Lessons of Fukushima Powerpoint Majia Nadesan - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

About This Presentation
Title:

Lessons of Fukushima Powerpoint Majia Nadesan

Description:

Powerpoint Presentation of My Complete Lessons of Fukushima Powerpoint Presentation Delivered at Wiklamette University Feb 2012 – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:4110
Slides: 134
Provided by: majia

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Lessons of Fukushima Powerpoint Majia Nadesan


1
Lessons From Fukushima
  • Dr. Majia Holmer Nadesan

2
Abstract
  • Lessons From Fukushima Governments and the Media
    Will Deceive the Public and Withhold Vital
    Information, Leaving Citizens to Create Informal
    Information Sharing NetworksThis paper will
    demonstrate that the Japanese and U.S.
    Governments withheld vital information from their
    citizens about the direction and risks of
    Fukushima radiation plumes and the degree and
    consequences of radioactive fallout. Second, the
    paper will demonstrate that the mainstream news
    media, including The Wall Street Journal and The
    New York Times, were complicit in hiding
    information about fallout levels, dispersion, and
    plant conditions. The U.S. media are commonly
    recognized as more independent from government
    than Japanese media. This disaster demonstrates
    that the U.S. mainstream news media censor
    information, even when public safety is at issue.
    Finally, this paper examines the spontaneous
    creation of information sharing sites and the
    subsequent development of a robust network of
    citizen-supported information sites in Japan and
    the United States.

3
Timeline
  • The nuclear disaster began on March 11 after
    Fukushima reactors lost water.
  • March 12 Fukushima reactor number 1 reactor
    exploded at 1530 after venting failed to release
    pressure.
  • Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano confirms
    that the concrete building surrounding the steel
    reactor container has collapsed as a result of
    the blast, but the steel containment chamber
    itself had not been damaged (BBC Timeline
    http//www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-1272
    2719 )
  • March 13 Assurances Risk is Low But Releases
    Steam from Unit 3
  • 0320 The World Health Organisation says the
    risk to the public from the radiation leak at
    Fukushima is "probably quite low (BBC Timeline)
  • March 14 An explosion occurred at the number 3
    reactor.
  • March 15 An Explosion occurred at number 2
    reactor after initial assurances.
  • Early March 15 containment structures of the
    three reactorswhich house the all-important
    reactor vesselsremain intact, Japanese official
    stressed, preventing large-scale radiation
    leaks.
  • Later in the day on March 15, an explosion
    occurred in reactor number (Yuka Hayashi
    Nuclear Risk Rising in Japan, The Wall Street
    Journal (2011, March 15) A1, A12).
  • Details of Unit 4 are Hotly Contested, Unclear

4
Fukushima Is a Major Disaster
  • Fukushima cesium leaks 'equal 168 Hiroshima
    bombs,' says report National Aug. 26, 2011
    http//www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/f
    ukushima-cesium-leaks-equal-168-hiroshima-bombs-sa
    ys-report
  • HOW MUCH FUEL "The Daiichi complex had a total
    of 1760 metric tons of fresh and used nuclear
    fuel on site last year, according to a
    presentation by its owners, the Tokyo Electric
    Power Company (Tepco). The most damaged Daiichi
    reactor, number 3, contains about 90 tons of
    fuel, and the storage pool above reactor 4, which
    the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRCs)
    Gregory Jaczko reported yesterday had lost its
    cooling water, contains 135 tons of spent fuel.
    The amount of fuel lost in the core melt at Three
    Mile Island in 1979 was about 30 tons the
    Chernobyl reactors had about 180 tons when the
    accident occurred in 1986." http//news.sciencema
    g.org/scienceinsider/2011/03/how-much-fuel-is-at-r
    isk-at-fukushima.html?rss1 

5
Background
  • I was driven to create this presentation by the
    scale of the Fukushima disaster, and the
    invisibility of an adequate response.
  • I drew upon my expertise as a scholar of
    communication to study government and media
    reports of the disaster since it began in March
    of 2011
  • I study biopolitics, the study of the
    intersections across (1) economic models (2)
    health (3) and dominant frameworks for
    interpreting and mitigating disease.  In my
    research Ive studied autism, as interpreted
    across scientific paradigms- including biological
    psychiatry and genetics Ive also studied how
    economic models shape attitudes toward the health
    of the population, in relation to the workplace ,
    childrearing, and environmental risks. The
    biopolitics of Fukushima are a primary concern of
    my current research.
  • To understand the significance of government and
    media accounts Ive researched radiation
    dispersion, radiation fallout and disease, and
    laboratory research on radiation, cell biology,
    and DNA. I received considerable assistance from
    diverse people, including those who post at
    Enenews, Fairewinds,, Fukushima Diary, Ex-SKF,
    Enformable, If You Love This Planet, NukePimp,
    etc. I also benefited from extended communication
    with people who have knowledge and expertise in
    radiation testing and other relevant issues,
    including Ret. Capt. Clyde Stagner, Robert
    Soltysik, Craig Daniels and my academic
    colleagues at ASU

6
Background
  • Many people know nothing about Fukushima. Yet, it
    has been spewing radiation for almost a year now
    and fires have raged at the plant.
  • Japan is extensively contaminated. Fallout is
    everywhere in the northern hemisphere. Health
    effects are certain. However, doctors are not
    trained in detecting sub-acute exposure to
    radiation poisoning. Symptoms will be diverse,
    and not clearly linked to radiation by doctors
    trained in conventional models of medicine that
    focus primarily on genes and lifestyle.
  • My data analysis of crisis communications and
    press releases reveals that governments have
    hidden the scope and severity of the crisis
    including its ongoing nature and the extent of
    fallout.
  • So, people may very well lose decades of their
    life and never know the cause, even while they
    see deteriorating health all around them. I
    believe public health authorities need to take
    action to project health implications and adopt
    prevention and remediation strategies.
  • I believe public health authorities need to take
    action to project health implications and adopt
    prevention and remediation strategies, especially
    in Japan but in the US and Canada as well.
  • This presentation seeks to use a variety of data
    to demonstrate that governments and media have
    failed to disclose information vital to human
    health and welfare.

7
Lessons From Fukushima
  • Lesson 1 Democratic governments may elect to
    withhold vital information in the event of severe
    disasters
  • The presentation demonstrates that the Japanese
    and U.S. Governments withheld vital information
    from their citizens about the direction and risks
    of Fukushima fallout.
  • Lesson 2 The Western media may censor vital
    information
  • The presentation demonstrates that the mainstream
    news media, including The Wall Street Journal and
    The New York Times, were complicit in hiding
    information about fallout levels, dispersion, and
    plant conditions.
  • Lesson 3 Spontaneous citizens networks can
    emerge in response to government censorship and
    these networks have multiple functions, benefits,
    and drawbacks
  • The presentation illustrates and examines the
    spontaneous creation of information sharing sites
    and the subsequent development of a robust
    network of citizen-supported information sites in
    Japan and the United States.

8
Overview of Lesson 1 Government Censorship
  • The Japanese and U.S. Governments withheld vital
    information from their citizens about the
    direction and risks of Fukushima radiation
    fallout. Thus, citizens were not adequately
    protected, evacuated to contaminated areas, and
    were not provided with Potassium Iodide tablets
    to combat uptake of Iodine-131.
  • Japanese Speedi data censored
  • Japanese officials resisted releasing important
    data about dispersion because of fear of
    panicking residents
  • Japanese officials did not authorize potassium
    iodide pills because of their unwillingness to
    acknowledge scale of disaster
  • Japanese officials failed to expand evacuation
    zone adequately because of censorship of
    dispersion severity
  • Japanese officials tried to shut down radiation
    monitoring equipment to reduce public fears about
    contamination
  • Japanese government officials set dangerously
    high standards for exposure and implemented
    faulty monitoring strategies
  • Japanese government withheld a report of the
    worst case scenario and minutes of the Fukushima
    disaster response task force
  • The Canadian and US Governments also failed to
    relay critical information about fallout and
    asserted no health effects despite evidence to
    the contrary
  • Each claim is supported with evidence

9
Lesson 1 Speedi Censored
  • Japan used a system called SpeediSystem for
    Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose
    informationto model March radiation releases and
    blamed the delay in reporting results to the
    public in mid-April to their efforts to narrow
    the margin of error in their calculations,
    although nuclear regulators in other countries
    were privy to Speedis results early on.
  • In July, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan
    publicly criticized the Japanese government and
    TEPCO for delays in reporting Speedi data to the
    public T
  • the society notes that there is the possibility
    that the damage to people's health from radiation
    exposure has increased because the government,
    Tepco and related institutions did not properly
    disclose information on the status of the nuclear
    accidents and the environmental contamination by
    radioactive substances..
  • Radiation hot spot in Namie, Fukushima Prefecture
    were not disclosed.
  • Speedi data were given to the US military before
    the data were provided to Japanese citizens
  • Hiroko Tabuchi, Keith Bradsher, and Andrew
    Pollack Japanese Officials on Defensive as
    Nuclear Alert Level Rises, The New York Times
    (2011, April 13) http//www.nytimes.com/2011/04/1
    3/world/asia/13japan.html.
  • Tabuchi, Bradsher, and Pollack Japanese
    Officials on Defensive, http//www.nytimes.com/20
    11/04/13/world/asia/13japan.html
  • Nuclear Accident Disclosure, Japan Times (2011,
    July 8) http//search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed
    20110708a1.html.

10
Japanese Officials Resisted Releasing Data on
Radiation Dispersion
  • Japan Economic Newswire (April 29, 2011).
    Weather chief draws flak over plea not to
    release radiation forecasts. Excerpted
  • The chief of the Meteorological Society of Japan
    has drawn flak from within the academic society
    over a request for member specialists to refrain
    from releasing forecasts on the spread of
    radioactive substances from the troubled
    Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant.
  • Niino later said in commenting on the intention
    he had in issuing the statement, "If (society
    members') forecasts were announced, it would have
    carried the risk that ordinary people may panic.
  • In this new statement, he said the principle of
    keeping information sources unified "should be
    applied when a country is going through a
    critical situation" and "should not be applied
    now that the release of radioactive substances
    has been prolonged.
  • The controversy over Niino's statements came to
    light when a series of delays in the release by
    the government of information related to the
    spread of radioactive substances have come under
    intense public scrutiny. end excerpt

11
Japanese Officials Failed to Dispense Potassium
Iodide Pills
  • Fukushima area municipal entities had supplies of
    potassium iodide pills but the Japanese disaster
    manuals stipulated that local officials wait for
    orders from the national government to
    distribute.
  • Tokyo waited 5 days after Mar 11 before ordering
    distribution
  • WSJ writes The failure to disburse the
    preventive pills follows other examples of how
    the Japanese government failed to implement
    available measures aimed at protecting local
    residents from the harms of radiation
  • Hayashi, Y. (2011, September 29). Japan
    Officials Failed to Hand Out Radiation Pills in
    Quakes Aftermath The Wall Street Journal.

12
Lesson 1 Governments Censor Risk Leading to
Inadequate Evacuation
  • On March 11, the Japanese government ordered
    persons within a 1.9 mile radius of the Fukushima
    I plant to evacuate and recommended that those
    within 6.2 miles stay within their homes.
  • On March 12, the evacuation was extended to 20
    kilometers.
  • On March 13, after the first explosion, the World
    health Organization reported that the risk from
    the reactors was probably quite low.
  • On March 17, the U.S. declared that U.S. citizens
    and troops should stay at least 50 miles from the
    Fukushima reactors.
  • March 25 the Japanese government declared a
    voluntary evacuation for people within 30
    kilometers of the plant while the official
    evacuation zone remained 20 kilometers, or
    approximately 20 miles.
  • On April 4, The Wall Street Journal reported that
    Japanese authorities had finally acknowledged
    that the evacuation zone needed to be expanded
    beyond the 20 kilometer zone.
  • April 8 Evacuation zone still at 20 kilometers
    intends to limit exposure to 50 millisieverts
  • "Timeline Japan Power Plant Crisis," BBC News
    (2011, March 13) http//www.bbc.co.uk/news/scienc
    e-environment-12722719.  
  • Norihiko Shirouzu and Rebecca Smith U.S. Sounds
    Alarm On Radiation, The Wall Street Journal
    (2011, March 17) A1.
  • Andrew Morse and Mitsuru Obe Setback for Japan
    at Rogue Reactors, The Wall Street Journal
    (2011, March 26-27) A1. 
  • Yoree Koh, Daisuke Wakabayashi, and Miho Inada
    Worries Mount Over Residents Still Near Plant,
    The Wall Street Journal (2011, April 4) A11.
  • Sekiguchi Obe (2011, April 8). Japan Weighs
    Wider Evacuation Zone. A6.
  •  

13
Lesson 1 Mar 31 Japanese Government Sought to
Shut Down Radiation Monitoring
  • During first month of the crisis the Japanese
    government sought to shut down radiation
    monitoring to prevent citizens from panicking
  • The Prometheus Trap / Order to Suspend Radiation
    Monitoring Feb 6, 2012 Asahi
  • On March 31, 2011, Michio Aoyama, a 58-year-old
    researcher at the Meteorological Research
    Institute of the Japan Meteorological Agency, was
    attending an International Atomic Energy Agency
    (IAEA) conference in Monaco when he received an
    e-mail from Japan. As he read the message, Aoyama
    could not help but shake his head in
    incomprehension and disbelief.
  • "We're discontinuing radiation monitoring? Now?
    But we've been doing it for more than half a
    century!
  • The sender of the e-mail was Takashi Inoue, 47,
    a researcher at the institute's Office of
    Planning in Tsukuba, Ibaraki Prefecture.
    According to Inoue, he received a phone call from
    the meteorological agency's Planning Division in
    Tokyo at 6 p.m. on March 31. The caller told
    Inoue, "Effective tomorrow, there will be no more
    budget for radiation monitoring. Please do as you
    see fit at your end.
  • http//ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushim
    a/AJ201202060076

14
Japanese Government Understated Radiation Threats
and Set High Standards for Exposure
  • Toshiso Kosako resigned from the Japanese
    Governments panel of nuclear experts on April 30
    in response to the governments ceiling on
    unacceptable standards of radiation levels in
    schoolyards.
  • Dr Kosako claimed that the Japanese government
    understated radiation risks and was slow to test
    for risks posed by contaminated seawater and
    seafood
  • Hayashi, Y. (2011, July 2-3). Ex-Advisor Says
    Tokyo Understated Radiation Threats. The Wall
    Street Journal, p. A7.

15
Lesson 1 Japanese Government Censored Disaster
Report
  • Cabinet Kept Alarming Nuke Report Secret Japan
    Times January 22
  • Japanese Government buried a worst-case account
    of the Fukushima disaster by treating it as a
    personal document of Japans Atomic Energy
    Agency.
  • The report projected that in the worst case
    scenario the plant would intermittently release
    radiation for about a year.
  • The report was buried in part because the
    Japanese government recognized it could not
    successfully evacuate citizens the necessary 170
    kilometers out. http//www.japantimes.co.jp/text/n
    n20120122a1.html
  • An interim report produced by the Japanese
    Government found that the government delayed
    relaying vital information to the public about
    the seriousness of the meltdowns and the
    radiation releases
  • Kageyama, Yuri (2011, December 260. Japan probe
    finds nuclear disaster response failed. The
    Associated Press. Available http//www.google.com
    /hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jJMKHqE_ffiXqRQKfiRIA
    rgaojBw?docId38cf0057befd494a98dac1dccbcf47c7
    and Japans Executive Summary of the Interim
    Report found here http//www.bloomberg.com/news/20
    11-12-26/fukushima-probe-highlights-nuclear-regula
    tor-in-list-of-nuclear-failures.html

16
Lesson 1 Japans Industry Minister Kept NO
MINUTES of Fukushima Taskforce
  • TOKYO (Kyodo) Japanese industry minister Yukio
    Edano on Tuesday apologized for the government's
    failure to take minutes of meetings of a
    taskforce dealing with the Fukushima nuclear
    crisis and said that he has instructed the
    Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency to compile
    them soon based on notes taken by meeting
    attendees.
  • Edano said at a press conference that although
    the meetings were held in emergency situations
    soon after the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi
    power plant, the government should have created
    minutes as soon as possible considering the
    public interest in the matter and the significant
    social impact that the handling of the accident
    has.
  • "As then-Chief Cabinet Secretary and the current
    Economy, Trade and Industry Minister, I
    apologize," he said.
  • Various crisis management decisions were made at
    the taskforce's meetings, such as setting of the
    evacuation zone and policies for conducting
    decontamination work after the leakage of
    radioactive materials from the crippled power
    plant.
  • http//mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20120124p2g00m
    0dm144000c.html

17
Lesson 1 Government Manipulation of Exposure
Data Persists in Japan
  • AKIKO OKAZAKI Fukushima group calls QRS radiation
    tests bogus (2012, Jan 2012). http//ajw.asahi.com
    /article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201201270050
  • A Fukushima day-care group sent letters earlier
    this month warning its members of what it sees as
    fraudulent tests to measure internal radiation
    exposure among kindergarteners and preschoolers.
    Many scientists have also questioned the
    effectiveness and legitimacy of the QRS.
  • "The QRS is an offspring of a device developed by
    a U.S. physician about a century ago, but it is
    not recognized as medical equipment either in the
    United States or Japan," said Macoto Kikuchi, a
    physics professor at Osaka University, who
    co-authored a book titled "Okashina Kagaku"
    (Suspicious science). "It is perceived as 'bogus'
    by scientists. The extent of internal exposure
    should be indicated in units of becquerels.
    Assessment of health should be impossible without
    figures (in becquerels).
  • Speech by Professor Tasuhiko Kodama Head of the
    Radioisotope Center at the Univ. of Tokyo July 27
    giving testimony to the Committee on Welfare and
    Labor in Japans Lower House in the Diet
    Criticized the governments failure to provide
    sensitive meters to test internal exposure and
    notes that internal radiation exposure measured
    in millisieverts is utterly meaningless

18
Lesson 1 Conclusions for Japan
  • Japanese government and Tepco authorities
    trivialized the risk and withheld vital
    information about the risks, leading people to
    take inadequate safety preparations and causing
    people to fail to evacuate to safe areas.
  • This inappropriate minimization of risk persists
    in the monitoring of citizens internal radiation
    exposure and in the testing of food and water.

19
Overview of Lesson 1 US and Canada
  • US Canadian Officials Censored and Trivialized
    Radiation Fallout, Preventing Citizens from
    Taking Simple Measures that Might Have Reduced
    Exposure Risks
  • Canadian gov. failed to disclose Iodine-131 in
    precipitation
  • Canadian gov. failed to test for contamination
    (or release results)
  • US officials minimized risks despite models
    predicting health effects from exposure to
    Fukushima Iodine-131 in Alaska and detection of
    Iodine-131 throughout nation
  • These incidents reveal a failure to warn and
    protect the public in a context of new knowledge
    about the harmful health effects of exposure to
    relatively low-levels of ionizing radiation

20
Canadian Officials Failed To Disclose Fallout
Exceeding Safety Levels
  • What are officials hiding about Fukushima? By
    Alex Roslin Oct 20 2011 http//www.straight.com/ar
    ticle-491941/vancouver/what-are-officials-hiding-a
    bout-fukushima
  • data shows rainwater in Calgary last March had
    an average of 8.18 becquerels per liter of
    radioactive iodine, easily exceeding the Canadian
    guideline of six becquerels per liter for
    drinking water.
  • Its above the recommended level for drinking
    water, Eric Pellerin, chief of Health Canadas
    radiation-surveillance division, admitted in a
    phone interview from Ottawa. At any time you
    sample it, it should not exceed the guideline.
  • Canadian government officials didnt disclose
    the high radiation readings to the public.
    Instead, they repeatedly insisted that fallout
    drifting to Canada was negligible and posed no
    health concerns.

21
Lesson 1 Governments Reduce Perceptions of Risk
By Failing to Test
  • Roslin cont Health Canadas data on rainwater
    is also puzzling for another reason. It sharply
    contrasts with the data collected by SFU
    associate professor of chemistry Krzysztof
    Starosta. He found iodine-131 levels in rainwater
    in Burnaby spiked to 13 becquerels per litre in
    the days after Fukushima. Thats many times
    higher than the levels detected in Vancouver by
    Health Canada.
  • Food is another big question mark. The Canadian
    Food Inspection Agency briefly tested Japanese
    food imports from the area around Fukushima, but
    it dropped those measures in June. Canada now
    relies on Japanese authorities to screen
    contaminated food.

22
US Officials Minimize Risk
  • We Do Not Expect Harmful Levels of Radiation To
    Reach U.S.http//www.youtube.com/watch?vlpAqiGSp
    29c
  • Broad, W. (2011, March 13). "Military Crew Said
    to Be Exposed to Radiation, but Officials Call
    Risk in US Slight" New York Times
    http//www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/world/asia/14plu
    me.html?_r1
  • On Sunday, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said
    it expected no harmful levels of radioactivity
    to move on the winds to Hawaii, Alaska or the
    West Coast from the reactors in Japan, given the
    thousands of miles between the two countries.

23
Safe? Cascades and Hot Particles
  • Research conducted by Arnie Gunderson and Marco
    Kaltofen
  • In the early days of the disaster, 10 hot
    particles a day inhaled in Seattle, 100X more in
    Japan.
  • Hot spots of hot particles in Seattle and local
    contamination throughout Cascades of 100
    becquerels (disintegrations per second) in about
    2 pounds of dirt
  • Marco Kaltofen found 100 becquerels from
    Cesium-134 and 137 in a square meter in the
    Portland Oregon area. This research was conducted
    before November 6
  • The radiation is going to cause cancer on a
    statistical basis
  • Findings discussed in Update from Gundersen on
    Robert Knight's Five O'Clock Shadow - WBAI, New
    York http//fairewinds.com/content/update-gunderse
    n-robert-knights-five-oclock-shadow-wbai-new-york
  • The data Gunderson discusses in this recent
    interview were presented in a November 6
    Interview - with Marco Kaltofen - titled
    "Airborne Radiation Spread" http//enenews.com/uni
    versity-researcher-weve-seen-radioactive-rain-outs
    -in-areas-of-oregon-and-washington-areas-with-a-lo
    t-more-radiation-video  0r http//www.youtube.com/
    watch?vRJe7rCHXgYs
  • Paper by Marco Kaltofen (2011, Oct. 31)
    Radiation Exposure to the Population in Japan
    after the Earthquake. American Public Health
    Association. http//apha.confex.com/apha/139am/web
    program/Paper254015.html

24
Iodine-131 in Kansas and Pacific Northwest
  • Govt Report Kansas detected Iodine-131 in grass
    at over 2,000 pCi/kg Attributed to Fukushima
    Report of Radiological Environmental Monitoring
    of the Environs Surrounding Wolf Creek Generating
    Station, Kansas Department of Health and
    Environment, July 2010-June 2011 Sample
    WCFV-1-A-005-2.5Location SharpeType
    PasturageDate April 5, 2011
  • Sample contained 2072.0 72 pCi/kg 131I and
    503.0 29 137Cs. This was not a result of WCGS
    operation, but is attributed to the Fukushima
    nuclear incident in Japan.
  • Radiation Levels in Northwest Rain Were Up to
    131 Times Drinking Water Standards Following
    Fukushima, Japan Nuclear Reactor Explosion.
    Heart of American Northwest. Press Release July
    7 Radiation Levels in Rain in WA and OR were
    high enough to be of concern despite news reports
    and officials stating that levels were below any
    level of public health concern

25
EPA Data and Individual Sampling Show Elevated
Levels of Radiation
  • Analysis of EPA data by Independent Consultant
    Robert Soltysik (http//freepdfhosting.com/e9ba187
    7d6.pdf)
  • He also analyzed the December EPA radiation data
    from Corvallis, Oregon for 2008 and 2011.
  • Beta was 2.1 times higher (112). Gamma range 3
    (200-400 keV) was up 4.4, gamma range 5 (600-800
    keV) was up 8.2, and gamma range 6 (800-1000
    keV) was up 4.8.
  • Ret. Capt. Clyde Stagner conducted similar
    analysis for Phoenix using EPA Envirofacts
    database for 2011 and 2010 and found 2011 up
    18.3 Gross Beta as compared to 2010

Time Period US beta radiation level N plt
March 15-31 5.09x background 1093 .001
April 1-30   2.01x background 1877 .001
May 1-23 1.15x background 1173 .011
26
Fukushima Uranium Transport Facilitated by Use of
Seawater
  • Uranyl peroxide enhanced nuclear fuel corrosion
    in seawater
  • Christopher R. Armstronga,1, May Nymanb, Tatiana
    Shvarevaa, Ginger E. Sigmonc, Peter C. Burnsc,d,
    and Alexandra Navrotskya,2
  • aPeter A. Rock Thermochemistry Laboratory and
    Nanomaterials in the Environment, Agriculture and
    Technology Organized Research Unit, University of
    California Davis, Davis, CA 95616
  • bSandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM
    87185
  • cDepartment of Civil Engineering and Geological
    Sciences, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame,
    IN 46556 and
  • dDepartment of Chemistry and Biochemistry,
    University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556
  • Contributed by Alexandra Navrotsky, November 30,
    2011 (sent for review October 31, 2011)
  • Abstract
  • The Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear accident brought
    together compromised irradiated fuel and large
    amounts of seawater in a high radiation field.
    Based on newly acquired thermochemical data for a
    series of uranyl peroxide compounds containing
    charge-balancing alkali cations, here we show
    that nanoscale cage clusters containing as many
    as 60 uranyl ions, bonded through peroxide and
    hydroxide bridges, are likely to form in solution
    or as precipitates under such conditions. These
    species will enhance the corrosion of the damaged
    fuel and, being thermodynamically stable and
    kinetically persistent in the absence of
    peroxide, they can potentially transport uranium
    over long distances.

27
Significance of Fallout
  • Mangano, J. Sherman, J. (2012). An Unexpected
    Mortality Increase in the United States Following
    Arrival of the Radioactive Plume from Fukushima
    Is There a Correlation? International Journal of
    Health Services, 42(1) 47-62.
  • Excess mortality statistics called by independent
    researcher Robert Soltysik http//freepdfhosting.c
    om/ccafb5715d.pdf http//i40.tinypic.com/2q39p8p.j
    pg

28
Significance?
  • For every 10 mSv of low-dose ionizing radiation,
    there was a 3 increase in the risk of age- and
    sex-adjusted cancer over a mean follow-up period
    of five years (hazard ratio 1.003 per
    milliSievert, 95 confidence interval
    1.0021.004). Cancer risk related to low-dose
    ionizing radiation from cardiac imaging in
    patients after acute myocardial infarction. By M
    J. Eisenberg, Jonathan A., P. R. Lawler, M.
    Abrahamowicz , Hugues R., L. Pilote
    http//www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC305094
    7/?toolpubmed
  • New Research on childhood leukemia and nuclear
    plants suggests significant health effects from
    low levels of ionizing radiation International
    Journal of Cancer study by C. Sermage-Faure, D.
    Laurier, S. Goujon-Bellec, M. Chartier, A.
    Guyot-Goubin, J. Rudant, D. Hemon and J. Clavel,
    Childhood leukemia around French nuclear power
    plants the Geocap study, 2002 2007,
    http//onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ijc.274
    25/pdf.
  • Prof. Yuri Bandazhevsky found that children
    contaminated with cesium-137 producing 50
    disintegrations per second (becquerels) per
    kilogram of body weight suffered irreversible
    heart damage . (Starrr, S. 2012 Health Threat
    From Cesium 1-137. Japan Times Feb 16. Available
    http//www.japantimes.co.jp/text/rc20120216a1.html
  • Genomic Damage in Children Accidently Exposed to
    Ionizing Radiation A Review of the Literature.
    Fucic, A. et al. (2008). Mutation Research, 658,
    111-123. Overall, the evidence from the
    studiesreveals consistently increased chromosome
    aberration and micronuclei frequency in exposed
    than in referent children
  • New Understandings of radiation Bystander effect
    and DNA Instability
  • New model emphasizes how low-dose radiation can
    cause indirect damage to cells through the
    bystander effect and through genomic instability.
    The effects of low-dose ionizing radiation are
    variable and can reduce DNA repair mechanisms,
    operate lethally on cells or some instances
    activate them depending upon type of radiation,
    chemical environment, etc.
  • Dietrich Averbeck, a, Towards a New Paradigm for
    Evaluating the Effects of Exposure to Ionizing
    Radiation Mutation Research/Fundamental and
    Molecular Mechanisms of Mutagenesis Volume 687,
    Issues 1-2, 1 May 2010 pages 7-12

29
NRC NO HARMFUL LEVELS
  • excerpt On Sunday, the International Atomic
    Energy Agency offered a spot of good news. The
    prevailing winds at Daiichi are blowing to the
    northeast, out to sea, and should continue to do
    so for the next three days.
  • If the wind carries the emissions to sea, that
    will certainly minimize the human and
    environmental impacts in Japan, said Timothy
    Mousseau of the University of South Carolina, who
    has spent the past decade studying the ecological
    consequences of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.
  • Such emissions would not endanger the United
    States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
    announced Sunday in a statement. Given the
    thousands of miles between the countries, the
    United States is not expected to experience any
    harmful levels of radioactivity. In other words,
    the danger could simply dissipate over the
    Pacific.
  • Ultimate impact of damage to Japan nuclear
    reactors still unknown. Brian Vastag, Published
    March 13, 2011http//www.washingtonpost.com/nation
    al/ultimate-impact-of-damage-to-japan-nuclear-reac
    tors-still-unknown/2011/03/13/ABbwoBU_story.html

30
NRC Failed to Disclose Its Scenarios for Fallout
in Alaska
  • Washington Post While assuring Americans
    publicly that there was no danger, the NRC did
    not disclose one worst-case scenario, which did
    not rule out the possibility of radiation
    exceeding safe levels for thyroid doses in
    Alaska, the e-mails show. Because things were
    uncertain, we considered it but the data that was
    available .?.?. did not support that very
    pessimistic scenario so no, it was not discussed
    publicly at that point, NRC spokesman Scott
    Burnell said. In the end, Alaska was not
    affected. (Mufson, S. 2012, Feb 7. Messages
    show conflict within NRC after Japans
    earthquakes and tsunami WashingtonPost
    http//www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/mes
    sages-show-conflict-within-nrc-after-japan-earthqu
    ake-and-tsunami/2012/01/09/gIQA2ll6uQ_print.html
  • Japan not alone in failing to protect population
    The WSJs criticism of Japan may apply to NRC
    The failure to disburse the preventive pills
    follows other examples of how the Japanese
    government failed to implement available measures
    aimed at protecting local residents from the
    harms of radiation Hayashi, Y. (2011, September
    29). Japan Officials Failed to Hand Out
    Radiation Pills in Quakes Aftermath

31
Deliberate Government Censorship?
  • No health effects are expected among the
    Japanese people as a result of the events at
    Fukushima, read a statement issued by the
    Nuclear Energy Institute, the nuclear industry
    trade group, at a June Washington Press
    conference (Karl Grossman Fukushima and the
    Nuclear Establishment, Counterpunch 2011, June
    16 http//counterpunch.org/grossman06162011.html)
    .
  • According to The Guardian, two days after the
    earthquake British government authorities
    contacted nuclear companies including
    Westinghouse, Areva, EDF Energy, and the Nuclear
    Industry Association to coordinate a public
    relations campaign aimed at assuring the public
    nuclear is safe in order to avoid resistance to a
    new generation of nuclear plants planned for the
    UK. In April, the UK office for nuclear
    development met with nuclear companies in London
    to "to discuss a joint communications and
    engagement strategy aimed at ensuring we maintain
    confidence among the British public on the safety
    of nuclear power stations and nuclear new-build
    policy in light of recent events at the Fukushima
    nuclear power plant."
  • Rob Edwards Revealed British Government's Plan
    To Play Down Fukushima, The Guardian (2011, June
    30) http//www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/ju
    n/30/british-government-plan-play-down-fukushima.

32
ConclusionLessons from Government Censorship
  • Public cannot currently rely on government to
    accurately describe risks posed by an ongoing
    disaster nor can they rely on government to
    evaluate ongoing risks to health posed by
    disasters
  • Government regulatory agencies are likely to
    minimize risks in order to prevent panic and
    public outrage

33
Lessons from Government Censorship
  • Japan betrayed citizens over radiation danger
    ABC Ballarat Australian Broadcasting
    Corporation ABC Australia. Mark Willacy January
    19, 2012
  • Japan has been accused of betraying its own
    people by giving the American military
    information about the spread of radiation from
    Fukushima more than a week before it told the
    Japanese public.
  • The mayor of a Japanese community abandoned
    because of its proximity to the Fukushima nuclear
    plant has told AM the governments actions are
    akin to murder.
  • An official from Japans science ministry, which
    was in charge of mapping the spread of radiation,
    has acknowledged to AM that perhaps the public
    should have been told about the dangers at the
    same time the US military was informed. ...
  • Just three days after the tsunami crushed the
    Fukushima nuclear plant, Japans science ministry
    handed over computer predictions about the
    radiation dispersal to the US military. ...
    Namie Mayor Tamotsu Baba
  • Because we had no information, we were
    unwittingly evacuating to an area where the
    radiation level was high. So Im very worried
    about the peoples health
  • I feel pain in my heart but also rage over the
    poor actions of the government
  • Its not nice language, but I still think it was
    an act of murder
  • What were they thinking when it came to peoples
    dignity and lives? I doubt that they even thought
    about our existence
  • Itaru Watanabe from the science ministry says the
    government
  • According to the government panel investigating
    the disaster, the information about the potential
    spread of radiation could have been given to the
    public
  • The science ministry should have told the
    nuclear disaster task force to pass on the data
    to the people But we didnt think of that

34
Overview Lesson 2
  • Government censorship and denial can succeed
    because the mainstream media largely fail to
    investigate government and Tepco reports.
  • Censorship/Data Manipulation evident in media
    reporting
  • Pattern Exists Between Alarming Initial Reports
    and Subsequent Efforts by Officials to Minimize
    Perceptions of Danger, Which Are Reported
    Uncritically by Mainstream Media
  • Media, including western media, may directly
    withhold vital information deliberately and as a
    result of their unwillingness to question or
    investigate official pronouncements
  • Mainstream media may frame issues in ways that
    inaccurately and/or misleadingly represent the
    significance and/or severity of the information.

35
Summary of Media Misrepresentations
  • During the early days of the disaster the
    Japanese press reported
  • That no explosions had occurred
  • That no more explosions would occur within hours
    of more explosions
  • That no meltdowns had occurred
  • That no radiation had been released
  • that the effects of radiation released was too
    small to affect health
  • That contamination was limited to peoples
    clothes
  • That no danger was posed by radioactive iodine in
    tap water
  • That contaminated food was safe to eat
  • US news media even less critical in reporting
    than Japanese press, particularly given an
    inability to formalize in print
  • that meltdowns had occurred
  • that melt-throughs were reported
  • that cold shutdown is a fantasy
  • Japanese, American and other nations media all
    systematically under-represented the scale of
    radiation releases, their ongoing dynamics, and
    their probable health effects
  • In particular, emphasis on no immediate effects
    and no acute effects functioned to mislead
    publics about severity of releases

36
A Note on Method Analyzing Mainstream Press
Reporting in Japan, Canada, US
  • We learn the most from the Japanese press when
    they interview experts not employed by Tepco or
    the national Japanese government.
  • Typically, an informative Japanese press release
    is followed by contradictory statements from
    Japanese government and Tepco officials
  • Observers must discern developments from leaked
    comments by officials, Japanese bloggers
    investigations (Ex-SKF and Fukushima Diary),
    from FOIA requests, (Enformable) and from
    crowd-sourced interpretations of the Tepco and
    JNN reported plant data and webcams.
  • Observers interpretations of webcam are limited
    by a variety of factors, including increasingly
    poor visibility and outright censorship.

37
Propaganda Techniques
  • Or-well January 15, 2012 at 1146 am Log in to
    Reply
  • RE-BUNK restating a position that is not
    well-supported factually, or restating it with
    details changed. Serves to promote confusion,
    intended to support a weak or unsupportable
    position.
  • E.G. Reactors are in cold-shutdown partial
    meltdown
  • POST-BUNKING pro-active and after-the-fact.
    Restates a position, or promotes false/misleading
    info or adds false/misleading info in response to
    new or discovered conditions. May serve to
    reposition or even change a previously stated
    position or intention.
  • No immediate health effects
  • PRE-BUNKING falsely positioning future intended
    acts or consequences, falsely framing terms of
    future discussion, serves to obfuscate and/or
    limit discovery through complete dialogue.
  • no Chernobyl
  • http//enenews.com/study-authors-now-20000-excess-
    u-s-deaths-after-fukushima-not-14000-follow-up-art
    icle-looking-at-age-groups-cities-in-works

38
Japanese Authorities on Japanese Television
(Pre-Bunking ) No Meltdown, No Danger
  • During the midst of these disasters, Japanese
    authorities insisted that there was little to no
    danger. On March 12, University of Tokyo
    Professor Naoto Sekimura appeared repeatedly on
    Japanese television to reassure local residents
    that all was under control.
  • David McNeill of CNN reports Sekimuras
    comments Only a small part of the fuel may
    have melted and leaked outside, he said.
    Residents near the power station should stay
    calm, because most of the fuel remains inside
    the reactor, which has stopped operating and is
    being cooled. In April, a former nuclear
    regulator who had served as a consultant to TEPCO
    in April claimed publicly that there was no
    danger of a total meltdown.
  • David McNeill Who's Telling the Truth On the
    Fukushima Meltdown? CNNGo.Com (2011, June 15)
    CNNGo.com http//www.cnngo.com/tokyo/life/tell-me-
    about-it/david-mcneill-whos-telling-truth-fukushim
    a-448215ixzz1PMTJwTk1.
  •  
  • Ex-Regulator Resigns from Tepco, Reuters video
    (2011, April 19) http//www.reuters.com/article/v
    ideo/idUSTRE73I10E20110419?videoId204721879.

39
Lesson 2 Denying ExplosionsComparison of
Initial Reports With Subsequent Statements
(Post-Bunking)
  • Report from Ex-SKF here Saturday, March 12, 2011
  • Ex-SKF Explosion at Fukushima Nuclear Plant,
    Evacuation Expanded to 20 Kilometers, Government
    Doesnt Tell the whole Truth
  • 430 pm, disaster prevention radio is flowing
    again. "There have been reports (that the
    explosion), it was a mistake."
  • http//ex-skf.blogspot.com/2011/03/explosion-at-fu
    kushima-i-nuclear-plant.html. His links for
    sources
  • http//www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/news/20110313-OY
    T1T00047.htm?frommain3
  • http//translate.google.com/translate?slautotle
    njsnprev_thlenieUTF-8layout2eotf1uht
    tp3A2F2Fwww.yomiuri.co.jp2Fnational2Fnews2F2
    0110313-OYT1T00047.htm3Ffrom3Dmain3

40
Japanese Press Uncritically Repeat Government
Assertions No Radiation Leaks
  • The Japan Times March 12, 2011, Saturday Kan
    pledges full rescue responseKanako Takahara,
    Staff writer Prime Minister Naoto Kan said the
    government is doing its utmost to ensure the
    public's safety and minimize the damage,
    including dispatching the Self-Defense Forces for
    rescue operations, following the massive
    earthquake and tsunami that hit the Tohoku region
    Friday.
  • "I ask the people to act with calm and continue
    to listen carefully for information via
    television and radio," Kan said in a televised
    address.He said some nuclear power plants
    stopped operations but the government detected no
    radiation leaks.

41
Sample Analysis Press Releases Aimed at
Minimizing Perceptions of Risk Emphasize No
Health Effects
  • Jiji Press March 12 News Addresses Radiation
    Releases
  • Jiji Press Ticker Service March 12, 2011 Saturday
    1113 PM JST (Update) Blast Hits Japan N-Reactor
    Building Container Unhurt
  • Because of the pressure release, radioactive
    substance may have leaked. At 329 p.m. on the
    fringe of the plant's grounds, the company
    detected radiation of 1,015 microsieverts per
    hour, almost equivalent to the maximum allowable
    annual radiation exposure of 1,000 microsieverts
    for a civilian. The radiation level was reduced
    later.
  • Jiji Press March 13 Information Management
    Aimed At Reducing Perceptions of Risk
  • March 13, 2011 Sunday 127 PM JST (Update) Safety
    of Japanese Nuclear Reactor Secured after Blast
    There appear to be little risk for now that a
    massive amount of radioactive substances will
    leak from the reactor, officials at the Nuclear
    and Industrial Safety Agency said. Chief Cabinet
    Secretary Yukio Edano said at a news conference
    that the amount of radioactive substances
    released due to the work is so small that human
    health is not affected. (http//www.lexisnexis.com
    .ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verbs
    rcsi169235stermsPUBLICATION(KyodoNewsInterna
    tionalTokyo))

42
Media Report Official Statements Uncritically
Despite Absurdity Radiation Exposure Limited to
Clothes
  • Japanese Residents May Have Been Exposed to
    RadiationTokyo, March 13 Jiji Press Ticker
    Service 1019 AM http//www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy
    1.lib.asu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verbsrcsi16
    9235stermsPUBLICATION(KyodoNewsInternationalT
    okyo)
  • Nine residents may have been exposed to
    radiation while being evacuated from an area near
    a quake-damaged nuclear plant in northern Japan,
    a government official said Sunday morning. The
    residents were evacuated by bus from the town of
    Futaba in Fukushima Prefecture, where the No. 1
    Fukushima nuclear plant is located, Chief Cabinet
    Secretary Yukio Edano said at a news conference.
  • Edano said the exposure was apparently limited to
    their clothes, there will be no serious health
    damage, Edano said

43
March 14 No Danger After Initial Explosions
  •  Jiji Press Ticker Service March 14, 2011 Monday
    1140 PM JST (Update) Partial Meltdown May Have
    Occurred at Another Fukushima Reactor
    http//www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/hot
    topics/lnacademic/?verbsrcsi169235stermsPUBLI
    CATION(KyodoNewsInternationalTokyo)
  • Tepco said Monday evening that the No. 2 reactor
    of its quake-hit Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power
    plant may have experienced a partial meltdown.
    The fuel rods of the reactor, each of which is 4
    meters long, became fully exposed to air because
    of a substantial drop in the amount of cooling
    water in the reactor, according to the firm's
    report to the prefectural government of
    Fukushima, northeastern Japan. For about two
    hours after that, the reactor appeared to have
    kept operating without any cooling water, and
    this might have caused the fuel rods to melt
  • Tepco also said that the No. 1 and No. 2
    reactors at its Fukushima No. 2 nuclear plant
    were no longer in dangerous states as the
    temperatures inside the reactors fell below 100
    degrees Celsius.
  • Unit 2 Explodes March 15

44
No Danger in From Radioactive Iodine in Tap Water
  • This analysis of news framing was conducted by
    blogger Ex-SKF March 19 comparing Kyodo News
    Japanese and Kyodo News English
    http//ex-skf.blogspot.com/2011/03/japan-earthquak
    e-kyodo-news-english-vs.html
  • One of the major headlines in Kyodo News English
    site (front page)Radioactive iodine beyond
    limit detected in tap water in Fukushima
  • One of the major headlines in Kyodo News Japanese
    site (front page) (translation)Radioactive
    iodine and cesium detected in tap water in
    Ibaragi, below limit, no health risk
  • Ex-SKF comments Is this some kind of a joke?
    English language news for doom and gloom foreign
    media consumption, and Japanese language news for
    extend and pretend Japanese media consumption?

45
Japanese Nuclear Regulators Still
Mis-Representing Scale of Disaster in April
  • In April, a former nuclear regulator who had
    served as a consultant to TEPCO in April claimed
    publicly that there was no danger of a total
    meltdown.
  • Ex-Regulator Resigns from Tepco, Reuters video
    (2011, April 19) http//www.reuters.com/article/v
    ideo/idUSTRE73I10E20110419?videoId204721879.

46
Rating of Accident Failed to Reflect Severity of
Multiple Explosions and Massive Releases
  • Fukushima N-Plant Accidents Rated Level 5, Worst
    in Japan Anonymous. Jiji Press English News
    Service Tokyo 19 Mar 2011.
  • Tokyo, March 18 (Jiji Press)--Japan on Friday
    gave a provisional rating of Level 5 to accidents
    at the No. 1, 2 and 3 reactors of Tokyo Electric
    Power Co.'s quake-damaged Fukushima No. 1 nuclear
    power plant, the worst for any nuclear accident
    that has happened in the nation.
  • The No. 1, 2 and 3 reactors at the Fukushima
    plant are seen to have experienced partial
    meltdowns, the first such phenomenon in Japan, as
    their cooling system were damaged by tsunami
    waves unleashed by the 9.0-magnitude earthquake
    that hit the Tohoku northeastern Japan region
    including Fukushima Prefecture.
  • At the No. 1, 2 and 4 reactors of Tokyo Electric
    Power's Fukushima No. 2 nuclear plant, the
    pumping systems temporarily stopped working. The
    nuclear safety agency thus gave a rating of Level
    3 to the incidents. END

47
US Media Pre-bunkingInitial Assurances
Findings
  • Its simply impossible to imagine anything like
    Chernobyl happening in these reactors, despite
    all the problems theyre having.
    http//www.npr.org/2011/03/14/134543680/sizing-up-
    japan-s-nuclear-emergency-no-chernobyl
  • Stephen Kurczy Staff writer. The Christian
    Science Monitor March 17, 2011 byline Fear of
    Japan's nuclear crisis far exceeds actual risks,
    say scientists Pop culture has long helped fuel
    an irrational fear of radiation, and dire
    warnings about Japan's embattled Fukushima
    Daiichi nuclear power plant are likely overblown,
    scientists say.
  • There is no question of a Chernobyl situation or
    of anything like the same threat to human health
    and safety An accident like Chernobyl cannot
    happen againthis is a reactor of a different
    generation. Even in the worst-case scenario of a
    total coolant failure, the radiation released
    will be hundreds of times less than from
    Chernobyl. http//www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
    2011/03/13/why-japans-nuclear-meltdown-is-no-chern
    obyl.html

Summary Report of RSMC Beijing on Fukushima
Nuclear Accident Emergency Response   WORLD
METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION CBS/CG-NERA/Doc. 5.4
(27.10.2011) Nuclear leaks occurred in
Fukushima and lasted for five days. The total
release amount was equal to that of Chernobyl
nuclear explosion p. 4
48
Lesson 2 WSJ Unable to Write Full Melt-Down
  • Article Power, Stephen Smith, Rebecca (2011,
    July 18). Nuclear plant safety proposals put on
    fast track. The Wall Street Journal, p. A3.
  • The print version of this article (referenced
    above) described the Fukushima mega-disaster as
    a partial meltdown
  • Article Nuclear Plant Loses Electricity in
    Temblor. The Wall Street Journal August 24
  • Electricity is needed to keep the reactor cores
    covered with coolant and to keep safe
    temperatures in spent fuel pools. Problems in
    both those areas led to the near-meltdown of
    reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan,
    following a 9.0 earthquake and tsunami on March
    11. http//online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311
    1903461304576526642400085456.html

49
December WSJ Finally Announces Meltdown
  • Wall Street Journal finally reports Reactor Core
    Melted Fully, Japan SaysFuel Breeched Vessel
    Floor, Operator Says, in its Gravest Status
    Report M. Obe T. Fowler (2011, Dec 1), p. A8
  • one reactors molten core likely burned through
    its primary containment chamber and then ate as
    far as three-quarters of the way through the
    concrete in a secondary vessel
  • The New York Times had reported this level of
    meltdown May 25 Japan Sees Signs of 2 More
    Meltdowns by H. Tabuchi p. 10
  • The plants operator also said that it was
    possible that the pressure vessels in the three
    stricken reactors, which house the uranium fuel
    rods, had been breeched as well. But most of the
    fuel remained inside the vessels, the company
    said far from a more severe nuclear meltdown in
    which molten fuel penetrates the ground, a
    calamity known as the China Syndrome

50
Meltdown was Really a Melt-Through, Reported in
June by the Yomiuri
  • 'Melt-through' at Fukushima? / Govt report to
    IAEA suggests situation worse than
    meltdownhttp//www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110
    607005367.htm"Nuclear fuel in three reactors at
    the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant has possibly
    melted through pressure vessels and accumulated
    at the bottom of outer containment vessels,
    according to a government report obtained Tuesday
    by The Yomiuri Shimbun."A "melt-through"--when
    melted nuclear fuel leaks from the bottom of
    damaged reactor pressure vessels into containment
    vessels--is far worse than a core meltdown and is
    the worst possibility in a nuclear accident.
  • Justin McCurry Fukushima Nuclear Plant May Have
    Suffered Melt-Through, Japan Admits, The
    Guardian (2011, Jun3 8) http//www.guardian.co.uk
    /world/2011/jun/08/fukushima-nuclear-plant-melt-th
    rough?CMPtwt_gu 
  •  Julian Ryall Nuclear Fuel Has Melted Through
    Base of Fukushima Plant, The Telegraph (2011,
    June 9) http//www.telegraph.co.uk/news/8565020/
    Nuclear-fuel-has-melted-through-base-of-Fukushima-
    plant.html
  • TEPCO Melted fuel ate into containment vessel
    http//www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/20111130_39.ht
    ml

51
No Major U.S. Newspaper Reported the Melt-Through
in June-Nov
  • Searched ABI and Lexus-Nexus using Fukushima and
    melt-through, Fukushima and meltthrough and
    Fukushima and China syndrome
  • Japanese Press Melt-through at Fukushima? Govt
    report to IAEA suggests situation worse than
    meltdown. The Daily Yomiuri(Tokyo), June 8, 2011
    Wednesday, Pg. 1
  • 1 US PAPER PICKED UP THIS REPORT INDIRECTLY. NO
    MENTION OF A MELT-THROUGH BE FOUND IN US MAJOR
    NEWSPAPERS AFTER THIS ONE REPORT UNTIL DEC

52
The 1 indirect report of the melt-through was
buried and on page A10.
  • Chico Harlan (2011, June 8) Japan to create
    independent nuclear agency. The Washington Post,
    A10.
  • As the disaster unfolded, Japanese authorities
    relied on computer models and uncertain data
    while trying to assess the full scope of the
    damage to the reactor cores. Even now, it will
    probably be years before guesses about units 1, 2
    and 3 turn into facts. But the government's
    admission Tuesday of a possible melt-through
    reaffirmed assumptions held by outside
    scientists.
  • "It's much like the Japanese government conceding
    that gravity is a possibility," David Lochbaum,
    an independent nuclear power expert, wrote in an
    e-mail. "Studies for decades have consistently
    concluded that a reactor core without cooling and
    makeup will overheat, melt, slump to the bottom
    of the reactor vessel, and burn through the
    vessel wall and drop on to the drywell floor."

53
Australian Media Can Type It Melt-Through
  • The Age (Melbourne, Australia) June 10, 2011
    Friday First EditionMeltdown to the core
    JAPANSECTION NEWS In Brief Overseas Pg.
    15LENGTH 121 wordsTOKYO. Molten nuclear fuel
    in three reactors at the Fukushima No. 1 power
    plant is likely to have burnt through pressure
    vessels, not just the cores. It is the first time
    Japanese authorities have admitted the
    possibility that the fuel suffered "melt-through"
    - more serious than a core meltdown. The report,
    which is to be submitted to the International
    Atomic Energy Agency, said fuel rods in reactors
    Nos. 1, 2 and 3 had probably not only melted, but
    also breached their inner containment vessels and
    accumulated in the outer steel containment
    vessels. The plant's operator, Tokyo Electric
    Power (Tepco), says it believes the molten fuel
    is being cooled by water that has built up in the
    bottom of the three reactor buildings.

54
Lesson 2 Media Censorship Japanese Gov. and
Media Report Cold Shutdown Despite Increasing
Evidence of Iodine-131 and Spiking Cesium in Dec
2011.
  • In this 4 minute clip, Prime Minister Noda of
    Japan explains that the claim of "cold shutdown"
    of the reactors was based on the average
    temperature of the overall reactor pressure
    vehicles (not bottom). 
  • PM Noda refused to address journalists' questions
    concerning the status of the fuel rods given
    Tepco's previous admission that melt-throughs had
    occurred.  http//www.youtube.com/watch?vMxUQKJwk
    IeYfeatureplayer_embedded
  • Fukushima Diary posted finding of Iodine-131 in
    dehydration sludge, sampled between 12/1 12/6
    in Japan. Original link here http//www.gesui.metr
    o.tokyo.jp/oshi/infn0579.htm
  • Also here http//www.pref.gunma.jp/cate_list/ct000
    05089.html
  • Evidence of Increasing detections of Iodine-131,
    which has an 8 day half life, indicate ongoing
    fission.
  • Dr. Chris Busby also asserts ongoing fission in
    this Dec 27 Russia Today interview
    http//www.youtube.com/watch?v1F0uFAWV7uc

55
Cold Shutdown?
  • The Mainichi Daily News News Navigator What is
    a 'cold shutdown' at the Fukushima nuclear plant?
    December 17 http//mdn.mainichi.jp/perspectives/ne
    ws/20111217p2a00m0na015000c.html
  • Excerpted "Question What does it mean when a
    nuclear reactor has achieved a "cold shutdown?"
  • Answer It means the reactors have been
    stabilized and shut down. Under normal
    circumstances this means control rods have been
    inserted into the gaps between the fuel rods in
    the reactor, and the temperature of the water in
    the reactor pressure con
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com