Title: Corporate Governance and IPO Case Study
1Corporate Governance and IPO Case Study
- Professor Alexander Settles
- Faculty of Management, State University Higher
School of Economics - Email asettles_at_hse.ru
2Corporate Governance and Initial Public Offerings
- Corporate Governance is a principle variable in
evaluating risk / setting discount for IPOs - Firms reaching the market make significant CG
changes to their board structure and practices to
conform to market expectations
3The First Wave (1996-2002)
4Recent History
- In 2006 LSE IPO Market exceeds NYSE IPO Market
- 2007 IPO pipeline from Russian companies reached
28 bln. compared with 20 bln. in 2006 - We are very concerned about corporate
governance, transparency of company financials
and protection of minority shareholders and, with
a number of Russian companies, these things are
called into question, Mr. Thair, the New York
Stock Exchange (April, 2007 www.ft.com) - Number of US listings of Russian companies since
2004 2 - Mechel (2004)
- CTC Media (2006)
- Number of LSE/AIM listings of Russian companies
greater than 200 mln. during 2005/2006 gt17
5Listing Rules
- NYSE SOX/NYSE Rules
- LSE UK Combined Code. Governance Metrics
International (2005) ranks UK as leading country
in terms of Corporate Governance - LSE GDR/London AIM Combined Code not required
but usually insisted by underwriters as Best
Practice
6Sarbanes Oxley
- Accounting regulation
- Public accounting oversight board
- Restricting consulting/auditing
- Audit committee
- Independent financial experts
- Internal control assessment
- Assessment by auditors and company (Section 404)
- Deemed costly and contested
- Cross-listing elsewhere
- Executive responsibility
- CEOs and CFOs must sign off on the companys
quarterly and annual financial statements. If
fraud causes an overstatement of earnings, these
officers must return any bonuses.
7Sarbanes Oxley
- Many argue that SOX is hurting U.S. capital
markets. - SOX undermines CEOs appetites for risk
- SOX is a full employment act for Accountants
(404) - The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, set
up by U.S. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson,
advocates rolling back the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
8Sarbanes Oxley
- U.S. is losing out on new international listings
- London is beating the U.S. in the number of IPOs
it draws. - Last year, the NYSE drew 192 IPOs and Nasdaq 126.
- The LSE, often cited as the example of how SOX is
chasing companies away, attracted a robust 617
IPOs, 510 of which were on the AIM, the exchanges
small-cap market.
9Sarbanes Oxley
- However, the U.S. IPOs are larger.
- Of a total of 118.2 billion raised through IPOs
in 2006 - 17.5 billion occurred on the LSE, 4.2 billion
on AIM - 16.9 billion on the NYSE
- 9.4 billion on Nasdaq
- 0.2 billion on AMEX, according to Thomson
Financial.
10NYSE Corporate Governance
- Listed companies to have boards of directors with
a majority of independents - The compensation, nominating, and audit
committees to be entirely composed of independent
directors - The publication of corporate governance
guidelines and reporting of annual evaluation of
the board and CEO
11Cadbury Code of Best Practice
- Cadbury Code
- Boards of directors of public companies include
at least three outside (non-executive) directors - The positions of CEO and chairman of the board of
these companies be held by two different
individuals - Cadbury Code is not legislated into law
- LSE requires companies to comply or explain.
- Empirical research suggests the code has been
effective despite not being enforceable in courts
12Role of the Board in a Public Company IPO /
Listing Experience
- The Board
- Effectiveness
- Talents and background of board members
- Tying board remuneration closely to performance
- Strategic thinking by the Board
- Managing risk effectively
13Role of the Board in Listing - IPO
- Developing a robust audit committee
- Taking corporate social responsibility on board
- Encouraging and active dialogue with shareholders
14The Effective Board
- Clear strategy aligned to capabilities
- Vigorous implementation of strategy
- Key performance drivers monitored
- Effective risk management
- Sharp focus on views of the capital market and
other key stakeholders - Regular evaluation of board performance
15The audit committees main responsibilities
- To monitor the integrity of the financial
statements - To review the companys internal financial
controls, internal control and risk management
systems. - To monitor/review the effectiveness of the
internal audit function. - To make recommendations to the board on the
appointment/removal of the external auditor
16The audit committees main responsibilities
- To monitor/review the external auditors
independence/objectivity and the effectiveness of
the audit process. - To develop/implement policy on the engagement of
the external auditor to supply non-audit services - To review arrangements by which staff may raise
concerns about possible improprieties
(whistleblowing)
17Stakeholders in the IPO Process
- Owners employees
- Stock Exchange
- Government (SEC, FSFM, etc.)
- Institutional shareholder
- Public Investors
18Google Time to Cash Out?
- Reports valued Googles IPO at 16 billion
- Estimated 2003 revenue 1 billion, profit 300
million - In order to compete with the giants (Yahoo! and
Microsoft), it would be in Googles best interest
to raise more money
19Googles naïve attempts to stay private
- Why stay private?
- Eric Schmidt Were generating cash. We dont
ever need to go public. - Google didnt want to become a short-sighted
company - However, Google was bound to become publicly
traded - SEC regulation forcing them to report because of
stock options offered to employees - Companies funded by venture capitalists almost
always result in IPOs - During 2003, they unsuccessfully toyed with
different strategies to remain private
20Googles IPO Process
- Decision to become public in early 2004
- Debate over filing for public offering
- Using investment bank vs. auction method
- Ended up using a Dutch auction
- Proposed S1 (formal public offering document)
- Sell 2,718,281,828 worth of shares
21S1 An Owners Manual for Googles Shareholders
- Outlined how Brin/Page planned on running the
company - Claimed Google was different, so it would not act
as a traditional public company - Proposed corporate structure that protected
Googles ability to innovate and retain its
distinctive characteristics - Dual class shareholding structure Founders and
executives have far more control than common
shareholder (common in media companies)
22Googles IPO Process
- Google IPO did not follow Wall Street practices
- S1 represented a destruction of the traditional
share selling, corporate governance, investor
communications, and management structure of
public companies - However, it showed tremendous numbers in the
income statement - Profits, Cash, Operating Margins
23Googles Struggle to IPO
- Bad Reputation
- Google increased Secrecy
- Slow amendments to S1 and entire process
- Playboy Interview
- Relentless scrutiny (SEC)
- Companies uneven management of overwhelming
growth - Reporting requirements would require a great deal
of restructuring (e.g. Advertising) - Founders reluctance about the public path
24Initial Public Offering (Finally)
- Auction on August 12, 2004
- Revealed market price range 85 to 108
- Public on August 19, 2004
- Price was 85/share
25Post-IPO steps?
- Created Tablets (declaration of what makes
Google itself) - Post-IPO Organization (core groups)
- Core search
- Advertising Products
- 20 Percent (Gmail, Google News, Orkut)
- 10 Percent (Google Keyhole, Picasa)
- Could now execute on its two core businesses,
while other groups could pursue projects that
could potentially turn into core businesses or
useful products
26Brin and Page Still in Power
- Brian Reid (former senior manager) sued Google
for age discrimination - Google is a monarchy with two kings
- Culture youth obsessed
- However, somehow they have succeeded
- 5 year revenue growth is 400,000
- Fastest growing company ever
27Russian IPO Examples - VTB
28VTB Overview
- The Group has three principal areas of business
- Corporate banking
- Retail banking
- Investment banking
29Offering Size
- 1,399,835,420,000 shares or 20.82 of the capital
of VTB was offered as GDRs - 79.15 was retained by the Federal Property
Administration
30Investment Banks
- Joint Global Coordinators
- Citi
- Deutsche Bank
- Goldman Sachs
- International Joint Bookrunners
- Citi
- Deutsche Bank
- Goldman Sachs International
- Renaissance Capital
31Corporate Governance Issues
- The interests of VTBs principal shareholder may
conflict with those of other shareholders - VTBs management has recognised a material
weakness in the Groups internal controls - Some interested party transactions of Russian
banks in the Group require the approval of
disinterested directors or disinterested
shareholders - Shareholder liability under Russian law could
cause the Group to be liable for the obligations
of its subsidiaries - There are weaknesses in legal protections for
minority shareholders and in corporate governance
standards under Russian law
32Corporate Governance Issues
- Of the eleven seats on VTBs Supervisory Council,
six are held by representatives of various
Government ministries and agencies, one is held
by representatives of each of the CBR and the
Russian President, one is held by VTBs
President-Chairman, and two are held by
independent directors.
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34IPO Process
- Global Offering
- Russian securities legislation does not permit
VTB to sell more than70 of the total number of
ordinary shares authorised in the Global Offering
in the form of GDRs. - Retail Offering - retail investors in Russia
Peoples IPO - The Institutional Offering
- 13.60 Kopecks or 0.00528 per Share and 10.56
per GDR. - Dec 2, 2008 share price is 2.05
35Good deal announced bad deal delivered?