Range Integrated Product Team

1
Range Integrated Product Team (IPT) Report
Maj Gen Robert C. Hinson HQ AFSPC/DO
2
Background

• Range IPT chartered by HQ AFSPC/DO to address CEO
  action items
• Lt Gen (Ret) Henry selected as Chairman
• Lt Gen Henry will brief at 10 Dec CEO conference

3
Desired CC Actions

• Approve release of Executive Report to CEO
  attendees
• Full distribution after 10 Dec CEO meeting
• Endorse IPT report and authorize AFSPC/DO to
  develop AFSPC plan to implement IPT
  recommendations

4
Range Integrated Product Team (IPT) Report
Richard C. Henry Lieutenant General
(Retired) Range IPT Chairman
5
Premise

• It is in the interest of the United States to
  have a strong commercial satellite and space
  launch industry because it strengthens the
  national economy and improves the nations
  leadership in a key arena of national power.

6
Premise

• It is in the interest of the Department of
  Defense, the United States Air Force and Air
  Force Space Command to have a strong commercial
  satellite and space launch industry. This will
  provide more assured access to space, reduced
  acquisition costs and increased launch
  reliability.

7
Outline

• Background
• Approach
• Benchmarks
• U.S. Spaceports vs. Foreign Ranges
• CCAS and VAFB
• Topics
• Range Capacity
• AF/Commercial Interfaces
• Public Safety
• Range Modernization
• National Perspectives
• Trends
• Objectives
• Vision

8
Background

• Action Items (Dec 97)
• Identify ways to turn Range faster, for all Range
  operations - top-to-bottom look, with Industry
  involvement
• Take a fresh look at how the Range can be made
  more efficient in the near-term - bottom-up
  approach
• Look at how the Range works from a broad
  perspective. Determine value-added and
  non-value-added functions/positions/associated
  costs

9
Background

• Action Items (Dec 97)
• Look at other Range operations to benchmark our
  process. Determine how our efficiency compares
  to other Ranges around the world.
• Review Range Concept of Operations -- look at
  what makes sense from a National perspective
• Ensure Range IPT centered on broader Range
  capacity issues

10
Background

• AFSPC/DO Range IPT Charter Objectives (Feb 98)
• Identify ways to turn Range faster
• Identify ways to reduce Range costs
• Identify minimum Range personnel requirements
• Establish road-map to increase Range capacity
• Establish policy regarding customer use of
  limited Range resources
• Benchmark Range operations with respect to other
  Space Launch Ranges around the world
• Determine value added functions or processes that
  can be incorporated from other Space Launch
  Ranges and eliminate non-value added functions

11
Background
AFSPC/CV activation of Range IPT (Apr 98)
12
Approach

• Sub IPTs
• Weekly telecons/video telecons
• Meetings when possible
• Principals
• Midterm Review (Jul 98)
• Final Review (Oct 98)
• Chairmans Meetings
• Team Effort
• Good Cross-Tell
• Expanded communications between AFSPC, SMC, and
  Industry

13
Benchmarks

• Extended Survey
• Non-attribution
• Baikonur - Competitive only in pricing
• Xichang - Competitive only in pricing
• CCAS - 2
• Kourou - 1
• CCAS not 1 because
• Commercial user priority low
• Difficult AF interfaces
• Difficulties working with Range Safety

14
Benchmarks
CCAS/ER - DTE heritage
WALLOPS ISLAND
(NASA)
ARGENTIA
CCAS / KSC / PAFB
HIGH INCLINATION ORBIT
EQUATORIAL ORBIT
ANTIGUA
SLBM CORRIDOR
JONATHAN DICKINSON
ASCENSION
15
ER OM TOA (FY 98)
16
ER Launch vs. Funding Rates (FY 98)
17
Benchmarks
VAFB/WR - OTE heritage and NRO influence
PILLAR POINT AFS
ANDERSON PEAK
WEST COAST OFFSHORE
VANDENBERG AFB /
OPERATING AREA
BALLISTIC MISSILE
BROAD OCEAN
AREA
HAWAII
POLAR
KWAJALEIN
ORBIT
PT. MUGU / SNI
(KMR)
(NAWCWPNS)
18
WR OM TOA (FY 98)
19
WR Launch vs. Funding Rates (FY98)
20
Benchmarks

• Eastern Range
• Oldest equipment
• Busiest schedule
• Principal target for concern
• Findings focus on CCAS/ER and 45 SW
• Most findings applicable to VAFB/WR and 30 SW

21
Range Capacity

• ER Situation (Jun 98)
• Range capacity estimates to date - problematic
• Range capacity not well defined - controversial
• Detailed operational analysis not supportable

22
Range Capacity

• The Range Capacity Model (Sep 98)
• Empirically derived
• Defines and interrelates operational issues
• Fleet Mix and Range support requirements
• Operations and scheduling processes
• Manpower and ops tempo
• Hardware and Range turnaround
• Supports detailed analysis necessary to test and
  evaluate potential improvements
• Adaptable to changing conditions
• Validated and accepted by launch community

23
Range Capacity

• Maximum Range Capacity (MRC) Assumptions
• No increase in scheduling changes
• No Range ops opportunities lost to lack of demand
• Crew rest rate based on current levels
• Current equipment and processes
• No increase in PMIs or other maintenance actions
• 25 annual downtime days and non-launch support

24
Range Capacity

• ER Capacity
• Titan IV stand-down (FY02)
• Increasing presence of EELV (FY02-07)

25
Range Capacity

• WR Capacity
• Titan IV stand-down (FY02)
• Fleet mix constant in out years (after FY04)

60
55
50
Launches
45
40
35
30
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Fiscal Year
26
Range Capacity

• Sensitivity Analysis
• Scheduling Stabilization
• 30 sched change reduction - 5 capacity increase
• Low cost, longer-term (ongoing)
• Support Requirements (Rehearsals) Reduction
• 30 rehearsal reduction - 6 capacity increase
• Low cost, longer-term (ongoing)
• Hardware Turnaround
• 40 H/W turn reduction - 20 capacity increase
• High cost, long-term

27
Range Capacity

• ER Core Crew Concept
• 50-60 person reconfiguration crew -- specific
  skills
• Reduces turnaround 50
• Increases capacity 20 (9 launches/year)
• Implementation in 6 months
• Estimated 3.5-4.5M per year

28
Range Capacity
ER Core Crew Impact
w/o Core Crew
Crew Rest 10 Hours
Crew Rest 10 Hours
Minus Count 8 Hours
Manpower
Range Safety and Range Confidence
Testing Requirements
Manpower
Customer and Range Safety Requirements
First Launch T-0
Second Launch T-0
Turnaround Time 48 hours
w/Core Crew
Second Launch T-0
First Launch T-0
Turnaround Time 24 hours
29
Range Capacity
80
ER Capacity Core Crew
75
70
65
ER Capacity
60
Launches
55
National Mission Model (ER) a/o
Jul 98
50
45
40
35
30
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Fiscal Year

• ER Core Crew Option
• An option should launch projection exceed MRC
  estimate

30
Range Capacity

• National Mission Model (NMM)
• Credibility?
• Stability?
• Usefulness?
• An alternative?
• NMM as currently portrayed, implies a level of
  precision beyond three years -- unobtainable

31
Range Capacity

• Recommendations
• Develop an alternative to NMM for out-year
  projections and correlate with POM cycle
• Adopt the Range Capacity Model as Command
  standard for Range capacity and operations
  analyses
• Use competition and incentives to gain innovation
  in range capacity and turn around improvements
• Hold Core Crew concept as option for use if
  capacity or schedule stress becomes a serious
  issue

32
AF/Commercial Interfaces

• Policies
• Oversight to Insight
• Scheduling
• Costs
• Real Estate and Property

33
AF/Commercial Interfaces

• Policies
• Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA) defines
  reimbursement
• DoDD 3230.3 implements CSLA
• Non-interference Basis
• Excess Capacity
• Tolerant support
• Second priority
• Requirement to comply with public law

34
AF/Commercial Interfaces

• Oversight to Insight -- Commercial
• Role reversals
• Oversight should not apply to commercial -- but
  exists
• Insight not yet well understood
• Mission assurance not within purview of Wing CC
• Relationship with spacecraft customer
• Safety issues
• Important to define what NOT to do

35
AF/Commercial Interfaces

• Scheduling
• Consistent comments/issues
• Responsiveness
• Flexibility
• All recognize
• Need for 3rd party management
• Need for friendly system
• Both Wings working these issues
• Interactive/management by exception

36
AF/Commercial Interfaces

• Costs
• Conflict of government system with commercial
  practices
• Level of redundancy in Safety mandatory
  instrumentation
• AF-provided vs. commercially available services
• Negotiable?

37
AF/Commercial Interfaces

• Real Estate and Property
• Importance of CSOSA
• Long delay impacted commercial operations
• Real property processing time
• Unfriendly environmental approval process
• Excess launch property and equipment policies

38
AF/Commercial Interfaces

• Recommendations -- AFSPC
• Policy addressing priority of commercial launch
• Include commercial launch in Wing mission
  statements
• Lease complexes 36A, 17A/B to launch providers at
  CCAS
• Publish command instruction regarding commercial
  launch
• Recognize launch provider as responsible and
  accountable except for public safety
• Certify launch providers as safety and
  environmental approval authorities for commercial
  spacecraft

39
AF/Commercial Interfaces

• Recommendations -- AFSPC
• Task Force to reconcile government bureaucracy
  with commercial business practices
• Work with Boeing -- led joint investment group
• Adopt 24 hrs or less as standard response time
  for schedule change requests
• Transfer scheduling function to RTS Contractor
• AF role is umpire/appeal authority
• Wing/Group training program for officers involved
  with commercial launch
• Define what is NOT AF responsibility

40
AF/Commercial Interfaces

• Recommendations -- AFSPC
• Examine positions requiring AF presence during
  launch
• Reduce requirement or add depth
• Recommend to OSD an initiative for CSLA revision
• Implement phase-down now

41
Public Safety

• USAF Executive Agent for US Government
• International considerations
• Impeccable record
• Same practices for forty years
• Cost exceeds 100 million/year
• Large database of experience
• Improving launch systems reliabilities
• Independent assessment of public safety practices
  never accomplished to date

42
Public Safety

• When in AFMC, Range Safety provided design
  experience base to industry
• EWR 127-1 significant amount of design criteria
  (40 yrs of lessons learned)
• Safety Office includes Engineering Section
• Safety approach not consistent with normal
  operational safety functions
• Review with AFMC in order

43
Public Safety

• General perceptions
• Personality dependent
• Unnecessarily demanding
• Interpretation vs. criteria
• Excessive oversight
• Politically independent
• Not a team player
• More so at 45 SW

44
Public Safety

• Recommendations
• Independent technical assessment by NAS
• Use technology to reduce costs
• Faster review, if possible
• Industry/NASA support, if possible
• Return design criteria of EWR 127-1 to AFMC
• Retrain Wing Safety personnel
• Determine AFMC role in Range Safety development
  programs

45
Range Modernization

• Difficult but absolutely essential program
• High visibility program if something goes wrong
• Challenge is to bring improved capabilities on
  line without interrupting launch schedules
• Reliability and maintainability trends in some
  subsystems are down
• Continuing requirements, cost, and schedule
  issues
• No systems integrator
• With transfer of IM to SMC, need for one is more
  pressing
• Continuing top-down leadership is needed

46
Mission Impact Problem Reports (CCAS)
G O O D
47
Mission Reliability
48
Range Modernization

• Difficult but absolutely essential program
• High visibility program if something goes wrong
• Challenge is to bring improved capabilities on
  line without interrupting launch schedules
• Reliability and maintainability trends in some
  subsystems are down
• Continuing requirements, cost, and schedule
  issues
• No systems integrator
• With transfer of IM to SMC, need for one is more
  pressing
• Continuing top-down leadership is needed

49
Range Modernization

• Difficult but absolutely essential program
• High visibility program if something goes wrong
• Challenge is to bring improved capabilities on
  line without interrupting launch schedules
• Reliability and maintainability trends in some
  subsystems are down
• Continuing requirements, cost, and schedule
  issues
• No systems integrator
• With transfer of IM to SMC, need for one is more
  pressing
• Continuing top-down leadership is needed

50
Range Modernization

• New and emerging commercial needs
• Transfer of IM to SMC permits systems approach
• Integrated Range Modernization to include post
  RSA development programs
• Requirements
• Near-term
• Far-term
• Launch capacity as a key performance parameter
  will drive sub-tier requirements

51
Range Modernization

• Recommendations
• Establish system integrator for RSA and IM
• Identify launch capacity as KPP
• Re-validate 1994 RSA ORD
• Address commercial needs
• Apply systems approach to RSA/IM Program
• Requirements
• Near-term
• Far-term
• Develop contingency plans to address near term
  problems, pending RSA
• SATAF concept at Wing level for RSA implementation

52
Ten-Year National Perspective

• Trends
• Diminishing AF presence
• AF/NRO launch rate stable or diminishing
• NASA launch rate stable or increasing
• Commercial launch rate increasing

53
Ten-Year National Perspective

• Factors
• Single-Stage-to-Orbit (SSTO) capability not yet
  clear
• Strong US military dependence on space assets
• Strong US business dependence on space assets
• Information technology fast becoming instrument
  of national power
• US spaceports are national assets
• Assured access-to-space is necessary element of
  long-term sustainment
• National security constellations
• Commercial constellations

54
Ten-Year National Perspective

• Discussion
• GPS can provide independent metrics
• Velocity
• Position
• Acceleration
• Direction
• TDRSS can provide telemetry relay
• Objective Reliable autonomous flight
  termination

55
Ten-Year National Perspective

• Discussion (cont)
• Ranges exist to measure performance and to
  protect public -- a test environment
• Space launch no longer a test activity
• Objective Divorce space launch from Ranges

56
Ten-Year National Perspective

• Discussion (cont)
• AFSPC Spaceport concept
• Geographic terminals
• NASA/KSC, Spaceport Florida Authority,
  Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, 45 SW see no obstacles
• Objective Spaceport operated like an airport --
  as a business

57
Ten-Year National Perspective
Canaveral Spaceport Configuration (Pre-EELV)
58
Ten-Year National Perspective

• Discussion (cont)
• Spaceport under DoD or non-DoD management?
• Still a dangerous world
• Spaceports are strategic targets
• Options for future not clear
• New DoD RD programs
• Return to Cold War era security
• AFSPC has intel and security infrastructure
• USSPACECOM has access to other CINCs
• Objective Continued AF jurisdiction

59
Ten-Year National Perspective

• Discussion (cont)
• Cost of doing business
• CSLA subsidizes commercial customers
• Government customers also subsidized
• Cost of Range OM high
• Cost of public safety high
• Technology trends point to lower costs
• EELV
• Autonomous FTS
• Improved launch reliability
• Range modernization
• Objective Spaceport financially self-sufficient

60
Ten-Year National Perspective

• Discussion (cont)
• Diminishing AF presence
• How much?
• Maximum use of contractor support
• AF Functions
• Contract and financial management, flight safety,
  disaster preparedness, security, weather,
  schedule and frequency management, real estate
  and facilities
• Objective Specialized organization (e.g.)
• Spaceport Operations Group
• Range Operations Group

61
Ten-Year Vision

• Spaceports operate as businesses
• Financially self-sufficient
• All users pay fees
• Spaceports operate independent of Ranges except
  to deconflict schedules
• Objective Wing organization
• Spaceport Operations Group
• Range Operations Group

62
Summary

• In summary, the Range IPT has
• Identified problems in customer relations,
  scheduling and safety -- and they are being
  worked
• Defined maximum Range capacities as a function of
  fleet mix pending Range modernization
• Defined an option for increasing the capacities
  by 20 percent
• Recommended co-equal priority launch scheduling
  with exceptions only in the national interest

63
Summary

• In summary, the Range IPT has
• Highlighted the importance and difficulty of the
  Range modernization program
• Defined long term objectives for the commercial
  and government space launch programs
• Recommended an Air Force - industry partnership
  for the long term
• Described a ten year Vision

64
Summary

• Launch is a risky business with many bumpy
  roads to cross
• if we dont make smart necessary changes TODAY,
  
• well be on the outside looking in!