MPAS 2004 Contemporary Chinese Politics and Society

1
MPAS 2004Contemporary Chinese Politics and
Society

• 9.1. INTRODUCTION - A FRAMEWORK TO ANALYSE
  STATE-SOCIETY
• RELATIONS IN THE PRC PARTY-STATE, FACTIONALISM
  AND
• TRANSITION FROM A TOTALITARIAN TO
  POST-TOTALITARIAN REGIME
• 16.1. POLITICS OF REFORM 1976-2007
• 23.1. ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION THE NATURE OF THE
  ECONOMIC
• MIRACLE. FILM I 10-12, CEAS SEMINAR ROOM
• 30.1. SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION I NEW SOCIAL
  STRUCTURE, SOCIAL
• MOBILITY, THE NEW MIDDLE CLASSES? FILM II
  12-14, CEAS SEMINAR ROOM (N.B. TIME)
• 6.2. SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION II SOCIAL COSTS AND
  ACCOMPLISHMENTS,
• GROWTH WITH DISPARITY. FILM III 10-12, CEAS
  SEMINAR ROOM
• 13.2. EMERGING SOCIAL FORCES I PROTEST. FILM IV
  10-12, CEAS SEMINAR ROOM
• 20.2. EMERGING SOCIAL FORCES II MEDIA AND THE
  INTERNET. FILM V 10-12, CEAS SEMINAR ROOM
• 27.2. THE PARTY IN THE REFORM PERIOD THE
  STABILITY OF POST-TOTALITARIAN REGIME OR WILL THE
  CCP SURVIVE THE REFORMS? FILM VI 10-12, CEAS
  SEMINAR ROOM
• I EXAM 5.3 II EXAM 14.3., III EXAM Spare exam
  (rästitentti) in June
• The course also includes Dr. Ma Weihong EMERGING
  SOCIAL FORCES III NGOS AND THE STATE (Virtual
  audio lecture)

2
INTRODUCTION

• Aims of the course The course introduces the
  students to the political, social, and economic
  issues and developments during the reform period
  in China (1978 - ). This is done through
  focusing on the state-society relationship during
  the period and employing a concept of regime
  transition form a totalitarian to a
  post-totalitarian regime, which connects the
  political transformation to the larger social and
  economic transition.

3
INTRODUCTION

• The reform period (1978 present) in China has
  been one of the greatest successes stories in the
  World economic history
• Has changed Chinese economic and social
  structures profoundly and created pressures for
  political reforms
• An uneven and complex process

4
INTRODUCTION

• The course introduces the historical background
  of the reforms and their economic, social and
  political consequences to contemporary Chinese
  society
• Party-oriented approach what, why and how has
  the CCP done in order to reform Chinese economy
  and how has this changed Chinese society?
• How has the Party responded to the social changes
  the reforms have produced?
• Will the Party survive its own reforms?

5
INTRODUCTION

• The starting point for the reforms is/was the
  Maoist state created under the leadership of Mao
  Zedong after the revolution in 1949
• Historically unique starting points lead to
  historically unique outcomes
• The course begins with introduction to the Maoist
  state and politics during it
• The basic concepts that help to grasp the nature
  of mainland Chinese society and politics
• Party-State
• Totalitarianism
• Factionalism

6
INTRODUCTION THE CONCEPTS

• PARTY-STATE
• The Chinese Communist Party came to power in
  China through revolution in 1949 after almost 30
  years of armed struggle
• The Republic of China (ROC) fled to Taiwan and
  was replaced with the Peoples Republic of China
  with proletarian dictatorship (also peoples
  dictatorship)
• Republican in form, but in effect a party-state
  dominated by the Chinese Communist Party, CCP
  (???, Gongchangdang)

7
INTRODUCTION THE PARTY-STATE

• A Leninist construction, modelled after the
  Soviet example and advice
• The leading party pervades all other formal
  institutions in the polity
• All levels of government down to the villages,
  enterprises and civic organisations have a dual
  structure of administrative organs and respective
  party cells
• Since 1949 the Party has been the de facto leader
  on all administrative levels and social units

8
INTRODUCTION THE PARTY-STATE
Figure 1.) The dual structure of party-state in
China
9
Picture 1) PRC and Its Provinces, Autonomous
Regions and Directly Ruled Metropolitan Cities
HK and Macau SARs (Taiwan / Republic of China
Arguable)
10
INTRODUCTION THE PARTY-STATE

• There is a corresponding Party organisation on
  every level of government
• The Party Centre Central Party units
• Central Committee, Politburo and its Standing
  Committee
• In history Party Centre has referred to few
  leading cadres or simply to Mao
• Party-state has 25-30 leading positions that form
  the elite of decision making
• From provinces down, party committees under party
  secretaries are decisive bodies

11
INTRODUCTION THE PARTY-STATE

• The Party dominance based on two factors
• Decides policy lines (what the party-state does)
• Upholds nomenklatura i.e. a list of candidates
  for leading positions in party-state (who does
  what in the party-state)
• Some 95 of all leadership positions in the
  government manned by party members
• gt The Communist Party is the key organization in
  Chinese politics, understanding how it works is
  paramount for understanding Chinese politics

12
INTRODUCTION TOTALITARIANISM

• But why politics is important to understand
  Chinese society and its change?
• TOTALITARIANISM
• Officially, the PRC has had a multi-party system
  since 1949
• There are 8 other officially sanctioned smaller
  parties, but the principle of mutual existence
  and supervision is not carried out in reality
• During the Mao period China was a totalitarian
  one-party state
• The guiding organizational principle was Leninism
• Vanguard Party assuming the leadership at all
  fronts of social life

13
INTRODUCTION TOTALITARIANISM

• Totalitarianism a problematic concept
• Originally devised to denigrate those regimes it
  has been attached to
• In the Cold War atmosphere the journalistic
  concept was picked up as a concept in political
  science and attributed also to the PRC
• Based on seeing all socialist countries forming a
  monolith block led from Moscow and hostile to the
  Free World

14
INTRODUCTION TOTALITARIANISM

• A classic treatise on the totalitarian
  syndrome, or model, was offered by Carl J.
  Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (1966)
• 6 features
• 1) An elaborative transformative ideology
• 2) A ruling single mass party led by one man
• 3) Use of physical and mental terror against the
  enemies of the system
• 4) A technologically conditioned, near-complete
  monopoly of control, in the hands of the party or
  the government, of all means of effective mass
  communication, such as the press, radio, and
  motion pictures

15
INTRODUCTION TOTALITARIANISM

• 5) A similarly technologically conditioned,
  near-complete monopoly of the effective use of
  weapons of armed combat
• 6) Central control of the economy
• The totalitarian model came under severe
  criticism by the late 70s for its inability to
  explain the internal developments of the
  socialist regimes and how these regimes actually
  worked in Eastern Europe and China

16
INTRODUCTION TOTALITARIANISM

• Sujian Guo (1998)
• Totalitarian regime identity can be defined
  through hard core elements of a system
• 1) An absolutist ideology and inevitable goal
• 2) Ideological commitment
• 3) A dictatorial party-state system
• The internal structure of the regime or its
  ability to carry out policies in practise do not
  determine its nature as such

17
INTRODUCTION TOTALITARIANISM

• For a system to be totalitarian more important
  than the exact nature of the institutions of
  dictatorship, are the regimes relation to the
  rest of the society
• Totalitarian regime does not bind or limit itself
  legally (rule of law), or politically (democratic
  elections, free press)
• High degree of state penetration in all sectors
  of civic life, economy, and total control of
  organised politics

18
INTRODUCTION TOTALITARIANISM

• Forced-draft campaigns for ideologically induced
  social transformation
• Seeking to create a new society on a scale that
  calls for massive social renovation and a
  recasting of the division of labour
• Creating a new world
• It follows that in totalitarian societies the
  state plays central role in social development
  (for good and bad)

19
INTRODUCTION POST-TOTALITARIANISM

• POST-TOTALITARIANISM
• Robert Tucker (1961) A totalitarian regime based
  on a revolutionary movement may go through
  alteration of its dynamism as a result of a
  qualitative change in the motivation of
  revolutionary politics
• Losing the faith in ideology and thereby
  commitment to social transformation

20
INTRODUCTION POST-TOTALITARIANISM

• In post-totalitarian order ideology no longer has
  any great influence on people, but ideology still
  plays its legitimizing part in the system
• People do not have to believe in the system, they
  merely have to comply with it to a degree that
  does not jeopardize the official truth
• The political order no longer actively controls
  everything it can it is sufficient to only
  control what is seen as necessary for the
  perpetuation of the system

21
INTRODUCTION POST-TOTALITARIANISM

• The order has ceased to use ideology as the basis
  of its goal setting
• No more forced-draft campaigns
• A retreat from socially dominant positions in
  many sectors observed
• Political control remains intact
• The ruling party chooses what it wants to control
  

22
INTRODUCTION POST-TOTALITARIANISM

• Criticism against seeing the PRC a totalitarian
  state
• Vivienne Shue (1988) The PRC was not a monolith,
  it was unable to fully indoctrinate its citizens,
  subcultures and resistance did not disappear
• All this is true, yet Maoist state did penetrate
  widely in the society, politicized every aspect
  of human life, and suppressed all independent
  civic activities while carrying out costly
  attempts of total social transformation
• May have been incomplete, but did fit the Sujian
  Guos model

23
INTRODUCTION POST-TOTALITARIANISM

• Maoist state has changed notably after Maos
  death, and it is this change and its consequences
  is precisely what this course traces
• But how to explain the change, what created
  political dynamism in totalitarian /
  post-totalitarian setting?

24
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• FACTIONAL MODEL
• China has a dictatorial one-party system, but the
  Party is hardly a monolith
• One explanation of the inner working of the Party
  is to see the its leadership functioning after
  factional model (which comes with variations)
• Factions informal groupings of leading cadres
  that centre around a leadership figure, based on
  ties of mutual benefits, usually having the same
  place of origin or other affiliation, patronage
  relationships, etc.
• Factions exist at all levels, the central level
  factions most well known

25
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• Factionalism has a long historical background
• The Party that came to power in 1949 was divided
  into semi-autonomous field armies with strong
  leaders (shantou, mountain tops)
• Transferring these leaders to civilian offices
  created independent kingdoms in many sectors
• Legacy has lived on, as power struggle between
  factional alliances has became the rule of the
  game in cadre politics that factional leaders
  have to play or perish (or play and perish
  nevertheless)

26
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• Factions are formally banned for splitting the
  Party
• Means that open factionalism is not tolerated
• Factions do not have formal organisations
  (compare to Japan and Taiwan, where factions are
  formalised within multi-party systems)
• In reality factions are endemic in the
  party-state and even its necessary outcome

27
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• Factions are seen to be based on wider cultural
  dispositions
• Guanxi (??, connections) networks important to
  explain factions
• Factionalism an extension of guanxi to politics
• Nathan (1973) Nature of guanxi ties
• Relation is established personally between a
  patron and client (clientilist networks)

28
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• It is especially appreciated and kept alive
  through exchange of gifts, services, etc
• It usually collapses, if the flow of these
  benefits stops
• Relation is often uneven, as its parties have
  different resources to draw to
• The relationship creates rights and obligations
  (unwritten, but recognised by both parties) to
  its members

29
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• Relationship can be broken by both parties and
  they can seek other similar relations as long as
  they are not mutually contradictory
• There are other kinds of important relations in
  Chinese culture, such as kinship, clan
  membership, corporate membership, etc.
• These can be important in politics as well, but
  are not factional relations by definition (they
  can be their basis, though)

30
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• In every day Chinese a faction (??, zongpai)
  refers to almost any political grouping
  regardless on what kind of relations it is based
  on
• Here faction refers to a leadership faction
• Factions can also form factional coalitions and
  alliances which are referred to as factions in
  common speech

31
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• A Leadership factional relation is based on
  guanxi, but it is more binding than normal-day
  guanxi relation
• Based on mutual political interests
• Breaking the tie may cause difficulties, even
  peril, to both of its parties
• All its members are in leading political
  positions (relatively speaking)
• Direct relations usually only with leader -
  subleader

32
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• Network can be expanded up or downwards
• A subleader should not seek other factional
  alignments
• In Party politics, the leader with most factional
  following is dominant
• Subleaders may defect to other factions
• Most stable factions are therefore found within
  same organisations of the leader-subleader, where
  flow of benefits can be steady

33
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• Factions can have their inner tensions
  (subleaders struggling over access to the
  leader), but competition against the other
  factions keeps them together
• Stable factionalist systems possible when there
  is a broad enough consensus on common ideological
  goals
• Otherwise, factions would split and begin open
  rivalry

34
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• Nevertheless factionalist struggle usually
  appears doctrinal
• The struggle goes on under the guise of high
  ideological rhetoric where factional differences
  are blown bigger and matters of principle
  emphasised
• In reality, real ideological differences small
• Factionalist politics calls for compromise
  politics and recurrent crisis in policy making

35
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• Factionalist politics targets persons
• Opponents are weakened by attacking leading
  figures, or their subordinates
• Compare to the dance of factions in East Asian
  liberal politics
• See pictures

36
Picture 2) Factionalism Changes History Mao
Zedong with and without his factional rival Peng
Zhen (Source Kiinan vuosisata, Tammi 1996, 186)
37
Picture 1) Who is missing the Party? An altered
picture on official mourning of Chairman Mao at
Tiananmen Square1976 The Gang of Four has
been removed.
38
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• What explains factions (Jing Huang 2000)
• 1) Policy choice model
• 2) Institutional interests model
• 3) Power struggle model
• Policy choice model policy differences between
  leaders create factions (factions are opinion
  groups)
• Institutional interests model conflicts of
  bureaucratic interests create basis for
  factionalism (fragmented authoritarianism)
• Power struggle model constant need to secure
  offices and career advancement creates incentive
  for factionalism

39
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• Huang Jing 2000
• Factionalism is the reason, not the consequence
  of power struggles
• Policy choices manipulated for factional
  interests, not the other way around
• Bureaucratic interests may coincide with
  factionalist interests, but factionalism (power
  considerations, interests of factional guanxi
  networks) are independent from bureaucratic
  interests

40
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• A dictatorial one-party system is conducive to
  factionalism for 4 reasons
• Power is wielded through and by individual
  leaders in strictly hierarchical organisation
• The party-state monopolizes all channels of
  communication and interest articulation
• Formal decision making procedures exist, but
  rules are not binding to leaders (weak
  institutions)
• Role of the army has been historically speaking
  strong in Chinese politics

41
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• Factions serve certain functions to their members
• They are exclusive channels of communication and
  information
• They make interest articulation and aggregation
  possible
• They serve as command structures

42
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• Factions and policy making
• There can be genuine policy disagreements between
  factions, but usually cadre politics (i.e.
  competition over leadership positions) is the key
  issue in factional infightings
• In Chinese politics policies are carried out not
  only through decrees, but, as importantly,
  through right persons in key positions
• Impossible to separate policy issues from cadre
  politics in factional struggles

43
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• Guanxi is the decisive factor in cadre politics
• Leaders build their networks on personal
  relations
• Dismantling opponents guanxi networks also
  important
• As noted, all leading cadres are nominated (not
  elected) to their positions from above
• Some formal rules and criteria apply, but
  political consideration is the decisive factor
• Appointments bring factional relations to the open

44
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• Formal decision making structures, institutions,
  are damaging to factionalism
• In policy process factionalism can create
  instability
• Especially if there is imbalance in factional
  strengths
• It also creates inconsistency factional leaders
  can oppose policies they would support on
  ideological grounds and vice versa

45
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• Totalitarianism and factionalism?
• Lieberthal (1995) China is ruled under
  fragmented authoritarianism
• China is ruled through centralized authoritarian
  political system, but the complexities of the
  party-state bureaucratic structure fragment
  actual power to many layers and separate
  organisations
• Deficiencies of communication and scarcity of
  reliable information add to this

46
INTRODUCTION FACTIONALISM

• Totalitarianism refers to the state-society
  relations, not the internal working of
  party-state, which can be fragmented and
  competitive, but still totalitarian
• Bottlenecks and stalemates of decision making
  usual in such a political system and call for
  factionalism
• Going through back-door, not through formal
  channels becomes a tempting option
• Strong leaders required to informally solve
  bureaucratic squabbles

47
INTRODUCTION CONCLUSION

• - Factions belong to all party systems, but under
  an one-party system they can destabilise the
  national (party) leadership that supposedly
  functions as a collective
• In Chinese history since 1949 factional conflicts
  have been many times solved not through
  compromise, but purges (especially under Mao
  Zedong)
• Occasionally the Party has even been on the verge
  of collapse due to factionalist infighting (the
  Cultural Revolution 1966-1976, 1989)

48
INTRODUCTION CONCLUSION

• Chinese contemporary history demonstrates how
  factionalist struggles in the Party leadership
  have also been over political lines
• Have set the pulse of Chinese politics
• In a totalitarian setting, social transformation
  has followed Party decisions
• Next lecture introduces politics of reform and
  then we move on to their consequences