Title: csness.ppt
1csness.ppt
2Notes towards aComputational Theoryof
Consciousness
- William J. Rapaport
- Department of Computer Science Engineering,
- Department of Philosophy, Department of
Linguistics, - and Center for Cognitive Science
- rapaport_at_cse.buffalo.edu
- http//www.cse.buffalo.edu/rapaport
32 (or 3) Questions for a Computational Theory of
Consciousness
- Could a computational cognitive agentbe
conscious? - I think so
- But it depends on whats meant by conscious
- 1.5. If so, how would we build one?
- Answer depends on psychological theories of
consciousness - How would we know?
- We wouldnt
- any more (or less) than we know about humans!
4And What about Qualia?
- What are qualia? What are numbers? ?
What is the base case of a recursion? - Problem of role of qualia in theories of
consciousness Problem of mathematical
structuralism
5What Is Consciousness?
- What is consciousness? From the OED
- L. con- together sci- knowingknowing
something with others,knowing in oneself, privy
to - 1601 (Ben Jonson) Attributed to inanimate
things as privy to, sharing in, or witnesses
of human actions or secrets - 1620 having the witness of ones own judgment or
feelings, knowing within oneself - 1651 (Hobbes) knowing, or sharing the knowledge
of anything, together with another - Not overly helpful
6- Perhaps slightly more helpful?
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8Kinds of Consciousness
- Chalmers
- Psychological consciousness
- Phenomenological consciousness
- Better
- Psychological problems of consciousness
- Phenomenological problems of consciousness
9Psychological Consciousness
- Chalmers
- awakeness, introspection, reportability,
self-consciousness, attention, voluntary
control, knowledge, awareness - The easy problems
- I.e., those explainable in principle
infunctional / computational or neural terms,
viz.
10Psychological Consciousness
- the ability to discriminate, categorize, and
react to environmental stimuli - the integration of information by a cognitive
system - the reportability of mental states
- the ability of a system to access its own
internal states - the focus of attention
- the deliberate control of behavior
- the difference between wakefulness and sleep.
etc. (Chalmers 1995, Facing Up to the
Problem of Consciousness)
- I.e., awareness
- Blocks access consciousness
11Psychological Consciousness
- Models
- Cartesian theater
- a big no-no for humans
- global workspace
- Baars, Franklin, Dehaene, et al.
- Andersons ACT-R buffers
- multiple drafts, fame in the brain
- Dennett
12On Multiple Drafts
- On the critical question of which version of the
novel Frankenstein is truest or best, however,
Charles E. Robinson editor of a scholarly
edition of the Frankenstein Notebooks demurs
These texts of Frankenstein are what we call
fluid texts, he says. There is no single
edition we can judge to be the best. - Howard, Jennifer (2008), The Birth of
Frankenstein, Chronicle of Higher Education
55(11) (7 November) B12-B15 quote on p. B15. - For fluid texts, read multiple drafts.
13Psychological Consciousness
- 1.5. Reflexive consciousness (Block)
- special case of access consciousness
- HOT (Rosenthal)
- self-representational experiences (Kriegel)
- Any of these models
- global workspace
- HOT
- multiple drafts,
- could be implemented
- neurally
- computationally
14Phenomenological Consciousness
- experience,what its like,qualia
- ??
- yes (Searle, Chalmers, Nagel, McGinn, Block,
G.Strawson) - no (Dennett)
15Phenomenological Consciousness
- I can explain to you what love is until I turn
blue in the face. I can take two weeks to
explain everything to you. But there is no
way I can make you feel it until you feel it.
(p. 40) - Schmidle, Nicholas (2008), Faith Ecstasy,
Smithsonian 39(9) (December) 36-47. - Cf. Jacksons Mary the color-blind color
scientist - Dennett
- Qualia cant be described (in language)
- ? Dont have to/cant explain them
16Phenomenological Consciousness
- Dennett (contd)
- ?? qualia
- ? only reports of them
- Dont have to explain why you experience green or
pain - Because you dont!
- Only have to explain why you say that you do!
- cf. How would your experience be different
if Earth revolved around Sun? (Wittgenstein) - What we think are qualia are really just states
of psychological consciousness
17Phenomenological Consciousness
- Could phenomenological consciousness (qualia)
be nothing but neuron firings? - yes
- Searle Its just biology (like digestion)
- WJR
- Its biology for humans
- but it could be implemented otherwise for
computers - (more later)
- no
- Chalmers ? non-physical, phenomenological
properties - McGinn Its an unsolvable mystery (for us)
- Nagel It can only be experienced
- yes?
- G.Strawson
- Because everything is experiential, including
neuron firings.
18NagelWhat Is It Like to Be a Bat?
19What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
- Cf. The Boy Who Sees through Sound
- Discovery Health documentary
- People (14 July 2006)
- http//www.people.com/people/article/0,26334,12125
68,00.html
20Phenomenological Consciousness
- Could phenomenological consciousness (qualia)
be nothing but neuron firings? (contd) - no (contd)
- Chalmers
- phenomenological consciousness is independent of
physics biology - mental properties cant be logically derived
from physical properties - because of the Argument from Zombies
- but ? 1-1 correspondence
- i.e., ? psycho-physical laws
21Is Consciousness Univocal?
- Maybe there are lots of different kinds of,or
aspects to, consciousness - Maybe more than one theory is correct
- Block, in Cognition 79 (2001) 217
22Some Philosophical Positions
- Consciousness does not exist
- Dennett
- There are physiological processes nothing else
- ________ ?
23Some Philosophical Positions
- Consciousness exists
- Nagel Consciousness exists can
only be experienced - _________ ?
- McGinn Consciousness exists
cannot be understood - ?????????? ?
- (a) (b) seem very close
24Some Philosophical Positions
- Searle Consciousness exists its
biologically caused - ?
- Chalmers Consciousness exists
its independent of physics/biology,
but theres a 1-1 correspondence
(there are psychophysical laws) - ??_________ ?
25The Hard Problem (Chalmers)
- Recall the distinction between
- Psychological concept of mind/consciousness
- as causal/explanatory basis of behavior
- functional characterization
- what mind does
- Phenomenal concept of mind/consciousness
- experience, qualia, what its like
- how mind feels
26The Hard Problem
- The hard problem
- the problem of experience
- How are organisms subjects of experience?
- Why do we experience sensations as we do?
- Why how does physical processing give rise to
our rich inner life?(all quotes/paraphrases
from Chalmers 1995)
27A Brief Look Ahead
- Suggestion
- Easy problem
- i.e., the functional characterization of
psychological consciousness - is like a recurrence relation or recursive
clause of a recursive definition or
mathematical structuralism - Hard problem
- i.e., qualia, or phenomenal consciousness
- is like the initial conditions or base
case or objects that play roles in
mathematical theories
28Chalmerss Zombie Argument(simplified version)
- A zombie is_def a creature that isphysically
behaviorally indistinguishable from us,but that
has no conscious experiences. - http//consc.net/zombies.html
- http//plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
- Physicalism is_def the theory that mental states
processes (logically) supervene on physical SP - I.e., any physical duplicate of me would
also be a psychological duplicate - Physicalism ? zombies are not conceivable
- But zombies are conceivable
- ? Physicalism is false
- ? Psychological phenomena (e.g., qualia) are
something over and above physical phenomena
29Ways to React to the Zombie Argument
- Thats right! (Chalmers)
- So wed better devise a separate theory of
psychological consciousness - take mental terms as primitive, not
characterizable in physical terms - cf. Newton gravity
- some psychophysical laws to tie them in
with the physical world - mostly 1-1 correspondences
30Ways to React to the Zombie Argument
- There cant be any zombies
- Any sufficiently complex cognitive system
(including any duplicates of me) will have just
as much subjective mentality as I do - Dennett I.e., none
- Or Commander Data will really be just as
phenomenally conscious as I am (and I really am
so!) ()
31Ways to React to the Zombie Argument
- () How to give a zombie consciousness?
- A calculator has the ability to add
- but it does so unconsciously, zombie-like
- Give Cassie a theory of math cognition
- then shed be aware of adding
- shed be conscious of it in both the
psychological sense and in the phenomenal sense - shed have the experience of adding
- but what gives her that experience?
- perhaps Rosenthal-like HOT?
32Ways to React to the Zombie Argument
- There can be zombies
- There are plenty of unconscious cognitive
processes - People who solved puzzles with insight activated
a specific subset of cortical areas. Although
the answer seemed to appear out of nowhere, the
mind was carefully preparing itself for the
breakthrough. The scientists refer to this as
the "preparatory phrase," since the brain is
devoting its considerable computational power to
the problem. The various sensory areas, like the
visual cortex, go silent as the brain suppresses
possible distractions. "The cortex does this for
the same reason we close our eyes when we're
trying to think," Jung-Beeman said. "Focus is
all about blocking stuff out " (New Yorker, 28
July 2008, p. 43) - All of this is unconscious so, zombies are
possible - but they could become conscious if another part
of the brain were aware of it, or watching it,
HOT-like - I.e., absent qualia
- So why couldnt all of them be unconscious?
33There Can Be Zombies
- This is the Really Hard Problem
- But then why do we experience some of them?
- Other really hard problems in the vicinity
- Why do we experience things as we do and not
another way? - cf. inverted qualia
- Why do we experience red as we do (however we do)
and not as the sound of a bell? - cf. synaesthesia
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35Qualia
- A quale (plural qualia) is
- a raw feel,
- a phenomenal experience,
- what its like
- Its what you experience when you
- sense a color,
- or hear a sound,
- or taste, or smell, or touch.
- Its what Chalmers says needs to be explained
36Qualia The Classic Problem
- Psychological consciousness can be characterized
functionally (i.e., computationally) - I.e., in terms of causal and logical relations
- between inputs and internal concepts,
- among internal concepts,
- between internal concepts and outputs
- Qualia cannot be characterized functionally
- Because of the possibilities of
- absent qualia
- inverted qualia
- ? Qualia are not psychological
- or else Psychological consciousness cant be
characterized functionally
37Do Qualia Exist?Wittgensteins Beetle in the Box
- "Suppose everyone had a box with something in it
we call it a beetle. No one can look into
anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows
what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.
Here it would be quite possible for everyone to
have something different in his box. One might
even imagine such a thing constantly changing.
But suppose the word beetle had a use in these
people's language? If so it would not be used
as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has
no place in the language game at all not even as
a something for the box might even be empty. No,
one can divide through by the thing in the box
it cancels out, whatever it is." - (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations I, 293)
38Qualia
- Are qualia beetles in boxes?
- Dennett yes!
- Chalmers
- maybe (?)
- but I do have a beetle in my box
- even if zombies dont have beetles in theirs!
39Are Qualia Beetles in Boxes?
- WJR
- we do have qualia
- even if we may be misled by them or misremember
them - we are phenomenally conscious
- even if sometimes we may not remember it
- e.g., blanking out when driving or daydreaming
40The Hard Problemfor me!
- No matter how detailed our theories of
psychological consciousness are,I do experience
qualia - Castañeda
- Philosophy must be done in the first person, for
the first person - What is that which I experience?What is
experience itself? - If I try to characterize it in terms of other
aspects of my mental economy,it loses its raw
feel nature - But if it is primitive, how can I understand
it? - Want a theory of qualia that is consistent with
computational theory of consciousness
412 Main Questions about Qualia
- Why ( how) do we experience anything rather than
nothing? - the zombie question
- the really hard problem
- Why are our qualia as they are not like
something else? - answer may depend on answer to 1
42Why Do We Experience Anything Rather than Nothing?
- Some plants are sensitive to light,some to what
we would call odors - I.e., airborne chemicals
- Can they see or smell?
- Do we see or smell?
- Or are we, too, merely light-
chemical-sensitive? - Does anything further happen in the brain?
- I.e., qualia?
- Or are qualia just our sensitivity to the light
chemicals? - Or is there any sensitivity (or sensation) at all?
43Why Do We Experience Anything Rather than Nothing?
- Cf. visual quale of seeing a red (traffic) light
with olfactory quale of an odor - Cf. these with the lack of an olfactory quale
- We are qualitatively insensitive to many odors
- We are certainly less sensitive than a dog
- Yet ?ly these odors do influence our behavior
- blind smell cf. blindsight
- If so, then we are at least partial zombies
- How could that be?
- Why is there such a difference?
- Does the (visual or olfactory) quale do anything?
44Why Do We Experience Anything Rather than Nothing?
- Cf. my visual quale of a red light with my
absence of a visual quale for infrared
light - Suppose infrared light influenced my behavior but
I was not subjectively aware of the IR light - I could be objectively aware of it
- via an objective sensing device
- via monitoring my brain
- Would that feel like anything?
- Maybe like an intuition
- Thats a quale, but not necessarily a quale of
the IR light - 2nd-order quale? HOT?
- But probably not like a visual experience of red
light - It wouldnt be a deeper red
45Why Do We Experience Anything Rather than Nothing?
- Whats the difference in my behavior between
- my reaction to the quale of red light
- my reaction to IR light w/o quale?
- Case 1
- I can voluntarily react (or not react) to the
quale of red light - doesnt run afoul of problem of free will
- whatever free will turns out to be will work here
- Case 2
- I have no choice
- especially if there is not even an intuition
46Why Do We Experience Anything Rather than Nothing?
- So we can be partial zombies
- but not complete zombies
- because
- a complete zombie would have no free will
- but we do
- If the complete zombie had free will,it would
then also have to have some HOT/access/awareness
of the impingement of the external object(s) - chemicals for odor, photons for vision, etc.
- on its sensory apparatus
47Why Do We Experience Anything Rather than Nothing?
- Knowing that the external object has so impinged
- being aware of its impingement
- from the 1st-person POV
- i.e., subjective awareness
- not objective awareness
- is the experience of a quale
- but ?ly ? inverted qualia
- i.e., what the quale feels like may ? physical
implementation
48Why Are Some Stimuli Experienced as Colors
Others as Sounds?
- ?ly because of different sources?
- photons
- sound waves
- chemicals in air
- But could be all felt on a common spectrumrather
than by orthogonal experiences - ?ly they are synaesthesia?
- Why are some things experienced at all, some
things differently, but others not at all? - ?ly because of evolutionary usefulness
- voluntary ability to perform the 4 Fs
- odors are not useful to us, but are to dogs
49Qualia
- Chalmers
- A mental state or process (MSP)can be
characterized functionally - external to the mental state or process
- behavioral
- in terms of the MSPs I/O relations to other MSPs
- its role in the cognitive economy
- A conscious MSP can also be characterized by
what its likeits quale - internal
- phenomenal
- by definition without functional role
- like Wittgensteins beetle in the box
50Qualia
- Cf. the monetary economy
- A dollar has the value it has because of the
role it plays in the world monetary economy - Does it have an intrinsic value? (a quale?)
- Dennett
- Does a dollar have something logically
independent of its functionalistic exchange
powers? - no there is no economic theory of such
intrinsic value - WJR
- at best, s intrinsic value isits role in the
world economy. - might play several roles at once
- cf. Hofstadter on value of Polish zloty
- Maybe the value of the paper its printed on?
- But that value is a function of the world
monetary economy!
51Qualia
- Cf. axiom systems intended interpretations
- Can characterize the natural numbers only as
- any sequence that satisfies Peanos axioms
- But an ? of sequences do that
- Theres no way to pick out the natural numbers
- trying to do that is like trying to characterize
qualia - Arithmetic is, in this sense, all there is to
number there is no saying absolutely what the
numbers are there is only arithmetic - Quine 1969 45
- I.e., numbers qualia arithmetic cog.
economy - Maybe a cog. agents internal mental
representation of numbers corresponds to the
qualia?
52Qualia
- Benacerraf 1965 What Numbers Could Not Be
- 3 is neither Ø, Ø, Ø,Ø nor Ø (
it cant be both) - each has properties relations that the other
lacksand that are irrelevant to numbers, e.g. - on both theories, numbers have set-theoretic
cardinality - on one theory, 3 3 on the other, 3 1
- on one theory, 1 ? 3 on the other, 1 ? 3
- none of these are true of the natural number 3
- Any object can play the role of 3
- Arithmetic isthe science that elaborates the
abstract structure that all progressions have in
common.It is notconcerned with particular
objectsthe numbers. The search for which
independently identifiable particular objects the
numbers really areismisguided.
53Qualia
- Burgess 2001, Set Theory
- The ordered pair (a,b) is defined to be
a,a,b, and from this definition the basic
law of ordered pairs, that (a,b)(c,d) iff ac
and bd, is deduced. It is not pretended that
this definition reveals what ordered pairs
really were all along. What the definition and
derivation of the basic law do show is that the
positing of ordered pairs subject to this basic
law as entities over and above sets is, in a
sense, superfluous.
54Qualia
- What is a graph?
- def a structure consisting of
- a set V of vertices
- a set E of edges,
- with certain relationships among the members of V
E - But what is a vertex? what is an edge?
- anything that satisfies the relationships among
the members of V E - So, a telephone network really is a
graph,because we can take phones to be
vertices phone connections to be edges - Its not merely that a phone network can be
modeled as (or by) a graph - It really is one!
55Qualia
- Logically speaking, vertices edges are (types
of) variables that can take as values certain
phones connections - such talk of variables is just talk of roles that
can be played by certain (usually physical)
objects - the objects implement those roles (i.e., those
abstractions)
56Qualia
- Veblen (on his axiomatization of geometry)
- The terms point and orderdiffer from the
other terms of geometry in that they are
undefined. (p. 344) - Because they are undefined, we are not told what
they are - Therefore, they can be (implemented by) anything
that can play their roles - Cf. Hilbert on geometry
- "One must be able to say at all timesinstead of
points, lines, and planestables, chairs, and
beer mugs.
57Qualia
- But Veblen
- there is essentially only one class of which
theaxioms are valid (346) - I.e., one class up to isomorphism
- In more exact language, any two classes K and K?
of objects that satisfy theaxioms are capable of
a one-to-one correspondence between them - i.e., they are isomorphic
58Qualia
- Hilbert would agree
- But, in terms of qualia
- a set of points and lines (as Euclid thought of
them) that satisfy the axioms - a set of tables and chairs that satisfy
the axioms - are like a spectrum and an inverted spectrum
59Qualia
- White 1974, What Numbers Are
- allegedly rebuts Benacerraf
- but really consistent with it
- focuses on the role-filler rather than the role
- a certain set is a 3 in a certain series
- I.e., it plays the role of a three
- just as Richard Burton played the role of Hamlet
in the celebrated 1964 production - There are indeed numbers, and there are plenty
of them - Yes and there are plenty of different qualia,
too - cf. inverted spectrum
60Qualia
- Cf. Rapaport 1999 on implementation as semantic
interpretation - The number 3 is anything that implements the 3rd
item in a sequence that satisfies the abstraction
described by Peanos axioms. - So, is a quale of a MSP anything that implements
it? - where it is characterized functionally,i.e.,
in terms of the cognitive economy?
61Qualia
- Gert, What Colors Could Not Be, JPhil 2008
- 2 ways to answer What is X?
- Better 2 ways to interpret X is Y
- like 3 Ø, Ø, Ø,Ø
- like water H2O
- (1) is part of the answer given in terms of a
relational theory describing what any candidate
for X must satisfy, by giving the script for
any actor playing the role of X - (2) gives a particular thing that plays the role
62Qualia
- But if there is a functional characterization of
water - e.g., Chalmerss watery stuff
- or my view of the narrow meaning of water
- then H2O is just one actor that can play the
role - and Twin Earths XYZ is another
- Its not that Hamlet is Richard Burton
- rather, Burton is one among many who have played
the role - in a particular production, Hamlet Burton
63Qualia
- Alternatively, compare
- ? is (or is a or plays the role of) 3
- Burton is (or plays the role of) Hamlet
- 3 S(2)
- which is a functional/structural definition
64Mathematical Structuralism Qualia
- The structural view of math doesnt require /
allow us to specify what 3 is - Only defines it in terms of its role
- Still
- When I do arithmetic, I implement 3 somehow
- e.g., as ?
- or as 3 (most likely!)
- or as my internal mental numeron
65Mathematical Structuralism Qualia
- The functional view of cognition doesnt require
/ allow us to specify what qualia are - Only defines them in terms of their role
- Still
- They have to / can be implemented
- and thus I do experience red in a certain way
66Qualia
- Block in Cognition 79(2001)203f
- Functionalism identifies consciousness with a
role - just like numbers
- Physicalism identifies consciousness with a
physical or biological property that fills or
implements or realizes that role in humans - just like water H2O
- The big question How do you know that it is
broadcasting in the global workspace that makes a
representation conscious as opposed to something
about the human biological realization of that
broadcasting that makes it conscious? - My answer
- You dont!
- Hence the possibility of absent qualia (i.e.,
zombies).
67Qualia
- Dehaene on physicalism (Cognition 79(2001)30)
- qualia might be biological properties of
consciousnesss workspace - each workspace state is highly differentiated
and of high complexity.thus the flux of
neuronal workspace states associated with a
perceptual experience is vastly beyond accurate
verbal description or LTM storage.Although the
major organization of this repertoire is shared
by all members of the species, its details result
from a developmental process of epigenesis are
? specific to each individual. Thus, the
contents of perceptual awareness are complex,
dynamic, multi-faceted neural states that cannot
be memorized or transmitted to others in their
entirety. - This could account for inverted, if not absent,
qualia
68Qualia
- But why am I perfectly content with the inability
to uniquely characterize the natural numbers - yet discontented with the inability to uniquely
characterize qualia? - how are natural numbers and qualia asymmetric?
- ?ly The quale of a MSP is not characterizable
in terms of its functional relationships - but in terms of how the experiencer relates to
it - but that runs into the value-of-a- problem
- its ultimately defined in terms of other MSPs
- leads us back to Dennett
69Qualia
- ?ly Nature of a quale must lead out of the
network of MSPs, into - the physical implementation?
- then we would have to allow for
- inverted absent qualia, depending on the
implementation - a bullet we might have to bite!
- gets us out of the mental-functional circle
- remains physical
- see Rapaport 2005, "Implementation Is Semantic
Interpretation Further Thoughts!
70Qualia
- If MSPs are physically implemented,then qualia
are part of the big picture, after all - they are values of variables
- those variables are part of the mental
(functional, computational) theory - their values are part of the physical
implementation of that theory - a side effect
- an implementation detail
- qualia-variables w/o values are absent qualia
- such MSPs would be unconscious
- qualia-variables with different values are
inverted qualia
71Qualia
- What else might qualia be like?
- Given an equivalence or an analogy
- where you dont know the value of either,you
cant fully understand it. - The other magicians nod, knowingly, like
bird-watchers seeing an unusual find in the
middle distance - (Gopnik, The Real Work, New Yorker (17MR0857)
- ?ly the relation between an MSP and its quale is
like an analogy - by experiencing, hence understanding, the quale,
we thereby come to understand (and undergo) the
MSP - Is a quale like a truth value?
- and the causal-functional role of a MSP is its
proof theory?
72Qualia
- Consider a recurrence relation, or recursively
defined function - f(0)q f(n1)g(f(n))
- the recursion is like the functional theory of
consciousness - Morbini Schubert Its like access
consciousness - the base case is like the quale
- Morbini Schubert (sort of) Its like
phenomenal consciousness - if h(0) r ? q h(n1)g(h(n)), then we have 2
distinct functions with the same functional
theory but different qualia - the recursion without the base case is like
absent qualia. - The base case is a particular implementation of
the recurrence. - OR ?ly g is whats like the quale?
- models/implementations of Peanos axioms can
differ in what they take 0 to be (base case) as
well as in what they take S to be (i.e., what g
is).
73Qualia
- The principal contrast is between
- pattern (or function)
- thing (or matter, or shape)
- Hofstadter, Ton Beau de Marot 307f
- Consider a semantic network representing a
functional characterization of the mind - Dennett thats all thats needed
- Chalmers the nodes need identifiers
- identification independent of their connections
- if they do (if they are filled in),then what
they are filled in with are qualia and if
yours are filled with something different from
mine, then we have inverted
qualiaelse we have absent qualia - qualia are dependent on the implementing medium M
- can be absent or can vary with varying M
74Qualia
- Could qualia be nothing but neuron firings?
- ?ly
- our phenomenological / qualitative experience
is just our first-person acquaintance with the
neuron firings - i.e., it is just the way those neuron firings
feel - this might depend on the implementation
75Does It Matter(for a Computational Theory)?
- When I look at a red box, it seems and looks red
- If you look at it, could you really see it
differently? - We both can describe it in the same way react
to it in the same way. - We both can look at a painting discuss its
colors, shapes, and emotional significance,
agree (or agree to disagree) about its beauty - How could that be if we are having very different
experiences?
76Does It Matter?
- Simplest explanation
- We are having the same or very similar
experiences! - Cf. simplest explanation of why we see the
world as we do - The world is as we see it
- modulo limitations of our sensory apparatus
- a bat or color-blind dog would see things very
differently - but I wouldnt expect to be able to sympathize
with its aesthetic judgments as I do with yours - cf. Winstons problem (Rapaport 2003, on
negotiation) Wittgenstein If a lion
could talk, we wouldnt understand it - cf. Dennett if a lion could talk, not only
would we understand it, but
other lions wouldnt!
77Does It Matter?
- Computers can be conscious
- either for Chalmerss reasons
- or for Dennetts
- But computers might not have to be consciousin
the way that humans are. - Whether they are cannot be known (by us)
- from 3rd-person POV, we cant know anothers
qualia - we can only know our own, from the 1st-person POV
- but theres no good reason to think others are
zombies - If it cannot be known, thentheres no moral
reason to treat even possible zombies (who are
behaviorally indistinguishable from us) any
differently from us