NASA Navy Cooperation - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

About This Presentation

NASA Navy Cooperation


... Communities of Practice supporting the Space Shuttle Program return-to-flight efforts. ... Calendars, Action Tracking, Announcements, Polls, Contacts, ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:205
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 35
Provided by: jsteven3


Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: NASA Navy Cooperation

NASA / Navy Cooperation Process Based Mission
Assurance Knowledge Management System (PBMA-KMS
) functional support to program and project
Henry Hartt and Don Vecellio ARES Corporation NA
SA Office of Safety Mission Assurance
April 5, 2005
  • FOR
  • Notable similarities between human space flight
    and nuclear submarine programs.
  • Both spacecraft and submarines operate in extreme
  • Both require integration of complex systems and
  • Both must maintain the highest levels of safety
    and reliability to perform their missions.
  • Navy has continued to operate safely and
    effectively in resource-constrained and declining
    production environments.
  • As NASA explores application of nuclear
    propulsion and power for space exploration,
    lessons learned from the Navys nuclear safety
    program could be beneficial.
  • Given current management challenges the Agency
    might benefit from in-depth examination of the
    engineering management, safety, and mission
    assurance practices employed by the Navy
    submarine force.

Initial Areas of Emphasis for NNBE Investigations
  • Assurance Requirements
  • SUBSAFE, Deep Submergence, Nuclear Reactors,
    Space Shuttle Program
  • Assurance Planning and Analysis
  • Life-Cycle Risk Management Requirements,
    Approaches, Tools (e.g., FMEA, Criticality
    Analysis, PRA, Hazard Analysis, etc.) for
    Design, Manufacturing, and Operations
  • Assurance Processes
  • Management, Organizational approach (reporting
    relationships / requirements flow-down),
    Resource Loading, Engineering, Training
  • Control Processes
  • Work Control, work instructions, configuration
    management, component/work documentation /
    pedigree (NAVY SUBSAFE Re-entry Control (REC)
    Process), Non-conformance disposition, Work
    review, Surveillance / Inspection, Change
    Control, Design Change Control, Configuration
  • Verification Processes
  • Audits Functional (SUBSAFE Periodic ), NASA
    Process Verification, NASA NEQA Audit,
    Certification, Ships Leave the Shipyard (hull
    or vehicle) SUBSAFE Pre-Fast Cruise, Audit,
    Parts see REC, Operational Readiness,
    SUBSAFE Unrestricted Operations Maintenance
    Requirements Certification (URO-MRC), Space
    Shuttle Certification of Flight Readiness Process

Navy Organizations Visited by NASA
  • NAVSEA (Naval Sea Systems Command) HQ / WNY
  • NAVSEA 07 (SUBSAFE Program)
  • NAVSEA 08 (Naval Reactors)
  • NAVSEA 05 (Ship Design Integration and
  • SUPSHIP (Supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion
    and Repair)
  • Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
  • SUBMEPP (Submarine Maintenance Engineering,
    Planning and Procurement)
  • NAVSEALOGCEN (NAVSEA Logistics Center)
  • SHAPEC (Ship Availability Planning and
    Engineering Center )
  • Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard Integrated
    Maintenance Facility
  • SUBSAFE Functional Audit
  • General Dynamics Electric Boat Division
  • Bath Iron Works

Navy Strengths
  • Rigor of SUBSAFE Safety Assurance Process
  • NAVSEA 08 religious assignment of lifecycle
    assurance responsibility
  • Emphasis on Minority Opinion in the Decision
  • Emphasis on Recurrent Training
  • NAVSEA Warrants Independent Technical
  • PDREP/RYG processes of maintaining a record of
    contractor/supplier Quality Assurance (QA)

NASA/NAVY Memoranda of Agreement
Supplier QA Information Exchange
  • Audit Participation

  • Engineering Investigations and Analyses

Navy Approaches Infused into NASA Processes
  • NAVSEA SUBSAFE and Nuclear Reactor training led
    to Safety Critical Decision Making (CSDM)
    training initiative implemented by Office of the
    Chief Engineer (OCE)
  • SUBSAFE Audits Model adapted to NASA Programmatic
    Audit and Review Process
  • Ongoing collaboration in Human Factors and
    Software development IVV
  • Pyramidal (three point) decision process
    (Technical, Program, Safety) adapted by NASA
  • ITA Technical Warrant Holders process established
    by OCE
  • Establishment of NESC
  • Creation of OSMA Review and Assessment Division

Summary Reports Published
  • December 20, 2002 -- Report 1 Navy Submarine
    Program Safety Assurance
  • July 15, 2003 -- Report 2 Naval Nuclear
    Submarine Safety Assurance
  • October 22, 2004 -- Ongoing NNBE Activities
    Software Subgroup Report I
  • http//

Safety Cultural Emphasis
  • "The only way to operate a nuclear power plant
    and indeed a nuclear industry -- the only way to
    ensure safe operation, generation after
    generation, as we have -- is to establish a
    system that ingrains in each person a total
    commitment to safety a pervasive, enduring
    devotion to a culture of safety and environmental

  • It can only reside and inhere in a single
  • You may share it with others, but your portion is
    not diminished.
  • You may delegate it, but it is still with you.
  • You may disclaim it, but you cannot divest
    yourself of it.
  • Even if you do not recognize it or admit its
    presence, you cannot escape it.
  • If responsibility is rightfully yours, no
    evasion, or ignorance, or passing the blame can
    shift the burden to someone else.
  • Unless you can point your finger at the man who
    is responsible when something goes wrong, then
    you have never had anyone really responsible.

Process Based Mission Assurance Knowledge
Management System (PBMA-KMS ) functional support
to program and project managers
  • PBMA-KMS deployed in March of 2001 is the first
    fully operational NASA-wide multi-functional
    Knowledge Management System
  • Developed and implemented under the sponsorship
    of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance
  • Merged existing NASA SMA program/project
    life-cycle knowledge architecture with
    state-of-the-art KM concepts presented in GWU/KM
    graduate coursework
  • PBMA Knowledge Architecture reflects integration
    of SMA functions (work processes) into the
    systems engineering program/project life-cycle
  • Maintaining ongoing dialogue with KM community at
    GWU, GMU, Washington KM Roundtable, KM-Pro /
    Universal KM Framework Workshop
  • PBMA-KMS serves program/project managers and
    safety and mission assurance professionals within
    a traditional life-cycle work breakdown context
  • Widely accessible / user friendly / content
  • In place policies requirements, best
    practices, lessons learned, tacit knowledge
    capture (video nuggets), collaborative tools,

PBMA-KMS Timeline
PBMA-KMS Work Groups/Communities of Practice
  • Over 7200 work group members
  • More than 340 individual communities of practice
  • 38 Communities of Practice supporting the Space
    Shuttle Program return-to-flight efforts.
  • 145 other NASA programs and projects also

Volume More people are coming to PBMA, they are
using the site for longer, and they are coming
back again for more information. - 190,000 hits
per month (an increase of over 20 from the
beginning of 2004). Return Visits numbers of d
aily visitors and returning visitors (key
indicators of value) have increased more than 25
during the last 12 months. Length of Visit most
telling indication of value is the length of
visit. Visitors are spending 45 more time at
PBMA then they were at the beginning of 2004.
PBMA - Knowledge Architecture
Each cell contains video-nuggets, text, links
KM Functional Utilities
The PBMA-KMS employs a core set of KM
functionalities that have the potential to serve
all users. These are "no-brainer" functional
requirements (i.e., the gas, water, electricity
and cable TV of knowledge management)
applicable/available to every unique knowledge
management system and architecture.
Individual Business Units with Unique
Knowledge Architectures
Business Unit-Specific Knowledge Architectures
Safety and Mission Assurance
Deep Space Programs
Financial Mgmt
Document Repository
Advanced Search / Discovery (across public
Secure Communities of Practice (Work Groups)
Secure Web Meetings
Knowledge Registry (expert finder)
Agency/Enterprise-wide KM Utilities
Selected PBMA Functionality
  • Framework Mode
  • Knowledge Architecture
  • Video Nuggets (a verbal corporate/tacit knowledge
  • Standard Security Work Groups
  • Web-based collaborative environment (CE) tool for
    public domain information
  • Enhanced Security Work Groups
  • Secure Web-based CE Tool for sensitive
  • Knowledge Registry
  • Web-based repository for SMA/engineering/technical
  • Secure Web Meeting
  • Secure, real-time white-board tool for sharing
    information and conducting meetings remotely via
    the Internet (secure uplinks/downlinks and

(No Transcript)
Standard Security Work Groupsand Communities of
  • COTS Web-hosted Product
  • Industry Best Practice
  • Password protected / NPR 2810.1 compliant
  • No ITAR / EAR or other Sensitive Data
  • Document Sharing and Management, Calendars,
    Action Tracking, Announcements, Polls, Contacts,
    Links, Threaded Discussions, etc.

Enhanced Security Work Groupsand Communities of
  • Developed in Partnership with GRC-CIO/IT
  • One-factor strong authentication
  • 128-bit SSL encryption
  • Designed to Support Sensitive Information
    Management and Exchange
  • ITAR / Export Controlled Information
  • Source Evaluation Boards and Competition
    Sensitive Information
  • Mishap Investigation Information

Provides a means of establishing a secure,
accessible site for team collaboration when
Administratively Controlled Information (ACI) is

PBMA Knowledge Registry
  • Locate/Contact Experts
  • Identifies where Agency SMA, Engineering, and
    Technology expertise and knowledge resides
  • Voluntary Registration
  • Linked to NASA Competency Management System
  • Allows users to locate specific subject matter
    experts in a fast, convenient mechanism
  • Searchable by selected (e.g., .mil, .nasa,
    .gov) domains
  • Can assist in Resource Management Planning
  • Currently supporting NASA / NAVSEA expert

Secure Web Meeting
  • Reduced travel
  • Schedule on your own, no dial-in numbers
  • Easy access plug-and-play appliance with no
    recurring costs
  • Real time collaboration
  • Remote white-board collaboration in a secure
  • Protected Transient Events 128-bit encryption
  • Implemented on a NASA Server behind NASAs
  • Operates with standard Web browsers
  • Does not require similar software on attendees
  • Easy client setup install or download it
    on-the-fly on first use
  • Host a "shared desktop" session over the
  • Capable of holding 10 meetings with 50 people in
    each simultaneously
  • Share any document, briefing, spreadsheet, etc.
    between multiple users
  • Pass control of the meeting among attendees
  • Make changes in real-time
  • Built-in meeting scheduling and user invitation

(No Transcript)
(No Transcript)
(No Transcript)
NR Key Organizational Observations (NASA/Navy
Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report 2 )
  • Total programmatic and safety responsibility for
    all aspects of design, fabrication, training,
    test, installation, operation, and maintenance of
    all U.S. Navy nuclear propulsion activities.
  • Flat organization with quick and assured access
    to the Director about 40 direct reports from
    within HQ, the field offices, and prime
    contractors. Communications between headquarters
    and prime contractors and shipyard personnel
    occurs frequently at many levels, and a cognizant
    engineer at a prime or shipyard may talk directly
    with the cognizant headquarters engineer, as
  • The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) is a
    very stable program based on long-term
    relationships with three prime contractors and a
    relatively small number of critical suppliers and
  • NR embeds safety and quality process within its
    organization i.e., the desired state of an
    organization completely mainstreams safety and
    quality assurance .
  • Reliance on highly qualified, highly trained
    people who personally accountable and responsible
    for safety.
  • Recurrent training a major element of safety
    culture. NR incorporates extensive outside
    experience (Challenger, Chernobyl, Three Mile
    Island, Army SL-1 reactor) into a safety
    training regimen that has become a major
    component of the NR safety record 128,000,000
    miles of safe travel using nuclear propulsion.
  • NR promotes the airing of differing opinions.
    Even with an absence of differing opinions,
    management is responsible to ensure critical
    examination of an issue.

NR Safety Observations(NASA/Navy Benchmarking
Exchange Interim Report 2 )
  • NR has an institutionally embedded closed-loop
    process that begins with a technical requirements
    base built on lessons learned from more than
    5,400 reactor years of experience, which in turn
    represents the foundation for the next-generation
    propulsion plant design specifications.
  • There is no single (stand-alone) document that
    prescribes NR design safety criteria or
    standards. Safety requirements are embedded in a
    uniform set of technical requirements.
  • NR has a rigorous change control process that
    enforces review and concurrence of each
    recommended change by all stakeholders. Managing
    change is frequently discussed at senior levels.

NR Implementation Observations(NASA/Navy
Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report 2 )
  • Each independent lab general manager is required
    to be technically competent and is directly
    responsible for the safety of the reactors and
    facilities under his/her cognizance.
  • The NR Director exercises (by law) direct
    supervision over the laboratories.
  • Review by Quality Assurance or Safety does not
    diminish responsibility of line organization for
    program/product safety.
  • There is no separate systems engineering group or
    a job category of systems engineer within NR.
    While no single individual serves as system
    safety engineer or integrator, there is an
    individual (Reactor Safety and Analysis Director)
    responsible for maintaining an overall design
    safety perspective.
  • Responsibility for safety of an action remains
    with the authoring engineer and his Section
    Heads. The Reactor Safety and Analysis Section
    reviews, consults and concurs in decisions on
    product nuclear safety aspects, but
    responsibility for product safety remains with
    the cognizant engineer and engineering
  • The Reactor Safety and Analysis Section has an
    independent and equal voice in design and
    operational decisions.
  • Evolutionary application of more than 50 years
    Lessons Learned to each program reduces
    operational risk and uncertainty.
  • Freedom to Dissent is a primary element within
  • Systemic emphasis on recruiting, training, and
    retaining the very best people for their entire
  • Critical self-evaluation of problems with strong
    Headquarters oversight isolates and controls the
    small problems before they escalate into large
  • Closed loop corrective action is mandatory.
    Problems must be identified, analyzed, and
    resolved and their resolutions proven
  • Cause analysis is performed via a formal
    fact-gathering critique, supplemented by expert
    assessment of root cause/corrective actions.
  • Heavy emphasis placed on reactor design
    ergonomics through the use of methods, such as
    interactive visualization techniques,
    walk-throughs, and discussions with operators.
    Operational human factors are emphasized but
    change for the sake of change is not permitted.

NR Compliance Verification Observations(NASA/Navy
Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report 2 )
  • Emphasis on Silver Bullet Thinking is Dangerous
    -- "there is no silver bullet tool or technique.
    All elements of quality assurance and compliance
    assurance must be rigorously implemented to
    ensure delivery and operation of safe, reliable,
    and high quality systems.
  • Audit teams include the requirement owner
    (technical authority) for a particular area.
    Owner participates in the audit process to
    acquire first-hand understanding of how technical
    requirements are (or are not) being implemented.
  • NR field offices act as day-to-day audit and
    inspection groups. Responses to their findings
    are required, and they must approve final actions
    in response to major comments.
  • Functional audits of shipyards supplemented by
    field office assessments and comparative
    evaluations of the sites own self-assessments.
  • Qualification and biennial re-qualification of
    all nuclear operators by written examination and
    oral board examination assures currency of
    skills. In addition, the NPEB administers an
    annual examination to the entire engineering
    department of a ship and reports results to the
    ships CO, the command authority for that ship,
    and NR Headquarters.
  • DCMA is used, but is given technical direction by
    NR directly rather than by DCMA HQ.
  • NR has Process Sponsor Program where engineering
    activity retains technical responsibility for its
    components but consults with process experts
    (sponsors) within their identified areas of
    responsibility, as necessary.

NR Key Certification Observations (NASA/Navy
Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report 2 )
  • NR performs incremental audits (similar to
    SUBSAFE) prior to key events to evaluate critical
    processes and to correct any problems with work
    accomplishment or critical documentation.
  • A seven-phase test program begins with visual
    check of installation and progresses through
    higher levels of detail to actual operation of
    the reactor and delivery of power to assure
    readiness of the reactor plant for sea trials.
  • A Joint Test Group (JTG), composed of
    representatives from the construction shipyard,
    NRRO, Ships Force, and the cognizant laboratory,
    reviews and approves the administration and
    performance of test documents and acceptance of
    test results.

Software Assurance Opportunities for
NASA(NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim
Report 3 )
  • Reappraise Shuttle software using CMM or CMMI
  • NASA may want to consider reappraising Shuttle on
    both the contractor and civil servant sides using
    CMM or CMMI to verify that their exemplary rigor
    has not diminished. This is especially important
    since the Shuttle is still certified at CMM Level
    5 despite not having been appraised in 8 years,
    during which time it has changed contractors
  • Strengthen the levels of defense for assuring
    software safety
  • NASA may want to consider strengthening its
    levels of defense for assuring software safety
    and quality. Specifically, this opportunity
    includes establishing and implementing better
    contractor requirements (Level 1), bolstering the
    Agencys Software Assurance (SA) resource pool
    (Level 2), and ensuring that IVV is called upon
    only in critical situations (Level 3).

Software Assurance Opportunities for
NASA(NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim
Report 3 )
  • 3. Strengthen Agency CMM/CMMI related
    requirements for mission critical software.
  • When updating NPD 2820, NASA Software Polices,
    NASA may want to consider not only keeping, but
    potentially strengthening, the CMM/CMMI related
    requirements for organizations developing or
    maintaining mission critical software. Some of
    this work has already been initiated in NASA SWE
    NPR 7150.2 (Software Engineering Requirements),
    which was in the administrative review cycle at
    the time of this report.
  • 4. Institute Agency-wide software inspection
  • The use of rigorous formal software inspections,
    developed based on industry best practices such
    as those prescribed by Fagan and Gilb, has
    provided positive lessons learned for NASA. NASA
    is considering instituting an Agency-wide effort
    to re-infuse these, or similar inspection
    processes, into all software intensive projects.

  • ACI Administratively Controlled Information
  • CAIB Columbia Accident Investigation Board
  • CE Collaborative Environment
  • CIO/IT Chief Information Officer/Information
  • CMS Competency Management system
  • CoP Community of Practice
  • COTS Commercial Off The Shelf
  • DCMA Defense Contract Management
  • EAR Export Administration Regulations
  • FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
  • GRC Glenn Research Center
  • MRC Maintenance Requirement Card
  • GWU George Washington University
  • GMU George Mason University
  • ICV Independent
  • ITA Independent Technical Authority
  • ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations
  • JTG Joint Test Group
  • KM Knowledge Management

NPEB Naval Nuclear Propulsion Examining Board
NR NAVSEA 08 Naval Reactors NRRO Naval Reactors
Representative Office OCE Objective Quality Evid
ence PDREP Product Data Reporting and Evaluation
Program PBMA-KMS Process Based Mission Assurance
Knowledge Management System
PM Program Manager PRA Probabilistic Risk Asses
sment REC Re-entry Control RYG Red/Yellow/Green
contractor evaluation process
SA Software Assurance SHAPEC Ship Availability P
lanning and Engineering Center
SUBMEPP Submarine Maintenance Engineering,
Planning and Procurement SUBSAFE Submarine Safet
y Program SUPSHIP Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Co
nversion and Repair SWE Software Engineering URO
Unrestricted Operations WNY Washington Navy Ya
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)