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Animals

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POSITIONS ON ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION. Abolitionism = df. All animal experimentation should cease immediately no matter how significant it ... ANIMAL RIGHTS ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Animals


1
Animals R. G. Frey
2
POSITIONS ON ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION
  • Abolitionism df. All animal experimentation
    should cease immediately no matter how
    significant it may be to humans or other animals.
    Tom Regan supports this.
  • Progressive abolitionism df. Animal experiments
    should be eliminated as other non-animal research
    possibilities arise.
  • Anything goes df. Animals can be used in
    research any way that humans decide.
  • Middle position df. Animals have moral
    standing their lives have value their pain must
    be seriously considered research should be
    progressively eliminated as other possibilities
    arise one must assess the relation of
    experimental benefits to experimental harms.
  • Frey thinks that the middle position morally
    justifies animal experimentation.

3
HUMAN BENEFIT
  • What drives animal research is the benefit to
    human beings of that research.
  • This benefit is typically used in an attempt to
    justify animal research.
  • However, as Frey indicates, this attempt at
    justification must be supplemented by other
    considerations because the benefits that animal
    research confers on us could be obtained from
    doing the research on humans. (And wouldnt
    using humans give us experimental results that
    would be of greater benefit to humans since we
    have the same bodies and nervous systems?)
  • Presumably everyone would think that that is
    wrong, but if it is wrong for us why is it not
    wrong for animals?

4
THE EXTREME POSITION
  • The extreme position for justifying animal
    research says that humans are morally superior to
    animals, and because of that moral superiority we
    can experiment on animals but not on humans.
  • Or, animals lack the moral standing that we have,
    and so that there is nothing morally
    objectionable to using them experimentally to
    benefit us.
  • Kant thought that animals have no moral standing
    in themselves, as humans do, since animals are
    not rational agents as we are, and are not
    self-conscious as we are.
  • For Kant, animals are here to benefit us, and so
    using them experimentally to our benefit is
    morally acceptable.
  • Frey disagrees with the extreme position.

5
THE TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATION
  • Frey the traditional justification of animal
    experimentation incorporates the extreme
    position.
  • The traditional justification rests on three
    claims
  • 1. Animals lack moral standing in themselves,
    they are not members of the moral community, as
    humans are. (Kant.)
  • 2. Animal lives have little or no value.
  • 3. Because humans have moral standing are
    members of the moral community we cannot use
    them in experiments as we can animals.
  • According to Frey, the traditional justification
    is wrong and must be abandoned.

6
HUMANS AND ANIMALS
  • Frey as we learn more about animals, it becomes
    more difficult to maintain a sharp break between
    animals especially primates and ourselves.
    (Primate is an order of mammals including humans,
    apes, monkeys, and related forms such as lemurs
    and tarsiers.)
  • Frey also points out that disease and
    degeneration can result in humans who cannot do
    many of the things that other primates can do,
    and so that too makes drawing a sharp line
    between us and them difficult.
  • There is also the factor of human arrogance
    simply thinking that we are superior and making
    moral rules that suit ourselves and exclude
    animals.

7
RELIGION AND ETHICS
  • Frey says that much of our condescension towards
    animals results from a religious ethic that
    places us at the culmen of creation and excludes
    them.
  • However, Frey says that we cannot take for
    granted any longer the religious underpinning of
    the claims of human superiority that suggest that
    we alone have moral standing and that animal
    lives have little or no value.
  • Frey In a pluralistic society, unanimity in
    religious opinion is no longer the case . . .
    different religions, especially Eastern ones,
    take different views about animals . . . and the
    number of non-religious people also appears to
    have risen.

8
ANIMAL RIGHTS
  • For Frey, animals have moral standing and so are
    members of the moral community and . . . their
    lives have value.
  • This then is a rejection of the first two points
    of the traditional justification of animal
    experimentation, viz. that animals have no moral
    standing and that their lives do not have value.

9
PAIN AND SUFFERING
  • If we take pain and suffering to be bad for
    humans, as we do, and animals can suffer and feel
    pain, as they can, then why should pain and
    suffering be bad for humans and not for animals?
  • Frey there is something odd about maintaining
    that pain and suffering are morally significant
    when felt by a human but not when felt by an
    animal.
  • For Frey, animal pain and suffering are relevant
    and should be considered what confers moral
    standing upon animal lives and gives them value
    is precisely what does these things in our lives
    namely, their experiential content.

10
THE CENTRAL PROBLEM I
  • Human beings are said to possess some things,
    such as intelligence, sentience, and
    self-direction, that animals lack, or possess
    them to a degree that animals lack.
  • If certain animals are not intelligent, sentient,
    or self-directed at all, or to the degree that
    the average adult human is, then experimenting on
    them may be thought to be acceptable.
  • The central problem here is that not all humans
    are intelligent, sentient, or self-directed to a
    degree required to protect them morally if those
    things are taken to be the basis for moral
    protection. And if that is the case, then why
    can they not be used experimentally?
  • Frey If animals do not gain protection from
    research because they lack the relevant degree of
    the relevant characteristic, then what about
    those humans who lack that degree of those
    characteristics?

11
THE CENTRAL PROBLEM II
  • Why is it wrong to use any human in research -
    especially those who are less intelligent,
    sentient, and self-determining than what is
    required to distinguish humans from other animals
    but not animals?
  • Frey The appeal to human benefit cannot stand
    alone as a justification of animal
    experimentation, since it would also justify
    human experimentation.

12
THE CENTRAL PROBLEM III
  • Frey for any characteristic selected such as
    intelligence as that around which to formulate a
    claim of protection, humans will be found who
    lack the characteristic altogether, or lack it to
    a degree sufficient to protect them from being
    used in medical experiments, or lack it to a
    degree that in fact means that some animals have
    it to a greater degree. and so, for that
    reason, should not be used in experiments.
  • Frey Indeed, depending on the characteristic
    selected, to distinguish humans from animals
    all kinds of animals, and of different species,
    will exceed the human case.

13
THE CENTRAL PROBLEM IV
  • Having had two human parents is not enough to
    secure moral protection.
  • This is because that says nothing about ones
    present quality of life, intelligence, capacity
    for pain and distress, the ability to direct
    ones life, and so on, and these sorts of
    characteristics appear much more like the kinds
    of things that would justify not treating a human
    life as we presently treat animal lives.
  • These things are important because they say
    something about the life being lived, not what
    produced that life.
  • Thus quality of life is more morally important
    than what resulted in that life.

14
THE CENTRAL PROBLEM V
  • If (at least some) humans cannot be separated
    from (at least some) animals used in experiments,
    then either animal research will have to stop, or
    we will have to experiment on some humans in
    addition to some animals namely those that lack
    some characteristic or characteristics used to
    separate man from animals.

15
MORAL STANDING I
  • According to Frey, moral standing or moral
    considerability turns upon whether a creature is
    an experiential subject, with an unfolding series
    of experiences that, depending on their quality,
    can make that creatures life go well or badly.
  • The key thing here then is that such an
    experiential being has a welfare that can be
    positively or negatively affected, depending upon
    what is done to it.

16
MORAL STANDING II
  • Frey thinks that animals that are routinely used
    in research such as rodents, rabbits, pigs, and
    non-human primates are experiential subjects
    who have moral standing and are members of the
    moral community in exactly the same way that we
    are.
  • Frey pain is a moral-bearing characteristic for
    us, and I cannot see what difference it makes as
    to which species feels pain. Pain is pain.
  • And if pain is important no matter which being is
    experiencing the pain, then Frey thinks that it
    is odd to suppose that the lives of beings that
    can experience pain including animals - do not
    matter.

17
QUALITY OF LIFE
  • Frey quality of life determines the value not
    only of human but also of animal lives.
  • Frey the quality of life is a function of the
    scope and capacities of a creature for different
    kinds of experiences.
  • If animals have a quality of life in virtue of
    being experiential beings, and quality of life
    can be negatively affected by pain, then animals
    will have to be taken into moral consideration,
    and it will not be morally acceptable to do just
    anything to them in using them in research
    experiments.

18
SPECIESISM
  • Speciesism df. Discrimination on the basis of
    species alone.
  • Relative to humans and animals used in research,
    it would be a case of speciesism to maintain that
    it is acceptable to use animals in research, but
    not humans, because humans are a superior
    species.
  • Kants view of the superiority of humans to
    animals would be speciesist.

19
COMPARING LIVES I
  • Although one wants to avoid speciesism, Frey
    thinks that human lives, on average, have a
    higher value than the lives of most animals.
  • This, he thinks, is due to the nature of human
    life contrasted with other life. Our lives are
    richer, our experiences deeper.
  • And he thinks that, the claim that the animals
    capacities provide it with a perfectly full life
    for a creature of its kind is not to the point,
    since it disregards the importance of comparing
    the quality of that life with human life, and
    human life is thought to be of greater quality.

20
COMPARING LIVES II
  • Although the average animals life has value, its
    value is not as great as the value of the average
    human life, and it is worse to destroy lives of
    greater rather than lesser value.
  • Frey recognizes though that such a view will be
    speciesist unless something other than species
    membership confers greater value on a persons
    life as opposed to an animals life.
  • Richness, capacity for enrichment, and quality
    of life are such things.

21
COMPARING LIVES III
  • Humans have a richness of life that does not
    characterize animal life. This includes such
    things as art, music, literature, family,
    friendship, love, and intellectual endeavors that
    inform life.
  • We can shape our lives in terms of our interests,
    choices, and values in ways that are not
    available to animals, including other primates.
  • Frey says that we are not condemned to a life
    appropriate to our species.
  • This means that we cannot ignore the role of
    agency in our lives.

22
COMPARING LIVES IV
  • As agents, humans make choices that not only
    affect themselves, but others. Choices that
    affect others are subject to moral evaluation,
    and free agents have duties to others that
    restrict their agency.
  • An animal that lacks agency is not a moral being
    in the full sense of being held accountable for
    its actions.
  • Agency is part of the value of human life. The
    moral relations in which normal adult humans
    stand to each other are part of whom they take
    themselves to be.

23
COMPARING LIVES V
  • Frey does not think that there is a life
    appropriate to the human species, no single way
    of living to which every human being is condemned
    to conform.
  • Agency enables us to make different lives for
    ourselves and others and so reflects, in this
    sense, how we want to live. and how others can
    live
  • Agency enables normal adult humans to enhance
    the quality and value of their lives in ways that
    no account of the activities we share with
    animals captures.

24
COMPARING LIVES VI
  • While animals are part of the moral community for
    Frey, and thus deserve moral consideration, their
    lives are not as valuable as ours, and so they do
    not deserve the same level of moral consideration
    that we do.
  • For Frey, we have a non-speciesist reason for
    thinking that normal adult human life is more
    valuable than animal life. Its richness and
    quality exceed that of animal life.
  • Therefore he thinks that we have a
    non-speciesist reason for using animals in
    preference to humans in research if we have to
    use a creature of some sort.

25
THE PROBLEM OF MARGINAL CASES I
  • The reason, for Frey, not to use humans in
    research is that human lives are more valuable
    than animal lives. There is a problem though,
    and that is that not all human lives have the
    same value.
  • Frey not all human lives have the same richness
    or scope for enrichment they do not, therefore,
    have the same value.
  • The value of the life of an animal then might be
    greater than the value of the life of some human,
    so that such a human might be thought better to
    experiment on than the animal.

26
THE PROBLEM OF MARGINAL CASES II
  • Frey thinks that it is impossible to say that all
    human life has the same value No normal healthy
    adult would choose to trade places with someone
    who is extremely ill, injured, paralyzed, or in a
    coma,
  • So Frey says that it seems absurd to pretend
    that lives of these sorts, lives that no one, not
    even the people living them, would wish to live,
    are as valuable a normal adult human life.
  • But, again, if human lives vary in richness,
    quality, and value and if the value of some
    human life is very low then the value of quite
    ordinary animal lives appears to exceed that of
    the human.
  • Why experiment then on animals whose lives exceed
    in value the lives of certain humans? Why not
    use those humans?

27
THE PROBLEM OF MARGINAL CASES III
  • Although he does not favor using any human being
    in medical research, Frey says that he does not
    know of any argument that would favor the use of
    an animal the value of whose life is greater than
    that of some human being.
  • Frey Assuming that we have to use some lives in
    research . . . we should use lives of lower than
    higher quality. Typically this will mean that we
    use animal lives.
  • Frey We simply cannot guarantee that this will
    always be so, however, unless we can find
    something that always ensures, whatever the
    richness and quality of human life, that it
    exceeds in value the lives of any and all
    animals.
  • Unfortunately, I know of no such thing.
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