Title: The Impact of Market Structure, Contestability and Institutional Environment on Banking Competition
1The Impact of Market Structure, Contestability
andInstitutional Environment on Banking
Competition
- Jacob Bikker (DNB, UU), Laura Spierdijk (RUG)
- and Paul Finnie (UBS)
- Eurobanking 2008
- 18-21 May 2008
- Maribor, Slovenia
2Competition
- Banking competition is very important.
- Competition
- Raises social welfare (lowers prices and improves
quality) - Fosters innovative behavior
- Strengthens monetary policy
- Has impact on Solvency and Financial stability
- Promotes access of households and firms to
financial services, thereby enhancing economic
growth
3Aim of our paper
- For competition policy we need to know what
determinants explain the degree of competition? - So aim of our paper is What drives competition?
- Step 1 Measure competition (gt H)
- Step 2 Explain competition (select determinants
gt X)
4Step 1 Measure competition PR model
5Step 1 Measure competition PR model
Input factor prices 1. Funding rate 2. Wage
rate3. Price of investment other
expenses Other variables4. Loan share (risk) 5.
Equity ratio (leverage/risk) 6. Other income
(product mix) 7. Share of deposits (funding
mix) 8. Share of non earning assets (composition
of assets)
6Discriminatory power of H
7Discriminatory power of H
8Step 1 Measure competition PR model
We have selected data of 17.500 banks in 89
countries over 10 years (1995-2004), together
100.000 observations This gives PR estimates of
H for 89 countries Where H changes over time
(33 of the countries), we take the value for
2004
9Step 2 Explain competition
- Potential variables concern
- Market structure
- Contestability factors
- Inter-industry characteristics
- Institutional features
- Macro-economic situation
10Variables explaining competition (1)
- Market structure variables
- Banking concentration ratios (CR5, HHI)
CR5 - Number of banks
- Foreign ownership of banks ()
- Contestability variables
- (Cross-sector) activity restrictions
(2)
11Variables explaining competition (2)
- Inter-industry variables
- Log (Life insurance / GDP)
() - Market capitalization / GDP
(3) - Institutional variables
- Property rights index
- Banking freedom index
- Regulation index
(4) - Restrictions on foreign investments
(5) - Socialist History
(6) - EU15 (7)
12Variables explaining competition (3)
- Macro-economic conditions
- Log (GDP / Capita) or development
(8) - Log (Inflation)
- Real growth of GDP or business cycle
(9) -
(WLS)
13Data
- We have only country-specific data on explanatory
variables for 76 out of 89 countries if we delete
two explanatory variables - Alternatively, for each extra explanatory
variables, we lose 10 countries - Data refer to 2004
14Estimation results (2004)
15Results
- A remarkable result is that banking market
concentration has no negative impact on
competition, as the traditional literature
suggest (assuming a static relationship). A more
modern and dynamic interpretation of this
variable is that competition may force banks to
consolidate, so that competitive banks end up in
a concentrated market. - This results is recently also found in other
studies
16Interpretation of the results
- Banks exert more market power in countries with
higher GDP per capita, that is, during peaking
business cycles (explanation less fighting for
market shares if the market increases) - Banks have more market power in countries to
which foreign investors have less access (in line
with expectations) - Banks become more competitive when regulation is
stricter (explanation part of regulation deals
with ban on competitive restrictions) - Former Socialist countries have not yet fully
developed competitive behaviour
17Relative importance of variables
- The factors that contribute most in explaining
competition (based on squared partial
correlation) - Socialist legal history
- Foreign investment index
- Growth GDP
- Regulation index
18Robustness tests
- Replacing HHI and Number of banks for CR5
- Add two more explanatory variables foreign
ownership and life insurance sector size
(lowering the sample size) - OLS instead of WLS
- 2SLS (as market structure variables might be
endogenous) - Higher minimum number of banks per country
- gt All results were unaffected
-
19Comparison to existing literature
- Claessens Laeven (2004) find that the
significant determinants of bank competition
during 1994-2001 are - foreign ownership () and activity restrictions
(-) - However
- they take only 22-39 countries into account
(depending on variant) - they use a limited set of explanatory variables
only - our approach is more robust (deleting correlated
variables) - they use explanatory variables originating from
various years
20Step 3 Large banks versus small banks (1)
- We have found in an earlier paper that small and
large banks have different competitive behavior - Large banks operate on other product markets
(with relatively less competition) or employ more
market power (due to e.g. brand name) and may be
in a better position to collude - Therefore, we explicitly distinguish between
small and large banks
21Step 3 Large banks versus small banks (2)
- We estimate PR with the quantile regression
approach and obtain H(t), that is, a function of
H depending on size (t in (0,1)) -
- We take t 0.1 (small banks) and t 0.9 (large
banks).
22Step 3 Large banks versus small banks (3)
- We find quite similar results as before
- The most important change is that large banks
depend also on activity restriction in the
sense that more cross-sector restrictions
increase their market power (similar to Claessens
Laeven (2004)) - Remarkably, both small and large banks are less
competitive in the EU15. We attribute this to
relatively more developed sophisticated banking
products
23Conclusions
- Obvious policy advice, particularly for less
developed markets - more regulation reducing competitive obstacles
- no obstacles for foreign investment
- reduce cross-sector restrictions
- Developments of new, sophisticated products may
reduce competition, due to their opaque nature.
This may require more regulation