Assessment of the Risks and Uncertainties in Eliminating Nuclear Material Stockpiles

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Assessment of the Risks and Uncertainties in
Eliminating Nuclear Material Stockpiles

• F. STEINHÄUSLER
• Div. of Physics and Biophysics
• University of Salzburg
• A 5020 Salzburg
• Austria
• Email friedrich.steinhaeusler_at_sbg.ac.at

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Topics

1. Source terms and policy issues
2. The need to act
3. Technical options
4. Security aspects
5. Conclusions recommendations

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SOURCE TERMS AND POLICY ISSUES
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SOURCES OF MILITARY HEU and Pu

1. Operational weapons
2. Weapon-grade material outside operational
   weapons
3. Fuel- and thermal-grade Pu in store

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MILITARY INVENTORY HEU/Pu(central estimate (t)
in 2003, SIPRI)

• US 635/47.5
• Russia 470/100
• UK15/3.2
• France 24/5
• China 20/4
• India little/0.31
• Pakistan 0.69/0.005
• Israel ?/0.51
• Total 1 165/160
• Production rate up to 250 kg/GW(th), a

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MILITARY DECLARED SURPLUS HEU/Pu(central
estimate (t) in 2003, SIPRI)

• US 174/52.5
• Russia 500/34
• UK0/4.4

• France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel 0/0
• Total 674/91

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UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS HEU/Pu(central estimate
(t) in 2003, SIPRI)

• France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel0/0
• Total 10/2.1

• US 10/2
• Russia 0/0
• UK0/0.1

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DISPOSED HEU/Pu(central estimate (t) in 2003,
SIPRI)

• China, France, India, Pakistan,
• Israel, UK, US 0/0
• Total 96/0

• Russia 96/0

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CIVILIAN Pu INVENTORY

• In spent nuclear fuel
• Separated in store
• In fast-reactor fuel cycle
• In thermal MOX fuel cycle

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Civilian Pu Production

• Typical annual Pu production rate in nuclear
  power reactors 180 kg /GW(e)
• Civilian facilities in UK and France can
  reprocess fuel elements of all nuclear power
  plants in EU and Japan
• 6-10 kg Pu/t of spent fuel

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CIVILIAN OWNERSHIPHEU/Pu(central estimate (t)
in 2003, SIPRI)

• Pakistan /-
• Israel /-
• Others /59.4
• Total
• 16-22/195

• US 5-10/4-5
• Russia /30.3
• UK ca. 4/59.8
• France ca. 5/40.3
• China /0
• India /0.7

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Past, Present and Future Pu Stockpiles (central
estimates)
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Weapon-usability ofReactor Pu

• - Higher rate of spontaneous fission
• - Increased heat production
• - Higher probability for pre-detonation
• explosive yield 1 to several kt
• E. Kankeleit, C. Kuppers, U. Imkeller, Report
  on the weapon-usability of reactor plutonium,
  IANUS-Arbeitsbericht 1/1989
• Compacting speed of 2-4 km/s

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Theft of separated Pu, whether weapons-grade or
reactor-grade, is a major security risk

• US National Academy of Sciences,
• Management and Disposition of Excess Plutonium,
• Vol. 12, National Academy Press,
• Washington, D.C.,
• 1994 and 1995

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2. THE NEED TO ACT
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Inadequate protection

• States can no longer claim to be able to protect
  100 military nuclear material stockpiles
• US Force-on-Force exercises (gt50 success rate)
• FSU several hundred illicit trafficking
  incidents since 1991 (at least 27 cases involving
  weapons-usable fissile material)

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Vulnerability of US DOE Pu Storage Sites

• Interim Pu storage (26 t) for 10 to 20 a
• Pu stored in 166 facilities at 35 sites 299
  vulnerabilities identified at 13 sites
• Inadequate facility conditions
• Incomplete safety analysis
• Degradation of Pu packaging, etc.
• Related to safety, environment and health (Nov.
  1994)
• Excluding Pantex Plant, Texas

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Imperfect state security networks

• States cannot rely exclusively on less than
  perfect state security networks to protect
  military and civilian Pu stockpiles
• Corruption of security forces, customs and
  politicians (www.transparency.org)
• Politically/religiously/financially motivated
  insider threat (extremism, blackmail)
• Criminal nuclear supply networks
  (Pakistan-Malaysia-Libya)

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Personnel performance and misuse of new
equipment at Russian nuclear facilities

• 9 sites investigated three of them had inter
  alia the following deficiencies
• Gate to central facility left open and unattended
• Nuclear material portal monitor not operational
• No access control at nuclear material storage
  site
• Security-related activities, February 2001

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Personnel performance and misuse of new
equipment at Russian nuclear facilities

• No response when metal detector was set off upon
  entry
• Wide spread drug and alcohol related problems
• Security-related activities, February 2001

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Potential for political instability

• Internal political stability of nuclear weapon
  states is not guaranteed (Pakistan?)
• Act of despair deployment of nuclear weapon as
  the last resort (Israel?)

22
Strong Man Policy

• Failed international crisis management, using the
  Strong Man-Global Policeman Policy, e.g.,
  identification of an external enemy, who will be
  threatened or contained with a nuclear weapon
  (DOD Nuclear Posture Review)
• US Strategic Nuclear Forces (2003)
• 14 Trident Submarines, 450 Minuteman III ICBM,
  
• 66 B-52H bombers, 20 B-2 Stealth bombers

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3. TECHNICAL OPTIONS
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Disposition Programme Short-term Objectives

• Make it harder for individuals to steal the
  material
• Increase the difficulty for rogue nations and
  terrorists to reuse the material

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Disposition Programme Long-term Objectives

• Prevent contamination of the environment and
  uncontrolled radiation exposure of man
• Signal to others that there is a path to the
  irreversible reduction of materials stockpiled
• Progress towards nuclear arms reduction

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Disposition Principle(e.g., for surplus
weapon-grade Pu)

• Create a substantial barrier to the recovery of
  the nuclear material

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Weapon-grade Pu

• Pu 238 0.01
• Pu 239 93.80
• Pu 240 5.80

• Pu 241 0.13
• Pu 242 0.02
• Am 241 0.22
• Age 20 years
• in percent (by weight)

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4 Theoretical Disposition Options, only 2
Realistic Choices

• 1. Pu dilution in oceans (environmental risk?)
• 2. Pu transport into space (risk of major
  accident?)
• 3. Immobilization of Pu
• 4. Reactor/accelerator methods using Pu

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17 Evaluation criteria

• 1. Operational time scale
• 2. Material throughput
• 3. Physical security
• 4. Self-protection
• 5. Long-term stability

• 6. Criticality issues
• 7. Safeguards Proliferation resistance
• 8. Suitability for final depository
• 9. State of development

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17 Evaluation criteria

• 10.Costs for start up
• 11. Costs for routine operation
• 12. Long-term neutron stability
• 13. Long-term chemical durability

• 14. Environmental impact
• 15. Local acceptance
• 16. National acceptance
• 17. International acceptance

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Example for Open Issues Proliferation Resistance

• Are all the technical methods deployed
  proliferation resistant?
• Does the method allow the pursuit of
  weapon-relevant technology options?
• Is it possible to covertly divert nuclear
  material?

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Example for Open Issues Operational time scale

• How long does the Pu have to remain in an interim
  storage area?
• When will the industrial-scale version of the
  disposition method be available?
• What is the time period required to totally
  eliminate Pu?

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Example for Open Issues Costs

• Costs for R D?
• Investment costs for constructing the facilities
  in US/Russia/EU?
• Operational costs of facility?
• Costs for final deposition of resulting waste
  products?

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IMMOBILIZATION OF Pu
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Immobilization technologies

• Direct glass vitrification
• Direct ceramic vitrification
• Can-in-canister vitrification

• Geologic disposal
• Electro-metallurgical treatment

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Direct glass vitrificationPrinciple

• Pu and n-absorbing material, mixed with molten
  glass and high level radwaste
• Pu concentration about 5 to 8 (by weight)
• Cooled into large logs (weight 2 t height 3 m)
• Large base of experience for industrial scale
  vitrification (B, F, UK since 1986 or longer)
• e.g., gadolinium lanthanide borosilicate

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Direct glass vitrificationOpen technical issues

• Optimal glass formulation for not immobilized Pu?
  
• Optimal level of solubility of Pu in glass?
• Prevention of accumulation of critical mass in
  processing equipment?
• Solubility of n absorber potentially higher than
  that of Pu, i.e., criticality possible after 10³
  years?

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Direct glass vitrificationOpen technical issues

• Radiation creates helium and oxygen bubbles in
  glass, increasing the volume impact of
  additional cracks?
• There is no natural analog of glass containing
  alpha-emitters long-term material behavior
  expose to internal alpha radiation exposure?

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Direct glass vitrificationOpen security issues

• Is subsequent Pu recovery from glass feasible?
• Ground glass, dissolve in nitric acid, remove Pu
  (PUREX process)
• Bench-top solvent removal process extracts about
  25 of Pu analog from a glass host
• Covert operation requires little
  additional equipment, no obvious new
  activity noticeable

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Direct ceramic vitrificationPrinciple

• Pu and n-absorber mixed in ceramic material with
  high level radwaste
• Pu concentraion lt10 (by weight)
• Radioactive ceramic material placed inside steel
  canister
• Limited large-scale industrial experience

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Direct ceramic vitrificationOpen technical and
security issues

• Remaining technical and security issues
• Similar to glass vitrification

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Can-in-canister vitrificationPrinciple

• Pu and n-absorbing material mixed with molten
  glass or ceramic material in steel cans (2.5 kg
  of Pu/can)
• 20 stainless steel cans loaded onto a rack within
  a larger steel canister(3 m long)
• Filled with molten, glassified high level
  radwaste from reprocessing
• Cooled (weight 2 t)

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Can-in-canister vitrificationOpen technical and
security issues

• Technical issues similar to glass vitrification
• Security issues
• - 1 spent fuel assembly from BWR/PWR
• 1.5/4.2 kg Pu
• - 1 canister (20 cans) 12.5 kg
  Pu
• canister contains 400 more Pu than spent
  fuel assembly
• Equivalent to 3 nuclear weapon pits

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Geologic DisposalPrinciple

• Deep borehole (several km)
• Enclose Pu or Pu mixed with high level radwaste
  within physical barrier (e.g., glass, ceramics)
• Transport enclosed pure Pu or mixture to borehole
• Close borehole to (a) minimize direct access (b)
  allow defined access at a later stage

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Geologic DisposalOpen technical and security
issues

• Pu leaching models Pu solubility is low (10E-8
  g/cm³) and glass surface area increases by a
  factor of 5 due to fracturing
• Fracturing due to quenching 10 times higher?
• Does crack growth continue throughout lifetime of
  glass(water, tectonic stress)?
• Intentional Pu Mining desirable at a later
  stage?
• B. Grambow (Materials Research Soc. Symp. Proc.
  333, 167-180 (1994)

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Electrometallurgical treatmentPrinciple

• Pu mixed with monolithic mineral form
• Result glass-bonded zeolite (GBZ)

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Electrometallurgical treatmentOpen Technical
and Security Issues

• Less technically mature than other disposition
  methods
• Several key steps not demonstrated yet at
  industrial scale
• Political concerns due to its similarity to
  nuclear fuel reprocessing

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REACTOR/ACCELERATOR TECHNOLOGIES USING Pu
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TransmutationPrinciple

• Origin in the 1970s
• Concept using high n fluxes, long-lived
  isotopes, particularly transuranics, can be
  transmuted
• Product stable or relatively short-lived
  radioactive substances

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TransmutationOpen technical and security issues

• High energy linear accelerator needed (p(GeV)
• High n flux required (gt10E16 n/cm²,s) over Pb or
  Bi spallation target
• High RD risk
• accelerator technology
• chemical separation methods

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TransmutationOpen technical and security issues

• High energy consumption
• Low throughput
• High cost
• Radioactive waste unavoidable
• Dual use option (Pu disposition Tritium
  production)
• Lack of industrial scale demonstration

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Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX )Principle

• Large industrial facility needed for multi-stage
  MOX fuel production
• metal Pu converted into Pu oxide powder
• grinding mixing with U
• sieving/sintering/cutting/polishing into pellets
• pellets filled into fuel elements

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Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX )Principle

• Mixture of natural U with Pu-Oxide, irradiated as
  fuel in commercial reactors
• MOX suitable reactors in Europe F(20), D(12),
  CH(3), B(2)

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Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX ) Open technical and
security issues

• MOX fuel in fast breeder 15-35 Pu
• MOX fuel in LWR 3-5 Pu
• 1 GW(e) 25-30 t MOX fuel/a
• 1 Reactor only 1.2 to 1.5 t of Pu/a
• to meet schedule
• full MOX core is needed

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Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX)Open technical and
security issues

• Full core MOX operation
• difficult reactor safety controls
• safe and secure management of MOX fuel over
  period of decades?

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Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX)Open technical and
security issues

• Once disposition campaign completed still 15 to
  25 a remaining lifetime of facility left MOX as
  the precursor for a Pu fuel cycle?
• Use of military Pu in commercial reactors
  undermining nonproliferation interests?
• Use of MOX facility for fuel production of
  military reactors?

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Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX)Open technical and
security issues

• Utilities expect higher operating costs
• Higher in-core n production rates
• Higher heat output
• Difficulties of using and storing MOX
• What incentives fees to be paid to
  utilities?
• Compared to ordinary reactor fuel

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4. SECURITY ASPECTS
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Diversion due to measurement uncertainties?

• MUF at nuclear material processing site
• Plant holdup (tanks, pipes, drains, etc.)
• Wide variations of material matrix
• Statistical variations
• Accidental spills
• Recording, reporting, rounding errors
• Honey pot syndrome

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Uncertainties/Fraud

• Nuclear material storage site
• Statistical uncertainty of measurement during
  non-destructive testing of container content
• Covert faking of intactcontainer seals
• Checking of container presence only (without
  verifying content)

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US Cumulative Pu Inventory Difference (1944-1994)
in kg

• Rocky Fl. 1 192
• Los Alamos 48
• Savannah R. 232
• Other sites 17
• - increase from book inventory

• Hanford 1 266
• Argonne West -3.4
• Lawrence L. 5.5
• Idaho NE -5.6
• decrease from book inventory

Total Difference 2 800 kg DOE Openness
Conference, Sept. 30, 1994
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Security Risks during Transport

• Transport moving target is generally at higher
  security risk than stationary target
• Rail/road transport 4 highly damaging attack
  modes possible
• Sea transport continuous navy escort required
• NATO Expert Group Terrorist attacks on nuclear
  power plants and nuclear material transports,
  Rep. SST.CLG.978964(July 2004)

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Countering Transport Security Risks

• Specially designed Super-containers necessary for
  transport of nuclear warheads
• Kevlar-based blankets needed to protect
  containers with dismantled nuclear weapon
  components
• Heavy-duty manipulators required for remote
  handling of nuclear warheads

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Spent Fuel Standard (SFS) adequate security?

• Radiation barrier decays with t½ 30 a minimal
  deterrent after 300 a (Pu mining)
• Cans embedded in radioactive glass or ceramic
  technically feasible to remove cans from external
  radiation barrier (re-start of reprocessing)
• Suicide terrorist not incapacitated (max.
  ?-radiation dose rate 6 Sv/20 min)

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5. CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS
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Comparative assessment of Pu elimination methods
(1)

• MOX fuel, vitrification and geologic depository
  can only delay reprocessing
• MOX will require about 250 a of reactor
  operation/100 t Pu
• MOX require the operation of many installations
  ( extensive transport of Pu-fuel and radwaste)

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Comparative assessment of Pu elimination methods
(2)

• Pu storage in deep boreholes requires minimum
  operations, easy to supervise (e.g., CCTV
  satellite)
• Vitrification simultaneous elimination of high
  level radwaste and Pu

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Comparative assessment of Pu elimination methods
(3)

• Irreversible Pu destruction only by transmutation
• Supervision of spallation units depends on design
  (e.g., operation as dual use facility feasible)
• Transmutation requires assurance of proliferation
  resistance
• Transmutation requires the operation of many
  installations ( extensive transport)

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Comparative assessment of Pu elimination methods
(4)

• RD requirements
• minimum Pu storage in deep boreholes
• maximum transmutation
• Cost estimates (for elimination of 400 t Pu)
• vitrification/borehole EURO 2-7 billion
• transmutation EURO 70 billion
• for comparison total cost US nuclear weapon
  development programme EURO 3 000 billion

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Comparative assessment of Pu elimination methods
(5)

• Can-in-canister shortest start-up and completion
  time of all Pu disposition methods 7a, resp.
  18 a
• MOX implementation 25 30 a
• except deep borehole storage
• assumption 5 t Pu/a
• assuming European MOX facilities as interim
  solution

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Comparative assessment of Pu elimination methods
(6)

• SYNROC is superior to glass vitrification
• chemical stability
• n stability
• resistance to Pu recovery

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Recommendations

• 1. There is no single, perfect method of
  eliminating nuclear material stockpiles each
  method has its pros and cons
• 2. Overall immobilization is superior to
  reactor/accelerator approach
• Nonproliferation
• Timing
• Cost
• Security

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Recommendations

• 3. Establish an international register of
  inventories and production capabilities for all
  relevant nuclear materials
• 4. Demand detailed material balances
• 5. End discrimination between military and
  civilian Pu stockpiles

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Recommendations

• 6. Strengthen the existing international
  monitoring system
• Kr 85 monitoring
• Tagging techniques
• Tamper-proof seals

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Excess weapon grade Pu poses a clear and present
danger to national and international security

• US National Academy of Sciences,
• Management and Disposition of Excess Plutonium,
• Vol. 12, National Academy Press, Washington,
  D.C.,
• 1994 and 1995

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The fate of the Russian 130 to 160 t of Pu is not
only of interest with regard to disarmament, but
represents a global interest in survival, which
requires from us solutions, or at least a
minimization of risks.

• Joschka FISCHER,
• Minister of Foreign Affairs,
• Germany,
• Sept. 1, 2000

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Famous last words...

• Benefits of Pu disposition programmes should not
  be exaggerated
• US and Russia can reconstitute Cold War sized
  arsenals with remaining, non-surplus Pu stocks
• Disposition is only an important first step
  toward a more comprehensive campaign

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There is no "small" nuclear bomb...
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Governmental leadership is needed in bringing
together the non-proliferation community,
industrial participants and the public on a
common agenda to rid the world of surplus weapons
material as soon as possible.

• Nuclear Energy Institute,
• March 11, 1998