Reciprocity and Cooperation: Implications for HighTech Management

1
Reciprocity and Cooperation Implications for
High-Tech Management

• Andrew Williams, M.S. SEE, GRA in Product
  Development Research Lab
• GE 493 Game Theory Final Presentation
• Rogers Paper suggests the need for a multiple
  theoretical approach, including game theory

2
The Game

• Repeated Game Should each employee give
  liberally of his knowledge, time, and expertise
  or should he withhold some
• Rogers suggests one can model it as a repeated
  prisoners dilemma game between employees or as a
  public goods scenario

3
Rogers Propositions Based on GT

• Smaller teams are more successful
• Higher group identification and commitment will
  lead to more success
• Long-term commitment representation will lead to
  more success
• High degree of reward sharing will lead to more
  success
• High degree of consequences will lead to more
  success

4
Model from Komorita, Hilty, and Parks

• Repeated prisoners dilemma game with payoffs of
  (6,6), (9,0), and (3,3)
• Players worked against a computer that utilized a
  Tit-For-Tat strategy
• Manipulate how forgiving the computer is
• Manipulate how provocable the computer is

5
Results of Research

• Delayed Forgiveness and Immediate Retaliation
  Increased Chronic Defection
• Immediate Forgiveness More cooperation and less
  chronic defection
• Immediate Retaliation Less chronic defection
• Traditional TFT decreased chronic defection,
  cooperation increased over time and chronic
  defection decreased over time
• Reformed Sinner more effective than Lapsed Saint

6
Challenges for Rogers Propositions

• Additional Propositions from Agency Theory
• Resist Monitoring Systems
• Encourage Peer Monitoring
• In direct opposition to other propositions
• With no controlscould result in total defection
• Employer does not know the employees payoff
  matrix
• In many situations, defecting means firing

7
Possible Changes to Model

• Two Games
• Signaling game between the employer and employee
• Public good problem between employees
• Signal is a form of indirect retribution
  displays the organizations strategy
• Axelrod, others have shown that without
  retribution, the player is taken advantage of

8
Conclusions

• How do we insure a TFT strategy with only peer
  monitoring?
• Too much lag or peer pressure are strategies with
  too much risk
• Need to incorporate a signaling model
• My proposition can one design a mechanism to
  extract a better cumulative payoff than TFT