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MGT 459 Negotiation

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People often do not know what others will do ... Don't be envious. Don't be the first to defect. Reciprocate both cooperation and defection ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: MGT 459 Negotiation


1
MGT 459 - Negotiation
  • Session 1.1

2
Two Major Types of Negotiation Situations
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
3
Two Major Types of Negotiation Situations
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
4
Factors Increasing Non-cooperative Negotiation in
Business
  • Decentralization within Company
  • Conflicts of interest
  • Sub-optimization
  • Strategic Alliances, Mergers, Acquisitions
  • 55 of alliances and 78 of MAs fail
  • Only 23 recover costs

Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
5
Non-cooperative Negotiation in Business
  • Specialization
  • Dependence on other firms for inputs
  • Competition
  • Can also create opportunities for cooperation
    (e.g., generic advertising)

Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
6
Myths about Interdependent Decision Making
  • Myth 1 Its a game of wits
  • I can outsmart them
  • Other party is just as smart
  • Myth 2 Its a game of strength
  • Show em youre tough!
  • Escalates conflict
  • Myth 3 Its a game of chance
  • Hope for the best
  • Many outcomes are predictable

Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
7
Forms of Social Dilemmas
  • A two-party dilemma is called a prisoners
    dilemma
  • A multi-party dilemma is called a social
    dilemma
  • Also known as Mixed-Motive Situations
  • Simultaneous incentives to cooperate and compete
  • Mutual cooperation is best for both parties,
    combined
  • Competition is best for each party, individually

Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
8
Prisoners Dilemma
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
9
Types of Prisoners Dilemmas
  • Type 1 One-shot decision
  • Dominance detection Party As outcome is better
    by defecting regardless of Party Bs decision
  • Equilibrium outcome results, neither party can
    unilaterally improve his or her outcome by making
    a different choice

Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
10
Types of Prisoners Dilemmas
  • Type 2 Repeated interaction over a fixed number
    of trials
  • Purpose of cooperation is to influence the
    behavior of other party
  • Backward induction Start by predicting outcomes
    in final trial
  • Final trial is essentially a one-shot decision

Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
11
Types of Prisoners Dilemmas
  • Type 3 Repeated interaction for an infinite or
    indefinite amount of time
  • Final trial not expected, or point in time not
    predictable
  • Cooperation may influence other persons behavior

Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
12
Examples of Mixed Motive Situations
  • Airlines
  • Auto manufacturers dealers
  • Arms race

Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
13
Winning (i.e. losing) Strategy for Prisoners
Dilemmas
  • Tit-for tat strategy
  • Always cooperate on first trial
  • On subsequent trials, do what opponent did on the
    previous trial
  • Tit-for-tat can never do better than its
    opponents
  • Tit-for-tat has the potential to induce
    cooperation

Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
14
Illustration of Tit-for-tat
15
Why is Tit-for-tat Effective?
  • Its nice
  • Competition elicits competition
  • Its tough
  • Solid cooperation would be exploited
  • Its forgiving
  • Commensurate response
  • Its not too clever
  • Other party can figure it out

Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
16
How to make TIT-FOR-TAT work
  • Dont be envious
  • Dont be the first to defect
  • Reciprocate both cooperation and defection
  • Dont be too clever

Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
17
Recovering from Defection
  • Try to see the other partys response as rational
    (i.e., one we would make)
  • Dont expect trust to be rebuilt immediately
  • Consider letting the other party catch up
  • Make your decisions at the same time

Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
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