The SABCs legal structure the benefits disadvantages of a national versus a regional structure

1
The SABCs legal structure the benefits/
disadvantages of a national versus a regional
structure

• Workshop on Save our SABC Reclaiming our Public
  Broadcaster
•  
• Wed 28 January 2009
• Guy Berger

2
Covering

• SABC size and shape are interlinked issues
• To save SABC from itself, we need to think Save
  our SABCs! (Plural)
• Not national OR regional, but both
• Integral to both national regional is a new
  shape for the boards how they are appointed,
  and who they represent.
• In short Spread the power!

3
SABC as is cries out for capture

• Debate is good, but destructive contestation
  corrodes public service broadcasting
• This will continue for as long as SABC remains
  both an attractive and easy target for
  political capture
• Current corrosive contest is between parties, and
  between the executive and the legislature,
  presidency, SABC staff, board itself.

4
Therefore, it can be argued

• What needs changing is the structural possibility
  for any single (external) force to exercise
  exclusive influence over a centralised lever of
  power.
• HOW?
• Dilute the power of political forces
• Redistribute power across several centres.

5
This is needed because

• As long as SABC governance is one of external
  contestation, rather than having different
  interests represented structurally within the
  governance itself, politics will find a way to
  prevail.
• Integrating interests inside the board does not
  avoid this entirely, but introduces moderating
  parameters compromise and co-operation.

6
Without structural change

• The current scenario will continue to be one
  where different political forces to try and
  frustrate another, to the detriment of developing
  common interest in the long-term credibility and
  broad public service thats on offer.
• Instead of elaborating, in theory practice,
  cutting edge Public Service, the agenda is abut
  who controls.

7
A package deal is needed

• Anything less than fundamental overhaul of SABCs
  structure (size) and its governance is a wasted
  opportunity, and indeed a mistaken step - because
  no single change will solve the
  over-politicisation problem

8
In sum, we need

• (1) Staggering the term lengths of the board
• (2) Unbundling the top position in the
  corporation
• (3) Expanding on the accountability mechanisms of
  the corporation
• (4) Sharing power with non-political
  stakeholders
• (5) Unbundling the concentration of power in a
  single broadcast entity.

9
No licence fee sans representation!

• Needed a system that enables all significant
  diverse interests to be included WITHIN the
  board.
• As board members, these representatives would
  have corporate governance responsibilities to
  aggregate, reconcile and accommodate their
  different interests as INSIDERS rather than as
  hostile outsiders seeking a winner-takes-all
  approach.

10
Recall and non-executive aspects

• Each nominating institution would have power to
  propose and remove its representative.
• Parliament would be empowered to dismiss its
  representatives, but not those of other
  stakeholders.
• Also, in this scenario, there are no executive
  directors on the board SABC management would
  report to the board, rather than being part of
  the board.

11
National SABC with 16-person board

• Presidential appointment 1
• Ministerial appointment (Department of
  Communications) 1
• House of Provinces ruling party appointment 1
• National Assembly reps from ruling party 4
• National Assembly reps from opposition parties 3
• Trade Unions 1, Churches 1 Business 1.
• University vice-chancellors representative 1
• Pansalb 1, SABC staff 1

12
Sing of de-politicising

• The whole system would no longer be the exclusive
  business of politicians
• Elected officials do represent public interests,
  but they also represent their own institutional
  and/or factional interests.
• Hence, they need to be balanced by direct
  representation of other public bodies.
• Ultimately, its also in politicians own
  interests that no political faction can prevail
  over SABC.

13
A challenge to rightsize

• As is a huge apparatus, SABC inevitably focuses
  interest and intensity of stakeholders seeking
  control.
• It is cumbersome, and susceptible to missing
  important opportunities on both the business and
  the content sides (especially in an age of
  emerging digital broadcasting).
• Eg. the two new regional TV stations in African
  languages have yet to see the light of day the
  website lags in its service potential.

14
Solution create several SABCs

• Drawing from the German model, SABC should be
  unbundled into separately governed bodies
• This would complicate party political quests for
  hegemony
• It would make for more autonomous and locally
  accountable institutions of public service
  broadcasting

15
For example, 12 SABCs

• 1. SABC National (consisting of SAFM, Metro, RSG,
  TV 1, 2 and 3, and their web sites)
• 2. Nine provincially-oriented stations (but
  networked in various ways) (consisting of African
  language radio stations, and web sites)
• 3. One provincial SABC for TV 4 and 5 (and web)
• 4. SABC International (TV, radio and web).
•  

16
Diversified controls

• For each of these SABCs, there should be separate
  boards of governance.
• As regards the involvement of political bodies,
  different state structures would be involved.
• Thus the boards of SABC National and SABC
  International would include representatives
  appointed via parliament and presidency and
  national ministry.

17
And the regions?

• Each of the nine provincially-oriented stations
  should have boards appointed via provincial
  parliaments, governments and presidency.
• Joint provincial appointments (perhaps via the
  National Council of Provinces) would bring in the
  relevant representatives for TV 4 and again for
  the case of TV 5).
• Each provincial board would also include the
  non-political stakeholder group representatives
  as outlined above.

18
In sum

• In total, this would give twelve SABCs, each with
  its own boards with flexibility to network in
  the US-affiliate mode.
• But instead of the single super-board at the
  moment, power would be distributed to a dozen
  structures each one representing diverse
  stakeholders (including diverse political forces)
  and their interests within it.

19
Dreaming?

• Nope all this is common practice in many
  countries.
• NGOs unions are represented on public
  broadcaster boards in Albania, Bosnia, Croatia,
  Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovenia.
• A portion of board members are elected
  representatives of the broadcasters staff
  themselves, in countries like France, Macedonia,
  Romania and Slovenia.

20
Dreaming?

• While political nominees make up a third of the
  two public broadcaster boards in Hungary, only
  half this quota may come from the ruling party.
  The rest have to come from the opposition.
• In practice, these dont work perfectly, but it
  is different to a singularity of broadcast power.

21
Objections?

• Unbundling weakens PSB role in construction of
  the national public / nation.
• It counters economies of scale (maybe)
• It makes the baby SABCs more vulnerable to
  competition from commercial rivals, threatening
  Public Service
• It might require more funds from the fiscus
• Its a revival of federalism.

22
More concerns

• The regionalisation component fragments the
  market à la commercial trends competes unfairly
  with private and community broadcast.
• It displaces centralised dysfunctionality to the
  even greater problems at provincial level.
• It provides possibilities for provincialised
  capture.

23
On balance?

• The bottom line in adding up the pros and
  cons, what is the better option?
• One SABC or many?
• One appointing body or many?
• You decide!