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THE CHARITIES ACT 2006: PUBLIC BENEFIT AND THE INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS

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Title: THE CHARITIES ACT 2006: PUBLIC BENEFIT AND THE INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS


1
THE CHARITIES ACT 2006 PUBLIC BENEFIT AND THE
INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS
  • Peter Luxton
  • Professor of Law
  • Cardiff Law School
  • Cardiff University

2
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CHARITABLE STATUS BEFORE
CHARITIES ACT 2006
  • 1. Charitable purpose
  • four heads of Pemsels case (1891) (Lord
    Macnaghten)
  • relief of poverty
  • advancement of education
  • advancement of religion
  • other purposes beneficial to the community
  • 2. Public benefit
  • used in two senses
  • (a) the purpose itself
  • (b) the section of the community to benefit

3
Public benefit (a) the purpose itself
  • The advancement of education is presumed to be
    for the public benefit
  • The test of benefit to the community goes
    through the whole of Lord Macnaghtens
    classification, though, as regards the first
    three heads, it may be prima facie assumed unless
    the contrary appears Lord Wright in National
    Anti-Vivisection Society v IRC 1948 AC 31, 42
  • But this does not mean that the court presumes
    that a purpose is for the advancement of
    education merely because the testator or settlor
    considers it to be so
  • Re Dupree 1945 Ch 16
  • Re Pinion 1965 1 Ch 85
  • Re Shaw 1957 1 WLR 729

4
Public benefit (b) the section of the community
to benefit
  • This is partly a matter of evidence
  • (number of persons capable of benefiting must be
    more than negligible)
  • But, apart from the first head (relief of
    poverty), there is also a rule of law
  • The persons to benefit must not be defined by
    reference to a personal or contractual nexus
  • So a trust to educate the descendants of a named
    person, or the children of employees of a company
    is not charitable
  • Note there is no contractual nexus if the
    contract arises merely in order to enjoy a
    benefit already conferred Joseph Rowntree
    Memorial Trust Housing Association Ltd v A-G
    1983 Ch 159

5
Excluding the poor?
  • Lord Camden once said that charity is a gift to
    a general public use, which extends to the poor
    as well as to the rich Jones v Williams (1767)
    Amb 651, 652
  • Lindley LJ said I doubt very much whether a
    trust would be declared to be charitable which
    excluded the poor Re Macduff 1896 2 Ch 451,
    464
  • Harman J said that a home of rest for
    millionaires could not be a charity Re Whites
    Will Trusts 1951 1 All ER 528, 530

6
  • However, in Re Resch 1969 1 AC 514, Lord
    Wilberforce said
  • The test is essentially one of public benefit,
    and indirect as well as direct benefit enters
    into the account.
  • That was in context of a gift for the general
    purposes of a hospital that charged fees
  • There was sufficient public benefit in the relief
    to the beds and medical staff of the general
    hospital

7
  • None of these cases was specifically concerned
    with the advancement of education
  • Since Jones v Williams (1767), the advancement
    of education has become a separate head of
    charity, distinct from the relief of poverty
    (Pemsels case (1891))

8
Independent schools can be charitable under the
pre-2006 Act if
  • They have charitable purposes (the advancement of
    education)
  • They satisfy public benefit in both senses
  • (a) the advancement of education is itself for
    the public benefit

9
(b) they benefit a sufficient section of the
community
  • fee-charging may reduce the section of the
    community capable of benefiting, but the
    remaining section is more than negligible
  • There is no contractual nexus because the
    contract to pay fees is merely the means by which
    the benefit is conferred
  • They do not fall foul of the statement in Jones v
    Williams, for one or more of several reasons
  • The statement does not apply to the advancement
    of education
  • The poor are unlikely to be in terms excluded
  • Poverty is a relative term a trust may be
    charitable for the relief of poverty even if it
    excludes the poorest and can benefit only persons
    of moderate means Re De Carteret 1933 Ch 103

10
IMPACT OF THE CHARITIES ACT 2006
  • Statutory list of charitable purposes in s 2(2)
    (descriptions of charitable purposes)
  • This includes the advancement of education
  • Statutory requirement of public benefit
  • To be charitable, a purpose must not merely fall
    within (or be analogous to a purpose within) the
    statutory list, it must also be for the public
    benefit s 2(1)(b)
  • Public benefit has the same meaning as
    immediately before the coming into force of these
    provisions

11
  • The only possible change in the law is as a
    result of section 3(2)
  • This states that, in determining whether the
    public-benefit requirement is satisfied, it is
    not to be presumed that a purpose of a particular
    description is for the public benefit.
  • Does this change the legal position as it was
    before the Act?

12
  • It seems that it was drafted with the Lord
    Wrights statement in the National
    Anti-Vivisection Society case (quoted earlier) in
    mind
  • The test of benefit to the community goes
    through the whole of Lord Macnaghtens
    classification, though, as regards the first
    three heads, it may be prima facie assumed unless
    the contrary appears.
  • Yet contrast Russell J in Re Hummeltenberg 1923
    1 Ch 237
  • no matter under which of the four classes a gift
    may prima facie fall, it is still, in my opinion,
    necessary (in order to establish that it is
    charitable in the legal sense) to show that the
    gift will or may be operative for the public
    benefit.

13
  • And Lord Simonds in Oppenheim v Tobacco
    Securities Trust 1951 AC 297 said that public
    benefit was necessary for every head of charity
    (including the advancement of education), with
    the exception of the relief of poverty
  • Are these statements at variance?
  • Lord Wright was speaking conceptually e.g. the
    advancement of education is presumed to be for
    the public benefit
  • Russell J was speaking evidentially i.e. he was
    referring to the particular words of any
    particular will, trust or constitution must
    show that the purpose specified is of public
    benefit for it to be the advancement of education
  • Lord Simonds was speaking of public benefit in
    the second sense (the community to benefit)

14
What is the impact of s 3(2)?
  • If s 3(2) operates at the conceptual level, it
    means that it is not to be presumed that the
    advancement of education itself is for the public
    benefit
  • This seems unlikely as Parliament has listed
    descriptions of purposes in the Act, it must be
    presumed that these are for the public benefit
  • S 3(2) seems to operate only at the evidential
    level
  • In the advancement of education this does not
    change the law, since there never was any
    presumption that a particular purpose (what the
    CCs General Guidance on Public Benefit calls
    aim) was educational unless the court was
    satisfied that it was for the public benefit (see
    Re Pinion, Re Dupree and Re Shaw)

15
  • In summary, in the context of the advancement of
    education, s 3(2)
  • does not reverse any evidential presumption of
    public benefit, and
  • does not reverse any presumption of public
    benefit in the sense of the community to benefit,
  • since in neither case has there been any such
    presumption
  • In short, in the context of the advancement of
    education, s 3(2) has no effect on the previous
    law

16
  • Any argument that independent schools are not
    charitable if they charge high fees and thereby
    (it is argued) exclude the poor, must therefore
    be based on the previous law
  • Indeed, the Act seems to strengthen the argument
    here presented (that the exclusion of the poor is
    irrelevant) because the statute puts the Pemsel
    classification (much expanded) into statutory
    form, i.e. it is a statutory recognition of what
    that case established namely that the
    advancement of education is distinct from the
    relief of poverty
  • Charity Commission Guidance under s 4 cannot
    change the law on public benefit

17
Public benefit must be contained in the purposes
  • Where the purposes of an organisation are
    ambiguous or unclear, the court may be able to
    determine its true purposes by reference to its
    activities
  • But there is no legal basis for the notion that
    an institution whose purposes are charitable (and
    so for the public benefit) can lose such
    charitable status merely because of the manner in
    which it is run by the directors or trustees
  • Under the law (both before and after the
    Charities Act 2006) public benefit is contained
    in an organisations purposes, not in its
    activities

18
  • The purposes of a charity for the advancement of
    education are necessarily for the public benefit
  • A charity does not have to show that it is
    providing public benefit in the way in which it
    carries out its activities
  • A charity merely has to show that it is carrying
    out its purposes
  • A charity asked to state how it has been
    satisfying public benefit in carrying out its
    purposes could therefore respond that it has been
    satisfying public benefit in that its purposes
    are charitable for the public benefit, and that
    it has been carrying out its purposes in the
    following ways (and so listing its activities)
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