Teaching Counterterrorism - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

View by Category
About This Presentation
Title:

Teaching Counterterrorism

Description:

Teaching Counterterrorism in the 21st Century James JF Forest, Ph.D. Director of Terrorism Studies Agenda Advice from Sun Tzu MIDLIFE (formerly DIME) CT Approach U.S ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:322
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 82
Provided by: teachingt4
Learn more at: http://www.teachingterror.com
Category:

less

Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Teaching Counterterrorism


1
Teaching Counterterrorism in the 21st Century
James JF Forest, Ph.D. Director of Terrorism
Studies
2
Agenda
  1. Advice from Sun Tzu
  2. MIDLIFE (formerly DIME) CT Approach
  3. U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy
  4. Conclusion Recommendations for Teaching

Notes - This presentation is entirely at the
unclassified level. - The views expressed herein
are those of the author and do not purport to
reflect the position of the United States
Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or
the Department of Defense.
3
1. Understanding the Terrorist Threat
  • NATO definition of terrorism
  • The unlawful use or threatened use of force or
    violence against individuals or property in an
    attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or
    societies to achieve political, religious or
    ideological objectives
  • Sun Tzu
  • Know yourself
  • Know your allies
  • Know your enemy

4
Sun Tzu Know Your Enemy
  • Understanding the Terrorist Threat
  • What motivates terrorists?
  • How do they get to a willingness to be a suicide
    bomber?
  • What do they want?
  • What are they capable of?
  • How do they view this struggle?
  • You have to be lucky everyday We only have to
    be lucky once - IRA Bomber

5
The Terrorists Perspective
  • For one thing, al Qaedas leaders believes that
    they have been tested by two superpowers (Soviets
    and Americans) they defeated the first, and
    survived the second despite overwhelming military
    force thus, both are considered victories
  • Globally, members of this global
    religious-inspired insurgency believe this is an
    epic struggle that will likely take place beyond
    the current generation of fighters
  • In Iraq, terrorists are developing a new cult of
    the insurgent by demonstrating how they, not the
    once-feared Saddam Husseins military, can
    inflict pain and suffering on the mighty U.S.
    (and coalition) forces
  • Rationale for terrorism perceived as only
    available means by which to achieve strategic
    goal

6
Terrorism as Strategy
  • Terrorism is not new
  • Terrorism is not merely religious 1980 Bologna,
    Munich attacks LTTE (Sri Lanka)
  • Terrorism as weapon in a strategy
  • Terrorist attacks as a formof strategic
    communication

7
Terrorism as Strategic Communication
  • What audiences are they attempting to communicate
    with?
  • What message for each audience?
  • How are they communicating (beyond acts of
    violence)?
  • What are your actions, foreign policies, etc.
    communicating, and to whom?
  • How can you determine the effectiveness of your
    own communications?

8
Some Strategic Acts of Terrorism
  • The terrorist act is generally a symbolic gesture
    against a group or national government. Tactics
    include
  • armed attacks
  • arson
  • assassination
  • bombing
  • hijacking
  • hostage-taking
  • kidnapping, etc.

Suicide bombings
9
Terrorism as Strategy
  • Terrorism as means to achieve goals and
    objectives
  • Strategic goals include
  • Political change (e.g., overthrow govt.)
  • Social change (e.g., France headscarf ban)
  • Economic change (e.g., stop resource export)
  • Religious change (e.g., fundamentalism)
  • Overall goal create a better world

10
Some Strategic Objectives of Terrorism
  • Recognition Gaining national or international
    recognition for their cause recruiting new
    personnel raising funds demonstrating their
    strength
  • Coercion Force a desired behavior of an
    individual or government
  • Intimidation Prevent individuals, groups, or
    governments from acting
  • Provocation Provoking overreaction by a
    government to the attack on symbolic targets or
    personnel, thereby gaining sympathy for their
    cause.
  • Insurgency support Forcing the government to
    overextend itself in dealing with the threat,
    thereby allowing the insurgency to gain support
    and commit further attacks against the government.

11
Marine Barracks Beirut, Lebanon23 October 1983
  • 241 Dead
  • 105 Injured

12
Khobar Towers - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia 25 June
1996
  • 19 Dead
  • 240 Injured

13
New York, World Trade Center12 October 1993
6 Dead1,042 Injured
14
Murrah Federal BuildingOklahoma City 19 April
1995
  • 168 Dead
  • 490 Injured
  • Some religious motivation, but different religion
  • Same tactics (ammonium nitrate truck bomb) as
    1993 WTC attack

15

American Embassy Bombings, Kenya and
TanzaniaAugust 1998 224 Americans, Kenyans,
and Tanzanians deadOver 4,025 injured

16
1999 LAX Attack Plan
17
USS Cole, Aden, YemenOctober 12, 2000
17 Dead39 Injured
18
Terrorism as Strategy
  • Increasing interest in soft targets
    (economically strategic impact, and less
    protected) such as
  • pubs in Northern Ireland London UK
  • open markets cafes in Israel
  • international airport, Sri Lanka
  • bus in Manila, the Philippines
  • shopping mall in southern Philippines
  • nightclub in Bali, Indonesia
  • banks in Istanbul, Turkey
  • hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia
  • nightclub in Berlin, Germany
  • and, of course . . .

19
New York City Washington, DCSeptember 11, 2001
2,973 Dead10,000 Injured
20
Karachi, PakistanMay 8, 2002 June 14, 2002
Attack on U.S. Consulate
Bus attack
14 Dead, including11 French engineers
12 Dead50 Injured
21
Bali, IndonesiaOctober 12, 2002
202 Dead350 Injured
Citizens from 21 countries, mostly Western
tourists, were killed in the blasts
22
Casablanca, MoroccoMay 17, 2003
44 Dead107 Injured
23
Jakarta, IndonesiaAugust 5, 2003
12 Dead60 Injured
J.W. Marriott Hotel, Jakarta
24
Riyadh, Saudi ArabiaNovember 8, 2003 April
21, 2004
Attack on Security Services Headquarters
3 simultaneous suicide car bomb attacks on
Al-Muhaya apartment complex
4 Dead148 Injured
17 Dead122 Injured
25
Istanbul, TurkeyNovember 20, 2003
27 Dead400 Injured
Primary Targets British consulate and the HSBC
bank headquarters
26
Madrid, SpainMarch 11, 2004
191 Dead1,035 Injured
27
Jakarta, IndonesiaSeptember 9, 2004
9 Dead173 Injured
Australian Embassy was primary target
28
London, UKJuly 7, 2005
54 Dead716 Injured
29
Strategy and Recruitment
  • Terrorism is an individuals strategic choice
    most often driven by a combination of
  • Intense grievances
  • Sense of crisis
  • Address a power imbalance - empower the
    disenfranchised
  • The ties that bind training camps, extended
    family, social networks trusted networks key
  • Combination of ideology and psychology
  • No constraints re geography, organizational
    affiliation, etc.

30
Strategy and Recruitment
  • Recruit individuals with differing talents or
    attributes to offer
  • Locals with knowledge of customs, culture
  • Foreigners with passports, language skills
  • Sleepers or operationalists who can fit in
  • Individuals who can serve as critical
    functionaries
  • Sleeper cells were key for the 9/11, Madrid and
    London attacks

31
Terrorists as Strategic Actors
  • Even though its a decentralized network, there
    are still critical functions that enable the
    network to operate
  • Critical functionary roles can become a hub of
    multiple networks
  • weapons procurement
  • financier (funder or banker) (particularly in
    Halawa system)
  • document forgerer
  • human traffickers
  • Support individuals (trusted contacts) can and
    sometimes do support multiple networks can
    provide supplies/facilitate trafficking of
    weapons funds to multiple networks
  • Example 60 of day spent moving legitimate
    charity money around 20 of day on Hamas
    transactions, other activity on side
  • Some may get profit for doing these
    support/function roles

32
Different members of the network play support and
action roles
33
Strategy and Training
34
Strategy and Training
  • Establish training camps developing the will to
    kill and the skill to kill
  • Operational space Geographic isolation
  • Teachers Experts in relevant knowledge, e.g.,
    military combat experience
  • Committed learners
  • Time, money, and basic necessities
  • Afghanistan
  • Algeria
  • Bosnia
  • Chechnya
  • Colombia
  • Egypt
  • Indonesia
  • Japan
  • Kashmir
  • Lebanon
  • Libya
  • Northern Ireland
  • Peru
  • The Philippines
  • Somalia
  • Spain
  • Sri Lanka
  • Sudan
  • Syria
  • Turkey
  • United States
  • Uzbekistan

35
Strategy and Training
  • Psychological dimensions
  • Moral disengagement
  • Displacement of responsibility
  • Disregard for/distortion of consequences
  • Dehumanization
  • Moral justification
  • Group power over behavior, personal decisions
  • Preparation for martyrdom

36
Strategy and Training
Lessons for new recruits include
  • education in explosives and detonators how to
    assemble bombs (e.g., TNT, C4), mines and
    grenades, pressure and trip wire booby traps, and
    the basic knowledge of electrical engineering
  • how to mount rocket launchers in the beds of
    pickup trucks
  • how and where to launder money
  • how to successfully conduct a kidnapping
  • how to conduct target identification,
    surveillance and reconnaissance
  • how and where to build camouflage-covered
    trenches
  • how to covertly communicate with other members of
    a group or network
  • how to fire handguns, machine guns and rocket
    propelled grenade launchers

37
Strategy and Training
Lessons for new recruits include
  • the rudiments of chemical and biological warfare
  • field command and escape tactics
  • marksmanship and camouflage
  • the use and employment of Soviet rocket-propelled
    grenades and shoulder borne STRELA missiles
  • sniper rifle skills how to fine-tune a rifle
    sight at short range to ensure accuracy at longer
    distances
  • how to direct weapon fire at targets on the
    ground and in the air
  • training in four-man unit deployments and
    formationsincluding wedges, columns, echelons
    and linestechniques similar to those used by
    U.S. Marines and Army Rangers

38
Strategy and Training
  • Increasing use of the Internet
  • Provide free tactical advice (print or online
    dissemination of information on bomb making,
    computer hacking, etc.)
  • Advise sleepers on how to adapt to local
    surroundings (e.g., dress, friendly relationships
    with locals, etc.)
  • Examples of online resources include
  • The Terrorists Handbook
  • How to Make Bombs, Book Two
  • 13 volume Encyclopedia of Jihad
  • Manual of Jihad
  • The Green Book (IRA)
  • The Turner Diaries (US extremists)
  • Muaskar al-Battar (The Al Battar Training Camp,
    an Al Qaeda magazine)
  • The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook
  • The Anarchist Cookbook
  • Field Manual for Free Militia
  • Sabotage Handbook
  • Special Force first-person shooter game,
    developed by Hizballah
  • Cyber-attack tools and instructions

39
Example of Tactics Ammonium Nitrate
  • Millions of tons produced each year for use as
    fertilizer
  • Mining companies mix small amounts of explosive
    grade ammonium nitrate with fuel oil to create
    explosives
  • Used in several IRA bombings
  • Used in World Trade Center bombing, 1993 (1,200
    lbs in truck bomb)
  • Used in the Oklahoma City bombing, 1995
  • Used in the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and
    Tanzania, 1998
  • Used in the Bali bombing, 2002
  • March 30, 2004 More than half a ton of ammonium
    nitrate fertilizer is found in a lock-up in West
    London. Eight British citizens, one American and
    one Canadian were arrested on suspicion of being
    involved in the commission, preparation or
    instigation of acts of terrorism.

40
Strategy and Training
  • These are Learning Organizations committed to
    capturing knowledge, analyzing it, forming new
    doctrine and tactics which are informed by
    lessons from the past
  • Learn from each other
  • Learn from trial and error (IRA example)
  • Media showcasing best practices to others
  • Managing public image (PR) (becoming more
    sophisticated)
  • Terrorists are learning many things in Iraq,
    like
  • Manufacturing and concealing IEDs
  • Urban warfare
  • Sniper and ambush techniques
  • Hostage taking
  • Media manipulation
  • OVERALL How to recruit, fund, and execute
    assymetric warfare

41
Suicide Terrorism as Logical Strategy
42
Suicide Terrorism Who?
  • Perception
  • Generalized profile of suicide terrorists,
    including
  • Young
  • Single
  • Male
  • Uneducated
  • Religious fanatics
  • Reality
  • The profile is wrong
  • Terrorists are
  • Preteen - mid-sixties
  • Both single and married with families
  • Both male and female
  • Both educated and uneducated
  • Not motivated by religious fanaticism
  • Worlds leader in suicide terror are Hindu Tamil
    Tigers who are conducting insurgency against Sri
    Lanka

43
Suicide Terrorism Why?
  • Perception
  • Seemingly irrational act
  • Reality
  • Part of a strategy that is
  • Well planned
  • Logical
  • Designed to achieve specific political objectives
  • Does two things
  • Inflicts immediate punishment against target
    society
  • Threatens more punishment in the future
  • Suicide attacks have increased over the past two
    decades
  • Why?

44
(No Transcript)
45
(No Transcript)
46
Suicide Terror Attacks are . . .
  • inexpensive and effective extremely favorable
    per-casualty cost benefits for the terrorists
  • less complicated and compromising no escape
    plan needed, and success means no assailant to
    capture and interrogate
  • perhaps the ultimate smart bomb this weapon
    can cleverly disguise itself, use various modes
    of deception, and effect last minute changes in
    timing, access, and target
  • a strategic communication device successful
    attacks are virtually assured media coverage
  • effective because the weaker opponent acts as
    coercer and the stronger actor is the target
  • Key difference from other attacks The target of
    suicide campaign cannot easily adjust to minimize
    future damage

47
Suicide Terrorism Where?
  • Three types of attacks are most likely to occur
  • High value, symbolic targets involving mass
    casualties
  • Important government buildings, installations, or
    landmarks
  • Major means of personal or commercial
    transportation
  • High value, symbolic targets against specific
    persons
  • Political assassinations (e.g., head of state,
    regional governor, etc.)
  • Deliberately lethal attacks targeting the public
  • Bus, train, subway bombings attacks on shopping
    malls, cinemas, sports stadiums, public gathering
    spaces

48
Understanding Counterterrorism
49
2. MIDLIFE (formerly DIME) CT Approach
  • Question Once we understand the threat, how do
    we address it?
  • Answer We employ all the instruments of national
    power available to us.
  • Military
  • Intelligence
  • Diplomacy
  • Legal
  • Information
  • Financial
  • Economic
  • Case studies of groups and events help us learn
    about each of these dimensions

50
Example of the Financial/Economic Dimensions
How does the LTTE Sustain its Operation
Financially?
In Areas heavily dominated by Tamils
51
INTERNATIONAL FUNDING
Propaganda/ Fund raising projects
52
US Counterterrorism Strategy
  • Helped Sri Lankan military develop 4 key
    capabilities
  • Operate behind enemy lines
  • Engage in night fighting
  • SEAL, special boat operations
  • Psyops capabilities
  • Helped Sri Lankan banking and commerce tracking
    systems locate disrupt money laundering networks

53
The L in MIDLIFE
  • Legal/Law Enforcement
  • Rule of law is vital, both domestically and
    internationally
  • The primary intelligence gatherers and first
    responders are local law enforcement officers
  • Help countries develop their law enforcement
    capabilities and legal institutions
  • Must conduct CT within ethical and legal
    frameworks, to avoid exacerbating existing
    grievances

54
Intelligence Learn from our own mistakes
  • We assumed simultaneous 9/11 attacks in U.S. were
    beyond the capabilities of terrorists
  • Overestimated the significance of past successes
    the terrorists own incompetence
  • Attention was focused exclusively on opposite
    ends of the terrorist technological spectrum
  • Believed terrorists were still interested in
    publicity and not killing

55
3. U.S. Strategy for Combating Terrorism
  • National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
    (released in February 2003)
  • Four main objectives
  • defeating terrorist organizations with global
    reach
  • denying sponsorship, support and sanctuary to
    terrorists
  • diminishing the underlying conditions that
    terrorists seek to exploit
  • defending U.S. citizens and interests

56
(No Transcript)
57
(No Transcript)
58
Elements of the National CT Strategy
  • 4 Ds
  • Defeat terrorist organizations of a global reach
  • Deny terrorists the sponsorship, support, and
    sanctuary they need to survive
  • Diminish the underlying conditions that promote
    the despair and destructive visions of political
    change that lead people to embrace terrorism
  • Defend against terrorist attacks on the U.S., our
    citizens and our interests around the world

59
Defeat terrorist organizations of a global reach
  • Objectives
  • Identify the terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions
    Intelligence, Diplomacy, Information)
  • Locate the terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions
    Intelligence, Diplomacy, Information)
  • Destroy the terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions
    Military, Financial, Legal)
  • Requires considerable interagency coordination
    and multinational cooperation
  • Particular importance given to organizations with
    combination of high motivation and significant
    capabilities

60
Deny terrorists sponsorship, support, sanctuary
  • Objectives
  • End state sponsorship (DIMEFIL dimensions
    Diplomacy, Intelligence, Economic, Financial,
    Information, Legal, and in the most extreme
    cases, Military)
  • Establish maintain international
    accountability (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomatic,
    Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial,
    Legal)
  • Strengthen international will to combat
    terrorism (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomacy,
    Military, Intelligence, Economic, Financial,
    Legal)
  • Interdict disrupt material support for
    terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomacy,
    Intelligence, Economic, Intelligence, Financial,
    Legal)
  • Eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and havens
    (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomacy, Military,
    Intelligence, Economic, Intelligence, Financial,
    Legal)
  • Requires considerable interagency coordination
    and multinational cooperation
  • In particular, we must work with willing and able
    states, enable weak states, persuade reluctant
    states, and compel unwilling states

61
Diminish the underlying conditions
  • Objectives
  • Strengthen international capacity to combat
    terrorism (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomacy,
    Intelligence, Military, Economic, Financial,
    Information, Legal)
  • Win the war of ideas (DIMEFIL dimensions
    Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Legal)
  • Requires considerable interagency coordination
    and multinational cooperation
  • Special attention is already being given to
    developing SOF capabilities in places like the
    Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel
    Region (e.g., TSCTI)
  • We need to focus on strengthening law
    enforcement/rule of law intelligence gathering
    sharing public diplomacy
  • Local communities must de-legitimize terrorism

62
Defend against terrorist attacks
  • Objectives
  • Implement National Strategy for Homeland
    Security (DIMEFIL dimensions Intelligence,
    Economic, Financial, Information, Legal)
  • Attain domain awareness (DIMEFIL dimensions
    Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic,
    Financial, Legal)
  • Enhance measures to protect critical
    infrastructure (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomatic,
    Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial,
    Legal)
  • Integrate measures to protect U.S. citizens
    abroad (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomatic,
    Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial,
    Legal)
  • Ensure an integrated response capability
    (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomatic, Intelligence,
    Information, Economic, Financial, Legal)
  • Based on the mindset that the best defense is a
    good offense

63
U.S. National Security Strategy, September 2002
(Replaces 2000 Clinton Edition)
64
National Strategic Framework for the GWOT
Ends
Overall Goal Preserve and promote the way of
life of free and open societies based on the rule
of law, defeat terrorist extremism as a threat to
that way of life, and create a global environment
inhospitable to terrorist extremists.
Enemy
Leadership
Ideological support
Weapons
Funds
Foot soldiers
Safe havens
Comms Movement
Access to Targets
Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism
Protect the Homeland
Disrupt and Attack Terrorist Networks
Ways
Help create and lead a broad international effort
to deny terrorist networks the resources they
need to operate and survive.
National, partner and international instruments
of power
Means
65
Military Strategic Framework for the GWOT
UNCLASSIFIED
Strategic Goal Preserve and promote the way of
life of free and open societies based on the rule
of law, defeat terrorist extremism as a threat to
our way of life, and create a global environment
inhospitable to terrorist extremists.
Termination Objectives from the Contingency
Planning Guidance
Ends
END-STATE
Enemy
Leadership
Ideological support
Weapons
Funds
Foot soldiers
Safe havens
Comms Movement
Access to Targets
Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism
Disrupt and Attack Terrorist Networks
Protect the Homeland
Enable partner nations to counter terrorism.
Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate
uncontrolled materials, and maintain capacity for
consequence mgmt.
Ways
Military Strategic Objectives
Defeat terrorists and their organizations.
Persuade, coerce, and when necessary, compel
states and non-states to cease support for
terrorists.
Establish conditions that counter ideological
support for terrorism.
Means
Combatant Commands, Services, and Combat Support
Agencies
66
Counterterrorism Strategy
  • Our strategy must involve denying terrorists
    sanctuary separating terrorists from the
    population
  • Must isolate them, take away their support, force
    them to continually be on the run
  • Organizing for force protection based on battle
    line mentality wont work
  • UAVs arent as useful as you might think
    over-reliance on technical wizardry has been a
    problem in the field
  • Attrition we must keep after them, never give
    up, while making sure they dont recruit new
    members

67
Counterterrorism Strategy
  • Human intelligence networks are critical
    (although non-efficient use of manpower)
  • Must have continual presence cannot go into a
    village looking for the terrorists
  • Focus on the enemys ideology, in addition to
    their tactics
  • This is a War of Ideas We need to convince them
    (potential supporters and recruits) that we
    (liberal democracies) offer a better way than
    separatist Islamic Jihad (but without attempting
    to convert them to our way of life)
  • We must work to bolster the image of American
    morals and values being compatible with those of
    the Arab and Islamic world, where we are too
    often portrayed as greedy, selfish hedonists

68
Counterterrorism Strategy
  • Evaluate trends and potentials, capabilities and
    intentions, and provide an operational net
    assessment
  • The contemporary terrorist threat involves a
    series of adversaries linked in networks.
    Combating networks requires an understanding of
    networked threats
  • Must not over-react terrorist strategy may be to
    provoke over-reaction, leading to further
    alienation and possible supporters among populace
  • Tactical level thwart an attack, pursue and
    bring to justice attack perpetrators
  • Strategic level build resilient communities

69
Counterterrorism Strategy
  • Information warfare - We must develop an
    effective counter-ideological message- Manage
    perceptions/be more proactive in the information
    battlespace- Undermine the perceived legitimacy
    among supporters
  • How well do we invest in and support the
    extremists whom we like (a.k.a., moderates)
    and support ways to amplify their voices?
  • We must invest in educational social
    institutions media organizations
  • Our National Strategy for Combating Terrorism can
    only be achieved through
  • Multinational partnerships
  • Interagency coordination

70
Coordination Levels
Coalition
Interagency
Joint
Army Combined Arms
71
Interagency Coordination Process
President
Principals Committee
Secretary Level
Deputies Committee
Deputy Secretary Level
Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG)
Core Group NSC, DOS, DOJ/FBI, DOD, CIA,
Treasury (Secret Service), and
Department of Homeland Security
72
The National Security Council
NSC Staff
Natl Security Advisor
DOS
DOD
POTUS
SECDEF
SECSTATE
CJCS
VP
JCS
DCI
WH COS
Sec of Home. Sec.
INTEL Community
NSC
DOHS
73
Interagency Coordination Lead Federal Agency
Concept
  • Terrorist Incident Overseas Department of State
  • Terrorist Incident in United States FBI
  • Consequence Management in United States
    Department of
    Homeland Security (FEMA)
  • Terrorist Financing Department of the Treasury
  • Military Action Department of Defense
  • and support lead agency
  • Intelligence Community Support
  • Identifying, locating and tracking terrorists and
    organizations
  • CIA, FBI, DIA and DoD Intel Orgs, State INR (plus
    Allies and Partners)

74
National Counterterrorism CenterAddressing the
first I in MIDLIFE
  • NCTC currently has assignees (USG staff) from
  • Federal Bureau of Investigation
  • Department of Defense
  • Central Intelligence Agency
  • Department of Homeland Security
  • Department of State
  • Others DOE, NRC, HHS, USDA, USCHP
  • Assignees to NCTC retain authorities of parent
    entities
  • In NCTC, key organizations involved in the fight
    against terrorism are collectively fulfilling
    shared responsibilities

75
Terrorism Information Access and Integration
  • Many U.S. Government networks are available in
    NCTC
  • Integrated architecture will enable a
    simultaneous, federated search capability
    against the terabytes of dataavailable to the
    U.S. government
  • Advanced analytic tools are facilitating the
    automated sourcing and tailoring multi-use
    products enhancing data exploitation and
    integration
  • Terrorism information covers an exceptionally
    broad array of data
  • Active information acquisition effort underway
  • Seeking awareness and integration of non-obvious
    terrorism information

76
Terrorism Analysis and CT Requirements
  • What do we know? What do we need to know?
  • Providing daily terrorism analysis for the
    President, senior policymakers, and the U.S.
    Government
  • NCTC produces integrated and coordinated
    analysis if there are analytic differences on
    the nature or seriousness of a particular
    threator issue, they are incorporated into the
    analysis
  • Producing special analysis and other in-depth,
    strategic, and alternative analyses
  • Counterterrorism Requirements - Identifying gaps
    in knowledge prioritizing transnational
    terrorism information needs

77
Toward a Counterterrorism System
  • Beyond implementing Center responsibilities, the
    greater goal is facilitating a counterterrorism
    system as part of a greater U.S. Government
    (USG) system-of-systems
  • All USG elements need not be centralized
    however, a distributed but integrated framework
    must be consciously agreed upon and orchestrated
  • Roles and responsibilities of USG CT elements
    must be as unambiguous and straightforward as
    possible intentional rather than haphazard
    redundancy

78
Conclusion
  • You must thoroughly know your enemy before you
    can successfully defeat him
  • You cannot address terrorism in isolation
  • Root causes (socioeconomic, religious extremism,
    etc.)
  • Facilitators (criminal networks, arms
    trafficking)
  • Finances are key
  • Ideology, other motivators
  • Information/public diplomacy is vital
  • All must be done in the context of moral, ethical
    legal principles
  • Bottom line CT goes way beyond strategy and
    tactics we must focus on environmental factors
    that facilitate terrorism

79
Suggestions for Teaching Counterterrorism
  • Use case studies to frame the key
    issues/challenges (particularly the moral, legal,
    tactical dimensions)
  • Assign National Security Strategy and other White
    House documents as required reading
  • Have students analyze National Strategy for
    Combating Terrorism from MIDLIFE perspective,
    noting that effective CT requires integration of
    all dimensions
  • Assessment (papers, presentations, quizzes)
    students should demonstrate - understanding of
    threat- the strategy behind the threat-
    dimensions of DIMEFIL model, and - the
    integration of DIMEFIL dimensions into holistic
    CT strategy

80
Suggestions for Teaching Counterterrorism
  • Integrative Exercise/Capstone Experience
  • Complex terrorism scenario
  • Assign different readings to different groups of
    studentsintegrative exercise should focus on
    the complex requirements for information and
    force collective strategic thinking and action
  • Questions for groups to answer can include
  • What will you recommend?
  • What are the moral, legal implications of your
    actions?
  • Who (what national assets) will you involve?
  • Overall goal is to integrate lessons learned
    throughout the course, and to learn while engaged
    in the exercise
  • Outcome should give you a sense of what theyve
    learned, whether or not they get it

81
Questions?
About PowerShow.com