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Title: csness.ppt


1
csness.ppt
  • version 20091211

2
Notes towards aComputational Theoryof
Consciousness
  • William J. Rapaport
  • Department of Computer Science Engineering,
  • Department of Philosophy, Department of
    Linguistics,
  • and Center for Cognitive Science
  • rapaport_at_cse.buffalo.edu
  • http//www.cse.buffalo.edu/rapaport

3
2 (or 3) Questions for a Computational Theory of
Consciousness
  • Could a computational cognitive agentbe
    conscious?
  • I think so
  • But it depends on whats meant by conscious
  • 1.5. If so, how would we build one?
  • Answer depends on psychological theories of
    consciousness
  • How would we know?
  • We wouldnt
  • any more (or less) than we know about humans!

4
And What about Qualia?
  • What are qualia? What are numbers? ?
    What is the base case of a recursion?
  • Problem of role of qualia in theories of
    consciousness Problem of mathematical
    structuralism

5
What Is Consciousness?
  • What is consciousness? From the OED
  • L. con- together sci- knowingknowing
    something with others,knowing in oneself, privy
    to
  • 1601 (Ben Jonson) Attributed to inanimate
    things as privy to, sharing in, or witnesses
    of human actions or secrets
  • 1620 having the witness of ones own judgment or
    feelings, knowing within oneself
  • 1651 (Hobbes) knowing, or sharing the knowledge
    of anything, together with another
  • Not overly helpful

6
  • Perhaps slightly more helpful?

7
(No Transcript)
8
Kinds of Consciousness
  • Chalmers
  • Psychological consciousness
  • Phenomenological consciousness
  • Better
  • Psychological problems of consciousness
  • Phenomenological problems of consciousness

9
Psychological Consciousness
  • Chalmers
  • awakeness, introspection, reportability,
    self-consciousness, attention, voluntary
    control, knowledge, awareness
  • The easy problems
  • I.e., those explainable in principle
    infunctional / computational or neural terms,
    viz.

10
Psychological Consciousness
  • the ability to discriminate, categorize, and
    react to environmental stimuli
  • the integration of information by a cognitive
    system
  • the reportability of mental states
  • the ability of a system to access its own
    internal states
  • the focus of attention
  • the deliberate control of behavior
  • the difference between wakefulness and sleep.
    etc. (Chalmers 1995, Facing Up to the
    Problem of Consciousness)
  • I.e., awareness
  • Blocks access consciousness

11
Psychological Consciousness
  • Models
  • Cartesian theater
  • a big no-no for humans
  • global workspace
  • Baars, Franklin, Dehaene, et al.
  • Andersons ACT-R buffers
  • multiple drafts, fame in the brain
  • Dennett

12
On Multiple Drafts
  • On the critical question of which version of the
    novel Frankenstein is truest or best, however,
    Charles E. Robinson editor of a scholarly
    edition of the Frankenstein Notebooks demurs
    These texts of Frankenstein are what we call
    fluid texts, he says. There is no single
    edition we can judge to be the best.
  • Howard, Jennifer (2008), The Birth of
    Frankenstein, Chronicle of Higher Education
    55(11) (7 November) B12-B15 quote on p. B15.
  • For fluid texts, read multiple drafts.

13
Psychological Consciousness
  • 1.5. Reflexive consciousness (Block)
  • special case of access consciousness
  • HOT (Rosenthal)
  • self-representational experiences (Kriegel)
  • Any of these models
  • global workspace
  • HOT
  • multiple drafts,
  • could be implemented
  • neurally
  • computationally

14
Phenomenological Consciousness
  • experience,what its like,qualia
  • ??
  • yes (Searle, Chalmers, Nagel, McGinn, Block,
    G.Strawson)
  • no (Dennett)

15
Phenomenological Consciousness
  • I can explain to you what love is until I turn
    blue in the face. I can take two weeks to
    explain everything to you. But there is no
    way I can make you feel it until you feel it.
    (p. 40)
  • Schmidle, Nicholas (2008), Faith Ecstasy,
    Smithsonian 39(9) (December) 36-47.
  • Cf. Jacksons Mary the color-blind color
    scientist
  • Dennett
  • Qualia cant be described (in language)
  • ? Dont have to/cant explain them

16
Phenomenological Consciousness
  • Dennett (contd)
  • ?? qualia
  • ? only reports of them
  • Dont have to explain why you experience green or
    pain
  • Because you dont!
  • Only have to explain why you say that you do!
  • cf. How would your experience be different
    if Earth revolved around Sun? (Wittgenstein)
  • What we think are qualia are really just states
    of psychological consciousness

17
Phenomenological Consciousness
  • Could phenomenological consciousness (qualia)
    be nothing but neuron firings?
  • yes
  • Searle Its just biology (like digestion)
  • WJR
  • Its biology for humans
  • but it could be implemented otherwise for
    computers
  • (more later)
  • no
  • Chalmers ? non-physical, phenomenological
    properties
  • McGinn Its an unsolvable mystery (for us)
  • Nagel It can only be experienced
  • yes?
  • G.Strawson
  • Because everything is experiential, including
    neuron firings.

18
NagelWhat Is It Like to Be a Bat?
19
What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
  • Cf. The Boy Who Sees through Sound
  • Discovery Health documentary
  • People (14 July 2006)
  • http//www.people.com/people/article/0,26334,12125
    68,00.html

20
Phenomenological Consciousness
  • Could phenomenological consciousness (qualia)
    be nothing but neuron firings? (contd)
  • no (contd)
  • Chalmers
  • phenomenological consciousness is independent of
    physics biology
  • mental properties cant be logically derived
    from physical properties
  • because of the Argument from Zombies
  • but ? 1-1 correspondence
  • i.e., ? psycho-physical laws

21
Is Consciousness Univocal?
  • Maybe there are lots of different kinds of,or
    aspects to, consciousness
  • Maybe more than one theory is correct
  • Block, in Cognition 79 (2001) 217

22
Some Philosophical Positions
  • Consciousness does not exist
  • Dennett
  • There are physiological processes nothing else
  • ________ ?

23
Some Philosophical Positions
  • Consciousness exists
  • Nagel Consciousness exists can
    only be experienced
  • _________ ?
  • McGinn Consciousness exists
    cannot be understood
  • ?????????? ?
  • (a) (b) seem very close

24
Some Philosophical Positions
  • Searle Consciousness exists its
    biologically caused
  • ?
  • Chalmers Consciousness exists
    its independent of physics/biology,
    but theres a 1-1 correspondence
    (there are psychophysical laws)
  • ??_________ ?

25
The Hard Problem (Chalmers)
  • Recall the distinction between
  • Psychological concept of mind/consciousness
  • as causal/explanatory basis of behavior
  • functional characterization
  • what mind does
  • Phenomenal concept of mind/consciousness
  • experience, qualia, what its like
  • how mind feels

26
The Hard Problem
  • The hard problem
  • the problem of experience
  • How are organisms subjects of experience?
  • Why do we experience sensations as we do?
  • Why how does physical processing give rise to
    our rich inner life?(all quotes/paraphrases
    from Chalmers 1995)

27
A Brief Look Ahead
  • Suggestion
  • Easy problem
  • i.e., the functional characterization of
    psychological consciousness
  • is like a recurrence relation or recursive
    clause of a recursive definition or
    mathematical structuralism
  • Hard problem
  • i.e., qualia, or phenomenal consciousness
  • is like the initial conditions or base
    case or objects that play roles in
    mathematical theories

28
Chalmerss Zombie Argument(simplified version)
  • A zombie is_def a creature that isphysically
    behaviorally indistinguishable from us,but that
    has no conscious experiences.
  • http//consc.net/zombies.html
  • http//plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
  • Physicalism is_def the theory that mental states
    processes (logically) supervene on physical SP
  • I.e., any physical duplicate of me would
    also be a psychological duplicate
  • Physicalism ? zombies are not conceivable
  • But zombies are conceivable
  • ? Physicalism is false
  • ? Psychological phenomena (e.g., qualia) are
    something over and above physical phenomena

29
Ways to React to the Zombie Argument
  • Thats right! (Chalmers)
  • So wed better devise a separate theory of
    psychological consciousness
  • take mental terms as primitive, not
    characterizable in physical terms
  • cf. Newton gravity
  • some psychophysical laws to tie them in
    with the physical world
  • mostly 1-1 correspondences

30
Ways to React to the Zombie Argument
  • There cant be any zombies
  • Any sufficiently complex cognitive system
    (including any duplicates of me) will have just
    as much subjective mentality as I do
  • Dennett I.e., none
  • Or Commander Data will really be just as
    phenomenally conscious as I am (and I really am
    so!) ()

31
Ways to React to the Zombie Argument
  • () How to give a zombie consciousness?
  • A calculator has the ability to add
  • but it does so unconsciously, zombie-like
  • Give Cassie a theory of math cognition
  • then shed be aware of adding
  • shed be conscious of it in both the
    psychological sense and in the phenomenal sense
  • shed have the experience of adding
  • but what gives her that experience?
  • perhaps Rosenthal-like HOT?

32
Ways to React to the Zombie Argument
  • There can be zombies
  • There are plenty of unconscious cognitive
    processes
  • People who solved puzzles with insight activated
    a specific subset of cortical areas. Although
    the answer seemed to appear out of nowhere, the
    mind was carefully preparing itself for the
    breakthrough. The scientists refer to this as
    the "preparatory phrase," since the brain is
    devoting its considerable computational power to
    the problem. The various sensory areas, like the
    visual cortex, go silent as the brain suppresses
    possible distractions. "The cortex does this for
    the same reason we close our eyes when we're
    trying to think," Jung-Beeman said. "Focus is
    all about blocking stuff out " (New Yorker, 28
    July 2008, p. 43)
  • All of this is unconscious so, zombies are
    possible
  • but they could become conscious if another part
    of the brain were aware of it, or watching it,
    HOT-like
  • I.e., absent qualia
  • So why couldnt all of them be unconscious?

33
There Can Be Zombies
  • This is the Really Hard Problem
  • But then why do we experience some of them?
  • Other really hard problems in the vicinity
  • Why do we experience things as we do and not
    another way?
  • cf. inverted qualia
  • Why do we experience red as we do (however we do)
    and not as the sound of a bell?
  • cf. synaesthesia

34
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35
Qualia
  • A quale (plural qualia) is
  • a raw feel,
  • a phenomenal experience,
  • what its like
  • Its what you experience when you
  • sense a color,
  • or hear a sound,
  • or taste, or smell, or touch.
  • Its what Chalmers says needs to be explained

36
Qualia The Classic Problem
  • Psychological consciousness can be characterized
    functionally (i.e., computationally)
  • I.e., in terms of causal and logical relations
  • between inputs and internal concepts,
  • among internal concepts,
  • between internal concepts and outputs
  • Qualia cannot be characterized functionally
  • Because of the possibilities of
  • absent qualia
  • inverted qualia
  • ? Qualia are not psychological
  • or else Psychological consciousness cant be
    characterized functionally

37
Do Qualia Exist?Wittgensteins Beetle in the Box
  • "Suppose everyone had a box with something in it
    we call it a beetle. No one can look into
    anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows
    what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.
    Here it would be quite possible for everyone to
    have something different in his box. One might
    even imagine such a thing constantly changing.
    But suppose the word beetle had a use in these
    people's language? If so it would not be used
    as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has
    no place in the language game at all not even as
    a something for the box might even be empty. No,
    one can divide through by the thing in the box
    it cancels out, whatever it is."
  • (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
    Investigations I, 293)

38
Qualia
  • Are qualia beetles in boxes?
  • Dennett yes!
  • Chalmers
  • maybe (?)
  • but I do have a beetle in my box
  • even if zombies dont have beetles in theirs!

39
Are Qualia Beetles in Boxes?
  • WJR
  • we do have qualia
  • even if we may be misled by them or misremember
    them
  • we are phenomenally conscious
  • even if sometimes we may not remember it
  • e.g., blanking out when driving or daydreaming

40
The Hard Problemfor me!
  • No matter how detailed our theories of
    psychological consciousness are,I do experience
    qualia
  • Castañeda
  • Philosophy must be done in the first person, for
    the first person
  • What is that which I experience?What is
    experience itself?
  • If I try to characterize it in terms of other
    aspects of my mental economy,it loses its raw
    feel nature
  • But if it is primitive, how can I understand
    it?
  • Want a theory of qualia that is consistent with
    computational theory of consciousness

41
2 Main Questions about Qualia
  • Why ( how) do we experience anything rather than
    nothing?
  • the zombie question
  • the really hard problem
  • Why are our qualia as they are not like
    something else?
  • answer may depend on answer to 1

42
Why Do We Experience Anything Rather than Nothing?
  • Some plants are sensitive to light,some to what
    we would call odors
  • I.e., airborne chemicals
  • Can they see or smell?
  • Do we see or smell?
  • Or are we, too, merely light-
    chemical-sensitive?
  • Does anything further happen in the brain?
  • I.e., qualia?
  • Or are qualia just our sensitivity to the light
    chemicals?
  • Or is there any sensitivity (or sensation) at all?

43
Why Do We Experience Anything Rather than Nothing?
  • Cf. visual quale of seeing a red (traffic) light
    with olfactory quale of an odor
  • Cf. these with the lack of an olfactory quale
  • We are qualitatively insensitive to many odors
  • We are certainly less sensitive than a dog
  • Yet ?ly these odors do influence our behavior
  • blind smell cf. blindsight
  • If so, then we are at least partial zombies
  • How could that be?
  • Why is there such a difference?
  • Does the (visual or olfactory) quale do anything?

44
Why Do We Experience Anything Rather than Nothing?
  • Cf. my visual quale of a red light with my
    absence of a visual quale for infrared
    light
  • Suppose infrared light influenced my behavior but
    I was not subjectively aware of the IR light
  • I could be objectively aware of it
  • via an objective sensing device
  • via monitoring my brain
  • Would that feel like anything?
  • Maybe like an intuition
  • Thats a quale, but not necessarily a quale of
    the IR light
  • 2nd-order quale? HOT?
  • But probably not like a visual experience of red
    light
  • It wouldnt be a deeper red

45
Why Do We Experience Anything Rather than Nothing?
  • Whats the difference in my behavior between
  • my reaction to the quale of red light
  • my reaction to IR light w/o quale?
  • Case 1
  • I can voluntarily react (or not react) to the
    quale of red light
  • doesnt run afoul of problem of free will
  • whatever free will turns out to be will work here
  • Case 2
  • I have no choice
  • especially if there is not even an intuition

46
Why Do We Experience Anything Rather than Nothing?
  • So we can be partial zombies
  • but not complete zombies
  • because
  • a complete zombie would have no free will
  • but we do
  • If the complete zombie had free will,it would
    then also have to have some HOT/access/awareness
    of the impingement of the external object(s)
  • chemicals for odor, photons for vision, etc.
  • on its sensory apparatus

47
Why Do We Experience Anything Rather than Nothing?
  • Knowing that the external object has so impinged
  • being aware of its impingement
  • from the 1st-person POV
  • i.e., subjective awareness
  • not objective awareness
  • is the experience of a quale
  • but ?ly ? inverted qualia
  • i.e., what the quale feels like may ? physical
    implementation

48
Why Are Some Stimuli Experienced as Colors
Others as Sounds?
  • ?ly because of different sources?
  • photons
  • sound waves
  • chemicals in air
  • But could be all felt on a common spectrumrather
    than by orthogonal experiences
  • ?ly they are synaesthesia?
  • Why are some things experienced at all, some
    things differently, but others not at all?
  • ?ly because of evolutionary usefulness
  • voluntary ability to perform the 4 Fs
  • odors are not useful to us, but are to dogs

49
Qualia
  • Chalmers
  • A mental state or process (MSP)can be
    characterized functionally
  • external to the mental state or process
  • behavioral
  • in terms of the MSPs I/O relations to other MSPs
  • its role in the cognitive economy
  • A conscious MSP can also be characterized by
    what its likeits quale
  • internal
  • phenomenal
  • by definition without functional role
  • like Wittgensteins beetle in the box

50
Qualia
  • Cf. the monetary economy
  • A dollar has the value it has because of the
    role it plays in the world monetary economy
  • Does it have an intrinsic value? (a quale?)
  • Dennett
  • Does a dollar have something logically
    independent of its functionalistic exchange
    powers?
  • no there is no economic theory of such
    intrinsic value
  • WJR
  • at best, s intrinsic value isits role in the
    world economy.
  • might play several roles at once
  • cf. Hofstadter on value of Polish zloty
  • Maybe the value of the paper its printed on?
  • But that value is a function of the world
    monetary economy!

51
Qualia
  • Cf. axiom systems intended interpretations
  • Can characterize the natural numbers only as
  • any sequence that satisfies Peanos axioms
  • But an ? of sequences do that
  • Theres no way to pick out the natural numbers
  • trying to do that is like trying to characterize
    qualia
  • Arithmetic is, in this sense, all there is to
    number there is no saying absolutely what the
    numbers are there is only arithmetic
  • Quine 1969 45
  • I.e., numbers qualia arithmetic cog.
    economy
  • Maybe a cog. agents internal mental
    representation of numbers corresponds to the
    qualia?

52
Qualia
  • Benacerraf 1965 What Numbers Could Not Be
  • 3 is neither Ø, Ø, Ø,Ø nor Ø (
    it cant be both)
  • each has properties relations that the other
    lacksand that are irrelevant to numbers, e.g.
  • on both theories, numbers have set-theoretic
    cardinality
  • on one theory, 3 3 on the other, 3 1
  • on one theory, 1 ? 3 on the other, 1 ? 3
  • none of these are true of the natural number 3
  • Any object can play the role of 3
  • Arithmetic isthe science that elaborates the
    abstract structure that all progressions have in
    common.It is notconcerned with particular
    objectsthe numbers. The search for which
    independently identifiable particular objects the
    numbers really areismisguided.

53
Qualia
  • Burgess 2001, Set Theory
  • The ordered pair (a,b) is defined to be
    a,a,b, and from this definition the basic
    law of ordered pairs, that (a,b)(c,d) iff ac
    and bd, is deduced. It is not pretended that
    this definition reveals what ordered pairs
    really were all along. What the definition and
    derivation of the basic law do show is that the
    positing of ordered pairs subject to this basic
    law as entities over and above sets is, in a
    sense, superfluous.

54
Qualia
  • What is a graph?
  • def a structure consisting of
  • a set V of vertices
  • a set E of edges,
  • with certain relationships among the members of V
    E
  • But what is a vertex? what is an edge?
  • anything that satisfies the relationships among
    the members of V E
  • So, a telephone network really is a
    graph,because we can take phones to be
    vertices phone connections to be edges
  • Its not merely that a phone network can be
    modeled as (or by) a graph
  • It really is one!

55
Qualia
  • Logically speaking, vertices edges are (types
    of) variables that can take as values certain
    phones connections
  • such talk of variables is just talk of roles that
    can be played by certain (usually physical)
    objects
  • the objects implement those roles (i.e., those
    abstractions)

56
Qualia
  • Veblen (on his axiomatization of geometry)
  • The terms point and orderdiffer from the
    other terms of geometry in that they are
    undefined. (p. 344)
  • Because they are undefined, we are not told what
    they are
  • Therefore, they can be (implemented by) anything
    that can play their roles
  • Cf. Hilbert on geometry
  • "One must be able to say at all timesinstead of
    points, lines, and planestables, chairs, and
    beer mugs.

57
Qualia
  • But Veblen
  • there is essentially only one class of which
    theaxioms are valid (346)
  • I.e., one class up to isomorphism
  • In more exact language, any two classes K and K?
    of objects that satisfy theaxioms are capable of
    a one-to-one correspondence between them
  • i.e., they are isomorphic

58
Qualia
  • Hilbert would agree
  • But, in terms of qualia
  • a set of points and lines (as Euclid thought of
    them) that satisfy the axioms
  • a set of tables and chairs that satisfy
    the axioms
  • are like a spectrum and an inverted spectrum

59
Qualia
  • White 1974, What Numbers Are
  • allegedly rebuts Benacerraf
  • but really consistent with it
  • focuses on the role-filler rather than the role
  • a certain set is a 3 in a certain series
  • I.e., it plays the role of a three
  • just as Richard Burton played the role of Hamlet
    in the celebrated 1964 production
  • There are indeed numbers, and there are plenty
    of them
  • Yes and there are plenty of different qualia,
    too
  • cf. inverted spectrum

60
Qualia
  • Cf. Rapaport 1999 on implementation as semantic
    interpretation
  • The number 3 is anything that implements the 3rd
    item in a sequence that satisfies the abstraction
    described by Peanos axioms.
  • So, is a quale of a MSP anything that implements
    it?
  • where it is characterized functionally,i.e.,
    in terms of the cognitive economy?

61
Qualia
  • Gert, What Colors Could Not Be, JPhil 2008
  • 2 ways to answer What is X?
  • Better 2 ways to interpret X is Y
  • like 3 Ø, Ø, Ø,Ø
  • like water H2O
  • (1) is part of the answer given in terms of a
    relational theory describing what any candidate
    for X must satisfy, by giving the script for
    any actor playing the role of X
  • (2) gives a particular thing that plays the role

62
Qualia
  • But if there is a functional characterization of
    water
  • e.g., Chalmerss watery stuff
  • or my view of the narrow meaning of water
  • then H2O is just one actor that can play the
    role
  • and Twin Earths XYZ is another
  • Its not that Hamlet is Richard Burton
  • rather, Burton is one among many who have played
    the role
  • in a particular production, Hamlet Burton

63
Qualia
  • Alternatively, compare
  • ? is (or is a or plays the role of) 3
  • Burton is (or plays the role of) Hamlet
  • 3 S(2)
  • which is a functional/structural definition

64
Mathematical Structuralism Qualia
  • The structural view of math doesnt require /
    allow us to specify what 3 is
  • Only defines it in terms of its role
  • Still
  • When I do arithmetic, I implement 3 somehow
  • e.g., as ?
  • or as 3 (most likely!)
  • or as my internal mental numeron

65
Mathematical Structuralism Qualia
  • The functional view of cognition doesnt require
    / allow us to specify what qualia are
  • Only defines them in terms of their role
  • Still
  • They have to / can be implemented
  • and thus I do experience red in a certain way

66
Qualia
  • Block in Cognition 79(2001)203f
  • Functionalism identifies consciousness with a
    role
  • just like numbers
  • Physicalism identifies consciousness with a
    physical or biological property that fills or
    implements or realizes that role in humans
  • just like water H2O
  • The big question How do you know that it is
    broadcasting in the global workspace that makes a
    representation conscious as opposed to something
    about the human biological realization of that
    broadcasting that makes it conscious?
  • My answer
  • You dont!
  • Hence the possibility of absent qualia (i.e.,
    zombies).

67
Qualia
  • Dehaene on physicalism (Cognition 79(2001)30)
  • qualia might be biological properties of
    consciousnesss workspace
  • each workspace state is highly differentiated
    and of high complexity.thus the flux of
    neuronal workspace states associated with a
    perceptual experience is vastly beyond accurate
    verbal description or LTM storage.Although the
    major organization of this repertoire is shared
    by all members of the species, its details result
    from a developmental process of epigenesis are
    ? specific to each individual. Thus, the
    contents of perceptual awareness are complex,
    dynamic, multi-faceted neural states that cannot
    be memorized or transmitted to others in their
    entirety.
  • This could account for inverted, if not absent,
    qualia

68
Qualia
  • But why am I perfectly content with the inability
    to uniquely characterize the natural numbers
  • yet discontented with the inability to uniquely
    characterize qualia?
  • how are natural numbers and qualia asymmetric?
  • ?ly The quale of a MSP is not characterizable
    in terms of its functional relationships
  • but in terms of how the experiencer relates to
    it
  • but that runs into the value-of-a- problem
  • its ultimately defined in terms of other MSPs
  • leads us back to Dennett

69
Qualia
  • ?ly Nature of a quale must lead out of the
    network of MSPs, into
  • the physical implementation?
  • then we would have to allow for
  • inverted absent qualia, depending on the
    implementation
  • a bullet we might have to bite!
  • gets us out of the mental-functional circle
  • remains physical
  • see Rapaport 2005, "Implementation Is Semantic
    Interpretation Further Thoughts!

70
Qualia
  • If MSPs are physically implemented,then qualia
    are part of the big picture, after all
  • they are values of variables
  • those variables are part of the mental
    (functional, computational) theory
  • their values are part of the physical
    implementation of that theory
  • a side effect
  • an implementation detail
  • qualia-variables w/o values are absent qualia
  • such MSPs would be unconscious
  • qualia-variables with different values are
    inverted qualia

71
Qualia
  • What else might qualia be like?
  • Given an equivalence or an analogy
  • where you dont know the value of either,you
    cant fully understand it.
  • The other magicians nod, knowingly, like
    bird-watchers seeing an unusual find in the
    middle distance
  • (Gopnik, The Real Work, New Yorker (17MR0857)
  • ?ly the relation between an MSP and its quale is
    like an analogy
  • by experiencing, hence understanding, the quale,
    we thereby come to understand (and undergo) the
    MSP
  • Is a quale like a truth value?
  • and the causal-functional role of a MSP is its
    proof theory?

72
Qualia
  • Consider a recurrence relation, or recursively
    defined function
  • f(0)q f(n1)g(f(n))
  • the recursion is like the functional theory of
    consciousness
  • Morbini Schubert Its like access
    consciousness
  • the base case is like the quale
  • Morbini Schubert (sort of) Its like
    phenomenal consciousness
  • if h(0) r ? q h(n1)g(h(n)), then we have 2
    distinct functions with the same functional
    theory but different qualia
  • the recursion without the base case is like
    absent qualia.
  • The base case is a particular implementation of
    the recurrence.
  • OR ?ly g is whats like the quale?
  • models/implementations of Peanos axioms can
    differ in what they take 0 to be (base case) as
    well as in what they take S to be (i.e., what g
    is).

73
Qualia
  • The principal contrast is between
  • pattern (or function)
  • thing (or matter, or shape)
  • Hofstadter, Ton Beau de Marot 307f
  • Consider a semantic network representing a
    functional characterization of the mind
  • Dennett thats all thats needed
  • Chalmers the nodes need identifiers
  • identification independent of their connections
  • if they do (if they are filled in),then what
    they are filled in with are qualia and if
    yours are filled with something different from
    mine, then we have inverted
    qualiaelse we have absent qualia
  • qualia are dependent on the implementing medium M
  • can be absent or can vary with varying M

74
Qualia
  • Could qualia be nothing but neuron firings?
  • ?ly
  • our phenomenological / qualitative experience
    is just our first-person acquaintance with the
    neuron firings
  • i.e., it is just the way those neuron firings
    feel
  • this might depend on the implementation

75
Does It Matter(for a Computational Theory)?
  • When I look at a red box, it seems and looks red
  • If you look at it, could you really see it
    differently?
  • We both can describe it in the same way react
    to it in the same way.
  • We both can look at a painting discuss its
    colors, shapes, and emotional significance,
    agree (or agree to disagree) about its beauty
  • How could that be if we are having very different
    experiences?

76
Does It Matter?
  • Simplest explanation
  • We are having the same or very similar
    experiences!
  • Cf. simplest explanation of why we see the
    world as we do
  • The world is as we see it
  • modulo limitations of our sensory apparatus
  • a bat or color-blind dog would see things very
    differently
  • but I wouldnt expect to be able to sympathize
    with its aesthetic judgments as I do with yours
  • cf. Winstons problem (Rapaport 2003, on
    negotiation) Wittgenstein If a lion
    could talk, we wouldnt understand it
  • cf. Dennett if a lion could talk, not only
    would we understand it, but
    other lions wouldnt!

77
Does It Matter?
  • Computers can be conscious
  • either for Chalmerss reasons
  • or for Dennetts
  • But computers might not have to be consciousin
    the way that humans are.
  • Whether they are cannot be known (by us)
  • from 3rd-person POV, we cant know anothers
    qualia
  • we can only know our own, from the 1st-person POV
  • but theres no good reason to think others are
    zombies
  • If it cannot be known, thentheres no moral
    reason to treat even possible zombies (who are
    behaviorally indistinguishable from us) any
    differently from us
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