Operational Analysis Support to the RAF During Op TELIC

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Operational AnalysisSupport to the RAF DuringOp
TELIC

• Presentation to the
• Defence Study Group
• Dstl Farnborough 18 Nov 04

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Air Warfare CentreOperational Analysis Element
Paul Stoddart Scientific Advisor Operations RAF
Waddington 18 Nov 04
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Air Warfare Centre
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dstl
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• OA in support
• of air
• operations

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This presentation will be at
CLASSIFICATION

• UNCLASSIFIED

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Air Warfare Centre
Strike Command
Commandant AWC
Development
Operations
Ops Support
Operational Analysis Element (OAE)
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AWC Mission
To Provide Timely Integrated Mission Support at
the Operational, Tactical and Technical
Levels of Warfare.
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Operational Analysis Element

• Provide scientific and technical expertise to
  AWC
• for essential and timely mission support to the
  front line

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Operational Analysis Element

• for essential and timely mission support to the
  front line
• An 80 solution now is better than the 100
  solution tomorrow
• Timescales can be very short

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OA Deployments

• Jan 91 - Operation GRANBY
• Jun 95 - Op DELIBERATE FORCE
• Mar 99 - Operation ALLIED FORCE
• Feb 03 - Op TELIC / IRAQI FREEDOM

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OAE on Op TELIC

• 10 analysts deployed to theatre
• One to National Component HQ
• One to UK Air Component HQ
• 2 to Coalition Air Component HQ
• 6 to deployed attack squadrons (3 bases)
• Home team for reachback support

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OAE Tasks in Op TELIC

• National Component HQ
• One OAE analyst ( other analysts)
• Collateral damage estimation
• Advice to Targets office
• Advice on weapon effects to RE for repair
• Generic wpns advice to UK NCHQ staff

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OAE Tasks in Op TELIC

• UK Air Component HQ
• One OAE analyst
• Scientific adviser to UK Air Component Cdr
• Questions varied, operational tactical
• Coalition counter-IADS campaign
• Urban Close Air Support

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OAE Tasks in Op TELIC

• Coalition Air HQ
• 2 OAE analysts embedded (10 US staff)
• Part of Coalition OA Team (principally US)
• Campaign Assessment
• Data compilation (major task)

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OAE Tasks in Op TELIC

• Deployed UK attack squadrons
• 5 (later 6) OAE analysts to 3 bases
• No analysts left for early changeover
• Advice weapon and system performance
• Data collection/compilation
• IT support

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Support to UK Attack Sqns

• Weapon-system performance
• Laser guided bomb ballistics
• Weapon delivery modes
• Weapon to target matching
• Laser designator/seeker performance

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Support to UK Attack Sqns

• Database/tool development
• Reporting Program Input data once
• 3 x reports output
• Mission LGB, RAF Historical
• Air Tasking Order parser
• Auto break out of sqn missions
• Killbox mapping
• Mapped no-strike and restricted strike targets in
  specified killbox

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Reachback Support to AWC

• Reachback
• From deployed HQs and Sqns to AWC-based analysts
• Storm Shadow performance
• Weapon applications
• OAE support to AWC
• Capability measure Iraqi military systems

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Post Conflict Analysis

• CWEAT
• Combined Weapons Effect Assessment Team
• In country assessment boots on the ground
• Target inspection
• Damage assessment
• Weapon suitability

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We like bridges but...
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...success can be elusive
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Lessons

• OA/scientific/IT support to HQs and especially
  sqns is definitely valued by the military
  customer
• Especially to have it on location
• Invited on Afghanistan holiday (Harrier)

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Lessons

• General
• Training and preparation of analysts
• Risk assessment difficult for war zones
• Medical
• Military training/kit - availability
• Tools, Techniques, Models usage currency
• Communications for reachback
• Standard data collection methods/formats
• Must understand operational context
• 80 answer now 100 tomorrow

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Lessons contd

• Locate analysts with customers
• ie with operators at HQs and operating bases
• Be active get out and speak to people
• Explain what OA can and cannot achieve
• Get to know them before op deployment
• Develop relationship before the op starts
• Get to know people personally
• Avoid (most) non-OA tasks
• be helpful but do not be an admin drudge

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Lessons contd

• Operational timescales can be very short
• Be accurate, be clear, be right
• OA output must be useful to the military customer
• Being correct is not enough be relevant
• Avoid lengthy, academic studies that have no
  conclusion Further studies are necessary

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Context

• To Achieve 90 Pk on a 60x100 Target
• (dumb bombs)
• WWII (B-17) 9,070 Bombs
• Korea/Vietnam (F-84/F-105) 176 Bombs
• Desert Storm (F-16) 30 Bombs
• Desert Storm (F-117) 1 LGB

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Op TELIC

• Op GRANBY
• 81 dumb weapons
• 19 guided weapons
• Op TELIC
• 16 dumb weapons
• 84 guided weapons

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Op TELIC OA Results

• Op TELIC Air domain data
• 4 Gb of data (Secret)
• 10,000 files
• 1,000 images weapon system videos
• Summarised, analysed and reported
• weapon numbers
• hit rates
• sortie rates (abort numbers and types)

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Bombing Tonnage
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Numbers - OIF

• Coalition combat ac 786
• 20,733 sorties
• 19,948 guided munitions launched
• 9,251 unguided munitions launched
• Leaflets Dropped 31,800,000
• 120,454 rolls of toilet paper

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So What?

• What do all the numbers mean?

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Iraq - Op IRAQI FREEDOM

• Combat Assessment plan initiated early
• Detailed plan
• a Operational Objectives
• 4 a Tactical Objectives
• 15 a Tactical Tasks
• 3-5 MoEs per Tactical Task
• Total data requirement HUGE !

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Lessons

• Campaign Assessment (CA)
• Very challenging short, high intensity war
• Data and analysis hungry
• How to measure effect
• True EBO or kinetic result crater counting?
• CA early input to planning essential

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Lessons

• Beware the temptation of Powerpoint
• Glossy slides are not a substitute for analysis
  and advice
• In Op IRAQI FREEDOM, the Coalition had Powerpoint
  supremacy
• Air Component Cdr 200-slide briefings!

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Thoughts for the future

• Campaign/Operation Assessment
• How well am I doing?
• Measures of Effectiveness
• How do I know when I have succeeded?
• Success Indicators
• Measure effect and progress
• Effort does not equal progress

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Conclusions

• OA support to ops works
• but must be quick and relevant
• Technical tactical areas well covered
• Campaign Assessment a capability gap

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• QUESTIONS