The rise of antidumping use and implications for regional agreements

1
The rise of anti-dumping use and implications for
regional agreements

• Simon J. Evenett
• 17 March 2004

2
Motivating Questions

• What factors account for the spread of AD use
  around the world?
• What, if any, are lessons from recent EU
  experience for other regions?
• Politicisation, institutional structures, impetus
  for reform at the global level.

3
Global spread of AD

• Since 1995 38 nations have used AD, cf. 8 in
  1980-4.
• Since 1995 65 nations exporters have been
  affected, cf. 36 in 1980-4.
• 1441 cases filed during 1995-2002.I-VI., cf.
  approximately 600 in 1980-4.

4
New versus old users of AD

• Old users EU, US, Canada, and Australia.
• Old users 600-700 cases every 5 years since
  1980.
• New users near zero in 1980-4. On current
  trends, likely to exceed 800 in 2000-4.

5
Filing Intensities of the top five users
6
Named Intensities of the top five targets
7
Reasons for spread

• Uruguay Round agreement on AD and WTO capacity
  building.
• Entrepreneurship by certain legal counsel.
• Retaliation motive.
• Rise of South-South trade.

8
Effects of implementing AD

• Threat effects.
• Investigation effects.
• Direct effects of AD orders on subject firms.
• Third party effects of AD orders.
• Traditional policy recommendation Just say no!
• Why not give voice to the victims of AD?

9
Regional rules on AD design choices

• Whether to allow AD cases within the region.
• Whether to replace AD by (a) safeguards or (b)
  certain competition laws.
• Whether to allow a region-wide public interest
  standard.
• Whether AD investigation should be purely
  technocraticor should it include political
  oversight.
• Lessons from EU experience.

10
The facts
11
The facts
12
EU anti-dumping procedure

• European Commission receives a complaint.
• European Commission conducts an investigation.
• Commissioners vote on whether to adopt
  preliminary duties.
• Member States vote in the European Council on
  whether to make the duties definitive.
• Community interest standard.
• Majority voting.
• Role of the Anti-dumping Advisory Committee.

13
Hypothesis

• Through its collective control of the imposition
  of definitive duties, the Member States
  influence
• The number of AD investigations.
• The size of the preliminary and determinative
  duties.
• The product coverage and country coverage of AD
  measures.
• The number of such measures adopted.

14
Evidence

• Votes in the European Council are secret and not
  reported.
• Leaks to the press.
• Searches of Factiva and Lexis-Nexis.
• Method, concerns and consistency.
• Over 800 articles found.
• 76 relevant news reports during 1997-2003.
• Substantial number from 1999 onwards.

15
Findings

• Most Member States actively express their views
  throughout the entire process.
• Considerable evidence of negotiation between
  Commission and Member States.
• North-South split on definitive duties.
• Welfare of importers/users receives a lot of
  attention.
• Some evidence of role of domestic political
  cycles.

16
Findings

• A lot turns on whether abstainers change their
  position.
• Country coverage altered to garner Member State
  support.
• Product coverage reduced to garner Member State
  support.
• Duties reduced to garner Member State support.

17
Closing remarks

• AD is spreading fast for imitation and
  institutional reasons.
• Ironically, regional institutions may provide a
  means to curb the spread of AD.
• Role of public interest standardsthe
  politicization of the AD procedure matters in
  discernable ways.