The Impact of Market Structure, Contestability and Institutional Environment on Banking Competition - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 23
About This Presentation
Title:

The Impact of Market Structure, Contestability and Institutional Environment on Banking Competition

Description:

Has impact on Solvency and Financial stability ... We estimate PR with the quantile regression approach and obtain H(t), that is, a ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:141
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 24
Provided by: Spier
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: The Impact of Market Structure, Contestability and Institutional Environment on Banking Competition


1
The Impact of Market Structure, Contestability
andInstitutional Environment on Banking
Competition
  • Jacob Bikker (DNB, UU), Laura Spierdijk (RUG)
  • and Paul Finnie (UBS)
  • Eurobanking 2008
  • 18-21 May 2008
  • Maribor, Slovenia

2
Competition
  • Banking competition is very important.
  • Competition
  • Raises social welfare (lowers prices and improves
    quality)
  • Fosters innovative behavior
  • Strengthens monetary policy
  • Has impact on Solvency and Financial stability
  • Promotes access of households and firms to
    financial services, thereby enhancing economic
    growth

3
Aim of our paper
  • For competition policy we need to know what
    determinants explain the degree of competition?
  • So aim of our paper is What drives competition?
  • Step 1 Measure competition (gt H)
  • Step 2 Explain competition (select determinants
    gt X)

4
Step 1 Measure competition PR model
5
Step 1 Measure competition PR model
Input factor prices 1. Funding rate 2. Wage
rate3. Price of investment other
expenses Other variables4. Loan share (risk) 5.
Equity ratio (leverage/risk) 6. Other income
(product mix) 7. Share of deposits (funding
mix) 8. Share of non earning assets (composition
of assets)
6
Discriminatory power of H
7
Discriminatory power of H
8
Step 1 Measure competition PR model
We have selected data of 17.500 banks in 89
countries over 10 years (1995-2004), together
100.000 observations This gives PR estimates of
H for 89 countries Where H changes over time
(33 of the countries), we take the value for
2004
9
Step 2 Explain competition
  • Potential variables concern
  • Market structure
  • Contestability factors
  • Inter-industry characteristics
  • Institutional features
  • Macro-economic situation

10
Variables explaining competition (1)
  • Market structure variables
  • Banking concentration ratios (CR5, HHI)
    CR5
  • Number of banks
  • Foreign ownership of banks ()
  • Contestability variables
  • (Cross-sector) activity restrictions
    (2)

11
Variables explaining competition (2)
  • Inter-industry variables
  • Log (Life insurance / GDP)
    ()
  • Market capitalization / GDP
    (3)
  • Institutional variables
  • Property rights index
  • Banking freedom index
  • Regulation index
    (4)
  • Restrictions on foreign investments
    (5)
  • Socialist History
    (6)
  • EU15 (7)

12
Variables explaining competition (3)
  • Macro-economic conditions
  • Log (GDP / Capita) or development
    (8)
  • Log (Inflation)
  • Real growth of GDP or business cycle
    (9)

  • (WLS)

13
Data
  • We have only country-specific data on explanatory
    variables for 76 out of 89 countries if we delete
    two explanatory variables
  • Alternatively, for each extra explanatory
    variables, we lose 10 countries
  • Data refer to 2004

14
Estimation results (2004)
15
Results
  • A remarkable result is that banking market
    concentration has no negative impact on
    competition, as the traditional literature
    suggest (assuming a static relationship). A more
    modern and dynamic interpretation of this
    variable is that competition may force banks to
    consolidate, so that competitive banks end up in
    a concentrated market.
  • This results is recently also found in other
    studies

16
Interpretation of the results
  • Banks exert more market power in countries with
    higher GDP per capita, that is, during peaking
    business cycles (explanation less fighting for
    market shares if the market increases)
  • Banks have more market power in countries to
    which foreign investors have less access (in line
    with expectations)
  • Banks become more competitive when regulation is
    stricter (explanation part of regulation deals
    with ban on competitive restrictions)
  • Former Socialist countries have not yet fully
    developed competitive behaviour

17
Relative importance of variables
  • The factors that contribute most in explaining
    competition (based on squared partial
    correlation)
  • Socialist legal history
  • Foreign investment index
  • Growth GDP
  • Regulation index

18
Robustness tests
  • Replacing HHI and Number of banks for CR5
  • Add two more explanatory variables foreign
    ownership and life insurance sector size
    (lowering the sample size)
  • OLS instead of WLS
  • 2SLS (as market structure variables might be
    endogenous)
  • Higher minimum number of banks per country
  • gt All results were unaffected

19
Comparison to existing literature
  • Claessens Laeven (2004) find that the
    significant determinants of bank competition
    during 1994-2001 are
  • foreign ownership () and activity restrictions
    (-)
  • However
  • they take only 22-39 countries into account
    (depending on variant)
  • they use a limited set of explanatory variables
    only
  • our approach is more robust (deleting correlated
    variables)
  • they use explanatory variables originating from
    various years

20
Step 3 Large banks versus small banks (1)
  • We have found in an earlier paper that small and
    large banks have different competitive behavior
  • Large banks operate on other product markets
    (with relatively less competition) or employ more
    market power (due to e.g. brand name) and may be
    in a better position to collude
  • Therefore, we explicitly distinguish between
    small and large banks

21
Step 3 Large banks versus small banks (2)
  • We estimate PR with the quantile regression
    approach and obtain H(t), that is, a function of
    H depending on size (t in (0,1))
  • We take t 0.1 (small banks) and t 0.9 (large
    banks).

22
Step 3 Large banks versus small banks (3)
  • We find quite similar results as before
  • The most important change is that large banks
    depend also on activity restriction in the
    sense that more cross-sector restrictions
    increase their market power (similar to Claessens
    Laeven (2004))
  • Remarkably, both small and large banks are less
    competitive in the EU15. We attribute this to
    relatively more developed sophisticated banking
    products

23
Conclusions
  • Obvious policy advice, particularly for less
    developed markets
  • more regulation reducing competitive obstacles
  • no obstacles for foreign investment
  • reduce cross-sector restrictions
  • Developments of new, sophisticated products may
    reduce competition, due to their opaque nature.
    This may require more regulation
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com