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Social Choice: An Overview

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Title: Social Choice: An Overview


1
Social Choice An Overview
  • Michael Munger
  • Duke University
  • Public Choice Outreach
  • GMU, Fairfax, VA
  • July 2006

2
Why Study Social Choice?
  • Isnt a society just a bunch of people arguing?
  • BT Origin of Government is disagreement,
    capturing gains from exchange

3
Why Study Social Choice Contract?
  • Discussion must be concentrated on the "margins"
    of variation in political institutions, not on
    the "totality" of such institutions, and the
    relevant question becomes one of criteria through
    which the several possible marginal adjustments
    may be arrayed. The contract theory, in this
    context, may be interpreted as providing one such
    criterion. Adopting the criterion implicit in the
    contract theory, the analysis of political
    institutions asks On what changes in the
    existing set of rules defining the political
    order can all citizens agree? This embodiment of
    the unanimity rule for all basic, structural
    reforms in political institutions, in the
    constitution, reflects the individualistic ethic
    in its broadest sense. (Calculus, Buchanan
    Appendix)

4
Why Study Social Choice?
  • What does justice mean? Fairness? Do these
    words just mean whatever the speaker wants, or do
    they have objective meanings?
  • Is it more important to have
  • Liberty?
  • Justice?
  • Security?

Justice
Security
Liberty
5
Common Heritage, Though Different Schools
  • In fact…..

What about it, Dad?
6
The Right Thing
  • There may not be any one right thing to do. It
    depends.
  • It is the nature of collective choices that they
    are unitary One defense budget, one standard
    for pollution, and so on.
  • Asking What Will We Do? begs the question. The
    real question is…
  • Why Do You Think There is a We?
  • Buchanan and Tullocks Two Levels Cant let
    the majority decide what the majority gets to
    decide

7
Coherence and Legitimacy
  • Can a group of people who disagree come to a
    consensus? How would this work? Why would we
    believe that the consensus is any more than an
    imperfect choice?
  • Do the choices of majorities tell us anything
    about the right thing to do in the face of
    disagreement?
  • Is there such a thing as the majority, which we
    just have to discover through voting or some
    political process?
  • I want…you want…what do we want?

8
Institutional Design
  • Institutions are the humanly devised rules of the
    game that shape and direct human interactions.
  • Institutions reduce uncertainty by shrinking the
    choice set of all of the players. If the rules
    are not formalized, the players spend too much
    time arguing over the rules, and less time in
    productive activities. The actual choice of
    institutions, however, is hard, since there are
    countless ways of choosing. What makes some
    institutions better than others?
  • In particular, is democracy a good institution?
    How would we know? What are the alternatives?

9
Tacoma Narrows Bridge
10
THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL CHOICE Overview
Absolved!!
  • I. Problem of Unintended Consequences
  • II. MetaSocial, or MetaChoice
  • III. Three sources of legitimacy/authority
  • IV. Transactions Costs and MarketsCoase,
    Kaldor/Hicks, Hayek.
  • V. PoliticsThree problems Buchanan, Hayek,
    Condorcet

11
THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL CHOICE Overview
Absolved!!
  • I. Problem of Unintended Consequences
  • II. MetaSocial, or MetaChoice
  • III. Three sources of legitimacy/authority
  • IV. Transactions Costs and MarketsCoase,
    Kaldor/Hicks, Hayek.
  • V. PoliticsThree problems Buchanan, Hayek,
    Condorcet

12
I. Unintended Consequences (Part the First)
  • Unexpected aggregate consequences of individual
    choice
  • Hog cycles
  • Keynes paradox of thrift
  • Hobbesian SoN/Prisoners Dilemma

13
I. Unintended Consequences (Part the Second)
Social Choice is Different
  • Unexpected individual consequences of aggregate
    choices
  • Auto safety Are Safer Cars Safer?
  • Alliances Most Fail When Attacked...
  • Pigou vs. Coase

14
Indl reactions Some Examples...
  • Auto Safety Peltzman claimed people choose
    their own risk level. Tullocks Modest
    Proposal

15
Indl reactions Some Examples...
  • Alliances Clearly, alliances are worthless.
    Nearly all alliances fail when attacked, in
    fact.
  • So an alliance agreement is of no value in
    deterring attack or protecting ones citizens.
    Right?
  • No.

16
Indl Reactions Examples--Pigou vs. Coase
  • Pigous Conjecture Markets are
    inefficient, as a means of allocating resources,
    to the extent that the (social) opportunity cost
    of a resource diverges from its price, or private
    cost to the user.
  • Coasess Counter-Conjecture If property rights
    are clearly and exclusively defined, and the cost
    of writing and enforcing contracts is not too
    high, market forces will make the opportunity
    cost and the price of a resource converge.

17
THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL CHOICE Overview
Absolved!!
  • I. Problem of Unintended Consequences
  • II. MetaSocial, or MetaChoice
  • III. Three sources of legitimacy/authority
  • IV. Transactions Costs and MarketsCoase,
    Kaldor/Hicks, Hayek.
  • V. PoliticsThree problems Buchanan, Hayek,
    Condorcet

18
II. Social metaChoice or MetaSocial Choice?
  • Choice of rules creates the society…The society
    is constituted by its constitution.
  • Choice of basic allocations, distributions of
    power and wealth
  • Partition of choice authority / legitimacy

19
Social metaChoice or MetaSocial Choice?
  • Choice of rules creates the society…The society
    is constituted by its constitution.
  • Constitutional Political Economy

20
Social metaChoice or MetaSocial Choice?
  • Choice of basic allocations, distributions of
    power and wealth
  • PPF
  • Bergson-Samuelson SWF
  • Secular Deism

21
Social metaChoice or MetaSocial Choice?
Roses
PPF 2
PPF 1
Guns
22
Social metaChoice or MetaSocial Choice?
Bergson-Samuelson
Roses
PPF
SWF
Guns
23
Social metaChoice or MetaSocial Choice?
Bergson-Samuelson Deism Two Welfare Theorems
Roses
Guns
24
Social metaChoice or MetaSocial Choice?
Arrow No SWF!!! Buchanan Ontology
Roses
Guns
25
THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL CHOICE Overview
Absolved!!
  • I. Problem of Unintended Consequences
  • II. MetaSocial, or MetaChoice
  • III. Three sources of legitimacy/authority
  • IV. Transactions Costs and MarketsCoase,
    Kaldor/Hicks, Hayek.
  • V. PoliticsThree problems Buchanan, Hayek,
    Condorcet

26
Legitimacy/Authority Hobbes or Hume?
  • The origin of civil government and the major
    influences in its development may be almost
    wholly nonrational in the sense that explanation
    on a contractual basis is possible. Societies
    form governments and change governments for a
    variety of reasons, many of which remain
    mysterious and far below the level of objective,
    scientific analysis. Political institutions, like
    languages, get changed, almost beyond
    recognition, by the gradual and largely
    unconscious modification imposed on them by the
    movement through time.
  • In this sense political society can be said to
    develop and to grow organically and, if the
    purpose of investigation is solely that of
    explaining such growth, there is perhaps little
    purpose in inventing anything like the
    contractual apparatus. (Calculus, Buchanan
    Appendix)

27
Legitimacy/Authority Hobbes or Hume?
  • Partition of choice authority / legitimacy
  • My own view
  • Three sources of authority, or legitimate
    decision-making, in any society
  • Politics/Democracy
  • Experts/Bureaucracy
  • Markets
  • Munger (2000), Analyzing Policy, W.W. Norton

28
Markets
Experts
Politics
29
Markets
  • Efficiency Policies
  • Market Structure
  • Control Externalities
  • Public Goods
  • Information Asymmetry
  • Equity Policies
  • Income Redistribution
  • Resource Distribution
  • Control Externalities
  • Institutional Reform Policies
  • Information
  • Values (Efficiency v. Equity)
  • Institutional Design

Experts
Politics
30
Markets
  • Efficiency Policies
  • Market Structure
  • Control Externalities
  • Public Goods
  • Information Asymmetry
  • Equity Policies
  • Income Redistribution
  • Resource Distribution
  • Control Externalities
  • Institutional Reform Policies
  • Information
  • Values (Efficiency v. Equity)
  • Institutional Design

Experts
Politics
Poli Sci (election / campaign finance reform,
etc.)
31
Markets
From whence? To what effect?
  • Efficiency Policies
  • Market Structure
  • Control Externalities
  • Public Goods
  • Information Asymmetry
  • Equity Policies
  • Income Redistribution
  • Resource Distribution
  • Control Externalities
  • Institutional Reform Policies
  • Information
  • Values (Efficiency v. Equity)
  • Institutional Design

Experts
Politics
32
THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL CHOICE Overview
Absolved!!
  • I. Problem of Unintended Consequences
  • II. MetaSocial, or MetaChoice
  • III. Three sources of legitimacy/authority
  • IV. Transactions Costs and MarketsCoase,
    Kaldor/Hicks, Hayek.
  • V. PoliticsThree problems Buchanan, Hayek,
    Condorcet

33
Focus for a moment on Markets….
  • Markets are not the absence of other sources of
    authority. Markets do not just happen.
  • On the other hand, unless the other sources of
    authority actively prevent market development,
    then at least some rudimentary market processes
    will nearly always spring up.
  • Active markets tend to drive prices down toward
    production costs. Corporations and firms prefer
    profits go up, not down. So the self-interest of
    firms is generally to try to suppress the
    workings of markets.
  • Fortunately, markets are robust enough that they
    are not easily suppressed, without the active
    complicity of one of the other sources of
    authority.

34
Preconditions for Markets (Necessary Conditions)
  • Differences in goals, tastes, or desires (diverse
    preferences)
  • Differences in endowments of productive resources
    and personal talents (diverse endowments)
  • Declining average costs as more output is
    produced (economies of scale)
  • Declining average costs as the scope of action of
    one producer is decreased (specialization and
    division of labor)

35
Gains From Trade
  • Gains from trade Differences in endowments, or
    differences in preferences, result in improved
    welfare for all participants, as long as trades
    are informed and voluntary. This is a benefit in
    consumption, since by rearranging the consumption
    bundles among citizens, we can make everyone
    better off, even though there is no increase in
    the total amount of goods available for
    consumption. Magic? No, just markets.

36
Gains in Productive Efficiency
  • By allowing entrepreneurs to take advantage of
    economies of scale, or economies accruing to
    increased specialization, markets foster economic
    growth. An increase in the level of economic
    activity means growth in the total amount of
    consumption goods available to citizens.
    Increased efficiency in production means that
    more can be produced with the same resources,
    again creating the potential for everyone to be
    better off.

37
Bonus Reductions in transactions costs, using
information transmitted by prices
  • Quite separate from efficiency in the allocation
    of consumption goods (i.e., ensuring all gains
    from trade are exhausted) and efficiency in the
    allocation of productive resources, markets also
    provide the important service of providing
    information. Prices convey information about
    relative scarcity in a concise, yet effective
    way.

38
Information, Tastes, and Culture
  • The peculiar character of the problem of a
    rational economic order is determined precisely
    by the fact that the knowledge of the
    circumstances of which we must make use never
    exists in concentrated or integrated form but
    solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and
    frequently contradictory knowledge which all the
    separate individuals possess. The economic
    problem of society is thus not merely a problem
    of how to allocate "given" resourcesif "given"
    is taken to mean given to a single mind which
    deliberately solves the problem set by these
    "data." It is rather a problem of how to secure
    the best use of resources known to any of the
    members of society, for ends whose relative
    importance only these individuals know. Or, to
    put it briefly, it is a problem of the
    utilization of knowledge which is not given to
    anyone in its totality. (F.A. Hayek, 1945, AER).

39
Four Ways to Allocate Resources in the Face of
Scarcity
  • 1. Price System (market) Resources
    are directed to their highest-valued use, so that
    whoever is willing to pay the most (either in
    terms of other valuable goods, or in currency)
    gets to control the resource.
  • Big winners People with lots of money, or with
    talents or resources the society values highly.

  • Disadvantages There are two. (a) Poor people
    may get too little, creating ethical problems of
    equity. (b) Independently of their basis in
    justice, market allocations may be politically
    untenable, if democratically-based authority is
    in a position to impose redistributive or
    confiscatory taxes.

40
Four Ways to Allocate Resources in the Face of
Scarcity
  • 2. Queuing A queue is a line. Queuing
    means a system of allocation based on waiting
    your turn. So, first in line is first in
    priority. If all the resource is used up before
    your turn, you lose out.
  • Big winners People with lots of time (actually,
    a low opportunity cost of time spent waiting in
    line).
  • Disadvantages There are two. (a) People
    standing in line incur lots of deadweight
    losses, or time wasted, for no gain in
    consumption or productivity. (b) There is no
    reason to believe that resources are directed to
    their highest valued uses black markets 

41
Four Ways to Allocate Resources in the Face of
Scarcity
  • 3. Chance Lotteries, drawings, or
    other random selection processes mean everyone
    has an equal chance of winning.
  • Big winners No individual is a winner from the
    process, because in terms of expected value
    everyone is treated the same. From an ethical
    perspective, however, this may be an advantage.
  • Disadvantage By definition, allocation is
    random. The person who actually gets the
    resource may value it at only a fraction of its
    worth to someone else. Opportunity cost is
    explicitly ignored in random processes.
    Consequently, chance allocations evoke secondary
    markets for reallocating by price.

42
Four Ways to Allocate Resources in the Face of
Scarcity
  •  
  • 4. Authority/Discretion Allocations can be
    made by experts, party officials, elected
    leaders, or central planners. This sort of
    allocation process is also called a command
    system.
  • Big winners Guess who the party officials,
    their friends, and family! Alternatively, the
    beneficiaries of the policy may be those targeted
    by the policy, if discretion is used to avoid
    corruption and follow the rules.
  • Disadvantage There are two. (a) Lose the
    information inherent in prices. (b) Corruption
    is irresistible.

43
Can Markets Plan the Economy?
  •  
  • Adam Smiths invisible hand
  • Social planner, and the farmer

44
My Plan Your Plan ? Our Plan Socialist
Calculation Debate
  • This is not a dispute about whether planning is
    to be done or not. It is a dispute as to whether
    planning is to be done centrally, by one
    authority for the whole economic system, or is to
    be divided among many individuals. Planning in
    the specific sense in which the term is used in
    contemporary controversy necessarily means
    central planningdirection of the whole economic
    system according to one unified plan.
    Competition, on the other hand, means
    decentralized planning by many separate persons.
    The halfway house between the two, about which
    many people talk but which few like when they see
    it, is the delegation of planning to organized
    industries, or, in other words, monopoly.
    (Hayek, 1945).

45
Division of Labor
  • It is the maxim of every prudent master of a
    family, never to attempt to make at home what it
    will cost him more to make than buy. The taylor
    does not attempt to make his own shoes, but buys
    them of the shoemaker. The shoemaker does not
    attempt to make his own clothes, but employes a
    taylor. The farmer attempts to make neither the
    one nor the other, but employs those different
    artificers. All of them find it for their
    interest to employ their whole industry in a way
    in which they have some advantage over their
    neighbours, and to purchase with a part of its
    produce, or what is the same thing, with the
    price of a part of it, whatever else they have
    occasion for. (WoN, p. 485).

46
Specialization
  • To take an example, therefore, from a very
    trifling manufacture but one in which the
    division of labour has been very often taken
    notice of, the trade of the pin-maker a workman
    not educated to this business (which the division
    of labour has rendered a distinct trade), nor
    acquainted with the use of the machinery employed
    in it (to the invention of which the same
    division of labour has probably given occasion),
    could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry,
    make one pin in a day, and certainly could not
    make twenty. But in the way in which this
    business is now carried on, not only the whole
    work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into
    a number of branches, of which the greater part
    are likewise peculiar trades. ... the important
    business of making a pin is, in this manner,
    divided into about eighteen distinct operation,
    which, in some manufactories, are all performed
    by distinct hands, though in others the same man
    will sometimes perform two or three of them. I
    have seen a small manufactory of this kind where
    ten men only were employed, and where some of
    them consequently performed two or three distinct
    operations. But though they were very poor, and
    therefore but indifferently accommodated with the
    necessary machinery, they could, when they
    exerted themselves, make among them about twelve
    pounds of pins in a day. There are in a pound
    upwards of four thousand pins of middling size.
    Those ten persons, therefore, could make among
    them upwards of forty eight thousand pins in a
    day. But if they had all wrought separately and
    independently, and without any of them having
    been educated to this peculiar business, they
    certainly could not each of them have made
    twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day. (WoN, pp.
    4-5).

47
Division of Labor is the Most Powerful Force for
Social Change the World has EVER Known
  • Division of labor is limited by the extent of the
    market
  • Globalization would result from DoL regardless of
    colonialization or any other conscious policy of
    governments
  • But, is it good? Is it just? Is it inevitable?
    Would we CHOOSE it, if the choice were presented?
    Or, is it just the aggregate unintended
    consequence of indl choice?

48
Markets….
  • Coase
  • Kaldor-Hicks
  • Potential Pareto
  • Hayek

49
THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL CHOICE Overview
Absolved!!
  • I. Problem of Unintended Consequences
  • II. MetaSocial, or MetaChoice
  • III. Three sources of legitimacy/authority
  • IV. Transactions Costs and MarketsCoase,
    Kaldor/Hicks, Hayek.
  • V. PoliticsThree problems Buchanan, Hayek,
    Condorcet

50
Step back for a moment…. The Fundamental Human
Problem (according to Munger)
  • How can we construct or preserve institutions
    that make individual self-interest not
    inconsistent with the common good?

51
Origins of Markets
  • Differences in endowments
  • Differences in preferences
  • Technical cost conditions (div of labor,
    economies of scale, increased dexterity,
    innovations in tool design)

52
Origins of Government Institutions
  • Disagreement/exchange (BT)
  • Capture gains from trade by reducing transactions
    costs
  • Make public goods possible

53
Origins of Government Institutions
  • What if we all wanted the same thing? Would
    government even be necessary?
  • It would. Because we do all want the same thing
    more….
  • On disagreement, Charles IV
  • My cousin Francis and I are in perfect accordhe
    wants Milan and so do I.

54
Collective Choices What is truth? said jesting
Pilate, and would not stay for an answer.
  • True Statements?
  • Democracy means rule by the people
  • Democracy is the best form of government
  • The many are wiser than any one person
  • Morality is defined by majorityDemocracy is a
    means of discovering truth

55
Collective v. Public Buchanan Problem
56
Central Questions
  • Can reasonable people differ? Can a reasonable
    person oppose gay marriage? Can a reasonable
    person be pro-life? Is it possible to support
    the war in Iraq?
  • What is the basis of disagreement
  • Chocolate vs. Vanilla? In politics, values. Are
    they primitives? Deliberation wont help.
  • Different information sets? Evidence about
    causes, different understandings of means-ends
    relations. Deliberation might help.
  • Is there a fact of the matter?

57
Central Questions
  • Is it true that the many are wiser than any one?
    Many people have argued this claim….
  • For it is possible that the many, no one of whom
    taken singly is a sound man, may yet, taken all
    together, be better than the few, not
    individually, but collectively. (Aristotle,
    Politics, Book I, Chapter 11)
  • Some important analytical support, under some
    circumstances. Condorcets Jury Theorem, for
    example.

58
Central Questions
  • The real problems of political/democratic
    choice
  • Scope of government/collective power the
    Buchanan problem
  • Information of time and place the Hayek
    problem
  • Coherence and legitimacy The Condorcet / Arrow
    problem

59
Scope
  • What can government decide? How would we decide
    what government can decide?
  • What do I get to decide, by myself? What things
    does my family get to decide?
  • Suppose a group of people want to decide
    something for me, for my own good? Can they do
    that? How could I stop them?

60
P.J. ORourkeInformation and Scope Problems of MR
  • Now, majority rule is a precious, sacred thing
    worth dying for. Butlike other precious, sacred
    things, such as the home and the familyit's not
    only worth dying for it can make you wish you
    were dead. Imagine if all of life were determined
    by majority rule. Every meal would be a pizza.
    Every pair of pants, even those in a Brooks
    Brothers suit, would be stone-washed denim.
    Celebrity diets and exercise books would be the
    only thing on the shelves at the library.
    Andsince women are a majority of the population,
    we'd all be married to Mel Gibson. (Parliament of
    Whores, 1991, p. 5).

61
James Buchanan Like Hobbes, too much liberty?
  • What should government be allowed to do? What
    is the appropriate sphere of political action?
    How large a share national product should be
    available for political disposition? What sort of
    political decision-structures should be adopted
    at the constitutional stage? Under what
    conditions and to what extent should individuals
    be franchised? (Politics Without Romance.)

62
Coherence and Legitimacy
  • Can a group of people who disagree come to a
    consensus? How would this work? Why would we
    believe that the consensus is any more than an
    imperfect choice?
  • Do the choices of majorities tell us anything
    about the right thing to do?
  • Is there such a thing as the majority, which we
    just have to discover through voting or some
    political process?
  • I want…you want…what do we want?

63
Problem of the U.S. in Iraq
64
Democratic Choices War in Iraq
  • Youve got to help me out here…play along!
  • YOUR Preferences and beliefs, as assigned card.
    REALLY! Accept the premise, and act like those
    are your preferences. Three choices
  • No war N
  • Aggressive war W
  • Police/political means P

65
Choices War in Iraq
  • One possibility isolationist variant of Powell
    doctrine
  • N W P
  • We should not get involved.
  • But, if we do, we should go in with overwhelming
    force.
  • Worst thing is to expose our troops/workers in a
    limited police action, depend on the U.N.
  • If your LAST name starts with A-F, this is YOU!

66
Choices War in Iraq
  • Another possibility Rummy World
  • W P N
  • Iraq/Saddam is an imminent threat, will develop
    WMD.
  • If not war, then must vigorously pursue
    sanctions
  • Worst thing is to do nothing, relax sanctions and
    let Iraq become nuclear power
  • If your LAST name starts with G-N, this is YOU!

67
Choices War in Iraq
  • Final possibility Prudent Dove
  • P N W
  • Let sanctions and inspections do their work,
    because Iraq is a potential danger to its
    neighbors and the world
  • We have no good claim to just war, so next best
    is to do nothing
  • Worst thing is to use war against a nation that
    has made no overt attack on the U.S.
  • If your LAST name starts with O-Z, this is YOU!

68
Choices War in Iraq
  • So…we have disagreement
  • Prudent dove wants to use P, police action
  • Rummy wants war
  • Isolationists would prefer to stay far away from
    foreign entanglements, so do nothing.

69
Choices War in Iraq
  • Lets use democracy, the pure kind where the
    people make the choice directly.
  • First, lets decide whether to use force, or do
    nothing….
  • Vote P vs. W to decide which activity is better,
    and then vote that against N. That way, we are
    comparing the best do something against do
    nothing.

70
Choices War in Iraq
  • So, P loses to W.
  • What remains is to put W up against N. How
    about that?
  • It turns out N beats W, and W beats P.

71
Choices War in Iraq
  • Consider what just happened. Simply by changing
    the order in which we consider the alternatives,
    I could generate as the winner any one of the
    three alternatives.
  • Choosing the agenda, then, is tantamount to
    choosing the outcome.
  • Is this just a conjurers trick, or does it tell
    us something about democracy?

72
Choices War in Iraq
  • If there are three (or more) alternatives, and
    there is disagreement, then democracy may be
    radically indeterminate.
  • More simply, there is no correct answer to the
    question, What do the people want?
  • In fact, some majority opposes every
    alternative.

73
Choices War in Iraq
  • Here is the problem
  • I/P Rummy Prud Dove
  • N W P Best
  • W P N Middle
  • P N W Worst
  • Majority preferences
  • W P N W
  • Endless, infinite cycling over alternatives. Not
    a tie, but a literal perpetual motion machine

74
But this is nonsense meetings end
  • That is what should terrify you meetings end,
    and things get decided. The point is that we are
    rarely presented with three or more alternatives.
    We usually are presented with two. How are
    those two chosen?
  • The Tomasi Revolution coalitions form,
    charismatic people take power. Not the will of
    the people, but the force of will of some
    demogogue or tyrant
  • If the rules matter to this extent, that means
    that procedures, not preferences, determine
    outcomes. And elites control procedures….

75
Democracy works fine…. So long as everyone agrees
  • But if there is disagreement, and at least three
    alternatives, then a majority opposes every
    available choice. So, democracy fails us when we
    need it most!
  • Since some choice has to be made, we are left
    with an outcome that is either
  • Imposed (tyranny)
  • Arbitrary (random or procedure-driven)
  • In either case, democratic choice is
    chimerical
  • Dictatorship with the trappings of democracy

76
The worst of all worlds
  • Democracy without constitutional liberalism…
  • 1. Rule of law, protections of property and
    liberty
  • 2. Limits on scope of issues within the
    jurisdiction of collective choice…
  • Democracy without these is the most terrifying
    kind of tyranny you can imagine. Americans, and
    the West, are confused about good government.
    The key is constitutional liberalism, not
    democracy.

77
Three Problems in Politics as Solution for Social
Choice Dilemmas
  • Buchanan Problem Scope
  • Hayek Problem Information
  • Condorcet / Arrow Problem Coherence

78
One Further Problem…. Leadership Social Choice?
  • Why do we put the pictures of leader on postage
    stamps?
  • So we may thumb their noses, and lick their
    hinder parts.
  • What role can leadership play in a democracy?
    Can leaders forebear, resisting the temptation to
    use the immanent potential for cycles to their
    own advantage?

79
  • Shakespeares Tragedy of Coriolanus Act II, Sc
    3
  • BOTH CITIZENS. The gods give you joy, sir,
    heartily! (Exeunt citizens)
  • CORIOLANUS. Most sweet voices!
  • Better it is to die, better to
    starve,
  • Than crave the hire which first we
    do deserve.
  • Why in this wolvish toge should I
    stand here
  • To beg of Hob and Dick that do
    appear
  • Their needless vouches? Custom
    calls me to't.
  • What custom wills, in all things
    should we do't,
  • The dust on antique time would lie
    unswept,
  • And mountainous error be too highly
    heap'd
  • For truth to o'erpeer. Rather than
    fool it so,
  • Let the high office and the honour
    go
  • To one that would do thus. I am
    half through
  • The one part suffered, the other
    will I do.

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