Outer Bag
26
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd) ENVIRONMENTAL
SAMPLING
Swipe Sampling from Process Equipment
Swipe Sampling from Vegetation
Sampling of Surface Soil
High Volume Water Sampling with a Special Filter
27
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd)
IAEA CLEAN LABORATORY, SEIBERSDORF
Scanning Electron Microscopy
Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry
28
IAEA Network of Analytical Laboratories

29
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES (contd)

• REMOTE MONITORING

30
SATELLITE IMAGERY
31
SATELLITE IMAGERY PROVIDERS

• IKONOS
• Quickbird
• Landsat 5/7
• Corona (declassified source)
• IRS Cartosat 1-2
• Radarsat 1 ERS 1-2
• SPOT 1-4 SPOT 5
• Orbview 3/4
• EROS A B
• KVR 1000, TK 350, DK-1
• FORMOSAT
• KOMPSAT

32
SATELLITE IMAGE
33
SATELLITE IMAGE
34
CONCLUDING REMARKS

• Safeguards is an essential component of the
  nuclear
• non-proliferation regime
• Provide assurance on the correctness and
  completeness of States declarations and thereby
  concluding that all nuclear materials and
  facilities in a State are exclusively used for
  peaceful purposes
• Safeguards is applied in an effective and
  efficient manner

35
CONCLUDING REMARKS (contd)EVOLUTION OF
SAFEGUARDS1984 - 2006
36
CONCLUDING REMARKS (contd)

• Cooperation with the States/Facility Operators is
  essential
• Continues training of IAEA staff
• Improvement in verification techniques and
  equipment
• Remember
• No safeguards system, no matter how extensive the
  measures are, can provide absolute assurance that
  there has been no diversion of nuclear material
  or that there are no undeclared nuclear
  activities in a State.
• Safeguards system has constantly evolved to meet
  the emerging challenges and it needs to continue
  to do so in light of the recent events.