Title: Management Accounting Practice and Research Related to Vertical Hierarchies within Organizations
1Management Accounting Practice and Research
Related to Vertical Hierarchies within
Organizations
- Kenneth A. Merchant
- University of Southern California
- EIASM, December 2006
2What is a vertical hierarchy?
- Organization built on series of
superior/subordinate relationships - Headquarters/divisions/departments
- Functional
- Divisionalized
- Geographical
3Critical problems in vertical hierarchies
- The organizational coordination problem
- The management control/agency/motivation problem
4Primary control alternatives in vertical
hierarchies
- Direct supervision (monitoring)
- Bureaucracy (rules and procedures)
- Meritocracy (autonomy plus accountability
5Creating a meritocracy is generally the preferred
alternative
- Encourage coordinated actions.
- Energize the workforce.
- Stimulate learning, creativity/innovation and
continuous improvement.
6Management accounting in meritocracies
- Long history
- E.g., DuPont, General Motors, GE
- Centralized control with
- decentralized authority
- Responsibility accounting
- E.g., Solomons (1965)
7Virtually all corporations of at least minimal
size
- Create financial plans/budgets
- Measure financial and operational performance
monthly - Use responsibility accounting
- Provide rewards based on financial performance
(typically annually)
8So is best practice well established?
9Among the things we dont know
- Why so heavy an emphasis on summary financial
measures of performance when it is known that
these measures provide poor indications of value
creation?
10What we want (in for-profit organiations)
- Measures that go up when value is created and
down when value is destroyed.
11What weve got
- Correlation between annual accounting earnings
and annual value creation .20
12Lots of financial measurement alternatives
- Profit measures (e.g., PAT, PBT, operating
income, EBITDA, OIBDA) - Return measures (e.g., ROE, ROC, ROI, RONA,
RAROC, CFROI) - Residual measures (e.g., residual income, EVA?,
economic profit)
13Summary financial measures unsolved questions
- Which measures work best in which settings?
- Can the measures be improved?
- Are there roles for financial measures even if
they do not reflect value changes well?
14Correlations between accounting earnings and
value creation
One year Two years Five years Ten years Source
Easton et al, JAR, 1992. Should firms just
extend the measurement horizon?
.22 .39 .57 .79
15Among the things we dont know (cont.)
- How best to link market, financial and
non-financial measures of performance? - Lots of frameworks for Integrated Performance
Measurement Systems - Balanced Scorecard
- Tableau de Bord
- Performance Prism
- Intellectual Capital Navigator
- SMART (Strategic Measurement and Reporting
Technique) - EFQM (European Foundation for Quality
Managements Excellence Model) - (Or more generally, MBO/CSF)
16Measurement issues when using a combination of
measures
- How to test the assumed causal linkages?
- How many measures is enough?
- How should the measures be weighted in
importance? (What is balance?) - What to do when measures have interactive or
non-linear effects on overall performance?
17An example ofa non-linear relationship
18We must understand better
- The different purposes of performance measurement
systems. - Does some combination of the major categories
say it all? attention directing, problem solving,
decision facilitating and/or decision influencing
- Difference between a dashboard
- and an objective function?
- Difference between a complete
- objective function and an
- optimally designed incentive
- system?
19Among the things we dont know (cont.)
- Why do so many organizations base
performance-dependent rewards on corporate
performance even though few employees can have a
material effect on overall corporate performance?
20Among the things we dont know (cont.)
- Can budgeting be improved, or is it really passé?
21Among the things we dont know (cont.)
- Why is the typical bonus formula so complex?
- For example
- Organizational level of performance
- Objective function
- Performance contingencies
- Shape of the reward function
22Shape of a typical short-term bonus function
Rewards
Results
23Among the things we dont know (cont.)
- Why dont firms use truth-inducing incentive
systems?
24Among the things we dont know (cont.)
- Why are systems sometimes dramatically different
across settings - Individual contingencies and combinations of
them - Management style
25Among the variances in practice that are
difficult to explain
- Differences in use of punishments
- Differences in tolerance for use of subjectivity
in performance evaluations - Differences in implementation
- of the controllability principle
26Differences in application of the
controllability principle
- 1. One companys philosophy No tolerance for any
excuses. - President We dont pay for effort. We pay for
results. - Most(?) companies protect managers from some bad
luck but reward them for virtually all good
luck.
27An important, poorly understood
contingencynational setting
Performance-dependent incentives for department
managers in automobile retailers U.S.
(n 433) earning formula bonus
64.3 Size of formula bonus ( salary)
54.6 Primary performance measureprofit
94.0 Formula bonus floor and cap 1.6
28Cross-national differences in reward systems
(cont.)
- Performance-dependent incentives for department
managers in automobile retailers, U.S. vs.
Netherlands - U.S. Netherlands
- (n 433) (n 145)
- earning formula bonus 64.3 10.3
- Size of formula bonus ( salary) 54.6 8.6
- Primary perf. measureprofit 94.0 15.4
- Formula bonus floor and cap 1.6 23.1
29Among the things we dont know (cont.)
- More generally, what are the motivations of
people in the hierarchy? - We know that its often not
- Value maximization e.g., superiors encourage
subordinates to create slack. - Pure self-interest e.g., many people try to do
the right things even at personal cost.
30Conclusion
- There is a lot yet to be learned, even in this
very mature area of management accounting.