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Nonmarket Valuation: the Challenge of Dealing with Preferences

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Title: Nonmarket Valuation: the Challenge of Dealing with Preferences


1
Nonmarket Valuation the Challenge of Dealing
with Preferences
  • Michael Hanemann
  • University of California, Berkeley

2
TOPICS
  • The complexity of modeling preferences for
    disaggregated commodities dealing with corner
    solutions
  • The challenges remaining the context dependence
    of preference and choice

3
Preferences vs Behavior
  • Starting around 1938, economics became firmly set
    in a behaviorist mold. Only behavior was the
    legitimate object of scientific study.
    Preferences were (i) of no inherent interest, and
    (ii) not susceptible of meaningful scientific
    study.
  • In practice, this mean that one focused on the
    estimation of demand functions where
    uu(x1,..,xN) and xi hi(p1,..,pN,y),i 1,..,N.

4
Now
  • This is no longer adequate as a complete
    description of what micro-economists do.
  • We spend a significant amount of time thinking
    about preferences. Why?
  • To conduct welfare valuation
  • To provide a more meaningful account of demand
    behavior
  • The modeling of demand for water-based outdoor
    recreation is an illustration of the latter.

5
Evolution of Travel Cost Method
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  • The next step was to incorporate quality site
    attributes explicitly into a demand function.
    This led to single site demand functions with
    quality
  • x f(p,q,y)
  • and then multiple site demand functions with
    quality
  • xi fi(p1,..,pN, q1,..,qN,y) I 1,..,N.
  • The question then arose
  • How can one do welfare evaluations for a change
    in q how does consumers surplus apply?
  • This was elegantly answered by Maler (1971, 1974)
    using the formulation u(x,q)

8
Attributes The Lancaster-Maler model
  • The utility function is uu(x,q) where
  • x is the quantities of individual commodities
    consumed,
  • q is attributes/characteristics of these
    commodities
  • While the individual selects the level of a,
    subject to a budget constraint, he takes q as
    given.
  • More generally, q is anything that affects a
    persons utility but that he does not control
    fixed attributes of the commodities, supplies of
    public goods, fixed attributes of the individual.
  • This model has become the workhorse of modern
    theory of environmental economics, but it also
    has an additional significance for consumer
    theory.

9
Disaggregated choice analysis
  • The larger significance is that it was part of a
    general reshaping of what economists think of as
    a commodity
  • Food, housing, shelter, versus an 8 ounce breast
    of organic, free-range chicken.
  • That is, aggregate commodities versus commodities
    disaggregated
  • Across individual, highly specific commodities
  • Across individual consumers
  • Across individual choice occasions.

10
  • Such disaggregated commodities have become the
    focus of demand analysis in many areas of
    microeconomics, as well as in market research
    (e.g., scanner data), but this focus started
    first in economics with environmental economics.
  • A major but inconvenient feature of disaggregate
    commodity data is the high frequency of zeroes
  • There is a myriad of disaggregated commodities,
    but any individual consumers purchases a tiny
    handful of what is available.

11
The problem of zero consumption
  • There are too many zeroes to be ignored.
  • They are real (structural) zeroes, not just an
    artifact of data measurement error.
  • They reflect a corner solution to the utility
    maximization problem.

12
  • Interior solution
  • Some of every good is consumed. The consumers
    optimum yields xi gt 0, all i.
  • Corner solution
  • Some goods are not consumed at the optimum
  • Extreme Corner Only one at most of the discrete
    alternatives is consumed.
  • What generates this the discrete alternatives
    are perfect substitutes or are mutually
    exclusive.
  • General corner solution Some goods are not
    consumed, but more than one of the discrete
    alternatives is consumed.

13
Types of model
  • Extreme corner solution
  • Purely discrete choices (McFadden, 1974)
  • Mixed discrete/continuous choices (Hanemann,
    1984)
  • General corner solution
  • Mixed discrete/continuous choices (Wales and
    Woodland, 1983 Hanemann, 1978 Lee and Pitt,
    1986 Phaneuf et al., 2000 vo Haefen et al 2004).

14
Pure discrete choice
  • N discrete alternatives utility of ith given by
    ui vi(pi,q,y) ei
  • The ith item is chosen iff ui uj all j.
  • This leads to a N-1 dimensional probability
    integral which may or may not have a closed-form
    expression (e.g. extreme value does, while normal
    does not)

15
Ad hoc approach to combining discrete and
continuous choice
16
Utility-theoretic approach to discrete/continuous
choice model
  • Given u(x,q,z), where x are disaggregated
    commodities with attributes q, while z is a
    Hicksian composite commodity standing for
    everything else, there are 2N possible
    solutions to the consumers problem, including an
    interior solution and 2N-1 corner solutions.
  • There are two ways to proceed

17
Direct evaluation of all possible corner solutions
  • Consider each of the possible corner solutions in
    turn and derive the indirect utility function
    that corresponds to it i.e. find the utility
    maximizing bundle of (x,z) subject to the
    constrain that the particular subset of
    commodities is non-zero.
  • The probability that this particular solution is
    selected is Pr ui uj j 1, 2N-1.
  • This leads to a 2N-1 dimensional probability
    integral which is unlikely to have a closed-form
    expression.

18
Approach based on Kuhn Tucker conditions
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  • The Kuhn-Tucker approach, introduced
    independently by Hanemann 1978 and Wales and
    Woodland 1983, has the advantage that there are
    is an (N-Q) dimensional probability integral,
    where Q is the number commodities consumed i.e.,
    one probability integral for each commodity not
    consumed. This is considerably less than 2N-1 .
  • It still is complex. The trick is to come up with
    a specification of u(x,q,z,e) and a stochastic
    specification for the joint distribution of the
    es that is reasonably tractable.

21
  • This proved tractable for maximum likelihood
    estimation when N 3 (Wales and Woodland) or N 4
    or 5. Prior to about 2002, the maximum had been N
    12.

22
Additional considerations
  • So far we have focused on tractability of the
    likelihood for estimation of demands.
  • In addition, once the underlying utility model
    has been estimated, one may want to use it
  • To predict demands when (p,q) change
  • To conduct welfare evaluation for changes in
    (p,q).
  • These turn out to involve an evaluation of the
    full set of 2N-1 potential corner solutions. This
    became the binding constraint when N was large.

23
Welfare evaluation brute force evaluation
24
Welfare evaluation additively separable utility
25
Dealing with a large N
  • Von Haefen applied his approach, based on
    additively separable utility, to N 55.
  • Other researchers have worked with other
    additively separable utility functions.

26
The problem
  • Being limited to an additively separable utility
    function in (x,z) is a serious constraint that
    significantly restricts the generality of the
    approach.
  • Now Felipe Vasquez in his just completed
    dissertation at Berkeley has found a way to relax
    this constraint and solve large N problems with
    additively non-separable utility functions.

27
Vasquezs contribution
28
Application
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32
Welfare measures
33
Implication
  • The number of commodities is no longer a barrier
    to allowing for non-separable utility.
  • It makes some difference whether or not one
    assumes additively separable utility.
  • Substitution among sites, permitted in a
    non-additively separable utility model, reduces
    welfare loss from reduction in sportfishing
    opportunities.

34
Challenges
  • Many other issues remain in the analysis of
    disaggregate choice behavior
  • The set of salient attributes is inherently
    subjective
  • There are likely to be non-attribute arguments of
    a utility function
  • These are a powerful source of
  • Heterogeneity in preferences
  • Context dependence
  • The bottom line we need to come to grips with
    the complexity of preferences!

35
Lancaster-Maler model introduces a subjective
element into preferences
  • The attribute set which are the attributes that
    the consumer considers salient?
  • What matters is the consumers subjective
    perception of the attributes he finds salient.
  • There is also the possibility of non-attribute
    arguments of the utility function

36
Non-attribute arguments
  • If a consumer cares about what she consumes, why
    might she also not care about how she consumes,
    including the process and circumstances.
  • Not taking the last piece of cake, fitting in
    with the group, not wanting to be disrespectful
    of ones elders, doing the right thing, wanting
    to appear thoughtful or prudent, not wanting to
    overpay, not letting the other fellow get away
    with cutting in front of you in line these are
    all attributes that a person could take into
    consideration when making a choice to eat a piece
    of cake.
  • If so, they become arguments of the utility
    function in an expanded Lancaster-Maler model.

37
Some implications
  • The qs represent a potential source of
    inter-individual heterogeneity
  • Also, a source of preference dynamics
  • Rikers concept of heresthetics argument over
    which characteristics/issues are relevant to the
    issue at hand
  • A hypothesis the coefficient on a given q is
    stable (sign does not change) but switching qs
    on/off depending on context generates behavior
    variation.
  • Preference is a deeper structure, of which tastes
    are a particular manifestation

38
Context dependence
  • Context dependence is a basic feature of human
    cognition. Perception, like so many other
    psychological processes is quintessentially
    contextual. Context can affect processes at
    every stage in early sensory transduction, in
    later perceptual encoding, in possible cognitive
    recoding, and in decision/response (Marks and
    Algom, 1998)

39
  • Swait, et al. Context Dependence and Aggregation
    in Disaggregate Choice Analysis Marketing
    Letters, 2002.
  • Context is not necessarily noise that washes out
    in the aggregate it can have a systematic impact
    on choice behavior.
  • Present a conceptual framework and mathematical
    model to represent the sources of
    context-dependence in individual choice behavior.
  • Argue for a shift in emphasis to mapping and
    measuring context dependence rather than assuming
    it away.

40
The nature of preference
  • Underlying much of the discussion of preference
    anomalies is an outdated conception of mind. This
    is the stored-rule or filing cabinet concept
    of mind, which goes back to Hobbes, who conceived
    of cognition in terms of storing and retrieving
    slightly faded copies of sensory experiences.
  • We now know from neuroscience that all cognition
    is a constructive process. People construct their
    memories, their attitudes, and their judgments.
    The real issue is not whether preferences are a
    construct, but whether they are a stable
    construct.

41
  • Furthermore, stability has to be assessed in a
    probabilistic, not a deterministic, framework
    precisely because of the influence of affect and
    context on cognition.
  • We know from the psychology literature that
    personality changes are rare, especially after
    the age of 30 (McCrae and Costa, 1990).
  • The same may be somewhat true of preferences
    viewed as a deep structure.

42
  • Economics is at a point where, having adopted a
    narrow and rigid concept of preferences, it is
    being forced to conclude that, as conceptualized
    thus, preferences do not exist.
  • A preferable alternative is to redefine the
    concept based on the richer understanding we now
    have from neuroscience, behavioral economics,
    experimental economics, and stated-preference.

43
  • Instead of writing preferences off, we need to
    take them seriously and come to grips with them.
  • For this we need a new toolkit. Some of the tools
    will come from existing models in economics RUM
    models, models of preference change, the
    Lancaster-Maler model which have been
    underutilized. Needless to say, some of the tools
    will come from new advances based in part on
    approaches elucidated at this conference.
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