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Government Intervention in Markets

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Title: Government Intervention in Markets


1
Lecture 19
2
Government Intervention in Markets
  • Except for taxes, have thus far ignored effects
    of government policies on market outcomes
  • Major areas of government intervention
  • antitrust law
  • regulation

3
Antitrust Law
  • laws that make monopolization, collusion, and
    certain pricing tactics illegal
  • economic justification
  • since welfare loss exists with price searchers,
    could potentially gain by reducing monopoly power
    or by restricting monopolistic pricing

4
Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
  • Sherman Act (1890)
  • Section 1
  • Prohibits contracts, combinations, or
    conspiracies in restraint of trade
  • Explicit agreement to restrict output or fix
    prices
  • Implicit collusion through parallel conduct

5
Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
Examples of Illegal Combinations
  • 1996
  • Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) pleaded guilty to
    price fixing for lysine -- three sentenced to
    prison in 1999
  • 1999
  • Roche A.G., BASF A.G., Rhone-Poulenc and Takeda
    pleaded guilty to price fixing of vitamins --
    fined more than 1 billion

6
Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
  • Sherman Act (1890)
  • Section 2
  • Makes it illegal to monopolize or attempt to
    monopolize a market
  • example Microsoft case

7
Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
  • Clayton Act (1914)
  • section 2
  • outlaws price discrimination that substantially
    reduces competition
  • section 7
  • makes illegal mergers that substantially lessen
    competition or tend to create a monopoly

8
Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
  • Federal Trade Commission Act (1914, amended 1938,
    1973, 1975)
  • Created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
  • Prohibitions against deceptive advertising,
    labeling, agreements with retailer to exclude
    competing brands

9
Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
  • Antitrust laws are enforced three ways
  • Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
  • A part of the executive branch--the
    administration can influence enforcement
  • Fines levied on businesses fines and
    imprisonment levied on individuals

10
Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
  • Antitrust laws are enforced three ways
  • Federal Trade Commission
  • Enforces through voluntary understanding or
    formal commission order

11
Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
  • Antitrust laws are enforced three ways
  • Private proceedings
  • Lawsuits for damages
  • Plaintiff can receive treble damages

12
Regulation
  • Rationale
  • public interest view
  • can reduce welfare loss associated with monopoly
    by regulating prices below monopoly levels
  • can promote economic efficiency by eliminating or
    reducing negative third party effects
    (externalities)

13
Regulation
  • rationale
  • capture view
  • regulatory mechanism is used by special interests
    to gain an advantage
  • producers, having lower costs of organizing, are
    more likely to influencing legislators/regulators
    so end up capturing the regulatory process

14
Regulation
  • traditional or economic regulation
  • general
  • regulations that fix prices and/or limit the
    number of sellers
  • natural monopolies and utility regulation
  • in the past, argued that utilities like
    telephone, gas, and electric are natural
    monopolies
  • may only be true for some aspects of these
    businesses
  • with a natural monopoly, economies of scale lead
    to one firm surviving in the market
  • firm will take advantage of monopoly position and
    charge monopoly price which results in a welfare
    loss

15
Regulation
  • natural monopolies and utility regulation
  • policy dilemma want to enjoy cost savings
    associated with economies of scale but avoid the
    welfare loss associated with monopoly pricing

16
Regulation
  • natural monopolies and utility regulation
  • rate regulaton solution
  • set price MC
  • since MChave to leave the industry in the long run
  • hard to know what marginal cost is
  • firm has reduced incentive to minimize cost
  • firm may have incentive to pad cost if it makes
    management better off

17
Regulation
  • natural monopolies and utility regulation
  • rate regulation solution
  • set price ATC
  • sustainable since firm covers its opportunity
    cost (earns zero economic profit)
  • ATC is easier to measure than is MC
  • still have reduced incentive to minimize cost
  • PMC so still have some welfare loss

18
Regulation of a Monopolist
Price
  • An unregulated monopolist with the costs
    indicated here will produce where MR MC
    (Q0) . . .

and charge
price P0.
P0
  • From an efficiency viewpoint, this output is
    too small and the price is too high. Can you
    explain why?
  • If a regulatory agency forced the monopolist
    to reduce its price to P1 (Average Cost
    pricing) . . .

LRATC
P1
the monopolist would expand
output to Q1.
MC
P2
  • Ideally, we would like output to be expanded
    to Q2

where P MC (Marginal Cost pricing), but
regulatory agencies do not usually attempt
to keep prices as low as P2. Can you explain
why?
D
MR
Q0
Q1
Q2
Quantity / Time .
19
Regulation
  • Regulation in Practice
  • An alternative pricing technique---rate-of-return
    regulation allows the firms to set a maximum
    price based on the expected rate or return that
    the firm will earn
  • equivalent to average cost pricing if allowed
    rate of return is the typical market return
  • using this technique requires hearings to arrive
    at the respective figures.
  • The hearing process creates a regulatory lag that
    may benefit producers (1950s 60s) or consumers
    (1970s 80s).

20
Regulation
  • natural monopolies and utility regulation
  • alternatives to rate regulation of natural
    monopolies
  • have government run enterprise
  • reduced incentive to operate efficiently since
    managers are not residual claimants
  • government may want to maximize profit rather
    than minimize welfare loss
  • auction off monopoly rights
  • while only one firm ex-post, can take advantage
    of competition ex-ante
  • firms would be willing to bid as low as PATC

21
Regulation
  • alternatives to rate regulation of natural
    monopolies
  • auction off monopoly rights
  • advantages
  • --- avoids problem of estimating costs
  • --- firm still has incentive to minimize cost
    once it
  • obtains contract
  • problems
  • --- need sufficient number of bidders to get
  • competitive outcome (with few bidders may
  • collude and rig bids)
  • --- risk associated with fixed assets
  • --- incentive to ceat on quality
  • --- hold-up problems

22
Regulation
  • social regulation
  • general
  • regulations that restrict the quality of products
    and services
  • rationale
  • public interest
  • consumers may be harmed by unsafe products or
    by incompetent suppliers of services (quacks)
  • too costly for consumers to know quality of all
    products and services
  • if government can collect information at a lower
    cost than consumers and uses it to ban low
    quality goods and services, consumers may benefit

23
Regulation
  • social regulation
  • rationale
  • public interest
  • in absence of regulation, low quality is
    constrained by competition among sellers and
    repeat purchase mechanism
  • capture
  • sellers may be concerned with low quality sellers
    tarnishing industry brand name
  • existing sellers can gain from restricting entry
    of new producers or products into the market

24
Regulation
  • social regulation
  • costs of social regulation
  • restricted choices for consumers
  • sometimes prefer lower quality (and a lower
    price)
  • requiring high quality leads some to choose less
    desirable substitutes or no service at all
  • moral hazard problems
  • as increase safety of products, reduce incentive
    to guard against loss
  • unintended effects
  • costs of verifying compliance
  • costs of running regulatory agencies

25
Regulation
  • social regulation
  • examples
  • state-level professional licensing
  • many professions, from barbers to morticians,
    are licensed
  • public interest case for licensing varies
    across occupations
  • many professions ask to be licensed
  • suggests capture may be occuring
  • current practitioners almost always
    grandfathered in when a profession is licensed
  • local building codes
  • externality argument
  • federal product safety regulation

26
Regulation
  • regulation of intellectual property
  • patents
  • grants monopoly right to produce and sell a good
    for 17 years
  • intended to encourage innovation
  • chance for monopoly profits encourages innovation
  • protects against free riding on research and
    development
  • creates a welfare loss
  • traditional welfare loss associated with monopoly

27
Regulation
  • regulation of intellectual property
  • patents
  • additional possible loss from wasteful activities
    to obtain monopoly rights
  • rent seeking
  • noteoutright bribes efficient

28
Regulation
  • Rent Seeking
  • Firms may spend to gain monopoly power
  • lobbying
  • advertising
  • building excess capacity
  • the incentive to engage in monopoly practices is
    determined by the profit to be gained.
  • example
  • 1996 Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) successfully
    lobbied for regulations requiring ethanol be
    produced from corn
  • Why only corn?

29
EndLecture 19
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