Bioweapons

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Bioweapons

• Diseases, Detection, and Doctrine

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I. Guillemin Points to Remember

• Three phases in the history of BW
• Difficulty of effective employment
• US/UK difficulties in efficient aerosol
  dispersion.
• USSR incidents in Kazakhstan and Sverdlovsk
• Japanese program backfires (perhaps kills more
  Japanese soldiers than Chinese!)
• Nonstate programs numerous but rarely effective
  Criticisms of Dark Winter scenarios
• No Golden Age of bioweapon use defenses kept
  pace with offense. Chemicals more commonly used.
  Why?

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I. Guillemin Points to Remember

• The Development of BW as WMD
• Note the US progress in WW II
• The Immunity Deal with Japanese scientists and
  Cold War Research
• Bureaucratic politics and the need to match
  atomic-scale devastation (competition for scarce
  resources)
• Arms races
• Looking Glass justifications and overestimation
  of opponents
• The surprising unilateral renunciation of Nixon
  What explains it?

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I. Guillemin Points to Remember

• Offense-defense overlap
• Vaccines as keys to offensive BW
• Project Whitecoat and the misuse of conscientious
  objectors
• The dilemma of verification the weakness of the
  BWC
• The Soviet program
• US resistance to verification
• Merits and risks of secrecy
• Responsible/Irresponsible nations distinction and
  international law

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II. Supplements to Guillemin

• Use in World War II
• The case of Stalingrad
• Suspicious outbreak of tularemia at Stalingrad
• Kenneth Alibek (Soviet weapons scientist) alleges
  USSR used bioweapons
• Other scientists believe outbreak was natural

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2. Japans Unit 731

• a. Guillemin lowballs the figures for Chinese
  deaths. But Langford (Introduction to Weapons of
  Mass Destruction, 2004, p.142) says 250,000
  Chinese killed by Japanese BW, mainly plague.
• b. A few thousand 250,000 is a big range. Can
  we narrow down the effectiveness of the Japanese
  program?

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i. Testimony of Hayashi Shigemi (October 7, 1954)

• "In 1943(we) spread cholera once in Shantung
  Province... The germ was first dumped into the
  Wei River, then the dike was destroyed to let the
  water flow into a larger area to rapidly spread
  the germ. I personally participated in this
  mission. I handed the germ to Kakizoe Shinobu, an
  Army medical doctor. He then in turn sent someone
  else to spread the germ. According to my
  knowledge, in our local area there were twenty
  five thousand two hundred ninety one Chinese
  people who died from this. How many died
  altogether I do not know, because it was
  top-secret information. Our mission was to murder
  Chinese people in mass, to test the effectiveness
  of the cholera germ, and to be ready to use it in
  fighting the Russians.
• Problem Unable to locate source of testimony
  (reprinted on highly nationalist web sites but
  no trials in 1954)

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ii. Sources of evidence

• Estimate of 3000 testimony of one official who
  witnessed about 600 deaths/year for 5 years at
  Ping Fan
• Now considered gross underestimate because
  excludes other camps
• Prisoners not issued unique IDs 101-1500 used as
  ID numbers, then recycled with next batch of
  prisoners. X-Rays destroyed by end of war.
• NONE of these estimates include the actual plague
  outbreaks in China. But can those be blamed on
  Japanese BW, or were they natural?
• Ishii had incentives to exaggerate effects of BW

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iii. Possible BW-caused epidemics, 1939-1942

• 1939-1940 Typhoid (near Harbin) from well
  poisonings
• 1940 Cholera (near Changchun)
• 1942 Paratyphoid A and Anthrax (near Nanking)
• 1939-1942 Plague epidemics near Ningbo (possibly
  from infected rats released in cities by Japanese
  troops)

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c. Bureaucratic Politics?

• Japanese forces were decentralized (Unit 731,
  Unit 100, Eu 1644, other units)
• Ishii-Kitano rivalry created incentives to
  overestimate BW effectiveness by both researchers
• Hypothesis Ishii and Kitano deliberately avoided
  use of controls (i.e. comparison to plague deaths
  in non-BW areas) in order to produce results
  (think US BMD tests or manufacturers tests of
  effectiveness for parallels)
• Hypothesis suggests deaths were gt10,000 (killed
  directly) but lt250,000 (because that ascribes
  all epidemics to BW, which is probably false)
• Proven BW-induced epidemics killed lt1000 in each
  case, sometimes lt 100
• Accordingly, real figures more likely to be in
  20,000-50,000 range
• Problem No evidence with which to test
  hypothesis. Much was destroyed and most of the
  rest is STILL classified by the US

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B. A broad definition of bioweapons

• 1. Pathogens Cause illness
• 2. Toxins
• Produced by biological organisms or synthesized
  in the labs
• Generally worse than chemical weapons
• Also prohibited by treaty -- biological and
  toxin weapons different from CW even if toxins
  are synthetic

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C. Types of Pathogens

• Antipersonnel To kill or disable people. Focus
  of most writers.
• Antianimal To kill livestock or pack animals.
  Less useful with mechanization, but still
  economic weapon.

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3. Antiplant A neglected hazard

• US stockpiled fungi (wheat stem rust, rye stem
  blast, rice blast) until 1972 for use against
  crops
• Most existing fungi have some corresponding
  fungicides ineffective unless transport /
  industry destroyed
• Monoculture increases vulnerability use of GEOs
  (genetically engineered organisms) increases risk
  because generally are cloned/engineered and
  patented.
• Potential devastation. Examples Irish potato
  famine, American chestnut blight

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4. Antimateriel

• Microbes can attack petroleum (developed for
  cleaning up oil spills)
• Other microbes produce rust and degrade rubber
  (less useful against modern alloys and plastics)

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III. Biological Weapons The Threat

• A. Characteristics Dependent on type of agent
  and dispersal mechanism
• 1. Types
• Major Categories Bacteria, Viruses, Toxins
• Persistent (Anthrax) vs. non-Persistent
  (Influenza)
• Lethal (Botulism) vs Incapacitating (Q Fever)
• Contagious (Smallpox) vs. non-Contagious
  (Anthrax)
• 2. How powerful are bioweapons? Answer depends
  on goals of program. Needed BW strategy and
  doctrine

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B. The Ideal Mass Killer Characteristics

• Persistence Spores or local animal reservoir
• Highly lethal ( infected that die), with little
  immunity
• No effective treatment (i.e. reducing mortality
  or enabling productivity)
• Factors encouraging epidemic formation
• Communicable between people (usually trades off
  against persistence ideal is BOTH animals and
  people as carriers)
• Relatively long incubation period
• Asymptomatic infection Infectious before
  symptoms emerge
• Vague onset symptoms
• Widespread dispersal
• Low ID50 Amount needed to infect
• 50 of people (median infective dose)
• Which pathogens come close?

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C. Do BW Superweapons Exist?

• No natural disease qualifies
• Genetic engineering can increase lethality and
  virulence but usually not persistence or
  communicability
• Tendency for reduced virulence over time
  disease that kills 100 usually burns out before
  infecting all possible hosts. Result evolution
  to weaker forms over time.
• Who would build one and why? Conclusion
  Assessing risk requires analysis of strategic
  choice

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D. The Strategic Choice of Antipersonnel BW Agents

• Two key choices whether pathogen will spread on
  its own (communicability) and whether disease
  kills or merely sickens (lethality)

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1. Bioweapons Design Choices
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2. Bioweapons Strategic Choices
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3. Bioweapons Selected Examples
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IV. In Depth Four BW Agents

• Selected as examples of general classes of BW
  agents

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A. Smallpox (Variola virus)

• History
• Most deaths of any infectious disease (500
  million deaths in 20th Century alone)
• Natural disease eradicated
• Last U.S. case 1949 (imported)
• Last international case 1978
• Declared eradicated in 1979
• Officially, only two stocks remaining (US and
  Russia)

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c. Use of smallpox in war

• i. French and Indian Wars (1754-1767)
• British gave Native Americans infected blankets
• Outbreaks ensued, some tribes lost 50
• ii. Allegations of use in U.S. Civil War
• iii. Alleged use by Japanese in China in WWII

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d. Why worry about an eradicated disease?

• Former Soviet Union scientists have confirmed
  that smallpox was successfully weaponized for use
  in bombs and missiles
• Active research was undertaken to engineer more
  virulent strains
• Possibility of former Soviet Union virus stock in
  unauthorized hands

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2. Bioweapon Potential

• a. Features making smallpox a likely agent
• Can be produced in large quantities
• Stable for storage and transportation
• Known to produce stable aerosol
• High mortality
• Highly infectious
• Person-to-person spread
• Most of the world has little or no immunity

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b. Likely effects of attack

• Nonimmune population
• lt20 of U.S. with substantial immunity
• Potential for more potent attack
• Engineered resistance to vaccine

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c. Paths to attack

• Airborne route known effective mode
• Initially via aerosol in BT attack
• Then person-to-person
• Hospital outbreaks from coughing patients
• Highly infectious
• lt10 virions sufficient to cause infection
• Aerosol exposure lt15 minutes sufficient

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d. Epidemiology of smallpox

• Person-to-person transmission
• Secondary Attack Rate (SAR)
• 25-40 in unvaccinated contacts
• Relatively slow spread in populations (compared
  to measles, etc.)
• Higher during cool, dry conditions
• Historically 3-4 contacts infected
• May be 10-20 in unvaccinated population
• Usually requires face-to-face contact
• Very high potential for iatrogenic spread
  ?

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3. Symptoms and Outcomes

• a. Incubation Four-day period before rash
  develops

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b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms
(not infection)

• Day 1 Initial rash appears minor

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b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms
(not infection)

• Day 2 Papules appear

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b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms
(not infection)

• Day 3 Rash is distinct papules are raised evenly

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b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms
(not infection)

• Day 4 Vesicles have become firm and filled with
  liquid (highly infectious)

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b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms
(not infection)

• Day 5 Vesicles have become pustules. Fever
  rises.

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b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms
(not infection)

• Day 7 Unmistakeable smallpox rash (note that the
  chest / torso usually have less pox than face /
  extremities unlike chicken pox)

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b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms
(not infection)

• Day 8-9 Pustules reach maximum size.

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b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms
(not infection)

• Day 10-19 Pox dry up and scab over. Scabs
  contain live smallpox virus. Victim is still
  highly infectious.

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b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms
(not infection)

• Day 20 Victim ceases to be infectious, but is
  likely to be scarred for life

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b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms
(not infection)

• Again, note that torso has fewer pox than face /
  extremities

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c. Outcomes of smallpox

• Historical data from limited-immunity populations
• ?

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d. Predicting fatalities Relevant Factors

• S-shaped curve is known but how many are in
  initial population exposed (first generation of
  cases) determines upper bound.
• Any delay in notification logarithmically
  increases total cases (and deaths)
• About 15 of those who get smallpox die in
  partially-immune populations
• Danger is greater outside developed countries
  (little residual immunity)

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B. Influenza A potential WMD?

• 1. History Disease distinguished recently

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a. 1918-1919 The worst recent pandemic
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From Americas Forgotten Pandemic by Alfred Crosby

• The social and medical importance of the
  1918-1919 influenza pandemic cannot be
  overemphasized. It is generally believed that
  about half of the 2 billion people living on
  earth in 1918 became infected. At least 20
  million people died. In the Unites states, 20
  million flu cases were counted and about half a
  million people died. It is impossible to imagine
  the social misery and dislocation implicit in
  these dry statistics.

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i. US deaths from influenza greater than US
killed in any war
Thousands
Civil WWI 1918-19 WWII
Korean Vietnam War
Influenza War War

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ii. Military Effects

• Slowed delivery of US troops on the Western
  front.
• 43,000 deaths in US armed forces.
• Slow down and eventual failure of the last German
  offensive (spring and summer 1918) attributed to
  influenza.

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iii. An unusual flu it killed military-age
people
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iv. Temporal and Spatial Extent
Armstrong, et al. JAMA 199928161-66.
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b. The 1957 Asian Flu

• i. Key facts

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ii. Asian Flu Timeline

• February 1957
• Outbreak in Guizhou Province, China
• April-May 1957
• Worldwide alert
• Vaccine production begins
• October 1957
• Peak epidemic, follows school openings
• December 1957
• 34 million vaccine doses delivered
• Much vaccine unused
• January-February 1958
• Second wave (mostly elderly)

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iii. Temporal and Spatial Diffusion
Spread of H2N2 Influenza in 1957Asian Flu
69,800 US deaths
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2. Avian Flu A potential BW Agent?

• a. Recent outbreaks
• 1997 H5N1 in Hong Kong
• 18 hospitalizations and 6 deaths
• 1999 H9N2 in Hong Kong
• 2 hospitalizations
• 2003 H5N1 in China
• 2 hospitalizations, 1 death
• H7N7 in the Netherlands
• 80 cases, 1 death

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Avian Influenza Poultry Outbreaks, Asia, 2003-04
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b. Ability to Vaccinate?

• Annual vaccine is trivalent (3 strains), pandemic
  vaccine will be monovalent.
• Production using current technologies would
  likely take 4-5 months ? may not be available
  before 1st pandemic wave
• There will be vaccine shortages initially
• 2 doses may be necessary to ensure immunity

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c. Control antiviral medications

• Uses
• Prophylaxis
• Treatment
• Issues
• Limited supply
• Need for prioritization (among risk groups and
  prophylaxis versus treatment)
• Unlikely to markedly affect course of pandemic

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3. Likely impact (conservative estimates)

• Attack rate (number of people infected) ranging
  from 15 to 35
• Cases gt 10 million
• Deaths 89,000 - 207,000
• Hospitalizations 314,000 - 733,000
• Note May exceed local hospital capacity

Source Meltzer et al. EID 19995659-71
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Estimated hospitalizations due to influenza
pandemic
95th percentile
Mean
5th percentile
Source Meltzer et al. EID 19995659-71
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Estimated deaths due to influenza pandemic
95th percentile
Mean
5th percentile
Source Meltzer et al. EID 19995659-71
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C. Q Fever, aka Query Fever

• 1. Characteristics Worldwide endemic disease in
  animals
• Caused by Coxiella burnetii
• Shed in birthing fluids, excreta, milk
• Humans infected via inhalation, ingestion

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Cases of Q fever in Humans Reported by State
Health Departments, 1978-2004
Years in which Q fever was a Nationally
Reportable Disease
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2. Assets of Q Fever for BW

• Shed in the environment in a small cell form
• that is very hardy (spore-like)
• Resistant to pH changes, desiccation, UV light
• Resistant to some common disinfectants
• Remains viable in soil, dust for months to years
• - isolated from barns, soil culture, PCR

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Growing Q Fever The 8-Ball Ft. Detrick, MD
ca. 1968
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3. Acute Q fever

• 1-3 week incubation
• Asymptomatic infections occur
• Nonspecific flu-like illness fever, severe
  headache, fatigue, nausea, vomiting, etc.
• Pulmonary Syndrome (30)
• Hepatitis (30-60)
• Chronic fatigue-like illness
• Following acute infection in Australian
  slaughterhouse workers (10)
• Antibiotics may shorten course
• Low mortality (lt 1 )

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D. Anthrax

• History
• Disease is ancient
• Disease most common in agricultural areas (cattle
  and sheep)
• Industrial Revolution Woolworkers disease
• Animal vaccine developed Cases dropped in
  developed world

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• AnthraxUnited States, 1951-2002

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• 20,000-100,000 cases estimated globally/year
• http//www.vetmed.lsu.edu/whocc/mp_world.htm

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e. Anthrax Attacks

• South Africa and Rhodesia 1978-1980 Anthrax
  probably used by apartheid forces
• Thousands of cattle died
• 10,738 human cases (largest known outbreak of
  human anthrax in history)
• 182 known deaths
• Black-inhabited Tribal Lands only
• White populations untouched
• South Africans admit involvement to Truth and
  Reconciliation Commission in 1998

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ii. Accidental release Sverdlovsk, April-May 1979
Cause now known to be failure to replace air
filter 94 infections, 64 deaths
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iii. 1993 Aum Shinrikyo attack

• Japanese religious cult
• Supreme truth
• No human injuries. Why?

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Answer They used the wrong strain

• Disease-causing strain carries 2 plasmids each
  containing a different toxin gene.
• Both genes must be expressed to cause disease.

Toxin gene 2
Bacillus anthracis
Toxin gene 1
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Answer They used the wrong strain

• Strain produced and disseminated by terrorists in
  Tokyo carried only one of the plasmids, so it was
  not pathogenic. Strain was actually used for
  vaccine research.
• Bioterrorists are not knowledgeable in the
  molecular biology of disease.

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iv. The Anthrax Letters, 2001

• 22 cases
• 11 cutaneous
• 11 inhalation
• 5 deaths (all inhalation)
• Index case in Florida
• 2 postal workers in Maryland
• Hospital supply worker in NYC
• Elderly farm woman in Connecticut

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Anthrax Cases, 2001

• 7 month old boy
• Visited ABC Newsroom
• Cutaneous lesion
• Initial diagnosis
• spider bite
• Punch biopsies confirmed anthrax

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2. Human Transmission

• Cutaneous
• Contact with infected tissues, wool, hide, soil
• Biting flies
• Inhalational
• Tanning hides, processing wool or bone
• Gastrointestinal
• Undercooked meat

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a. Cutaneous Anthrax

• 95 of all cases globally
• Incubation 3-5 days (up to 12 days)
• Spores enter skin through open wound or abrasion
  ?Large skin ulcer created
• Fever and malaise ? 5 - 20 mortality
• Untreated septicemia and death. Edema
  (swelling due to lymphatic fluid) can lead to
  death from asphyxiation if lesion is near neck

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Day 2
Day 4
Day 6
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b. Gastrointestinal Anthrax

• Severe gastroenteritis
• Incubation 2-5 days after consumption of
  undercooked, contaminated meat
• Case fatality rate 25-75
• GI anthrax never documented in U.S.

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c. Inhalation Anthrax

• Incubation 1-7 days
• Initial phase
• Nonspecific - Mild fever, malaise
• Second phase
• Severe respiratory distress
• Cyanosis, death in 24-36 hours
• Case fatality 75-90 (untreated)

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3. Vaccination and Treatment

• Vaccine available but effectiveness unproven in
  humans (only monkeys)
• 5-35 experience systemic side effects
• No long-term side effects proven
• Six shots plus annual booster required

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b. Treatment

• i. Penicillin
• Has been the drug of choice
• Some strains resistant to penicillin
• ii. Ciprofloxacin
• Chosen as treatment of choice in 2001
• No strains known to be resistant

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4. Anthrax BW Possible Effects

• a. Worst-case scenario (Office of Technology
  Assessment)
• 50 kg of spores
• Urban area of 5 million
• 250,000 cases of anthrax
• 100,000 deaths
• 100 kg of spores
• Upwind of Wash D.C.
• 130,000 to 3 million deaths

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b. Why have previous releases failed to generate
mass casualties?

• Imperfect dispersal low volume (Sverdlovsk) or
  limited volume of aerosol (2001 letters)
• Availability of antibiotics Allows prophylaxis
  unless attack is both massive and undiscovered
  before symptoms

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V. Biodefense Prevention

• Preventing state use of BW
• Mass vaccination is impractical (unless one has
  time i.e. intends to use them first)
• Deterrence Threaten retaliation with something
  that exceeds benefits of BW use (thus increased
  BW effectiveness increases threat needed to
  deter)
• Nonproliferation Prevent the spread of
  capability (more on this later)

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B. Preventing Bioterrorism

• Access control. US data and regulations
• gt300 registered institutions with bioweapons
  agents
• gt16,000 registered individuals with bioweapons
  agents
• Only security requirement is a lock on the door
• No requirement to exclude non-screened personnel
  for labs
• No requirement for secure transport

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2. Anticipation Ideal Characteristics for
Potential Biological Terrorism Agent

• Inexpensive, easy to produce
• Can be aerosolized (1-10 µm)
• Survives sunlight, drying, heat
• Cause lethal or disabling disease
• No effective treatment or prophylaxis
• Person-to-person transmission (to make the most
  of small amounts of agent)

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Ideal Agents for Terrorists

• Smallpox is ideal but well-guarded
• Anthrax has only limited treatment (must treat
  before symptoms to save inhalational cases) and
  isnt communicable but is otherwise the best
• Third best is probably plague, especially if many
  people are rapidly infected

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3. Estimated Casualties From an Undetected
Bioterrorist Release

• WHO data (Health Aspects of Chemical and
  Biological Weapons, 1970)
• Assumes urban area of 500,000 people
• Assumes 110 pounds (50 kg) of dried agent
  released in a one mile (2 km) line upwind of the
  city
• Assumes attack is initially undetected
• Assumes developed country

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3. Estimated Casualties From an Undetected
Bioterrorist Release
Includes deaths
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4. Challenges of Detection
a. Initial Symptoms too vague to know attack has
occurred
Agent
Clinical Effect
Initial Symptoms

Mediastinitis Pneumonia Pleuritis,
hepatitis Pneumonia Pustules
Anthrax Plague Q fever Tularemia Smallpox
Headache Fever Malaise Cough
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b. Epidemiologic Clues

• Tight cluster of cases
• High infection rate
• Unusual or localized geography (rural disease in
  urban area)
• Unusual time of year (i.e. flu-like symptoms in
  midsummer)
• Dead animals (for some diseases)

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4. Which groups are capable?

• a. Requirements
• Virulent strain of agent
• Equipment and expertise to culture agent safely
• Equipment and expertise to stockpile agent until
  use
• Equipment and expertise to generate right size
  aerosol OR access to processed food / water
  supplies

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b. Intent Which groups try?
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C. Defense against accidental release

• Encourage other countries to implement
  safeguards, esp. on government programs
• US High security for BW research but not private
  research.
• Universities Essentially no safety regulations
  (voluntary only, apply to NIH grants for
  recombinant-DNA research only)

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VI. Proliferation of BW

• A. What are the incentives to build BW?

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1. Advantages of Bioweapons

• Small amount needed
• Pathogens grow inside host
• Extremely toxic
• Botox Dot of an i kills 10
• Easy/inexpensive to grow
• Cheese making equipment (viruses more difficult
  than bacteria / toxins)
• Large amount produced in short period of time
• Days to weeks
• Potential for panic

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2. Disadvantages of Bioweapons

• Protection of Workers and Public
• Release into environment (Sverdlovsk was state of
  the art!)
• Quality control
• Particles must be aerosolized (1 micron or so)
• Delivery problems
• Rain, wind, UV light
• Bombs, bomblets, and shells produce poor,
  localized aerosols
• Heat and shock waves (explosions) kill most
  organisms
• Poor storage survival
• Difficult to control release boomerang effects

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B. Patterns of Proliferation
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1. CBW Proliferation (Official)
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2. Suspected BW Proliferation
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3. Causes of BW Proliferation

• Portfolio Strategy Every BW aspirant has also
  pursued Chemical and/or Nuclear Weapons. What
  does this suggest?
• Cost-Effectiveness BW cheaper than other WMD
• Ease of acquisition offensive BW relies on
  dual-use technology
• Difficult to detect Weakness of BWC,
  permissibility of defensive research

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4. Predicting BW Proliferation

• Best predictors are security variables
• Enduring Rivalry Increases Risk
• Dispute Involvement Increases Risk
• Defense Pact Decreases Risk
• Large states more likely to develop BW
• Other predictors include
• Democracy Decreases Risk
• IO Membership Slightly Increases Risk
• Wealth Increases Risk

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C. Proliferation The Risks

• Risk of state use Relationship depends on
  balance between deterrence and escalation
• Deterrence Use of threats to prevent BW
• Escalation Use of BW to achieve dominance in
  war
• Little evidence to test comparisons State BW
  use has always been rare. Only examples are
  cases where no retaliation was possible.

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d. BW Doctrines as Evidence (Planning the
Unthinkable)

• i. Realism States use BW to alter the balance of
  power with rivals. Implies BW good for the weak
  side in asymmetric dyads, bad for the strong side
  in asymmetric dyads, and good for balanced dyads.
  Problem balance of capabilities appears to
  increase war risk!

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ii. Organization theory

• Military organizations pursue autonomy and
  therefore develop offensive strategies
• Undermines ability of BW to deter (realism)
  because militaries are partially independent of
  political calculations that drive civilians to
  avoid war

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iii. Strategic culture theory

• Civilians also pursue goals other than national
  security i.e. re-election
• Militaries differ in the degree to which they
  seek autonomy
• No clear conclusions about whether more BW is
  dangerous
• Which theory is correct? Read the case studies

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2. Risk of nonstate use

• Proliferation should increase risk of nonstate
  use, ceteris paribus. Why?
• However, hypothesis is difficult to test because
  all is not equal Role of nonstate actors in
  politics changes over time (increase in foreign
  military intervention by nonstate actors)

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3. Risk of accidental use

• Risk is not zero remember Sverdlovsk
• Risk increases with each new BW state
• Safety measures can slow the increase but not
  avert it.

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4. The danger of proliferation

• The nonstate dimension We dont need to assume
  rogue states are any different in order to
  conclude that more BW is dangerous. Majority of
  BW uses have been nonstate or accidental
  releases!
• State-level deterrence fails does not deter
  nonstate actors and has only limited effect on
  accidental releases (provides incentive for
  strong safety systems)
• Conclusion Deterrence alone is insufficient.
  Efforts to reduce proliferation or roll back BW
  programs necessary to decrease BW risk

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D. Anti-Proliferation Strategies

• Nonproliferation Arms Control
• (See Assignment 2 and in-class exercises for
  details on the BWC and its effect on
  proliferation)

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a. The 5th Review Conference of the BWC

• US scuttles the conference (Guillemin) BUT
• Russia also tried to undermine BWC through
  definition of dozens of terms (would create legal
  loopholes to enable everything but BW programs)
• NAM (led by China and including Pakistan and
  India) sought to strengthen Article X (sharing
  technical expertise) at the expense of Article
  III (export controls) and even inspections

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b. The 6th Review Conference

• Ended December 8, 2006
• Only significant accomplishment was agreement on
  annual meetings before the next Review Conference
  in 2011
• (The 2011 meeting is our simulation)

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2. Counterproliferation Compellence as a strategy

• Rejects deterrence alone must have ability to
  coerce states or groups with BW into renouncing
  it, not just to refrain from using it
• Distinct from arms control includes use of
  force associated with reluctance to make
  concessions (bargain)

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3. Paradoxes of Anti-Proliferation

• a. Counterproliferation can undermine
  nonproliferation Threat of pre-emptive war may
  encourage WMD development. New
  counterproliferation strategies threaten first
  use of nuclear weapons (new bunker busters). See
  the Sagan article for why this might be a bad
  idea.

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b. The deterrence dilemma

• Deterrence cannot roll back BW, because BW
  programs built in full knowledge of the deterrent
  threat (i.e. already taken into consideration)
• Increased ability to deter increases threat
  (primary driver of proliferation)

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c. The nonproliferation paradoxes

• Rewarding bad behavior Incentives to renounce
  BW may encourage others to build BW as bargaining
  chips
• Substitution effect Verification on one
  dimension of WMD may increase appeal of other
  dimensions