Coalitions: Maintaining Hegemony in the Post Cold War World.

1
Coalitions Maintaining Hegemony in the Post
Cold War World.

• Steven T. Walker
• swalker1_at_mix.wvu.edu

2
Research Question

• Do coalitions formed during times of crisis have
  a positive effect, beyond the immediate needs of
  the crisis, on cooperation between the coalition
  members? If so, how long do these positive
  effects last?
• Specifically, does coalition building have any
  long-term effects on state alignment within the
  international system?
• Do coalitions help assuage the security fears of
  less powerful nations, and persuade them that
  there is no need to balance the power of the
  dominant state?

3
2. Background

• On August 2, 1990, 100,000 Iraqi troops and 300
  tanks crossed into Kuwait, beginning the first
  major test of the post-Cold War international
  system. During the days after the invasion, the
  American leadership scrambled to assemble a
  coalition that would represent a united front
  against the Iraqi aggression.
• Beginning on January 15, 1991, the US led a
  coalition of thirty-six other nations in military
  actions to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait. This
  coalition was extremely successful and a
  cease-fire was declared on February 27, 1991.
• In this case, the Coalition dominated on the
  battlefield, but did the congeniality of wartime
  cooperation extend into other areas of
  international affairs?

4
3. Theory

• According to Balance of Power theory, the
  international system abhors a situation in which
  one nation dominates all others. This theory
  maintains that such a situation will be
  short-lived, because other nations will align
  themselves against the hegemon and balance its
  power.
• I argue that the post-Cold War environment has
  been a unipolar system, with the US as the global
  hegemon. Furthermore, no nations have risen to
  seriously challenge its power, nor have any
  states aligned against the US in an attempt to
  balance its power. The question needs to be asked
  as to why this is so.

5
4. Hypothesis

• There are undoubtedly many possible explanations
  for the lack of balance in the post-Cold War
  system. I hypothesize that one reason nations
  have not aligned themselves against the US is
  because of residual goodwill that was built
  between the Coalition members during the days of
  the Persian Gulf War. Quite simply, because the
  US worked in concert with other nations to repeal
  an aggressor, the Coalition members have viewed
  the US as less of a threat than they might have
  otherwise.

6
5. Methods

• I examine the United Nations General Assembly
  voting records for all thirty-seven members of
  the Persian Gulf War Coalition, from 1988-1993.
• In addition, I contrast Israels voting record
  with that of the Coalition members, particularly
  with the Arab members.
• I code these votes as yes, no, abstaining,
  or not present on the different issues, and
  look for patterns of voting that emerge,
  specifically bloc voting by the Europeans or the
  Arab states.
• I am thus able to develop categories of voting
  patterns that demonstrate the amount of agreement
  between the members of the Coalition on a wide
  range of topics over the six year period.

7
6. Data

• Roughly 100 agenda items are brought before the
  UN General Assembly every year for a vote. I look
  at each of these for all thirty-seven members of
  the Coalition and Israel, over the six year
  period 1988-1993. That yields a data set of
  roughly 22,800 separate votes on 600 agenda
  items.
• I analyze this data set to determine if there are
  any significant changes in voting patterns for
  any of the coalition members, using the years
  prior to the invasion of Kuwait as a baseline.

8
7. Preliminary Findings

• While this research is ongoing, some patterns are
  already beginning to emerge.
• I have collected and analyzed the votes for
  Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar,
  Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the
  United States, and Israel for the period
  1988-1992.
• During this entire period, both before and after
  the war, the United States and the Arab states
  were at odds about 85 of the time. The exception
  was in 1992 when they disagreed only 76 of the
  time. This would seem to suggest that at least
  for these states, there was no larger benefit of
  the Coalition. The US and Israel, on the other
  hand, vote identically on most topics throughout
  the period.

9
7. Preliminary Findings cont.

• However, if we look at the 15 to 24 of the
  votes that do not fit the normal pattern of the
  US voting no and the Arab states voting yes,
  there is a dramatic shift after the invasion of
  Kuwait. In 1988 and 1989, the Arab states and the
  US were in agreement 42 and 46 of the time
  respectively. In 1990 and 1991 this jumped to
  100 and 90 respectively. By 1992 this agreement
  had fallen to 70, but that was still much higher
  than before the conflict.

10
7. Preliminary Findings cont.

• Much of this movement can be explained by new
  items coming onto the UN General Assembly agenda,
  including those items pertaining to Kuwait and
  the fate of the Iraqi people. These were items on
  which the US and the Arab states agreed. Still,
  the Arab states, on one occasion after the war,
  do not vote directly against the US on a matter
  regarding the US embargo against Cuba. They chose
  to abstain in this case, even though they had
  voted against the US on similar issues before the
  war. This suggests a slight softening of the Arab
  states position.
• Preliminary findings have provided an ambiguous
  picture of a coalitions effects on larger
  relations between members. It is hoped that as
  the voting patterns of the other Coalition
  members becomes clear, we will be able to make
  more precise statements about the larger value of
  coalitions. Despite the complexity of findings so
  far, I believe this is an interesting research
  question, and one worth further investigation.