Policy options for future negotiations, elements for scenario development

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Policy options for future negotiations, elements
for scenario development
Philippe Tulkens Federal Planning Bureau Task
Force Sustainable Development Brussels Belgium
GECS meeting- Sevilla 09-2001
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Equity principles and related burden sharing rules
Equity principle
Example of implied burden sharing rule
Interpretation
Share abatement costs across countries in
proportion to emission levels
The economic burden is proportional to emissions
(eventually including historical emissions)
Polluter pays
Every individual has an equal right to pollute or
to be protected from pollution
Equal per capita emissions
Egalitarian
Countries with similar economic circumstances
have similar emission rights and burden sharing
responsibilities
Equalize net welfare change across countries (net
cost of abatement as a proportion of GDP is equal
for each country)
Horizontal
The greater the ability to pay the greater the
economic burden
Net cost of abatement is directly correlated with
per capita GDP

• Vertical

current level of emissions constitutes a status
quo right
reduce emissions proportionally across all
countries to maintain relative emission levels
between them
Sovereignty
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Historical view

• First quantitative objective (1992) Annex I
  emissions stabilization by 2000 at 1990 levels
  (UNFCCC Art.4.2.a).
• Discussion on future targets started in COP 1
  (1995) in the Ad Hoc Group of the Berlin Mandate.
  
• The work continued until COP-3 (1997), the Kyoto
  negociations.
• Kyoto final targets from 8 to 10 relative
  to 1990 emissions levels to be reached in the by
  2008-2012. Within the EU, the scale goes from
  28 ( Lux) to 27 (Pt).

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Kyoto Protocol (1997)

• 5,2 target not predefined and the
  differenciation among Parties was not based on a
  specific method.
• Agreement based on negociations interests and
  national circumstances of the Parties

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Present discussions in the negotiations

• Only a SBSTA process on the Brazilian proposal.
• Next discussion on targets by 2005.
• Non annex I countries believe that the whole
  process will start from scratch.
• Some annex I Parties seem to consider the Kyoto
  type targets as usefull tools for further
  negotiations.

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Proposals elaborated in the Ad Hoc Group of the
Berlin Mandate

• Flat-rates targets are left out (no principle of
  differenciation)
• 17 proposals from Parties with differenciation
• (no proposal from the USA)
• Review from
• Torvanger and Godal (1999) or Ringius, Torvanger
  and Underdal (1999)

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Parties proposals Convergence 1.
France 2. Switzerland 3. EU Historical
responsibility 4. Brazil 5.
Brazil-RIVM Multi-criteria formula 6.
Norway (GDP/capita, emission/capita,
emissions/unit of GDP) 7. Iceland Fossil fuel
dependency 8. Australia 9. Iran Menu
approach 10. Japan I 11. Japan II Sector
approach 12. EUs Triptique approach GDP per
capita approach 13. Poland et al. 14.
Estonia 15. Poland and Russia 16.
Korea Cost-effectiveness (equalize MAC) 17. New
Zealand

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Proposals from the literature

• Claussen and Mc Neilly, 1998 (Pew Center)
• Rose et al., 1998
• Rose and Stevens, 1998
• Rose, 1992
• Rowlands, 1997
• Ridgley, 1996
• Kawashima, 1996
• Barett, 1992
• Agarwal or Meyer (CC, GCI)
• CICERO-ECN (2001)

• Countries divided into three tiers according to
  standard of living, responsibility, and
  opportunity
• Welfare implications for world regions
  non-linear programming model
• Emissions trading in dynamic model extend Kyoto
  Protocol to the developing countries
• Tradable emission quotas calcultae welfare
  changes for large countries
• Emission targets for OECD countries
• Multiple criteria methodology
• Emissions needs to set targets for Annex I
  countries tests single-criterion and
  multicriteria rules
• Tradable emission quotas game theoric analysis
  of outcomes for large countries
• Transition to an equal/capita rule
• Multi-sector Convergence Approach

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Proposals from the literature

• Philibert and Pershing, 2000
• Mueller, 2001
• Baumert, Bandari, Kete, 1999 (WRI)
• Criqui (2000)

•  Voluntary commitments 
• Adapted convergence
• Emission intensity targets
• Soft landing path

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Selection of proposals

• Possible criteria
• A) feasibility
• B) global or local relevance
• C) future potential
• D) political acceptability
• From Parties Japan II, France, Norway,
  Brazil-RIVM, Triptique
• From Literature CC, Ability to pay, Equal net
  welfare change