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National Security Decision-making & Policy Planning OVERVIEW Interagency Processes for Crisis Response By Len Hawley RCNSC July 22, 2009 at NDU Do it wisely and do ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Importance


1
National Security Decision-making Policy
Planning
OVERVIEW Interagency Processes for Crisis
Response By Len Hawley RCNSC July 22, 2009 at
NDU Do it wisely and do it well NSC
Advisor Brent Scowcroft
2
Outline
  • Do it wisely Making consistently sound
    decisions on policy strategy for conflict
    prevention, mitigation and transformation
  • Do it well
  • -- Integrating the diplomatic, political,
    military, humanitarian and other efforts of a
    successful international response
  • -- Mobilizing the domestic and international
    actors to respond successfully as coalitions in a
    long-term commitment

Topics
  • Importance
  • Policy Context and Operating Environment
  • Decision-making on Intervention
  • Mission Strategy of Conflict Transformation
  • Building Blocks
  • Political-Military Plan
  • International Coalitions Response Limitations
  • Parting Tips and Observations

3
Importance of Interagency Processes
  • Reduces the complexity of a crisis situation
  • Conceives policy aims in the near and long term
  • Builds consensus across agencies and among
    partners
  • Develops realistic options for policy-makers
  • Crafts a Pol-Mil Plan that gives direction to
    agencies
  • Purpose Strategy
  • Mission Elements Objectives
  • Integrating Organizational Constructs
    Mechanisms
  • Practices for Managing Implementation
  • Mobilizes several coalitions with capabilities
    and resources
  • Fixes accountability with political appointees

4
Levels of Interagency Decision-making Planning
  • Policy or Pol-Mil Planning
  • Strategic or Agency Planning
  • Operational Planning
  • Mission-level Planning
  • Tactical Planning

5
Recurring Cases for Interagency Action
  • Domestic Disasters Emergencies
  • Hurricanes, ice storms, river flooding,
    wild-fires, CBRN attacks, etc.
  • Foreign Regional Crises
  • Rwanda, Haiti, Kosovo, North Korea, Iraq,
    Lebanon, Congo, Somalia, Burma, etc.
  • Transnational Plagues
  • Computer virus, Financial meltdown, Food
    contamination, Avian flu, Narcotics trafficking
    Islamist terrorism, etc.
  • Cooperation and Capacity-building Initiatives
  • Nonproliferation, Legal financial transactions,
    Water management, Emissions control, Immigration
    control, Law enforcement, etc.
  • each case has different players and rules

6
Policy ContextThreat of Troubled States in
Conflict
  • Local conflicts can have wider adverse
    consequences
  • - undermine regional stability
    development progress
  • - weaken Alliance collaboration
    expansion
  • - incite fanaticism export terrorism to
    homelands
  • - reverse major power cooperation on
    security matters
  • - threaten innocent citizens and
    facilities abroad
  • - radicalize the region undermine
    friendly moderate governments
  • - jeopardize progress in democratization
    in the region
  • - empower corrupt / criminal governments
  • - displace whole populations
  • - divert scarce economic resources
    diminish economic growth
  • - promote illegal weapons sales support
    mercenary operations
  • - perpetrate human rights abuses
    atrocities
  • Thomas Friedman (NYT) The lesson of 9/11 is
    that if we dont visit bad neighborhoods they
    will surely visit us.
  • Response options have serious limitations
    political will, security forces, material,
    civilian capacity funding resources

7
Complex Operating EnvironmentBattlefield of
the 21st Century
  • Collapse of government and tribal structures
  • Porous borders ungoverned regions
  • Numerous parties to the conflict
  • - Military Paramilitary Militias
    Private Armies
  • - Insurgents Terrorists
  • - Cartels, Organized gangs
  • Warlords -- all or nothing malevolent actors
  • Lack of discipline control within factions
  • Links to terrorist and other networks
    worldwide
  • Ineffective or tenuous cease-fires
  • Collapse of public services, police, and
    justice system
  • Widespread starvation and disease
  • Massive refugees displaced persons
  • Violence and abuses against civilians
  • Intense media coverage of operations
  • No foundation for civil society
    democratization
  • Powerful illegal economic incentives for
    continued conflict
  • this is not a structured problem

8
Do it Wisely Comprehensive Assessments
  • Realistic policy-making requires an assessment of
    all aspects of the situation. Senior leaders
    will see the crisis differently, disagreeing on
    the nature of the problem and its solution.
  • Assessments can make or break a crisis response
    effort. An important caution-we tend to misjudge
    the difficulty of a crisis situation.
  • Various assessment tools are used intelligence
    reports, scenarios, political analyses
    forecasts, sector assessments, systems of systems
    analysis, interagency conflict assessment
    framework, expert judgments, local indicators,
    polling, etc.
  • Good discourse is critical (but often ignored)
    between the policy community and the intelligence
    community.
  • Analyses, forecasts and scenarios help senior
    leaders in meeting their rational, political and
    psychological needs

9
Do it WiselyThe Policy-making Triad The
Iterative Process of Strategizing
  • Recurring Issues
  • - Assessments Credible?
  • - Goal Realistic?
  • - Issues Important?
  • - Options Desirable?
  • Commitments Reliable?
  • Risks Manageable?
  • - Success Attainable?

Policy Options Strategies of Intervention
Intelligence Assessment Analysis of the
Situation
Policy Instruments Resources Component
Strategies
Recurring Issues - Tools Available DIME LE,
CO, etc.? - Coalition Contributions? -
Inherent Limitations? - Understanding Effects in
Time? - Applied in a Coherent Effort? -
Mechanisms for Integration? - Agency Costs and
Expected Return?
Recurring Issues - Actors Aims and Commitment?
- Actor Perception of our Resolve? - Actor
Influence on other Nations? - Sensitivity to
Costs and Risks? - Willingness to Escalate? -
Power of Regional Networks?
10
Do it WiselyStrategy for Conflict
Transformation
11
The Strategy of Conflict Transformation
  • Achieving a viable peace is all about
    transforming the way the competition for power
    unfolds in the divided society
  • Real transformation alters the existing
    war-hardened power structure (otherwise its not
    transformation). The goal is to bring along
    local leaders willing to compromise in support of
    the peace process
  • Because the existing power structure must be
    changed toward moderation, four strategies really
    do matter each must be tuned to the particular
    power structures and players.
  • Politicaldemilitarize political life and promote
    moderate leadership
  • Securityprovide a safe and secure environment
  • Rule of Law Justiceestablish good governance
  • Economiccreate a legitimate, non-corrupt
    political economy
  • These strategies are interconnected with one
    another, otherwise the entire effort will not
    successfully affect the existing power structure
    for a favorable transformation.
  • . . . . Dont ever underestimate the challenge
    . . .

12
Interagency Players
Key US Participants
Major Partners

(Depending on Situation)
President
UN / WB
NSC
OSD
State
CIA
JCS
NGOs
IOs
Principals Committee
USUN
Justice
Regional Organizations
AID
OMB
Deputies Committee
Treasury
DHS

Neighboring States
Interagency Policy Committees
Congressional Liaison
Other Agencies TBD

Coalition Participants
13
Twelve Building Blocks Mobilizing Intl Will
and Coalitions
  • Clarify the Compelling Justification for
    Intervention
  • -- Basis of urgent necessity for extraordinary
    action
  • -- Need a persuasive justification for several
    years
  • -- Focus on domestic audiences political,
    security, moral views
  • Gain Consensus on an Achievable Political
    Solution
  • -- Major powers and contributors have a keen
    interest
  • -- Need solution to be achievable in a
    realistic timeframe w/ locals
  • -- But maintain ambiguityclear end states
    create enemies
  • Pass an Empowering Security Council Mandate
  • -- Built on Settlement and Regional Org
    statements
  • -- Need to empower the International Mission to
    act decisively
  • -- Intl civilian leader establishes the
    primacy of the peace process

14
Twelve Building Blocks Mobilizing Intl Will
and Coalitions (cont)
  • Gain Backing by Regional Powers and Intl
    Organizations
  • -- Exercise considerable political, military,
    and economic clout
  • -- Need to be engaged diplomatically to shape
    their involvement
  • -- Most have some historical tie to at least
    one faction
  • Gain Operational Assistance by Neighboring States
  • -- Assistance is crucial to a variety of
    mission tasks
  • -- Need to anticipate how neighboring state
    will act
  • -- A neighbors vital interests are usually at
    stake
  • Contain Transnational Non-state Actors
  • -- Flourish during conflict and weak govt
    control
  • -- Need to understand networks before going in
  • -- Usually operate with support of a
    neighboring state

15
Twelve Building Blocks Mobilizing Intl Will
and Coalitions (cont)
  • Define an Acceptable Military Role ( A
    Green-helmet Force)
  • -- Need to impose stability, demobilize groups,
    defeat militants
  • -- Requires a cohesive, combat-ready MNF
  • Demobilize Armed Groups
  • -- Need to remove arms from politics and guard
    against attacks
  • -- Requires a credible force and innovative
    approaches
  • Impose Public Order and Rule of Law
  • -- Need to impose public security at the outset
    and win support
  • -- Requires taking ownership of the entire ROL
    system
  • Undercut Funding to Hard-line Obstructionists
  • -- Need to get control of economic predation by
    obstructions

16
Twelve Building Blocks Mobilizing Intl Will
and Coalitions (cont)
  • Field an Integrated International Mission w/
    Unified Direction
  • -- All these missions are ad hoc, rapid
    deployments
  • -- Need capable mission leadership to lead
    diverse group
  • -- A Genuine Partnership of military and
    civilian leaders is key
  • Implement a Rolling Three-year Financial Plan
  • -- Funding takes a long time to get flowing,
    not enough initially
  • -- Need to identify costs (high) in the first
    three years and donors
  • -- No intervention is ever easy to pay for in
    the first years
  • -- Support of big donors tends to wane

17
Table of Contents of a Pol-Mil Plan
  • Introduction the geo-strategic context and
    planning scenario
  • Policy Direction policy guidance, aims and
    strategic posture
  • Situation Assessment comprehensive situation
    assessment
  • Strategic Purpose, Mission, Endstate Objectives
    core
  • Pol Mil Strategy most important aspect of the
    intervention
  • Mission Organization Concept structure,
    phases, financing
  • Preparatory Tasks mobilizing conditions
    getting ready
  • Mission Area Tasks meat of the plan
  • Follow-on Mission guidance for pol-mil planners
  • Interagency Management how the intervention
    will be managed

18
Do it Well.Who will get the job done?
  • An intervention requires several coalitions
  • - a political coalition (led by France)
  • - a relief coalition (UNHCR)
  • - a military coalition (UK under NATO)
  • - a rule of law coalition (UN)
  • - an institution building coalition (OSCE)
  • - a economic reconstruction coalition (EU /
    World Bank)
  • - a donor coalition (The G-8 Finance Ministers)
  • Some coalitions are largely multinational
    while others are mostly multilateral. Some are
    mixed.
  • The political and structural foundations of
    each coalition have to be set in place. Each
    coalition will have its own structure,
    leadership, participants, operating parameters,
    and planning capacity.
  • Intervention planning and diplomacy go
    hand-in-hand. Gaining consensus among coalition
    partners is key.

19
Do it Well . . .Intl Coalitions -- Foundations
  • Informal political consensus for common action
    (not an alliance) to address a compelling
    practical necessity
  • Ad hoc and short-lived -- it disbands when either
    the need goes away or the mission has run its
    course. Players are both multinational and
    multilateral
  • Unity is central to its success, but it is highly
    vulnerable. A coalition is inherently weaker
    than the opposition
  • A lead nation with robust political will and
    sufficient diplomatic and military capacity to
    carry the mission forward successfully
  • A core partnership that serves as the engine of
    the coalition and shapes the realistic
    operational aims of the mission
  • Effective mechanisms for coalition management
    Political steering group, management process and
    agreements, organizational controls, etc
  • Substantial financial backing over the duration
    of the mission -- a three to seven year period

20
Response LimitationsFew Capable Lead Nations
About Twelve
  • Why Important?
  • Secures concrete commitments to participate
  • Operationally integrates coalition participants
  • Establishes mechanisms for coalition management
  • Nurtures cohesion when the going gets tough
  • Does much of the dirty work and heavy lifting
  • What are the Key Attributes of a Capable Lead
    Nation?
  • Recognized disposition for non-intervention in
    the region
  • Strong domestic public support for long, hard,
    costly commitments
  • High-level personal diplomacy by political and
    military leadership
  • Effective diplomatic connections to supporting
    major power
  • Previous defense cooperation arrangements in the
    region
  • Professional competence of the nations defense
    forces
  • Internal intelligence collection capacity--both
    political and security
  • Strong financial management capacity for the
    coalition
  • Sophisticated public information and media
    affairs capacity
  • A well-founded international reputation

21
Response LimitationsDiminishing Capacity of
Member States
  • Limited political will -- most nations view UN
    peacekeeping as a toothbrush, not a knife
  • Most military forces and police lack
    expeditionary capabilities--basically they serve
    as home guard forces
  • Many nations lack military hardware and equipment
  • Most nations cannot conduct brigade-level
    military operations
  • Most nations lack force multipliers, and do not
    know how to use them
  • Some capable nations have higher priorities for
    military and police
  • Many nations cannot afford delays in compensation
  • Voluntary contributions--limited donor support
    for voluntary contributions to non-peacekeeping
    activities in UN missions

22
Parting Tips Observations
  • Start early--get the intel community up and
    running before it becomes urgent.
  • Help policy makers make value judgements--give
    them information to the level of detail
    appropriate for the decision so they can make
    such important judgments.
  • Rely on scenarios--precise prediction of events
    is not the central issue, instead a policy-maker
    seeks to gain an understanding of the dynamics of
    the crisis.
  • Know that policy-makers have important political
    needs--success and credibility.
  • Know that regional planners lead functional
    planners on overall policy approaches, even
    though they may lack expertise on many
    substantive and functional issues.
  • Know that agencies work within traditional
    organizational roles and routines often producing
    inappropriate plans or creating gaps in response
    efforts.
  • Use a strawman proposal to gain interagency
    consensus.
  • Beware--the pace and pressure of the media is
    absolutely relentless.
  • Know that in a crisis, media reporting and
    analysis lags policy decisions by 3-4 days and is
    about 60-80 accurate, depending on the news
    operation.

23
Interagency Processes for Crisis Response
Backup Slides
24
PNSR Rationale
  • The world has changed dramatically since the
    Cold War
  • National security concerns have expanded.
  • Transnational threats have emerged with global
    reach
  • Conflict in troubled states has wider adverse
    consequences
  • Whole of government responses are necessary
  • Capabilities to respond are limited and
    diminishing
  • Our current national security system has
    glaring limitations in producing desired outcomes
    today and in the future.
  • The world is changing faster than our system
    can react. Recent crises of 9-11, Katrina, Iraq
    and Afghanistan demonstrate a dysfunctional
    national security system.
  • The timing for national security reform is
    right. A new Administration Congress can move
    forward now with reforms.

25
PNSR Report Part III Assessment of Current
Performance
  • Core Institutional and Managerial Problems (106
    Case Studies)
  • The system is grossly imbalanced, supporting
    strong departmental capabilities at the expense
    of integrating mechanisms.
  • Departments and agencies use resources for
    capabilities required for their core mandates
    rather than for national missions.
  • Presidential intervention to compensate for the
    systems inability to integrate capabilities or
    reallocate resources to national missions
    centralizes issue management and burdens the
    White House.
  • A burdened White House cannot manage the national
    security system as a whole, so the system is not
    agile, collaborative, or able to perform well.
  • The legislative branch provides resources and
    conducts oversight in ways that reinforce these
    problems and make improving performance
    difficult.

26
PNSR Report Part VI RecommendationsSeven Themes
(1)
  • 1. Refocus on National Missions and Outcomes
  • Broaden scope of national security
  • Create the Presidents Security Council
  • Establish a (super-Cabinet) Director of National
    Security
  • 2. Create Unity of Purpose
  • Strengthen strategic direction
  • Improve system management (Human Capital,
    Resources, KM)
  • Create interagency task forces for crisis
    management
  • 3. Decentralize Issue Management
  • Shift management of issues to integrated teams
    (vs. committees)
  • 4. Link Resources to National Security
    Objectives
  • Prepare a six-year national security budget

27
PNSR Report Part VI RecommendationsSeven Themes
(2)
  • 5. Align Personnel Development with Strategic
    Objectives
  • Create a national security professional corps
  • Use promotion requirements to create incentives
  • Strengthen education and training programs
  • 6. Improve the Flow of Knowledge and
    Information
  • Strengthen the Executive Secretary function
  • Consolidate security classification systems
  • 7. Build a New Partnership with the Legislative
    Branch
  • Establish Select Committees in the Senate and
    House
  • Strengthen the roles of the Foreign Relations
    Committees
  • Provide greater flexibility in reprogramming
  • Revise the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
  • Consolidate oversight of the Department of
    Homeland Security

28
PNSR Report Prospects for Implementation
  • Three vehicles for reform efforts
  • Executive Orders or Presidential Directives
  • Amendments to Rules of the House and Senate
  • New National Security Act
  • Initial roll-out did not make a big splash (but
    was a splash intended?)
  • Incoming Administration appears inclined to act,
    but President Obama has yet to endorse the PNSR
    Report.
  • Some controversyalthough many of the
    recommendations have been widely supported, the
    premises for them are questioned.
  • No member of the Guiding Coalition endorsed all
    recommendations.
  • Reforms on the legislative side will be the most
    difficult.
  • A political consensus for action is at hand, but
    specific reforms are an open question and the
    costs of reform will be a big factor.

29
Do it Wisely. . . Key Policy Considerations
  • Threat to peace and security? Compelling
    necessity?
  • Consensus for action by the international
    community?
  • Unacceptable consequences of inaction?
  • Leveraged consent by the parties-access,
    security, cooperation
  • Adequate support by regional local actors?
  • Realistic role of the UN or Coalition?
  • Appropriate legal authority for the mission?
  • Realistic mission and operational concept?
  • Clear objectives, duration and end state?
  • Assured funding resources available 3-5 years?
  • Sufficient public and congressional support?
  • Acceptable role for U.S. contribution?

30
Do it Wisely. . .Mission Success Considerations
  • Conflict ripe for resolution?
  • Parties committed to the settlement peace
    process?
  • Power-sharing deal mitigates future conflict?
  • Control of illegal economic incentives for
    conflict?
  • Executability of the peace process?
  • Cooperation by the parties?
  • Availability of effective leverage on the
    parties?
  • Appropriate mandate objectives / tasks?
  • Capable mission structure and leadership?
  • Credibility of the deployed force?
  • Political unity and will among the coalition
    participants?
  • Integrated civilian and military campaign plan
    activities?
  • Peace implementation strategy?
  • Post-conflict peace-building gameplan?
  • Realistic spoiler strategy?
  • Adequacy of the transition strategy?
  • Operational support of neighboring states?
  • Responsive policy oversight and management?

31
The Implementation NightmareSpoilers to the
Peace Process
  • Peace processes create spoilers /
    obstructionists--those who believe the peace
    process threatens their power and may use force
    to undermine UN efforts. They threaten the peace
    process by
  • Attacking civilians
  • Stealing relief supplies and raiding UN
    facilities, equipment and vehicles
  • Taking hostages or killing relief / UN personnel
  • Assassinating government officials
  • Engaging in corruption, arms trafficking, drug
    running or stealing precious resources
  • Spoilers differ in their goals and degree of
    commitment
  • Limited spoiler--has limited goals such as
    power-sharing arrangement
  • Greedy spoiler--has goals that expand or contract
    based on cost-risk calculations
  • Total spoiler--pursues retention of total power
    not subject to change, all or nothing player
  • We must match the strategy to fit the type of
    spoiler / obstructionist
  • Limited spoiler--provide inducements to join the
    peace process
  • Greedy spoiler--use carrots and stick to ensure
    compliance with norms of behavior
  • Total spoiler--use force or threat of force to
    deter and/or remove spoilers base of support
  • Deal with the spoilers patrons who provide guns
    and other support

32
The Big PicturePressures to End the Mission
  • Harsh Realities
  • Interventions are never fast, easy, or cheap
  • Intl support fades quicklypressure to bring
    em home
  • Efforts in the post-war stage cannot be
    sustained indefinitely
  • Central task the mission needs to manage down
    residual crisis situation in stages so the
    process can be sustained over time
  • Stage 1 Imposed Stability / Unsustainable Peace
    Process
  • Stage 2 Viable Peace / Sustainable Peace
    Process
  • Stage 3 Self-enforcing Peace / Self-sustaining
    Peace Process

33
The Local PicturePressures to Continue Fighting
  • War-torn societies have lost practices for
    dealing with its internal political
    confrontations by any means other than war
  • State institutions are weak, ineffective,
    corrupt, or ignored
  • Warring factions are prepared to continue the
    fight
  • Some locals are wary of international intrusions
  • Implementation of political stability has several
    perils
  • Deep ethnic divisions persist during
    implementation
  • Lack of trust among the parties limits dialog and
    negotiation
  • Internal faction politics constrain leaders
  • Fear of defeat and death limits risk-taking
  • Weak third-party guarantees undermine confidence
  • Bottom line post-conflict is a planning
    fantasy

34
Sources of Obstructionist Power
  • Obstructionist power is entrenched in the
    country well before the fighting ends, and it
    extends into neighboring states and often
    globally
  • Obstructionists leverage entrenched power
    structures
  • -- Political tyranny and oppression
  • -- Hostile violence by armed groups
  • -- Lawless rule and injustice
  • -- Organized crime, economic predation and
    corruption
  • Challenge the most powerful obstructionists
    have all four in play

35
A Useful Distinction in Strategy-makingTransitio
n vs. Transformation
  • Transition Applies to what we do we make
    phased evolutions in the peacekeeping mission.
    As the UN mission evolves from peace enforcement
    to stability operations and peace-building, we
    make transitions to a less intrusive, coercive
    role in peace implementation.
  • Applicable words
  • Implementation of a mandate
  • Hand-off to a Follow-on Mission
  • Transition to the host nation
  • Exit strategies
  • Transformation Applies to what they do the
    local society makes progress (or not) in moving
    from war to peace. The peace process enables
    the locals to transform their society from
    continued fighting toward practices that support
    a lasting, self-sustaining peace.
  • Applicable words
  • The peace process
  • Desired effects
  • Social change..Tipping points
  • Endstate

36
Designing a Capable Mission A Genuine
Partnership
  • Strategic Perspective A provisional authority
    running a fragile country. Model A UN
    Civilian Authority w/ MNF Command
  • Aligned Deployment Footprint Co-located HQ
    Civilian, Military, Indigenous down to district
    or municipal level.
  • Unified Policy Direction Civilian lead as a
    Provisional Authority (w/o infringing on the
    militarys chain of command)
  • Organization Internal Pillar Structure of
    operating coalitions
  • Integrated Executive Leadership An Executive
    Steering Group
  • Coherent Operations A Director of Operations
  • Keep Pace An Civil-Military Situation Center
  • Integrated Mission Planning Construct
  • Mission Campaign Plan ( 3-year time horizon)
  • Mission Next State Plan (3-5 month time
    horizon)
  • Operations / Activity Planning(3-4 week time
    horizon)

37

The Ideal An Integrated Campaign Planning
Construct
Several interdependent lines of effort (each with
a strategy) Political, Security, Rule of Law
Political Economic, etc to Transform Conflict
bringing about a Critical Endstate
Next State 1
Next State 3
Next State 2
Time
Political/ Strategy
Viable Peace (Desired Endstate)
Imposed Stability (Beginning State)
Security Strategy
Rule of Law Strategy
Political-Economic Strategy
T h e P e a c e P r o c e s s
Critical Benchmarks that Signify Key Turning
Points (Decisive Effects) in the Transformation
Process
38
Interagency Campaign PlanningContext Approach
  • Organizational Context
  • Space created by senior civilian and military
    leaders
  • Includes experts from all relevant agencies
  • Integrates agency views from Day 1 onward
  • Relies on prudent consensus-building
  • Forms a separate team for each alternative
    strategy
  • Enables unique agency planning methodologies
  • Approach
  • Situation Assessment
  • Problem Framing
  • Mission Goal Ends Determination
  • Alternative Strategy Approaches
  • Decision
  • Integrated Implementation Planning
  • Risk Management
  • Strategic Influence

39
Do it wiselyDefine the Multi-Dimensional Mission
  • Diplomatic collaboration / Military coalition
  • Cease-fire / Disengagement / Stabilization
  • Prisoner exchange
  • Weapons control / Demobilization
  • Demining
  • Humanitarian relief
  • Refugee / Displaced person return
  • Internal political cooperation
  • Counter-terrorism
  • Anti-official corruption / Illicit criminal
    operations
  • Spoiler management
  • Political Transition / Elections /
    Democratization
  • Rule of Law / Police / Criminal justice
  • Atrocities / Abuses / War crimes prosecution
  • Civil and social order
  • National reconciliation
  • Economic reform restoration / Private
    investment
  • Public Diplomacy
  • Flash point management

40
The Political Strategy
  • Ends When the war aims of the factions are
    still at play in a bitter struggle for power, the
    incentives for violence must be transformed
  • from intolerant zero-sum confrontations in
    which incentives and payoffs for continued
    violence persist,
  • to a system of governance where competition
    for power can be conducted through non-violent
    processes.
  • Thrust Encourage the parties to rethink their
    interests and aims
  • Lines of Effort
  • Nurture favorable conditions for political
    dialogue
  • Humanitarian relief, Electrical Power,
    Demobilization,
  • Basic Services, Public Support, Victims
    Grievances,
  • Acquiescence of Influential Leaders
  • Mediate conflict incrementally
  • Build a working coalition to run a civil
    administration
  • Contain obstructionism
  • Channel the competition for power into
    nonviolent processes.

41
The Security Strategy
  • Ends When paramilitary and militants obstruct
    the peace process through violence, the security
    environment will must be transformed
  • from a context dominated by armed groups that
    are willing and able to use violence and
    intimidation to destroy the peace,
  • to a context in which armed groups are
    marginalized by being subordinated to legitimate
    governmental authority, reintegrated into
    society, or defeated.
  • Thrust Defeat militant extremists by finding,
    fixing striking
  • Lines of Effort
  • Adopt an assertive posture with a maneuverist
    approach
  • Seek reliable local intelligence to guide
    operations and prevent harm to the peace process
  • Mount framework operations in support of civil
    authority to find, fix, and strike against
    militant extremists
  • Conduct joint military-police planning and
    action
  • Transform local security forces into
    contributors to peace

42
The Rule of Law Strategy
  • Ends When lawless rule prevails, both the
    capacity of indigenous institutions and the
    context in which they operate must be transformed
  • from instruments of state repression where
    political and criminal elites enjoy impunity,
  • to servants of the public capable of preserving
    order, protecting basic rights, especially for
    minority groups, and applying the law
  • Thrust Confront threats to the emerging rule of
    law
  • Lines of Effort
  • Develop institutional capacity (law, police,
    justice, penal system)
  • Shape the context by dismantling criminalized
    power structures
  • Establish safeguards on performance

43
The Political-Economic Strategy
  • Ends When illicit sources of revenue provide
    the motivation and means for obstructing the
    peace process, the political economy must be
    transformed
  • from a political economy of conflict in which
    the gray and black markets predominate and
    illicit wealth reinforces political power,
  • to a functioning formal economy in which the
    integrity of revenues required for essential
    state services is protected
  • Thrust Tip the balance between incentives for
    sustaining the peace and those for sustaining the
    conflict
  • Lines of Effort
  • Undercut the economic foundations of
    obstructionist power
  • Strengthen the coalition for peace by ensuring
    that peace pays
  • Develop a fiscally autonomous and sustainable
    state
  • Lay the macroeconomic foundation to expand the
    formal economy and broadly distribute the
    benefits of peace

44
Attributes ofHigh Performing Interagency Groups
  • High Conceptual Level
  • Share an understanding of goals and priorities
  • Expand frames of reference (dip, pol, mil,
    econ, hum, dev, legal, etc.)
  • Seek a broad situation assessment (sources
    intel, dip, partners, etc.)
  • Search for ambiguous assumptions and
    information gaps
  • Focus on a realistic time horizon
  • Clarify the tough value trade-offs in the
    policy decisions
  • Match commitments with political will
  • Prudent Consensus Approach
  • Agree on an effective process plan
  • Strengthen interagency team identity
  • Control internal politics among team members
  • Foster competitive debate
  • Forge a consensus approach for action
  • Vigilant Group Management
  • Keep pace--stay ahead of the crisis
    environment
  • Recognize press issues in advance

45
Systemic Tensions Levels of Interagency
Collaboration
  • Drivers of Fragmentation
  • Regional vs. functional offices
  • Civilian vs. military officials
  • Short vs. long-term time horizons
  • Political ambiguity vs. defined objectives
  • Share information vs. control the agenda
  • Policy preferences vs. legal requirements
  • Rapid vs. organized response
  • Programmed vs. unresourced activities
  • Crisis responders vs. funding managers
  • Levels of Interagency Collaboration
  • Disunity
  • De-confliction plan in isolation, then avoid
    clashes
  • Coordination stitch together agency plans at
    the seams
  • Integration follow top-down direction w /
    common objectives
  • Coherence weave actions together under common
    strategy

46
Do it Well Policy Planning vs. Strategic
Planning
  • Pol-Mil Planning
  • Advance Planning Process
  • Policy / Political Level
  • Aim is to create policy options
  • that will advance U.S. interests at stake
  • Pol-Mil Planning building consensus,
    harmonizing efforts, and mobilizing power to
    bring about desired ends
  • Multi-agency processes with some multi-national
    and multi-lateral actors involved
  • Negotiated per value judgements of policy
    makers and equities of the agencies involved in
    the effort
  • Harmonization of the priorities and
    implementation milestones among all civilian and
    military agencies
  • Agency Planning
  • Joint Planning Process
  • Strategic and Operational Level
  • Aim is to achieve agency objectives
    directed by a higher Pol-Mil Plan
  • Campaign Planning coordinating an agencys
    ways and means over time to achieve assigned
    agency objectives
  • Single agency processes with some
    multi-national and multi-lateral input
  • Calibrated per agency doctrine and internal
    processes divisive policy issues are to be
    resolved higher
  • Synchronization of the efforts among the
    various organizations and units mostly within a
    single agency


47
Do it Well The Advance Planning Process
Guidance for Advance Planning Initiates
interagency planning effort. Includes potential
crisis scenario, regional strategy, comprehensive
situation assessment, U.S. purpose and scope of
effort, etc.
  • Phase 4 Pol-Mil Strategy
  • - Confirms policy aims
  • - Clarifies strategy to wield power
  • Phase 5 Interagency Pol-Mil Plan
  • - Elaborates the intervention strategy
  • - Integrates agency efforts
  • - Establishes mission organization, concept
    of implementation, and interagency management
  • - Fixes accountability for major mission
    element task implementation
  • Phase 6 Agency Planning
  • - Completes agency plans
  • - Designates assets, resources issues
  • Phase 7 Interagency Rehearsal
  • - Confirms playbook for final countdown
  • - Reviews agency plans
  • - Harmonizes initial efforts
  • Phase 1 Analysis Problem Framing
  • - Clarifies context and major challenges
  • - Frames the problem and solution approaches
  • - Envisions mission elements and tasks
  • Phase 2 Policy Goal Projection
  • Policy Issues
  • Clarifies the desired goals of an intervention
  • Forecasts future scenarios
  • - Clarifies policy issues
  • Phase 3 Strategic Approach
  • - Outlines the USG approach to the crisis
  • -- core strategy to strengthen U.S. posture,
  • -- preventive strategies,
  • -- crisis response strategy,
  • -- escalation control strategy, and
  • -- hedging strategies for geo-strategic shifts
  • - Recommends interagency preparations




48
Do it wellInteragency Pol-Mil Planning Lessons
  • Assess all aspects of the situation
  • The best solutions are home grown listen to the
    host nation key players and their aims --
  • Gain multilateral consensus on strategic purpose
  • Consult with coalition partners to strengthen
    plan
  • Formulate strategy (pol-mil plan) integrating
    diplomatic, military, humanitarian, police and
    other efforts. Avoid sharp civil-military lines.
  • Track underlying assumptions of the Presidents
    policy decision and over time evaluate the
    overall approach to achieve the desired end state
    as the operation unfolds
  • Establish mechanisms for integration at all
    levels
  • Prepare work hard to achieve success. Be
    flexible and adjust

49
Twelve Tips for Pol-Mil Planners
  • Assess the difficulty of the situation
  • Be realistic about political will to sustain an
    intervention
  • Clarify the regional and international politics
    at play
  • Sharpen the focus on the geo-strategic context
  • Start systematic advance planning activities
  • Get a working consensus on overall policy
    guidance
  • Continually define success
  • Craft strategies to mobilize, sustain and wield
    power
  • Craft a roadmap for the political transformation
    process
  • Assemble the several coalitions needed for the
    intervention

50
Thoughts for a Senior Leader
  • First, figure out what you are trying to
    accomplish in collaboration with your genuine
    partner.
  • Craft an overarching campaign strategy to
    accomplish the broad goals.
  • Involve yourself in the policy decisions others
    are making.
  • Start early with a continual discourse with the
    intelligence community and regional experts.
  • Build a strong working consensus for your mission
    with your staff, the commanders, and civilian
    actors at your level.
  • Nurture relationships with others to shape the
    external environment.
  • Participate in the daily strategic communications
    effort. Define yourself through actions not
    statements.
  • Resourcesask for what you need to ensure the
    mission is sustainable.

51
Summary Many Implications
  • Getting to Viable Peace in about three years
    requires
  • An empowering UNSC mandate backed by key Member
    States.
  • Influential mission leaders to give focused
    political direction as custodians of the peace
    process.
  • A genuine partnership among the top civilian
    and military leaders to craft and implement a
    coherent mission strategy.
  • Early implementation of all four strategies to
    jumpstart conflict transformation at the outset.
  • Several coalitions to get the job done in all
    lines for effort.
  • A political-military plan that brings together
    key participating nations, agencies and
    organizations.
  • . . . . and a lot of hard work and
    persistence . . .
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