Small Wars Lecture Series

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Small Wars Lecture Series

• 5 Sep - The Battle of Annual, Dr. William Dean
• 4 Oct - Foreign Internal Defense, Lt Col Greg
  Metzgar
• 18 Oct - The Battles of Fallujah, Mr. Bing West
• 14 Nov - Principles of Counterinsurgency, Lt Gen
  David Petraeus
• 10 Jan - Eating Soup with a Knife, Lt Col John
  Nagl
• 28 Feb - Globalizing Insurgency, Dr. Lewis
  Griffith

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A Forgotten Small War Spain, the Battle of
Annual, and the Rif War 1921-1927

• William Dean
• DEI
• Small Wars Lecture Series
• September 5, 2006

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Game Plan

• Origins of Spains Colonial Conquest of Morocco
• Spanish Colonial Army on the Eve of Annual
• Brothers Abdel Krim
• Disaster of Annual
• Consequences of Annual
• Coalition War against the Rif Republic
• Secret History of WMD
• Army of Africa and the Spanish Civil War

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A History of Colonial War

• 1895-98 Spanish colonial army fought insurgents
  in Cuba, Philippines
• Some of the veterans would fight in Morocco
• Very brutal campaigns with extensive use of
  concentration camps
• Spanish colonial army did poorly in symmetric war
  against U.S.
• Defeat of 1898 was a trauma for Spanish Army

Spanish army in Cuba
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Early Moroccan Campaigns

• 1908 - Spain invaded Morocco
• At this time French advancing in southern
  two-thirds of Colony
• Made possible by 1906 Great Power confer-ence in
  Algeciras
• Technically, Spanish working for Moroccan sultan
  Abdel Aziz who could not control area

Sultan Abdel Aziz
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Early Opponents and Cultural Context

• Most inhabitants in Spanish zone were Berbers
• Two early opponents were El Rogui and El Raisuni
• Spanish believed they were spreading western
  civilization
• Spanish mining interests became very important
• Spanish disrupted local economy
• Spanish regarded French as competitors

El Raisuni
7
The State of the Early Spanish Army in Morocco

• Army composed of Spanish conscripts with minimal
  training, poor equipment
• Top heavy with officers
• Poor maps
• Officers failed to learn from 1890s
  counter-insurgencies
• Inappropriate tactics against Rifians

Spanish conscripts
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The Birth of the Army of Africa

• At Barranco del Lobo (July 1909) a Spanish column
  was decimated with over a thousand casualties
• Led to campaign of revenge - birth of Army of
  Africa
• Soon units of Muslim regulars were created
• 1909-11 the Spanish expanded their holdings
• At the same time the French expanded their
  control in Morocco

Barranco del Lobo aftermath
9
Spanish Military Policy in Morocco 1911-1921

• Capital established in Tetuan
• Tried to get cooperation of local elites
• Halfhearted war with El Raisuni
• Many bribes were made to Moroccan elites
• Spanish Army in charge of daily security ops,
  contacts with tribes, collection of taxes, law
  and order
• Few civic works or improvement of local economy
  or infrastructure
• Spanish military govt told soldiers to respect
  local culture but this was rarely obeyed

Aerodrome at Tetuan, 1913
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Morocco during World War I

• During WWI German agents try to provide money and
  weapons to Moroccans in French and Spanish
  Morocco
• France barely held onto colony during war
• In 1917 Spanish govt changes system of pay and
  promotion - angered Army of Africa

French Foreign Legion sentry, Atlas Mountains
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Abdel Krim Family Cooperates with Spain

• Sidi Abdel Krim el Khattabi - influential judge
  from Ajdir
• Received pension from Spanish, collaborated with
  them along with two sons
• Pragmatic collaboration
• Elder son Mohammed worked as journalist and judge
  while younger brother studied in Madrid
• During war Mohammed imprisoned by Spanish, who
  poisoned father in 1920

Brothers Mhamed (L) and Mohammed (R) Abdel Krim
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Spanish Army on the Eve of Anual

• Budget for campaign inadequate
• Spanish Foreign Legion created in 1920
• Jose Millan Astray
• Many problems that had existed in 1909 still
  existed
• Many Spanish evaded call up
• Overall commander was General Berenguer -
  commander at Annual was General Silvestre

General Damaso Berenguer
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Major Problems of the Spanish Army

• Poor IPB - unaware that Krim brothers formed an
  army against them
• As late as May 1921 Krim promised loyalty to
  Spain
• Poor artillery and machine guns, shortage of ammo
• Spanish forces spread out over eastern front in a
  series of block houses
• Posts were far from water and hard to supply
• Silvestre overconfident due to previous experience

Rif region - northern Morocco
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The Spanish Offensive

• June 1921 Spanish front in eastern Morocco
  stretched 80 km and was 92 km from major city of
  Melilla
• Huge logistical problems
• Regardless, Silvestre launched ambitious
  offensive with insufficient troops, equipment,
  logistics
• No reserve near front line
• Spanish advance consisted of 3-pronged attack
  near Al Hoceima (heart of Abdel Krims territory)

Spanish gunners firing on Moroccans
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The Capture of Abbaran (June 1)

• Silvestre warned by intel that Beni Urriaguel
  tribe was massing for offensive
• Despite this Spanish set up exposed post on Mt
  Abbaran
• Beni Urriaguel cut barbed wire and rushed the
  position
• Native police turned on Spanish comrades and shot
  them
• Defeat important in psychological terms, many
  chiefs were under great pressure not to
  collaborate

Mt Abbaran
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Advance to Igueriben

• Despite setback at Abarran Silvestre continued
  advance, built 4 new blockhouses
• One on Mt Igueriben 6 km south of Annual
• Water supply for 300 men 4.5 km away

• On July 17 Abdel Krims forces attacked, besieged
  position for four days
• Garrison's water ran out, men drank urine or ink
• Mule carcasses exploded from heat, artillery
  shells ran out
• Silvestres forces could not relieve them
• Garrison given surrender order, but charged
  Riffians or committed suicide

Igueriben troops
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Nowhere to Hide at Annual

• After Igueriben, Silvestre was over-extended, had
  to retreat back to Melilla
• Line of retreat cut off, looked for airpower help
• Not enough aircraft
• Wanted to retreat to the coast but navy could not
  evacuate
• Berenguer could not organize rescue force fast
  enough and was fighting a campaign in the west
• Failure of Joint Ops

Spanish defenders
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The Disaster of Annual

• Silvestre could not decide whether to retreat or
  dig in at Annual
• Quarreled with officers no unity of command
• Meanwhile columns of Rifians were advancing on
  the camp

• Many Regulares turned on their Spanish officers
• Panic seized officers and enlisted
• Artillery pieces abandoned

Legion's makeshift defenses
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Collapse of Leadership

• Officers tore off their insignia or fled in cars
  filled with luggage
• Silvestre went to his tent and committed suicide
• Weapons, munitions, money abandoned
• Complete breakdown of C2

General don Manuel Fernández Silvestre
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Massacre at Izumar Pass

• Largest slaughter of Spanish troops took place at
  Izumar Pass
• Women, children took part in the slaughter
• Spanish bodies horribly mutilated
• Hundreds of prisoners taken in the retreat

Mutilated Spanish corpses
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Retreat to Melilla

• Spanish soldiers from intermediate positions
  joined retreat
• Cavalry regiments protected retreat
• Largest munitions dump in the Eastern blown up
• Rifian guerillas reached Gurugu mountains and
  began shelling Melilla
• 4,000 Spanish soldiers spread out between Annual
  and Melilla and 1,800 in garrison

Spanish column retreats
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Monte Arruit

• Spanish re-enforcements sent to Melilla after
  campaign against El Rasuni
• Legion forces led by Franco
• Rifians besiege 3,000 Spanish troops under Gen
  Navarro's command
• Abdel Krim shelled fort with artillery captured
  at Annual
• Aircraft tried to drop supplies (ice)
  unsuccessfully
• Agreeing to terms, garrison marched out of base
  and was massacred
• Last Spanish position outside of Melilla

Spanish corpses at Monte Arruit
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The Cost of Annual

• Disaster lasted from July 22nd till August 9th
• Over 10,000 Spanish troops were killed
• Abdel Krim captured rifles, radios, trucks,
  aircraft, artillery
• Worst Spanish colonial catastrophe

Annual memorial
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Why the Disaster of Annual Happened

• Poor discipline caused by poor pay and training
• Failure to link training, equipment and strategy
• Poor intelligence led to underestimating enemy
• Misuse of Regulares
• Poor military leadership
• Africanistas blamed civilian govt back home
• Poor communications and logistics

Spanish Regulares
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The Significance of Annual

• Army of Africa, and briefly civilian elites,
  focused on revenge
• Media now supported military
• Battle radicalized Africanistas
• Consequences for Spanish Civil War
• Middle class young men now volunteered for duty
  in Morocco
• Abdel Krim now emerged as leader of Rifians

Rif state banknote - never issued
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Annual Compared to other Western Military
Disasters

• Annual was one of the worst defeats for a Western
  power with profound consequences
• Britain - Isandhlwana (1879), Majuba Hill (1880),
  Maiwand (1880)
• U.S. - Custers Last Stand (1876)
• Italy - Adowa (1895)
• Major defeats caused by racial arrogance, poor
  IPB
• None had the long lasting consequences of Anual

Custer's Crow scouts
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The Forging of a Colonial Army

• Defeat of Annual led to creation of an army
  within an army
• Distinct elites within Army of Africa
• Pilots, Officers of the Legion and Regulares
• Army now committed to total war - less interested
  in spreading Western civilization

Alfonso XIII General Aviation Badge (1913-1931)
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The Army of Abdel Krim

• Abdel Krims army did not capture Melilla because
  grain harvest took priority
• Set up sophisticated system of command and
  control
• Spanish used SIGINT
• Division between people of the mountains and flat
  landers
• Two different languages Arabic and Shelja
• Obtained weapons from French

Moroccan soldiers
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Army of Abdel Krim (cont)

• At its peak - 90,000 soldiers
• Capable of symmetric and asymmetric warfare
• Wanted to create a Republic of the Rif
• Wanted to modernize Rif
• Used secular and religious motivations
• Worked with labor unions in Spain and France
• Received rhetorical support from Comintern

3rd International - Lenin speaking
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A Strategy of Peseta Diplomacy and Aerial
Bombardment

• Counter-offensive was launched (reconquista)
• 160,000 troops sent to Morocco and 700 million
  pesetas spentonly 35 km of territory reconquered
• Army morale sapped by investigation commissions
• Some tribes paid off to join Spanish and more
  aircraft sent to Morocco
• More emphasis on bombing

Farman Goliath
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Spanish Airpower

• First air squadron arrived in Morocco in 1913
• Initially used for ISR
• Defeat of Annual increased reliance of airpower
• Spanish developed systematic air campaign ops
  between 1921-25
• Learned tactics from RAF
• Over 150 aircraft
• De Havilland 4s, Bristol fighters, French Farman
  Goliaths, German Fokkers

de Havilland 4 - RCAF 1921
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Spanish Airpower (continued)

• Spanish planes dropped mustard gas, incendiaries,
  HE
• Psychological impact important
• Targets included souks, livestock, Abdel Krim's
  HQ
• Primitive bombing equipment
• Accuracy not important
• Planes had to swoop low
• Effective Rifian AAA led to loss of several
  aircraft
• Aircraft used in re-supply of encircled posts
• Aircraft used for CSAR

Bristol fighter crash
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Spanish Pilots

• Privileged elite
• Anarchists of Spanish army each flew as it
  suited him best
• Air training school with tennis courts and
  swimming pools
• Pilots more politically progressive than officers
  in Legion or Regulares

Capitan Antonio Arias
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A Secret History of Chemical Warfare

• After Annual mustard and phosgene fired by
  artillery, dropped by aircraft
• Force enhancer and adoption of total war WMD
  part of strategy
• Spanish bought WMD from Germans
• German technicians built, worked in gas factories
  in Spain and Morocco
• Created future bond between Africanistas and
  German Army (Condor legion)
• Operational problems using gas
• Spanish army did not have gas masks
• Abdel Krim tried to use WMD

Mustard gas production facility, 1921
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Other Nations and Chemical Warfare

• 1916 - France used gas in Tunisia
• Civilian targets, use of goums and aircraft
• France used gas in Rif war
• Italians used gas in Libyan pacification
  campaigns
• I do not understand this squeamishness about the
  use of gas, I am strongly in favor of using
  poison gas against uncivilized tribes - Winston
  Churchill
• British used gas against Kurds and in Iraq in
  1920s
• After Versailles gas not allowed against
  Europeans but could be employed in Africa, Asia

French goums
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Primo de Rivera and Morocco

• 1923 - Primo de Rivera seized control of govt
  stayed in control until 1931
• Government constitutional monarchy, but
  Alphonso XIII was a figurehead
• de Rivera initially against Moroccan campaign,
  but became supporter in 1924
• Ended trials of Africanistas

Primo de Rivera, 1923
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Strategic Background of a Coalition War

• Spanish consolidated position in fall of 1924 at
  Chauen
• Heavy loss of life and equipment
• By April 1925 Abdel Krim captured El Raisuni
  freed him for offensive against French
• Brother tried to buy weapons in London and met
  with Druze leaders

Chauen
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The Franco-Spanish War

• In April 1925 Abdel Krim attacks French Morocco
• Confident after fighting Spanish
• French blockhouses in his territory
• 43 out of 66 posts fall - Krim comes within 20 km
  of Fez
• French bring in 120,000 troops under Petain
• In July rivals become coalition partners
• Abdel Krims strategic mistake godsend to Spanish

Fez, 1926
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Al Hoceima Amphibious Landing September 1925

• Sep - coalition fleet and force attacks Abdel
  Krim near HQ
• Shelling from fleet and bombardment form the air
• First modern air/sea amphibious landing
• Abdel Krim prepared - good intel
• Rifians attack other end of protectorate, force
  Spanish to weaken forces there
• Rifians sink Spanish warship with artillery
• Numerous operational problems landing Spanish
  troops
• Rifians use IEDs on beach

Spanish landing at Cebadilla Beach near al
Hoceima, 10 Sep 1925
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Al Hoceima (continued)

• Rifian assaults against Spaniards on beach failed
• Spanish able to establish bridgehead
• In October 90,000 French and Spanish troops
  attacked Ajdir
• French changed their opinion of Spanish Army
• Army of Africa had dramatically improved since
  Annual
• Capable of combined ops and air/land ops

Spanish fort Peñon de Alhuceimas at al Hoceima
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The End of Abdel Krim

• Nov 1925 to Apr 1926 French and Spanish forces
  stayed in winter quarters
• Limited air ops
• Krim could not find new weapons, army melted away
• Caught between French and Spanish pincer attacks
• May 1926 - surrendered to French
• Minor fighting continued until 1927

Spanish FT-17 tanks
42
The Legacy of Abdel Krim

• Exiled to Mauritius
• Supported Arab nationalist causes
• Escaped to Cairo, encouraged Arab soldiers to
  desert French Army in Indochina 1946-54
• Supported FLN in Algeria
• Abdel Krim is one of the great non-Western
  captains

Moroccan soldiers
43
Domestic Impact of the Rif War in Spain and France

• Paris labor unions marched in solidarity with
  Rifians
• First time Left overtly sympathized with
  third-world insurgency
• Druze fight insurgency in Syria in first
  coordinated insurgencies
• CGT in Madrid leads anti-war marches
• Many soldiers oppose war
• Rif War leads to greater political polarization

Sultan El-Atrash starts revolution in 1928
against the French
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Long Term Impact on Spain

• Army of Africa becomes radicalized, embraces
  fascism or monarchy
• Franco becomes major figure
• When Spain becomes republic Left antagonizes
  Africanistas
• Africanistas launch campaign of reconquista in
  1936 to save Spain from Communism and anarchy
• Left becomes new Rifians
• Germans aid Franco with aircraft
• Spanish soldiers will fight on Russian front
  (Blue Division)

1938 Teruel battle, Franco with Lt Col Medrano
and Maj Barroso
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The Rif War and Military History

• Rif campaigns see change in colonial war from
  fighting for hearth and home to ideologically
  motivated insurgency
• Dominant pattern until 1991
• First insurgency where opponent has high tech
  equipment
• 1st time counterinsurgent powers have to develop
  air/land operations
• Armor used for 1st time
• SIGINT becomes factor
• Arms trafficking important

Small arms trafficking
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Relevance for Today

• There is a connection between strategy, training,
  and equipment
• Airpower is a blunt instrument in COIN
• Systematic violation of human rights by the
  military can have long term political
  consequences and radicalize a military
• Western militaries that underestimate non-western
  foes flirt with disaster
• Understanding an opponents culture is a
  necessary ingredient for victory