The Politics of Transition in Central and Eastern Europe Lecture 3: Exit, Voice, and Democratic Cons

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The Politics of Transition in Central and
Eastern EuropeLecture 3 Exit, Voice, and
Democratic Consolidation

• Dr Gwendolyn Sasse
• Gwendolyn.Sasse_at_nuffield.ox.ac.uk

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Albert O. Hirschmann (1970)

• original concern is with repairable lapses of
  economic actors (i.e. drop in performance/quality
  )
• exit customers stop buying a product or
  members leave a firm/organisation
• voice direct expression of dissatisfaction to
  management, articulated by customers or members
  of an organisation (signalling mechanism)
• loyalty an underlying attachment/commitment to
  the product or organisation trade-off between
  certainty of exit and the uncertainty about
  future improvement loyalty holds exit at bay and
  activates voice
• gt what are the equivalents in the
  political/societal sphere?
• H. argues that there is a complicated
  relationship between exit and voice voice
  is a residual of exit where demand is elastic
  (i.e. easy exit inhibits voice), but an
  alternative where demand is inelastic (i.e.
  difficult exit encourages voice), but not
  mutually exclusive since there are occasions
  where the possibility of exit aids voice

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How transferable to political/societal dynamics?

• H. argued explicitly that the voice and exit
  strategies could be applied to political
  organisations and systems
• review of these applications by Dowding et
  al.(2000) suggests that H.s model mostly used as
  suggestive labels rather than systematic
  empirical test conceptual weaknesses (esp.
  loyalty which Barry (1974) called an ad hoc
  equation filler) lack of distinction between
  individual collective voice exit
• but frames complicated relation between
  stability and change and the role of action and
  inaction in this widening the analysis of
  participation beyond elites and linking up with
  debates on civil society, social capital,
  mass mobilisation and trust in
  transition/consolidation

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Extension by Hirschman (1993)

• H. himself extended categories to
  describe/analyse the collapse of the GDR,
  comparing/linking the private, individual
  strategies of the Ausreiser (exiters) with
  the more public, active reactions of the
  Bleiber (stayers) of the huge demonstrations
  in Leipzig, Dresden, etc.
• gt how good a case? too exceptional mass exit
  became an option and exit was not corrective in
  H.s original sense

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Application to CEE More Exit than Voice?

• Greskovits (1998) explanation of lower level in
  CEE of mass protest compared to Latin America
  (political patience)
• socio-economic differences between the regions (
  social costs of transition)
• legacy of socialism lack of organisational
  capacity for mass protest and the populations
  lack of experience of violent challenges to the
  social order
• continued role of the state in preserving
  essential welfare and important subsidies
• expanded role of exit as an alternative to
  voice in the resort to informalism especially
  in economic behaviour
• channelling of voice into institutional
  political channels (protest voting for esp.
  nationalist-populist parties and in referenda
  rather than strikes or demonstrations)

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• gt But
• 1) Greskovits does not evaluate the impact of the
  CEE types of exit and voice on the
  re-equilibration (G.Ekierts term) of the
  system, which was Hirschmans preoccupation
• 2) political opportunity structure not
  sufficiently highlighted as a crucial variable
  explaining types of exit and voice (Szabo 1996)
• 3) need for differentiation (time and place)
• 4) question clear-cut distinction between LA/SE
  and CEE/FSU how do we explain the coloured
  revolutions?

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Cycles of (De-)Mobilisation ?

• Karl Schmitter (1996) argue (LA/SE) that mass
  demobilisation after a mobilised period of
  revolutionary activity involving regime change is
  an almost universal fact
• masses were involved in strikes or
  demonstrations in most CEE countries in 1988-90
  (transition), but scale and frequency of such
  politically motivated activity have declined in
  most areas since (consolidation) instead
  partial re-channelling into institutional
  participation
• periods of re-mobilisation (largely
  non-violent) in response to economic crisis,
  tough government measures, electoral fraud etc.
  (e.g. coloured revolutions?)

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Repertoire of contention (C.Tilly) in CEE

• Voice
• - strikes
• - demonstrations
• - campaigns
• - protest voting (link to populism)
• Exit
• - permanent emigration
• - temporary or internal migration
• - informalism in economic and political
  activity
• 1) tax evasion, street trading, illegal
  employment, asset stripping, capital flight,
  criminal activity, corruption, mafia gangs,
  drugs, etc.
• 2) abstention from voting (or is this voice?),
  political apathy, etc.
• gt Which of these means are corrective, or
  simply destabilising?
• gt relationship to voting behaviour/party system
  unclear

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The Broader Context The Civil Society Debate

• intellectual origins of the concept resistance
  to the state
• became widespread in the Enlightenment (18th
  century) as a sphere of autonomy limiting the
  scope of absolute monarchy (intellectuals,
  entrepreneurs) check on power
• revived in Eastern Europe ( to some extent LA)
  in 1970s as an autonomous sphere of
  moral/intellectual resistance to the
  totalitarian state (Michnik, Havel, etc.) not
  necessarily conducive to democratic politics

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Defining civil society

• networks of formal and informal associations
  that mediate between individual actors and the
  state these networks may function for good or
  for evil (Bermeo)
• (Footnote literature of the 1970s discussion
  of interest groups, popular organisations
  included discussion of overly active society
  harming democracy Hirschman et al. a mixture
  of alert and inert citizens, or even an
  alternative of involvement and withdrawal, may
  actually serve democracy better than total,
  permanent activism or total apathy (1970) dense
  organisational network can facilitate extremist
  mobilisation/collapse of democracy (Weimar
  Germany, fascist Italy))
• gt is economic activity included?
• gt distinction from politics/state not always
  clear (e.g. development into parties or members
  moving into parties)
• gt more than NGOs, but where to stop?
• gt measured against ideal-type when pointing to
  lack in CEE/FSU?

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Transition vs. Consolidation

• basic def. consolidation is the transformation
  of democratic rules and institutions into
  regular, accepted and predictable patterns
• two-turnover-test (electoral alternation) as a
  baseline for transition or consolidation
  (Huntington)
• process by which democracy becomes the only game
  in town (Przeworski)
• habituation phase (Rustow) growing confidence
  in and practice of democratic rules and norms
  development of political parties linking elites
  masses
• blurred distinction between transition and
  consolidation despite attempt for more precision
• end point unclear when is democratisation
  complete?

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What makes for democratic consolidation?

• electoral turnover?
• agreement on state/nation (national unity)
• lasting elite pact or elite turnover?
• mass mobilisation at the outset of transition
  (Bunce) or continuous mass involvement?
• consolidation of party system?

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Linz and Stepan (1996)

• Three dimensions for assessing democratic
  consolidation
• Behavioural
• Attitudinal
• Constitutional/Institutional
• Five Conditions of Consolidation
• - civil society
• - political society
• - rule of law
• - functioning state bureaucracy
• - institutionalised economic society

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Alternative definition (Schedler, 1998)

• preventing democratic breakdown (key!)
• preventing erosion
• completing democracy
• deepening democracy
• organising democracy

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Political Parties

• Typology of parties
• mass parties arising from a mass movement and/or
  dependent on a large mass membership, many of
  whom are not active, and having regional local
  organisations
• cadre parties often arising out of parliamentary
  fractions, relying on small activist membership
• catch-all parties large parties aiming at
  broadening their natural constituency to capture
  the centre by minimising divisive ideology
• cartel parties (Katz Mair) elite-dominated
  parties which collude as a group to manage
  government, parliament and elections in their
  interest

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Role of Parties in the Democratic Process

• mediate between state (government, parliament)
  and society (voters)
• articulate interests of particular groups and
  aggregate them into a programme to be presented
  to the electorate
• ultimate objective is government (to form it,
  take part in a coalition, or influence it in
  debate and legislation) hence leadership
  recruitment function
• informational and mobilising roles (increasing
  public awareness of political issues, setting the
  agenda, stimulating activism)
• when forming part of a stable system they can
  ensure greater predictability and discipline
  (lock-in effect)
• gt how important are political parties in
  transition/
• consolidation?
• gt how effective?
• gt how stable?
• gt how representative?

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How different are post-communist parties? (Mair)

• distinct post-communist democratisation
  (near-absence of civil society more complex
  reform process delayed emergence of party
  systems)
• different type of electorate (more open, volatile
  and uncertain no clear cleavage structures,
  top-down parties/sofa parties)
• different context of competition (short-term
  interests of elites, institutional incentives
  towards instability, openness of competition)
• different pattern of competition (adversarial
  elites, majoritarian rather than consensual style
  of politics catch-all-parties/populism)
• gt exaggeration of difference? measured against
  ideal-type (e.g. Lipset/Rokkan, 1967)?

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Attempts at explaining variation

• Prior regime type
• Kitschelt et al. 3 types of communist system 1)
  national-accommodative (Pol. Hung.) 2)
  bureaucratic-authoritarian (GDR, Cz.) 3)
  patrimonial (Bulg., Rom.) producing different
  conditions for development of parties
• i.e.
• where the Communist Party (CP) was ready to
  negotiate early and/or seen as pro-national, it
  retained more popularity and was able to
  transform itself into a social-democratic party
  (Pol. SLD Hung. MSZP Lith. LDDP Slovenia
  SLSD)
• where the CP was seen as anti-national and
  authoritarian communism was more decisively
  rejected (Est., Lat., Cz.) (NB pre-comm. trad.
  shapes expectations, organisation)
• where CP was seen as pro-national but was deeply
  embedded in corrupt authoritarian networks it
  managed to retain initial control of transition,
  reforming slowly and with difficulty (Bulgaria
  BSP Romania NSF gt PDSR Albania ASP Serbia
  SPS)
• gt But tricky distinctions of prior regime
  types
• gt But overemphasis on CP

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contd.

• Pre-Socialist political traditions
• stateness issues (ethnic parties stabilising or
  destabilising?)
• party-formation strategies and resources (e.g.
  Grzymala-Busse state capture by opportunistic
  parties vs. constraints)
• institutional factors (parliamentary system,
  electoral system)
• party laws and funding
• proximity to Western party families and external
  support