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F' G' Hoffman

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Title: F' G' Hoffman


1

The (Re) Emergence of Hybrid Threats
F. G. Hoffman Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory 20 May, 2009
2
Emerging Viewpoint
  • it is common to define and divide the
    so-called "high end" from the "low end," the
    conventional from the irregular armored
    divisions on one side, guerrillas toting AK-47s
    on the other. In reality, the categories of
    warfare are blurring and do not fit into neat,
    tidy boxes.
  • We can expect to see more tools and tactics of
    destruction - from the sophisticated to the
    simple - being employed simultaneously in hybrid
    and more complex forms of warfare.
  • As defense scholars have noted, these hybrid
    scenarios combine the "lethality of state
    conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor
    of irregular warfare. SecDef, Foreign
    Affairs

3
Reinforcing Views
Todays military leaders (especially those who
have been engaged in the field since 9/11) know
that the environment has changed and our existing
concepts are inadequate. But we have yet to
fully crack the code on the breakthrough
concepts and organizational and technological
innovations that will allow us to fully adapt to
the new hybrid form of warfare.
4
What Hybrid Construct Offers
  • A concept to describe evolving character of
    conflict
  • A construct to challenge current conventional
    thinking and binary intellectual bins
  • A concept that highlights and reinforces the true
    granularity or breadth of spectrum of human
    conflict
  • A concept that raises awareness of potential
    risks and informs ongoing force posture debate

Thus, this is not a theoretical discussion but a
debate about the future, what priorities should
be assigned, and how to invest and posture US
forces for the future.
5
Outline
  • LAST STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
  • ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCT
  • SUPPORTING THEORIES
  • HISTORICAL PROTOTYPES
  • IMPLICATIONS AND ISSUES
  • CONCLUSION

6

2006 QDR/NDS Quad Chart
LIKELIHOOD
Strategic Guidance broader set of challenges of
which the most complex would be combinations.
7
An American Perspective
A useful strategic perspective, but these
distinct modes of war are intellectual bins
that say more about us than our opponents.
8

Insights from Foreign Perspective
Unrestricted Warfare "But in past wars, the
combination was all done within the limits of the
military sphere. This narrow sense of the concept
of combinations is, of course, very inadequate
for today.
The possibility of continuous sporadic armed
conflict, its engagements blurred together in
time and space, waged on several levels by a
large array of national and sub-national forces
means that war is likely to transcend neat
divisions into distinct categories. Dr. Mike
Evans
Future use of armed force best described as
multi-variant General Gareev
9

Blurring Modes of War
The first feature we can predict with
confidence is that there is going to be a
blurring, a further blurring, of warfare
categories. Dr. Colin Gray, UK
Networks have even shown a capacity to wage war
toe-to-toe against nation-stateswith some
success, The range of choices available to
networks thus covers an entire spectrum of
conflict, posing the prospect of a significant
blurring of the lines between insurgency, terror,
and war. John Arquilla,
The boundaries between regular and
irregular warfare are blurring. Even non-state
groups are increasingly gaining access to the
kinds of weapons that were once the exclusive
preserve of sates. And even states will
increasingly turn to unconventional strategies to
blunt.American power. Max Boot
10

Emerging Security Challenges
TERRORISM
IRREGULAR
TRADITIONAL
DISRUPTIVE
While history provides some useful
examples.coping with networks that can fight in
so many different ways sparking myriad, hybrid
forms of conflict is going to require some
innovative thinking John Arquilla
11
Future Conflicts

Conventional Capabilities
Hybrid Conflicts
Terrorism
Irregular Warfare
Criminality
Hybrid threats Any adversary that simultaneously
and adaptively employs a fused mix of
conventional weapons, irregular tactics,
terrorism, and criminal behavior in the same
battlespace to obtain their political objectives.
12
Definitional Issues
  • Basis for definition modes vice structural
  • Admixture of different modes/methods of fighting
    or
  • Hybrid as composite of state non-state actors
  • Simultaneity?
  • All four modes?
  • Degree of operational and tactical fusion
  • State based forms

Hybrid threat Any adversary that simultaneously
and adaptively employs a fused mix of
conventional weapons, irregular tactics,
terrorism, and criminal behavior in the
battlespace to obtain their political objectives.

13
Construct Diffusion
  • Sec Def
  • USD Policy
  • CJSC Capstone Concept
  • JFCOM Joint Operating Environment
  • Maritime Strategy
  • USMC VS 2025/EMFTS
  • Various former OSD officials, US Army and Air
    Force officers
  • British/Aussies
  • NATO Multiple Futures Project

14
Outline
  • LAST STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
  • ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCT
  • SUPPORTING THEORIES
  • HISTORICAL PROTOTYPES
  • IMPLICATIONS AND ISSUES
  • CONCLUSION

15

Compound Wars
  • Both Hybrid Compound Wars involve use of
    conventional and irregular force(s)
  • Compound Wars have strategic links or
    coordination
  • But geographically separated
  • Different forces, not contiguous or fused
  • Designed to make conventional forces
    operationally decisive

In hybrid conflicts, regular and irregular
capabilities can be fused into a single force to
achieve decisive effects.
16
Possible Historical Cases
  • Anglo-Boer War, 1898-1902
  • Irish/British conflict, 1919-1921
  • French vs. Viet Minh, 1946-1954
  • Somalia, 1993
  • Chechnya, 1995
  • Serbia vs. NATO, 1999
  • Second Lebanon War, 2006
  • Russo-Georgian conflict, 2008

17

Prototype 2d Boer War
  • State-like
  • With external support
  • Superior weaponry
  • Mausers w/ smokeless cartridge
  • Krup Artillery
  • Mobility
  • Organization Commando
  • Disproportionate Costs
  • 28,000 British (8K KIA)
  • 26,000 Boers (6K KIA)
  • Political Victory (???)

18

Chechnya
Hybrid forces can effectively incorporate
technologically advanced systems into their force
structure and strategy, and use these system in
ways that are beyond the intended employment
parameters. Operationally, hybrid military
forces are superior to western forces within
their limited operational spectrum. LtCol W. J.
Nemeth, USMC in Future War and Chechnya A Case
for Hybrid Warfare,
19

Hezbollah Prototype Hybrid
  • State-like capabilities
  • Long Range Missiles
  • Anti-ship Cruise Missiles
  • Anti-armor systems
  • UAVs
  • SIGINT
  • Selected tactics
  • Highly trained in traditional and irregular
    modes
  • Extensive preparations
  • Exploitation of political effects

Hezbollahs combat cells were a hybrid of
guerrillas and regular troops-- a form of
opponent that U.S. forces are apt to encounter
with increasing frequency. Ralph Peters
20
Recent Analysis
  • Rigorous analysis from IDF perspective
  • Found that Hezbollah was unique is some respects
  • Decomposition did not address rockets,
    combinations and Hz Info ops
  • Argues that large-scale transformation for IW may
    be ill advised.

In reality, there is a continuum of methods
between the polar extremes of the Maginot Line
and the Viet Cong, and most real world cases have
always fallen somewhere in between.
"The resistance withstood the attack and fought
back. It did not wage a guerrilla war
either...it was not a regular army but was not a
guerrilla in the traditional sense either. It
was something in between. This is the new
model. Nasrallah
21
Georgia 2008


Several Georgian state computer servers have
been under external control since shortly before
Russias armed intervention into the state
commenced on Friday, leaving its online presence
in disarray.
22
Outline
  • CURRENT STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
  • ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCT
  • SUPPORTING THEORIES
  • HISTORICAL PROTOTYPES
  • IMPLICATIONS AND ISSUES
  • CONCLUSION

23
Potential Hybrid Scenarios
  • Iraq
  • Iran
  • Lebanon
  • North Korea
  • Russia
  • Pakistan
  • Nigeria
  • Syria
  • Afghanistan
  • Balkans
  • Caucuses

China is viewed as a special case
24
Likelihood vs Consequences
MOST LIKELY
Train/Advise/Assist
Building Partner Capacity
Relief Operations
Peace Enforcement
MOST DANGEROUS
Frequency
Show of Force
NEO
Acts of Terrorism
COIN
Civil War
Limited War
Forcible Entry
Regional Conflict
Global War
Peacetime and Crisis
Low Intensity Conflict
Mid-Intensity Conflict
High Intensity Conflict
INTENSITY LEVEL
24
25

Implied Change
Humanitarian Assistance
Most Likely, More Complex and Increasingly More
Lethal
Relief Operations
Peace Enforcement
Show of Force
Frequency
Noncombatant Evacuation
Selective Strike
Global War
Major Combat
Peacetime Crisis
Low-Intensity Conflict
Mid-Intensity Conflict
High-Intensity Conflict
26

Force Structure/Posture?
  • Crusaders for Wars Amongst the People
  • Conservatives or Traditionalists
  • The Orthodox School full spectrum force
  • Division of Labor

Defence planning should seek to achieve and
sustain a military posture that is flexible and
adaptablenot a preclusive vision of future war.
Colin Gray, Fighting Talk
27
Conclusion
  • Hybrids not necessarily novel
  • Future more complicated than COIN vs.
    Conventional
  • The enemy gets a vote
  • Emerging character of modern conflict displays
    greater granularity, lethality, complexity
  • Tactics of the smart, not the weak
  • Implications not clear
  • Needs further study, more games, research
  • Carefully consider force posture implications

We wanted to show that every age had its own
kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its
own peculiar preconceptions.
On War, p. 593.
28
those who are engaged in warfare must break out
of the confines of domains if they are to be able
to enter a state of freedom in thinking about
warfare. Breaking the boundaries of ideology is
a prerequisite for breaking the boundaries of
action.
Questions???
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